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UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA 



Forty Years of German- American 
Political Relations 



BY 
JEANNETTE KEIM 



A THESIS 

PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL 

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR 

THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY 



PHILADELPHIA 

PRINTED BY WILLIAM J. DORNAN 

1919 






M^ 



Copyright 

JEANNETTE KEIM 

1919 



GHft 

University 



.1 ^ _ ! ^ M '0 



^•» 



PREFACE 



The study covered by this thesis was begun in the autumn of 
1916 and was undertaken for the purpose of discovering the general 
character of the relationship between the United States and Ger- 
many after both nations had become world powers, but before 
events occurred leading immediately to the great war. Covering 
so long a period, I have confined my study fairly closely to the 
field of government publications and to autobiography. The 
nature of the subject, the recent character of the material and the 
conditions of the times have prevented access to the manuscript 
archives of either government. Therefore the only unpublished 
materials available were the very interesting Bancroft and Davis 
manuscripts dealing with the 1870 period. I have found, however, 
such an abundance of material in the published sources mentioned, 
that I feel justified in tracing from it the following conclusions: 

First : The general relationship between the two countries shows 
three main periods of development: There was the early period, 
comprising approximately the first decade after the founding of 
the Empire, in which the relations were spontaneously cordial. 
This was followed by a period of friction developed partly by the 
increasing economic rivalry of the two countries, but mostly by 
the development in Germany of an aggressive expansion system, 
and characterized by an indifference on the part of the German 
Government toward the eftect of that policy upon the United 
States. The third period, comprising the decade following the 
Spanish-American war, shows a status again of generally good 
relations, created in part by the solution of certain outstanding 
controversies and in part by the deliberate policy of the German 
Government to cultivate in the interests of the empire the friend- 
ship of the United States. The expansion policy progressed 
steadily, but it took into account the factor of the United States. 



IV PREFACE 

Second: The commercial controversies between the two coun- 
tries centered chiefly in their contrasting interpretations of the 
"most-favored-nation" principle as expressed in the Prussian 
Treaty of 1828. The United States correctly maintained that the 
treaty stipulated clearly for a basis of reciprocity, and the American 
Government acted uniformly upon this principle thi'oughout the 
negotiations. Germany, ignoring the equivalence clause of the 
treaty, incorrectly clauned unconditional "most-favored-nation" 
treatment and did not itself throughout this period act uniformly 
upon that principle. The German Government, however, ulti- 
mately adopted the interpretation of the United States. 

Third: The policies of the two countries toward the natives of 
the lands of their commercial enterprise were in contrast. This 
was shown in the several distant spheres in which the German and 
American commercial interests came in contact with each other, 
particularly in Samoa, in China, and in Venezuela. The German 
Government asserted German interests in these spheres, with 
some deference to the policy of other great powers, but with little 
or no concern for the rights or independence of the natives or of 
the politically weak governments rightfully sovereign there. The 
United States, on the other hand, whether working for the inde- 
pendence of the Samoans, for the integrity of China or for the 
prevention of forcible measures against Venezuela, threw its 
influence constantly in defense of native peoples, their rights to 
self-government and to undisputed possession of their territory. 

jNIaterial for this thesis has been found in the libraries of the 
University of Pennsylvania, in the Public Library of New York 
City and in the Library of Congress in Washington. I am indebted 
to Mr. Paulsitz, of the manuscript division of the New York 
Library, and to the staff of the manuscript division of the Library 
of Congress for their interest and assistance in my work. I am 
especially indebted to Miss Helen S. Crowne, ^Miss Anna AV. Hill, 
INIiss Nellie C. Smith and others of the library staff of the Uni- 
versity of Pennsylvania for their generous help throughout my 
three years' work at the University. I wish, finally, to express to 
"Miss Julia Russell my grateful appreciation of her cordial and 
efficient cooperation as my secretary. 



CONTENTS 



Preface ••' 

CHAPTER I 

Relations between the United States and Germany, 1S70 . . 7 

CHAPTER II 
Treaty Relationship 36 

CHAPTER III 

American Citizens of German Birth — Their Rights in Germany . 51 

CHAPTER IV 
Commercial Relations 64 

CHAPTER V 

Samoa: The United States and Germany in the Pacific . . . 112 

CHAPTER VI 
The Spanish-American War 216 

CHAPTER VII 
Germany and the Open Door in China 244 

CHAPTER VIII 
Germany and the Monroe Doctrine 273 



Bibliography 305 

Appendix . . 319 



ABBEEVIATIONS 



A. & P. Accounts and Papers (British State Papers). 

F. R. Foreign Relations of the United States (U. S. diplomatic 

correspondence with foreign countries). 

V. R. Verhandlungen des Reichstags. 

R. Gbl. Reichs-Gesetzblatt. 

M. Malloy's "Treaties, Conventions, etc." 

Sen. Ex. Doc. Senate Executive Documents. 

House Ex. Doc. House Executive Documents. 

Sen. Misc. Doc. Senate Miscellaneous Documents. 

House Misc. Doc. House Miscellaneous Documents. 

Sen. Rep. Senate Reports. 

House Rep. House Reports. 

R. L. S. Robert Louis Stevenson: "A footnote to history," etc. 



For description of the above works and other sources used see Bibliography. 



FORTY YEARS OF GERMAN-AMERICAN 
POLITICAL RELATIONS 



CHAPTER I 

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND 
GERMANY, 1870 

The newly created German Empire received a cordial welcome 
from the United States. Many factors combined to create in 
the American Republic a feeling of warm sympathy for the 
German people who had just fought a successful war against a 
monarch unpopular in the United States, and who were now 
uniting, like those states, into a federal union. This sympathy 
had a natural basis in the large and steadily increasing population 
of German extraction in the United States,^ and in the personal 
and political intercourse between the two countries which this 
engendered. There was also present the reminiscence of the 
recent American Civil War, during which Prussia, the leading 
state in the new German nation, had been one of the few friends of 
the Union cause in Europe, whereas the most hostile of European 
powers during the American crisis was in 1870 the foe of Germany. 
Such forces, making for friendly relationship, were increased in 
their effect by the pronounced sympathies of the American 
minister to Germany for the country of his residence and his 
earnest personal desire to see cultivated a close friendship between 
the new empire and the United States. 

The American friendliness for Germany was brought out 
during the Franco-Prussian war. In spite of the careful neutral 
stand taken by the government, there was, at the beginning of 
the conflict at least, much unconcealed satisfaction over the 
successes of the German armies. Mr. Davis, Assistant Secretary 

1 Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part 2, p. 956, 41st Congress, 3d Session. 
Senator Sumner reported Bismarck as declaring that— 

"Germany had in the United States her second largest state after Prussia." 



8 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

of State records in his Journal- an incident of a meeting of the 
Cabinet during the early days of the war: 

"While we were talking," he writes, "news was brought in from 
the Associated Press that Weissenbruch had been captured by the 
Prussians after a bloody fight. The defeat of the French did not 
seem to make anyone less cheerful." 

During the same Cabinet meeting President Grant conversed 
with the Assistant Secretary on the relations of the United States 
to the belligerents. He instructed Mr. Davis to inform Mr. 
Berthemy, the French Minister, when the opportunity offered, 
"That it was the intention of the United States Government to 
preserve a strict neutrality in the war, but that he must not be 
surprised if a strong feeling manifested itself among the people 
in favor of the Prussians; that the people had good memories, 
and they remembered that while the Germans sympathized with 
the Union and took its bonds freely during the war the French 
people had manifested no sympathy for the Union but had nego- 
tiated a loan for the Rebels, and the French Government had sent 
an expedition into Mexico which had been construed by the 
people as an act hostile to this country." That the President's 
predictions were verified was attested by Mr. John M. Read, an 
American consular official in Paris, who wrote^ that there was a 
very strong prejudice in that country against Americans on 
account of the sympathy shown by the people of the United States 
for Germany. The French Minister, M. Berthemy, analyzed^ 



2 J. C. B. Davis, Journal, 1870-71 (August 5, 1870). 

3 J. C. B. Davis Mss. 

37 Avenue Austin, 
Paris, August 16, 1870. 
John Meredith Read to Davis: 

". . . Since the war was declared I have been charged with the 
consular affairs of the North German Confederation throughout France and 
as the representative in this particular of the "Prussians" I am not looked 
upon with favor by the masses of the French. There is a very strong preju- 
dice against all Americans on account of the sympathy shown b}^ the people 
of the United States for Germany, and when one adds to this the offense of 
representing in any respect the "Prussians" it does not add to one's safety." 

■* J. C. B. Davis, Journal, September 6, 1870. Also Congressional Globe, 
42d Congress, 2d Session, Part 2, 1871-72, p. 1069. 



AMERICAN SYMPATHIES DURING FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 9 

the American sentiment as divided along party lines, the Demo- 
crats favoring the French and the Republicans sympathizing with 
Germany. The Assistant Secretary of State replied to him 
that he had not himself been aware of such a division; that it was 
his private opinion, however, that the American sentiment was 
personal to the Emperor and his dynasty and not against France 
or the French people. The French Minister could not wonder 
that there should be in the United States such a feeling against 
the Emperor and his government because of their policy during 
the recent American war, when they gave aid to the Rebels by 
permitting loans in Paris to the Confederacy, and in addition to 
this, attempted to establish a monarchy on the southern border 
of the United States. The political division mentioned by the 
French IMinister was also voiced in Congress, Senator Morton, 
of Indiana, declaring it to be a notorious fact that the sympathy 
of the Republican party, as a general thing, was in favor of Ger- 
many and against France, and equally notorious that the sympathy 
of the Democratic party was for France and against Germany. 
Among the reasons for this, he stated, were the liberal sentiments 
of the Germans, which accorded with the principles of the Repub- 
lican party. There was also the feeling that Louis Napoleon, a 
usurper, had overturned a republic and had declared war against 
Germany without adequate and proper cause. 

Sentiments toward the two warring countries found expression 
in a Senate discussion^ over the sending of a relief ship to Europe. 
The joint resolution provided that a naval vessel be authorized to 
carry to Europe "such supplies as may be furnished by the people 
of the United States for the destitute and suffering people of 
France and Germany." This resolution being introduced in 
February, 1871, after the German armies had overrun France, 
one of the Senators, Mr. Howard, of Michigan, declared that he 
did not consider that the Germans were in need of any supplies 
from the United States, and moved to strike out the words "and 



5 Congressional Globe, 1870-71, Part 2, p. 954 ff, 41st Congress, 3d Session, 
February 4, 1871. 



10 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

Germany." This motion called forth prompt opposition and led 
to a discussion of the comparative relations of the United States 
to the two belligerents. Senator Pomeroy, of Kansas, declared 
that though the French were the ancient allies of the United States, 
the Germans were the modern allies, had helped to recruit the 
northern armies with men and had saved the life of the nation. 
Senator Morton, of Indiana, stated that this war was inaugurated 
and brought on by France — that he could sympathize, however, 
with the suffering of the French people, who were in no way 
responsible for it. ]\Ir. Fowler, of Tennessee, took a different 
stand. He said he failed to see any evidence that Germany had 
ever been an ally of the United States or that the country had 
received any particular assistance from Germany during the 
late war, and that since the German Government's raid on the 
people of France after the battle of Sedan he had personally no 
sympathy with it. Senator Stewart, of Nevada, reminded him 
that Germany alone had taken five or six hundred million dollars 
of United States bonds when the country was most in need of 
credit and when those bonds were debarred from the exchange in 
London and from the Bourse in Paris. The Senator from Ten- 
nessee replied that that fact only showed that the Germans had 
made a good business investment, that, moreover, he had never 
seen any effort on the part of the Germans to establish free and 
independent governments, but that they had shown a concen- 
tration of despotic power, while the French people were the 
freest on the continent and had been constantly struggling for 
free institutions. At this juncture Senator Schurz, of ^Missouri, 
rose to the defense of the land of his birth and declared that he 
did not think there were any governments on the face of the 
globe who expressed their sympathy with the cause of the Union 
as straightforwardly and emphatically as the GoAernment of 
Prussia and the German governments generally, and it was the 
same with the German people. ]\Ioreover, in the matter of the 
United States bonds, these were taken by Germany when the 
issue of the war was by no means decided; it was a dangerous 
venture, but they embarked on it because they belie^'ed in the 



^^ 



PRO-GERMAN SYMPATHIES. OF BANCROFT 11 

Republic of the United States, had faith in the great destinies 
of the country, and because their sympathies impelled them to 
risk their interests with the fortunes of the American Government. 
In conclusion of the discussion. Senator Sumner, of Massachusetts, 
acknowledged the equal debt of the United States to both nations. 
After reviewing the services of France at the time of the Revo- 
lution and the permanent obligation arising from it, he con- 
tinued : 

"But is our obligation to Germany less? I cannot forget that 
this great country, fertile in men as in thought, has contributed 
to ours a population numerous and enlightened, by which the 
Republic has been strengthened and our civilization elevated. 
France contributed to national independence, Germany to national 
strength and life. How shall I undertake to determine the 
difference between these two obligations? We owe infinitely to 
France, we owe infinitely to Germany." 

The discussion gave no evidence of a division of sentiment on 
political lines, all the speakers being Republican, but was in 
general illustrative of the prevailing friendly feeling toward the 
German nation at this time. 

An extreme exponent of this attitude was Mr. George Bancroft, 
American INIinister to the North German Union and subsequently 
accredited to the German Empire. His dispatches to Mr. Hamil- 
ton Fish, Secretary of State, and to his own nephew, Mr. J. C. 
Bancroft Davis, then Assistant Secretary of State, are filled with 
sympathy for the German cause in the war, with admiration for 
German character and institutions and with unaffected effort to 
promote a very close political relationship between the new Empire 
and the United States. He considered the war throughout to be 
one of "aggression" and "without a cause"*^ on the part of France, 
and one of self-defense on the part of Germany. When, after the 
series of Prussian victories, which he terms "magnificent," the 

«J. C. B. Davis Mss., Bancroft to Davis, Berlin, September 5, 1870. 
Also Bancroft Mss., No. 136, Berlin, September 21, 1870. See also in J. C. 
B. Davis's Mss. a letter from Henry W. Ryder, American Consul at Chem- 
nitz, to Davis, August 30, 1870. 



12 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

demands against France were presented by Bismarck, Bancroft^ 
reported that these demands were considered throughout neutral 

' Bancroft Mss., No. 136. 

American Legation, 
Berlin, September 21, 1870. 
Sir: 

I am able to report to you on the best authority the views which are 
entertained by the alHed German governments in relation to the conditions 
of peace to be established between themselves and France. The pledges for 
peace contained in the Plebiscite so lately adopted in France have not been 
made good. Events have shown that excitability of the disposition of the 
French nation. The majority of the French Chamber, the Senate, and the 
organs of public opinion through the jjress have demanded a war of conquest 
against Germany so loudly that the isolated friends of peace lost all courage to 
oppose, and the Emperor may have thought himself justified in asserting 
that he had been forced into the war by public opinion. 

In view of these facts the German allied governments cannot find a guaran- 
tee of peace in the disposition of the French people. They must not therefore 
deceive themselves into the belief that there is no reason to expect after this 
peace a speedy renewal of attack. Whatever may be the conditions which 
may be demanded from France, the French nation will never forgive the 
series of defeats which have attended their present war of aggression. Even 
though the Germans were to demand no cession of territory, no indemnity, 
no advantage except the glory of their arms, there would remain the wounded 
self-love of the French people and their hereditary desire of conquests, and 
they would only wait for a day when they might hope to renew the war with 
better success. The forbearance of the German Governments in 1867 was due 
to their desire not to conjure up an era of bitterness and angry passions, but by 
patience and the careful culture of friendly relations between the two nations 
to lay the foundations of an era of peace and reciprocal good-will. As this 
moderation failed of its effect, and as the Germans against all their efforts 
have been compelled to encounter a war of aggression, they regard it hence- 
forward as necessary to look for some securities against the next attack other 
than can be found in the good-will of France. The guarantees which were 
established in 1815 against the same ambition of the French people have lost 
their effect and Germany must now rely on its own strength and its own 
resources. The Germans ought not to be continually exposed to the necessity 
of again making the same exertions which they have done at this time, and 
material securities are therefore needed for their own protection and for the 
preservation of the peace of Europe. These securities are to be demanded 
not from any transient government of France but from the French nation, 
which has shown itself ready, as the history of past centuries proves, to 
follow any government into war and under any government to seek acquisi- 
tions of territory from Germany. In order therefore to establish peace, 
securities must be obtained against the next imminent attack from France 
and that can be found only in the change of the present defenseless l^oundary 
of South Germany, so that the point from which future attacks may emanate 
may be more remote and the fortresses with which France has hitherto threat- 
ened Germany may so far be brought into the power of Germany as to con- 
stitute hereafter defensive bulwarks against invasion. 

The views which I have here detailed to you I know to be those which are 
entertained in the cabinets of the German princes. They also exist in all but 
irresistible strength in the mind of the German people. 

I will add but one remark of my own: A true guarantee for Germany 
against future attacks from France would be the political union of Germany 
itself, and the most earnest negotiations are now pending between N. Ger- 



Bancroft's views on German terms 13 

Europe to be "moderate" and to be necessary securities against 
the "next imminent attack from France." Should Germany 
retire from France, he wrote, ^ leaving boundaries as they were, 
France would soon renew the battle for the Rhine, and as the 

many on the one side, and S. Germany, especially Wiirtemburg and Bavaria, 
on the other, for the accompUshment of that object. Germany, being united, 
will have nothing to fear from France on the one side, or Russia on the other. 

Bancroft Mss., No. 145. 

American Legation, 
Berlin, September 29, 1870. 
Sir: 

On the 24th of this month I sent you the following telegram: 

Fish, Secretary, Washington, District Columbia, 

"Bismarck offered Favre truce. Conditions: Convention to be called; 
Germany to hold Strasburg, Verdun, Toul. Yesterday Favre rejected offer. 

Bancroft." 

"The account conveyed in the telegram is authentic. In the opinion of 
Europe the terms offered were moderate. The statement that the Germans 
demanded Mount Valerien is a misrepresentation. Now, the fall of Toul 
has been followed by the momentous event of the surrender of Strasburg 
just 189 years after the day on which it was seized by Louis XIV. Seventy 
thousand troops are thus set free to invade southwestern France; the left 
wing to touch Lyons. The effects of the surrender on the war are immense. I 
cannot represent to you strongly enough the fixedness of the purpose of 
Germany to retain Strasburg and with it Alsace as a part of Germany. All 
Germany demands it from a patriotic national feeling, S. Germany as a 
neqessary defense. The acquisition of this territory proves the strongest 
incentive to the S. Germans to form themselves into one empire with the 
N. Germans, for Alsace is the bulwark of S. western Germany and the trans- 
rhinane possessions of Bavaria leave her no option but to overcome her 
jealousy of Prussia and assist in forming a united Germany. . . ." 

^ J. C. B. Davis Mss., Bancroft to Davis. 

Berlin, October 12, 1870. 

( _-) 

"This government disclaims utterly any desire for territory as such, and 
wishes for no acquisition for Prussia; the change of boundary is the demand 
of the military as a line of defense. Were Germany to retire from France 
now, leaving boundaries and fortresses as they were, France would soon renew 
the battle for the Rhine. The day will inevitably come when Belgium will 
be annexed to France, and then the German-Rhenish provinces would be 
exposed to the most imminent danger. To guard against it, Germany 
demands Strasburg, a demand which is now in Europe not censured as extrava- 
gant; Germany demands also Metz, and on that the European mind is more 
divided. These demands are made primarily in the interests of South Ger- 
many, whose princes formerly constituted the Rheinbund of Napoleon, and 
have held their lands on sufferance. France holding Strasburg could at 
any time march to Munich. This sense of danger is controlling, and you 
may set it down as fixed and resolved upon to hold at the peace both Metz 
and Strasburg. On the right of demand I give no opinion ; but peace depends 
on its being comphed with." 



14 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

day would come when Belgium would be annexed to France, the 
German Rhenish province would be exposed to imminent danger. 
To prevent this Germany was demanding Strasburg, and this 
demand was not censured in Europe as extravagant. With 
regard to the demand for Metz, opinion was divided, and while 
not expressing his own opinion on the right of this demand, the 
minister asserted that peace depended on its being complied with. 
"P'inally," he wrote, "I will not withhold my opinion that the 
German armies are now engaged in a war not only for the peace, 
independence and union of Germany, but also for the best inter- 
ests of civilization, of civil and religious liberty and of popular 
freedom." ^ 

Holding such a viewpoint toward the two belligerents, it is not 
surprising to find the American minister hoping for some evidence 
of similar feelings on the part of his home government. In Sep- 
tember, 1870, Mr. Bancroft^° wrote in confidence to his nephew, 
INIr. Davis, that he had been hoping to see from Mr. Fish " some 
good strong word expressing a complaint of a declaration of war 
so injurious to commerce and without a cause," or if this could not 



» Bancroft Mss., No. 121 (to Secretary of State Fish). 

'° J. C. B. Davis Mss., Geo. Bancroft to Davis. (Secret and confidential.) 

" Dear John: 

I have been hoping to see from Mr. Fish some good strong word, not 
Adolating neutrality, but perhaps expressing a complaint of a declaration 
of war so injurious to commerce without a cause, and if that cannot be, then 
what all Europe and all neutral governments would respond to, an energetic 
remonstrance against the needless cruelties exercised toward the Germans 
domiciled in France, a most numerous, a most industrious, wealthy, orderly, 
peace-loving, cultivated people. A good letter expressing sympathy with 
the Germans would have a most important effect and perhaps in our elections 
carry them in November. I am certain it is best, i. e., right in itself and politic 
for the Government, in some way to mark strongly a sympathy with the 
Germans. 

Another consideration not so free from doubt presents itself. The neutral 
European powers will, when the negotiations for peace begin, attempt to 
exercise a pressure adverse to the Germans. The question ai'ises whether 
we could, and if we can, whether we should, exercise a counter-pressure, so 
as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively by the two nationalities, 
German and French, without meddlesome intervention from powers that 
like ourselves profess neutrahty. I do not presume to offer an opinion on 
this subject, only to call attention to an aspect of the negotiations which is 
very likely to arise. 

I am ever affectionately yours, 

Geo. Bancroft." 



EFFORTS TO SECURE ACTION IN FAVOR OF GERMANY 15 

be, then at least "an energetic remonstrance against the needless 
cruelties toward the Germans domiciled in France." Such a 
letter expressing sympathy with these Germans would, he declared, 
have an important effect and perhaps carry the home elections in 
November. He considered it both right in itself and politic for 
the United States Government " in some way to mark strongly a 
sympathy with the Germans." Moreover, in regard to the future, 
he hoped that if the neutral European powers should attempt to 
exercise during the peace negotiations " a pressure adverse to the 
Germans," that the United States would "exercise a counter- 
pressure, so as to leave the matter to be settled exclusively by the 
two nationalities, German and French." 

In reply the Assistant Secretary summed up" the general attitude 

1' J. C. B. Davis Mss (to Bancroft, reply to September 5 letter from B.). 

Washington, September 23, 1870. 
"My Dear Uncle: 

I don't see how Mr. Fish could have well done more than he did do to 
manifest our individual sympathy for the German cause in this war. There 
was throughout the country a deep-seated feeling in their favor until it was 
believed they showed a determination to prolong the war for the sake of 
acquiring territory inhabited by a population that does not wish to come 
under their sway. When the pubhc got this idea, which may or may not 
have been correct, they ceased to feel the intense sjanpathy which they had 
previously exhibited, and an attempt by the administration to interfere in 
any way in their favor, or to swerve from a rigid neutrality, would have been 
resented by the good sense of America. 

We have not received here any evidence of needless cruelties toward the 
Germans in the execution of the decree of expulsion. Washburne has made no 
complaint. The decree itself may have been harsh and uncalled for, but 
it seems to have been a military measui'e, entirely within the discretion of 
the French military authorities. Sherman did the same thing at Atlanta — so 
that we are the last people who could complain of the principle. 

There has been a stuched and persistent pressure from the German Legation 
since the beginning of the war to force us into an attitude toward France 
inconsistent with our neutrality. Baron Gerolt has spared no effort to entrap 
me into improper positions. He tried to make me protest against the expul- 
sion of the Germans. What right had we to protest in an affair which did 
not concern us until we were asked by the North German government to be 
their mouthpiece — which they have never done. He grew angry when I 
told him of open violations of the neutrality laws by his consul in New York, 
and refused at first to take any warning. And he had several times pressed 
similar questions upon me in a way that has obhged me to be almost harsh 
with the old gentleman. What he has done to Mr. Fish I cannot say. In 
spite of all this, we have always construed, and without giving France cause 
of offense, that the sympathies of the Administration are with Germany. 
I think I may safely say that the whole country is satisfied with the course 
Mr. Fish has pursued in this matter. 

As to intervention on our part , I do not think that it will take place without 
the previous consent of l)oth parties — nor will it take place then by any 
prospect if it is to be done jointly with other powers." 



16 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

of the American people and the administration toward Germany. 
He stated that there was a deep-seated feehng throughout the 
country in favor of the Germans until they sought to prolong the 
w ar, in order to acquire territory inhabitated by a people who did 
not wish to come under their rule/^ after the American public had 
received the impression that this was being done, there was less 
sympathy for Germany, and " an attempt by the administration to 
interfere in any way" in favor of the Germans or "to SAver\'e from 
a rigid neutrality would have been resented by the good sense 
of America." Mr. Davis set forth the difficulties encountered 
in maintaining that rigid neutrality. Baron Gerolt, the German 
INIinister, he wrote, spared no effort to entrap him into improper 
positions, seeking to have the Government protest against the 
expulsion of German civilians from France. While that expulsion 
decree may have been harsh and uncalled for, it seemed to him to 
be a military measure within the discretion of the French military 
authorities. Moreover, he had had to complain to the German 
minister of the open violation of the American neutrality law by 
the German consul in New York, who had been assisting German 
officers to return to the army.^^ In spite of such actions he had 

12 J. c. B. Davis Journal, August 29, 1870. 

" Baron Gerolt said he had called in consequence of information received 
through the Associated Press that England, Russia and Austria intended 
intervening in the war to make peace, to ask what would be the public feeling 
in the country in regard to such an intervention — that those powers natur- 
ally looked with jealousy on the increase of German influence and power 
and would oppose an increase of territory. He added that he was induced 
to make the request because I had told him at my house that the people of 
this country would not look favorably on the conquest of Alsace and Lorraine. 

I replied that what I had said to him I had said privately as one gentleman 
to another in my own house; and that I had no objection to repeat in the 
same way that it was my inchvidual opinion that the demand of territory 
would prolong the war and in that way would not be favoral^ly regarded by 
the people of the United States — but that officially I had only to say to him 
that wliile the United States do not permit European intervention in the 
affairs of their continent, they did not on the other hand intervene in European 
affairs." ' 

1' J. C. B. Davis Mss., 1870-71. 

AuGXTST 1, 1870. 

"The Baron responded at once to my note. I told him that I had taken 
the liberty to ask him to call at the Department because 1 had seen in the 
newspapers and heard otherwise that Mr. Roessing, the North German 



CAREFUL NEUTRALITY OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 17 

always construed, " and without giving France cause of offense, 
that the sympathies of the administration were with Germany." 
In reference to intervention, ]\Ir. Davis asserted that such would 
hardly take place without the consent of both belligerents, and 
not at all if it required joint* action with other powers. 

The claims of the German Minister and of Bancroft that the 
United States should issue a protest against the expulsion of 
German civilians from France were based on the function, which 
had been assumed by the American Government, of acting as 
protector in France of all citizens of the North German Union. ■"* V 
This immense work was in the hands of Mr. E. B. Washburne, "^ 
United States Ambassador to Paris. In addition to other services, 
he distributed among needy Germans the funds forwarded to him 



Consul at New York, was receiving persons at the consulate and furnishing 
them with the means of returning to Germany to take part in the war, and 
that I thought it due to the Baron as a friendly act, to say that if that was 
so he had better be cautioned, as this Government intended to preserve and 
enforce its neutraUty in this contest. The Baron answered quite testily, 
that Mr. Roessing had done nothing to violate our laws — that over 600 
people had apphecl to him for means to go back, but that he had refused all 
except persons who had left Germany under written obligations to return 
in case of war and serve out their term in the army — that there were a dozen 
or sixteen of such persons to whom he had loaned money to pay their expenses 
back to enat)le them to go into the army — that such persons were not citizens 
of the United States — that we had no claim upon them — that they were bound 
to go back — that they were now in the Prussian army — that if they did not 
go back they would be deserters — ^that Mr. Roessing in assisting them did 
not violate the law — ^that in what he had done he had acted with the sanction 
of the Baron-^and that they would return individually and not in squads. 
I got the statute and pointed out to the Baron that it was an offense to assist 
(?) a person within the jurisdiction of the United States to go beyond their 
limits with intent to enter in the service of a foreign prince, as a soldier, marine 
or seaman, and I told him that I was afraid that Air. Roessing would be 
held by our courts to have already violated that law, and I thought it l)ut a 
friendly act to caution him. The Baron rephed that it could not be so. 
Mr. Roessing had violated no law of the United States — no court would 
hold so — and proceedings could be commenced against him to test it if we 
thought he had done wrong. Seeing the temper he was in I contented myself 
with saying that I had given him notice and he must exercise his own judgment 
as to what he would do. . . ." 

1^ Bancroft Mss. No. 121 (to Secretary of State Fish). 

Mr. Bancroft wrote that England having taken over the protection of the 
French in Germany would have gladly undertaken to help matters, even the 
protection of Germans in France. Bismarck, however, "refused to allow 
this and by turning over the office to our government, called the United 
States visibly into the circle of first class poXvers." 



IS RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

by the Prussian Government. ]\Ir. Washburne at one time wrote 
to Bismarck that he was giving assistance to twenty-nine hundred 
Germans. ^^ His efficient services in this capacity, while satis- 
factory to France, won the praise of Bismarck and the German 
Emperor^^ and contributed effectively to the good feeling in 
Germany toward the United States. At the time of the French 
order of expulsion of the North Germans from France, jNIr. Wash- 
burne, acting under private instructions from the State Depart- 
ment, ]:>resented to the Duke of Gramont an appeal," "in the name 

15 Hepner, Adolf: "America's Aid to Germany in 1870-71," No. 123. 
Mr. Washburne to Count Bismarck, Paris, March 3, 1871. 
1^ Ibid., No. 154, Prince Bismarck to Mr. Washburne: 

Berlin, June 13, 1871. 
. . . "His Majesty has commanded me to convey to your Excellency 
his grateful recognition of the zeal and kindness you have devoted to the 
interests of the German residents under circumstances of extraordinary 
difficulty, and with corresponding sacrifice of time and personal comfort. 
I beg to add the reiterated expression of the sense of obligation I shall ever 
preserve for the uniform promptness and courtesy I have experienced from 
you in a business connection of nearly a twelvemonth's duration. 

With sentiments of the highest consideration, I have the honor to be 

Your Excellency's obedient servant 

Bismarck. 

Also Bancroft Mss. No. 126, Bancroft to Fish, Berlin, August 22, 1870. 
Also Congr. Globe, 42nd Congress, 2nd Session, Part III, p. 2456. 
Cameron (of Pennsylvania), April 16, 1872. 

"I ask leave to introduce a joint resolution, and in introducing it, I desire 
to say a single word. The Emperor of Germany, wishing to manifest his 
gratitude to ministers and consuls of the United States in France, is desirous 
of paying them some substantial compliment, but that cannot be done with- 
out tiie permission of Congress. I, tlierefore, offer a joint resolution on the 
subject for the purpose of having it referred to the Committee on Foreign 
Relations. 

There being no objection, leave was granted to introduce a joint resolution 
(S. R., No. 6) permitting certain cUplomatic and consular officials of the 
United States in France to accept testimonials from the Emperor of Germany 
for their friendly services to the su1)jects of the Emperor during the war 
between France and Germany; which was read twice by its title, referred to 
the Committee on Foreign Relations, and ordered to be printed." 

1^ For Washburne's protest to Gramont against Expulsion Order of North 
Germans from France see Correspondence of E. B. Washburne, Franco- 
German War and Insurrection of the Commune. Washington Gov. Print. 
Office, 1878, No. 44. Washburne to Fish, August 22, 1870, pp. 40 ff. 

"I said (to Gramont) further that in carrying out the wishes and instruc- 
tions of 'my Government, I wished in the name of humanity to make an 



REMONSTRANCE AGAINST EXPULSION OF GERMANS 19 

of humanity," to revoke the order, or if that were not possible to 
so modify it as to permit the larger class of Germans in Paris to 
remain, whose conduct could give no possible cause of complaint to 
the French Government," Secretary of State Fish directed^* 
Assistant Secretary Davis to instruct Mr. Washburne to do what 
he could consistently with public law and w^th the United States' 
position as a neutral to mitigate the severity of the recent French 
order. Mr. Fish considers that, the measure being within the 
recognized rights of a belligerent, the United States could not 
"protest" but might "remonstrate" and "use good offices." Mr. 
Davis informed Baron Gerolt of jMr. Washburne 's remonstrance 
and the German ^Minister wished to have the action of the United 
States made public. This, however, the Secretary, in the interests 
of neutrality, refused to do.^^ 

earnest appeal to the French Government, through him, to revoke the order 
if it should be considered possible; and if that could not be done to so modify 
it as to permit the large class of Germans in Paris to remain whose conduct 
could give no possible cause for complaint to the French Government." 

Formal note August 17, 1870, Enclosure 2 m. No. 44, p. 46. 

"Under these circumstances therefore, I feel that I should fail 
to discharge the full measure of the duty devolving upon me in this regard, 
and that I should be forgetful of the ol)ligations of humanity did I not make 
the strongest appeal to the government of his Majesty, through your Excel- 
lency, to further consider this question and to ask that if it be not possible 
to suspend action altogether, that there may be at least some modification 
of the measures already taken so as to permit such subjects of the belligerent 
powers as are under my protection, who are now in France, to remain in the 
country so long as their conduct shall give no cause of complaint, and further 
to ask for them that protection which the law of nations accords to unarmed 
enemies. In making this appeal I but obey the wishes of my Government, 
which has instructed me to do everything which is consistent with the posi- 
tion of my country as a neutral, and with the law of nations to alleviate the 
condition of things now existing as regards these people with whose protection 
I have been charged." 

1* J. C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis, Garrisons, Tuesday 
morning, August 16, 1870. 

1^ Upon the Baron's insisting, Assistant Secretary Davis informed him 
that he could not permit any foreign minister to advise the department as to 
the arrangement of its affairs and that it was for the United States Govern- 
ment to decide whether it would or would not make public its acts. 

J. C. B. Davis Journal, August 13, 1870. 

"Received this morning a telegram from Washburne that Germans were 
ordered to quit France — that many were poor, without means to go — that 
great suffering might result and that he wished to know if the Prussian Govern- 



20 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

A factor holding possibilities ad^'erse to the friendly relationship 
between the United States and Germany at this time was the sale 



ment would place means at his control to pay for their passage. Sent at 
once a copy to Mr. Bancroft and to Baron Gerolt. The Baron called to 
know what we intended to do. I answered that we had communicated the 
information to Bancroft, and that it was for the Prussian Government, not 
for us, to now decide what sliould be done. He said, "Will you not instruct 
Mr. Washburne to i:)rotest against this? It is an act of cruelty the like of 
which has not been perpetrated for over three hundred years. There are 
over two hundred thousand Germans in Paris, most of them poor operatives, 
and the suffering will be incredible. This must be the act of a mob. It 
cannot be the act of the French Government." I answered that Mr. Wash- 
burne had already protested — that three weeks ago the Due de Gramont 
had given notice that it might become necessary to take such a step and 
that Mr. Washburne had written a long and able paper trying to prevent it, 
and that his course meets with the approbation of the department. I added 
they have the right to do this, cruel as it may be, and having decided to do 
it, after full representations from this government of reasons why it should not 
be done, it is for Prussia to decide whether she will or will not provide the 
means for moving these unfortunate men. He said the thing was cruel and 
wrong, and that at least the department ought to make public what had been 
-done. I answered that it was for this government to judge whether it would 
or would not make public its acts, that in case it seemed to me proper that 
we should not publish what we had done — whatever were our individual sym- 
pathies, whether with France or Germany, we intended to maintain a strict 
neutrality and would do no act which could be construed by either party as 
done in the interest of the other. He showing a purpose to continue the 
discussion, I said I would not permit any foreign minister to advise us as 
to the management of the internal affairs of this department." 

The whole State Department seems to have had its trials with the German 
minister, Baron Gerolt, who apparently was retained because of having been 
so long in the service. Mr. Bancroft wrote that at the least suggestion 
from the Department the German Chancellor would recall him. 

See J. C. B.' Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis, October 12, 1870. 

"As to the manner and matter of Gerolt, he would be chsavowed here. 
I have privately requested a friend of his to give him a warning, but he is 
too weak and too dull to be teachable; were I to speak to the government, 
Bismarck, who cannot endure his imbecility, would insist immediately on his 
recall. So a word, a half word, or a whisper, and the good old man will be 
left with leisure to prepare for a better world. I would get him reproved, but 
Bismarck would mark the sincerity of the reproof by removing liim. Perhaps 
this had better be done. With France re])resented by an able man like 
Berthemy or Paradet, Germany should no longer be represented bj' a broken 
down old man who in his best years was not the wisest of mankind." 

J . C. B. Davis Mss. Hamilton Fish to Davis, Washington, October 13, 1870. 

"This is Thursday — "Dip. day." I am in momentary apprehension of 
the apparition of Gerolt with his pocket full of papers covered with German 
text — uncertain which is the paper he wshes to let off at me, and when he 
has made several mistaken selections and has appealed to me to know what 
it was he came to say, the good little old man at last ma}' remember that he 
has been instructed to bring to my notice the shipment in French steamers 
of guns packed 'in original cases' having the name of the U. S., etc., etc. In 



PROBLEM OF AMERICAN MEDIATION 25 

authorized to state that the German Government desired "to hold 
the same poHcy with the United States in its deahngs with China 
and Japan and would always be found ready to develop that policy 
which the common interest and sense of justice of the two nations 
had initiated." 

With the proclamation of the republic in France and its prompt 
recognition by the United States^^ there was presented the problem 
of the United States' mediation between the two belligerents, A 
request that the United States join the other powers in intervention 
for the purpose of peace was presented by the French Minister of 
Foreign Aft'airs immediately on receiving the news of the United 
States' recognition of the new republic. The proposal for joint 
action was at once rejected''- as being contrary to a uniform 

caution which you desired to exercise in the Chinese seas and the grounds of 
it. In reply I have received repeated hearty assurances of the wish of this 
Government to go hand in hand with the United States in its Eastern Asiatic 
policy. It accepted unconditionally every suggestion made by you. . . ." 

Bancroft Mss No. 99. Bancroft to Fish. 

American Legation, 

Berlin, June 9, 1870. 
"Sir: 

Today I am able to reply to your No. 192 of April 18, '70, in relation to 
the systematic persecution of the native Christians by the authorities of 
Japan. The protocols of the conferences of the representatives of the treaty 
powers were duly communicated to the cabinet of Berlin. This Government 
is sincei'ely disposed to move in concert with the U. S. It has therefore 
instructed its representatives in Japan to act in harmony with his colleagues, 
especially with the representative of the U. S. The instructions direct him 
for the present at least not to employ force and not to make any menace of 
an intention to employ force, l>ut if by any necessity armed force should be 
employed by the U. S. and North Germany for any other imperative reason, 
it might then become not imi)roi:)er to take advantage of the situation to 
speak with more energy for the protection of the Christians in the Japanese 
Empire. This Government will be willing to issue to its own representatives 
instructions analogous to yours. 

I am authorized to add as a general rule this Government desires to hold 
the same poUcj' with the U. S. in its dealings with China and Japan and will 
always he found ready to develop that policy which the common interest and 
sense of justice of the two nations have initiated. 
I remain, Sir, 
. Yours sincerely, 

(signed) Geo. Bancroft. 
31 F. R., 1870, pp. Ill, 116 and 117. 

3- J. C. B. Davis Journal. 

Septemher 8, 1870. 

"The President called at 11 o'clock. I told him that Washburne had 
recognized the new government in Paris and that Favre had expressed pro- 
found emotion. I read the dispatch stating that France desired me to join 
the other powers in efforts for peace. He said that his impressions were 
against that. I said that mine were, too, and that in no event would I make 
a joint effort, to which he assented. . . ." 



20 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

foreign policy of the United States, but ■Mr. Bancroft was in- 
structed^^ to ascertain whether Germany desired to have the good 
offices of the United States interposed. The American minister 
advised emphatically against intervention'^' in any form, on the 
ground that it would be rejected by Germany and therefore prove 
embarrassing to the American Government and of no benefit to 
any other. In fuller explanation of his cabled message, Mr. 
Bancroft set forth in two despatches'-^ further reasons why the 



33 F. R., 1870, p. 193. 
No. 142. 

Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft (telegram). 

Dep.\rtment of State, 

September 9, 1870. 
"Washburne telegraphs that France requests United States to join other 
powers in effort for peace. Uniform pohcy and true interest of United States 
not to join European powers in interference in European questions. President 
strongly desires to see war arrested and blessings of peace restored. If 
Germany also desires to have good offices of United States interposed, President 
will be glad to contribute all aid in his power to secure restoration of peace 
between the two great powers now at war, and with whom United States has 
so many traditions of friendship. Ascertain if North Germany desires such 
offices, but without making the tender thereof unless assured they will be 
accepted." 

Fish. 

34 F. R., 1870, p. 206, No. 160. 

Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish (cable telegram). 

Berlin, September 11, 1870. 

(Received September 11.) 
"No time now for America to intervene. Germany rejects all foreign 
interference. Every other power holds back. America would stand alone 
and unable to accomplish anything. Our interest, dignity require us for the 
present to stand aloof." 

Bancroft. 

35 Bancroft Mss. Nos. 132 and 133. 

No. 132. 

American Leg.\tion, Berlin, 
September 12, 1870. 

''Nothing can be more easy than to give an answer to your inquiries by 
telegram. In the first place, no power of Europe has as yet made any effort at 
mediation or intervention or interference for the restoration of peace lietween 
Germany and France; and therefore there are no powers which the United 
States could join. Secondly, at the time when France meditated the unpro- 
voked declaration of war, neither a European power nor the United States 
interposed their influence to prevent the w^ar of aggression and conquest. 
It is therefore the unanimous opinion of Germany, expressed in the most 
solemn manner by addresses from its considerable cities, that Germany and 
France should, without foreign interposition, be left to themselves to settle 
the peace. The German Government have not formally given their adhesion 
to these addresses, but I have no doubt that they suljstantially express their 
policy. I give it as my undoubting opinion, that the interposition of the 



Bancroft's opposition to American mediation 27 

United States should undertake no action at that time between 
the warring powers. When France meditated, said Bancroft, 
"the unprovoked declaration of war, neither a European power 
nor the United States had interposed their influence to prevent the 
war of aggression and conquest." It was therefore the opinion 
throughout Germany that the two nations should be left to them- 
selves to settle the peace. Moreover, if the various European 
powers should "combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either 

Uni.ted States as a mediating power would, at the present time prove 
embarrassing to our own Government and of no benefit to any other." 

No. 133. 

American Legation, Berlin, 
September 12, 1870. 
"Sir: 

In further reply to your telegram received on the tenth, it may be said 
that many reasons exist why the American Government should as yet adhere 
strictly to its traditional policy with regard to foreign affairs. Should the 
European powers combine to exercise a pressure unjustly on either of the 
belligerents the question might arise whether the United States might not 
properly exercise a counter-influence on the side of right. Even in this con- 
tingency there would still be room for doubt. As things stand at present, I 
think tile United States cannot interfere in any manner consistent with its 
dignity. 

We all as Americans are ready to welcome the restoration of the republic 
in France, and to desire for it a chance for free development. I certainly 
wish to see it established as the permanent form! The strength of our repub- 
lican syinjjathies formally expressed l)y our highest representative in France 
might in the eyes of many unfit us for the strict impartiality of a mediator. 

A great difficulty presents itself at the threshold in the want of a recog- 
nized government in France. We acknowledge that which has just been 
constituted at the Hotel de Ville but more than half of Europe has not done 
so. Germany has not done so. The United States would therefore appear 
in the attitude of deciding for Europe and for one of the beUigerents the 
question as to the valid government of France. In about three weeks France 
has seen three ministers succeed each other. We may believe in the perma- 
nence of the present ministry, Isut a large part of Europe will hardly do so. 
It is uncertain if the people of France would consider themselves liound by 
a peace ^vliich the present government should form. There are many who 
insist that according to legal iforms the regency has not Ijeen properly deposed 
and that the new ministry has not yet received the sanction of a popular vote 
or a politic constituent assemljly. 

To those who reason in that way General Trochu is the only authorized 
agent of the government. For he had the sanction of the two chambers of 
the regency and also of the gathering at the Hotel de Ville. 

Further the United States would be emliarrassed in any attempt to suggest 
just and proper conditions of peace. . . . The demands of moral support 
on the side of France would necessarily be very exacting, so that the attempt 
to befriend might end in the deep and permanent dissatisfaction of the party 
that asked to be befriended. The Germans are bent on the reannexation 
of Alsace and German Lorraine. This is a point on which the United States 
Government might prefer not to give advice." 



28 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

of the belligerents the question might arise whether the United 
States might not properly exercise a counter-influence on the side 
of right. "^^ There was also the difficulty of determining whether 
the present ministry in France, though recognized by the United 
States, was a permanent one. Furthermore, "the United States 
would be embarrassed in any attempt to suggest just and proper 
conditions of peace." The Germans were bent on the "reannex- 
ation of Alsace and German Lorraine," and this was a question 
"on which the United States might prefer not to give advice." 
From the various reasons set forth by ]\Ir. Bancroft, it is evident 
that the American ^Minister did not wish the United States to be a 
party to any movement that would rob Germany of the fruits of 
victory." These reasons set forth by Mr. Bancroft were acknowl- 
edged shortly afterward by the Secretary of State''* to be " among 

'^ J. C. B. Davis Mss. Bancroft to Davis. September 5, 1870. 
There is little difficulty in determining the belligerent referred to by "the 
side of right." (See confidential letter to Davis, quoted in footnote 10.) 
" Carl Schurz: "Speeches," etc., vol. I, p. 519 ff. 
This viewpoint was also held by Senator Schurz. 
Letter from Carl Schurz to Hamilton Fish, Sec'y of State. 

St. Louis, 
September 10, 1870. 

"The telegraph informs me that the President has signified to the Prussian 
Government his willingness to serve as a mediator between the belligerents 
in Europe. Judging from the tone of the German press and all the indications 
which float on the surface, there seems to be but little probability that the 
offer will be accepted. I am glad you chsclaimed at the same time any inten- 
tion on the part of the LTnited States to take part in any comljination of 
neutral Powers for the purpose of bringing about a settlement of the conflict. 
From a purely American point of view I think it \\ill be the best policy for 
us to let the denouement of that war take care of itself. As to giving an 
expression of our moral sympathy with the Republic as such^— and in France 
it exists only in name — Mr. Washburne has devoted himself to that in his 
own way. I fear he has created hopes which will be doomed to disappoint- 
ment; the men who have undertaken to revive the traditions of 1792 — an 
impossible task under existing circumstances — will be apt to catch at straws 
and then abuse other people for leaving them in the lurch, because the straws 
are not timbers." 

38 F. R., 1870, p. 194, No. 146. 
Mr. Fish to Mr. Bancroft. 

Department of St.\te, 
Washington, September ,30, 1870. 
No. 246. 
"Sir: Your dispatch No. 13.3, of the 12th instant, has been received. 

The reasons which you present against an American intervention between 
France and Germany are substantially among the considerations, which 



SIMILARITY OF GERMAN AND AMERICAN FEDERATIONS 29 

the considerations which determined the President" in the policy 
of "rejecting all idea of mediation unless upon the joint reciuest 
of both of the warring powers." 

A further important factor creating 'in the United States a 
marked friendliness toward the new German Empire was the 
prevailing belief that that Empire represented really a confeder- 
ation, the United States of Germany, and that the German people 
were going through a unification process very similar to that of 
the original American States. It was the conviction of American 
statesmen that the unification of Germany signified the adoption 
in Europe of the American sj'stem of federation and American 
liberal ideas of representative government. The outcome of the 
American civil war was held to have demonstrated the success of 
a republican form of government and to have therefore influenced 
the German statesmen to try a similar form. Referring to the 
constitution of the North German Union, Mr. Bancroft asked 
Count Bismarck^'-* whether the striking points of resemblance 

determined the President in the course and policy indicated to you in the 
cable dispatch from this office on the 9th instant, and in rejecting all idea 
of mediation unless upon the joint request of Iwth of the warring powers. 

It continues to be the hope of the President, as it is' the interest of the 
people of this country, that the unhappy war in wliich France and North 
Germany are engaged should find an early end. 

This Government will not express any opinion as to the terms or conditions 
upon which a peace may or should be established between two governments 
equally sharing its friendship, but it is hoped that the prolongation of the 
war may not find its cause either in extreme demands on the one side, or 
extreme sensitiveness on the other side. 

So far as you can consistently and without any official interposition of 
advice or of counsel, it is hoped that you will lose no proper opportunity to 
indicate the wishes and hopes of the President and of the American people 
as above represented, and to contribute what you may to the presentation 
of such terms of peace as befit the greatness and the power which North 
Germany has manifested, and as shall not be humiliating or derogatory to the 
pride of the great people who were our earliest and fast ally 

I am, sir, your obedient servant, 
H.\MiLTON Fish." 

3" Bancroft Mss. (Table conversation with Count Bismarck.) 

Thursday, September 26, 1867. 
"During dinner he was exceedingly courteous directing a word to one and 
another but talking with me more than the rest. I reminded him of the 
strong points of resemblance between our constitution and the constitution 
of the North German Union, and asked him if it was the result of imitation 
or that the same necessity led to the same results. He said 'a little of each.' 
The Bundesrath he regarded as in fact a Chamber. It had the power of pro- 



30 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

between it and the constitution of the United States were the 
result of imitation or whether "the same necessity led to the same 
results," and the Count replied, "a little of each." Later the 
American minister reports^" that in remodelling the constitution 

posing laws, amending them and negativing them. The members of it were 
indeed subject to recall, but then, though they appeared as the representatives 
of various sovereigns, those sovereigns were restrained by their respective 
constitutions, representative assembhes and responsible ministries so that 
there was none of them likelj- to send a delegate who should not substantially 
represent the opinion of the state to which he belonged." 

« Bancroft Mss. No. 152. 

American Legation, 
Berlin, October 17, 1870. 

"Sir: 

There is much discussion of the constitution best adapted to United 
Germany. For centuries the Enghsh constitution was for continental Europe 
the model of constitutional freedom; but it is no longer looked to for an 
example, and the constitution of the United States is now the study of the 
statesmen who wish to renovate Europe. A federal union is now become 
the ideal. The opinion prevails that the system of two legislative chaml^ers 
is better than that of one and that the present Reichsrath of North Germany 
is not sufficiently invested with co-ordinate powers of legislation. The want 
is felt of a body like our Senate, which should have an organic life as a whole 
and hfe in all its parts. The Councillor who last went from the Foreign 
Office to Headquarters took with laim a copy of the Constitution of the United 
States and a commentary upon it. As the several provinces of Prussia and 
all the states of Germany have their respective Diets, a Senate for Germany 
might be elected precisely in the same manner as our Senate is elected. 

In a leading article of the 11th of this month the new Prussian gazette, 
reputed to be the organ of conservatism, eulegizes our Senate as the body 
that harmoniously unites the principle of general union and the principle of 
the vitality of the several states, and in commenting on the forms necessary 
for Germany it remarks: 'The Senate of the United States of America gives 
the most striking proof that such a house of states is not a mere monarchical 
and still less a mere feudal institution, but that it is necessary for every 
federal union, if that union is also to maintain its federal character.' 

As yet the members of the Reichsrath will be chosen by the several provin- 
cial legislatures, but the principle of election and not of descent is estalihshed 
ancl will not be changed. In the present constitution of the North German 
Union there is no hereditary power whatever recognized e.xcept that of its 
head and I believe that no change in this respect will take place. Suggestions 
have indeed been made for the establishment of a house of princes, but I 
think that the question has been settled in favor of the example of the United 
States. Germany will have an elective senate, not an imitation of the British 
House of Lords. The federation union of all Germany has not as yet been 
definitely agreed upon; but to my question the answer from those who know 
best is that there is good ground for hope. The difficulty at present lies 
mainly in settling the place of Bavaria in the event of a general union. At 
the present moment it seems probable that the King of Prussia wall not be 
proclaimed Emperor of Germany; that the present North German Union will 
become more nearly a German union; and that it will remain, as it now is, a 
republic with a permanent hereditary executive. According to our American 
ideas of republicanism, there is more of solid, sulistantial, law-respecting, 
enduring republicanism in Germany than in anj' other state of Europe, not 



Bancroft's expectations of republicanism in Germany 31 

of the North German Union to suit the needs of United Germany, 
German statesmen were studying the constitution of the United 
States rather than that of Great Britain, since a federal union had 
become their ideal. The United States Senate was praised in the 
German press as "a body that harmoniously united the principle 
of general union and the principle of the vitality of the several 
states." In the constitution of the North German Union no 
hereditary power was recognized except that of its head, and Mr. 
Bancroft believed no change would take place in that respect 
in the enlargement of the union. i\t that time (October, 1S70) it 
seemed to him probable that the King of Prussia would not be 
proclaimed Emperor of Germany but that the country would 
remain, as he then considered it, a republic with a permanent 
hereditary executive. In summing up the political situation the 
American minister wrote to the Secretary of State : 

"According to our American ideas of republicanism there is 
more of solid, substantial, law-respecting, enduring republicanism 
in Germany than in any other state of Europe, not excepting 
England, and it proceeds in part from the character of the German 
mind, in part from the very great number of little republics with 
which Germany was crowded through many hundred years, till 
the close of the last century and even in the beginning of the 
present. This has had an influence on laws, language and pre- 
cedents which facilitate the general transformation of Germany 
into a popular, federal union." 

The final change of name for the "Chief of the United States 
of Germany" from that of President to that of Emperor was made, 
according to Bancroft,*^ at the request of Bavaria. The title of 
Kaiser, he asserted, was not especially in favor, regenerated Ger- 
many having renounced all affinities with the Roman empire of the 



excepting England, and it proceeds in part from the character of the German 
mind, in part from the very great number of little republics with which 
Germany was crowded through many hundred years till the close of the 
last century and even in the beginning of the present. This has had an 
influence on laws, language and precedents, which facilitates the general 
transformation of Germany into a, popular, federal union." 

^1 Bancroft Mss. No. 165. 
3 



32 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES ANT) GERMAN"!', 1870 

middle ages. In general the American minister expected to see for 
United Germany 'the establishment of the "most liberal govern- 
ment in Europe." In one sense he considered it the "child of 
America," since but for the success of the Union cause in the 
American civil war it would not have been established. That 
success "sowed the seeds of regeneration of Europe, " of which the 
New Germany was a product. 

This opinion that the New Germany stood for liberal tendencies 
of government was not held by Bancroft alone. Senator Schurz, 
himself a fugitive from Prussian rule in 1849, predicted^- at this 
time that in spite of the monarchical form of government 
Germany would turn out to be "the most progressive power, 
steadily progressive." This new Germany and the United States 
together would have to make the international law of the world 
and the two nations would find their interests to agree on all 
essential points. President Grant himself emphasizfed the simi- 
larities between the two unions, the American and the German. 
In a special message to Congress'^ in February, 1871, in which he 

^2 Carl Schurz: "Speeches," etc., Vol. I, p. 519 ff. 

Letter from Carl Schurz to Hamilton Fish, Sec'y of State. 

St. Louis, September 10. 1870. 

One thing is settled now. Germany is destined to be the great power of 
Europe, and it will be a verj^ substantial one. There are no humbugs and 
shams about it. It is all solid and real from top to bottom. And in spite of 
its monarchical form of government, it will also turn out to be the most 
progressive power, steadily progressive. And this Germany and the United 
States together will have to make the international law of the world. I 
expressed that opinion long before Sadowa, and now it must be apparent to 
everyone who knows the two countries. They will find their interests to 
agree in all essential points, and before long they will, without pre-concert, 
meet in the pursuit of common objects, especialty as far as the regulation of 
. the trade of the world is concerned. We ought to keep this prospect in view 
in all our diplomatic doings." 

^' House Misc. Doc. 210, Part 7, 53rd Congress, 2nd Session. "Messages 
and Papers of the Presidents." (Richardson), p. 120 f. 

Executive Mansion, 

February 7, 1871. 
"To the Senate and House of Representatives: 

The union of the States of Germany into a form of government similar 
in many respects to that of the American Union is an event that cannot 
fail to touch deeply the sympathies of the people of the United States. 

This union has been brought about by the long-continued, persistent 



grant's views on the unification of GERMANY 33 

recommended that the American representatives at Berlin be 
placed on the same footing with the American representatives in 
London and Paris, he took occasion to snm up the many common 
interests of the two countries. The American people, he declared, 
saw in the union of Germany an attempt to reproduce in Europe 
some of the best features of the American constitution. The local 
governments of the several states were preserved while the power 
conferred on the chief would impart strength for purposes of self- 
efforts of the people, with the deliberate approval of the governments and 
people of twenty-four of the German States, through their regularly constituted 
representatives. 

In it the American people see an attempt to reproduce in Europe some 
of the best features of our own Constitution, with such modifications as the 
history and condition of Germany seem to require. The local governments 
of the several members of the union are preserved, while the power conferred 
upon the chief imparts strength for the purposes of self-defense, without 
authority to enter upon wars of conquest and ambition. 

The cherished aspiration for national unity which for ages has inspired the 
many milhons of people speaking the same language, inhabiting a contiguous 
and compact territory, but imnaturally separated and divided by dynastic 
jealousies and the ambition of short-sighted rulers, has been attained, and 
Germany now contains a population of about 34,000,000, united, like our own, 
under one Government for its relations with other powers, but retaining in 
its several members the right and power of control of their local interests, 
habits, and institutions. 

The bringing of great masses of thoughtful and free people under a single 
government must tend to make governments what alone they should be — 
the representatives of the will and the organization of the power of the people. 

The adoption in Europe of the American system of union under the control 
and direction of a free people, educated to self-restraint, cannot fail to extend 
popular institutions and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas. 

The relations of the United States with German}' are intimate and cordial. 
The commercial intercourse between the two countries is extensive and is 
increasing from year to year; and the large number of citizens and residents 
in the United States of German extraction and the continued flow of emigra- 
tion thence to this country have produced an intimacy of personal and political 
intercourse approaching, if not equal to, that with the country from which the 
founders of our Government derived their origin. 

The extent of these interests and the greatness of the German Union seem 
to require that in the classification of the representatives of this Government 
to foreign powers there should be no longer an apparent under-valuation ofc 
the importance of the German mission, such as is made in the difference 
between the compensation allowed by law to the minister to German}' and 
those to Great Britain and France. There would seem to be a great pro- 
priety in placing the representative of this Government at Berlin on the same 
footing with that of its representatives at London and Paris. The union of 
the several States of Germany under one government and the increasing 
commercial and personal intercourse between the two countries will also add 
to the labors and the responsibilities of the legation. 

I therefore recommend that the salaries of the minister and of the secretary 
of legation at Beriin be respectively increased to the same amounts as are 
allowed to those at London and Paris. 

U. S. Grant." 



34 RELATIONS BETWEEN UNITED STATES AND GERMANY, 1870 

defense without authority to enter upon wars of conquest and 
ambition. The unification of great masses of thoughtful and free 
people under a single government must tend to make that govern- 
ment the representative of the will and the organizer of the power 
of the people. The result of the adoption in Europe of the Ameri- 
can system of federation must be "to extend popular institutions 
and to enlarge the peaceful influence of American ideas." The 
relations between the United States and Germany were "intimate 
and cordial" and the commerce between the two countries "exten- 
sive and increasing." It was therefore very fitting that the 
mission to Germany should be placed on an equality with the 
missions to England and France. 

In the final summing up of the important ties between the two 
countries the American Minister wrote to the Secretary of State"** 
that if the United States needed the "trusty good-will of any 
government in Europe it could have that best with Germany, 

** Bancroft (Howe) to Hamilton Fish. 

Berlin, October 18, 1870. 

". . . As to this war, Count Bismarck's words to me were: 'I clearly 
understand why your government should choose to be neutral;' at the same 
time he has always desired to cultivate particularly friendly political rela- 
tions between Germany and the United States. Our foreign pohtical interests 
almost always run parallel with those of Germany and are often in direct con- 
flict with those of France. Bismarck and the king were true to our union 
during our civil war, when France took sides against us. Germany respected 
the independence of Mexico; the French supported the Austrian adventurer. 
The United States were the first power to speak for the security of private 
property at sea in time of war; Germany is the only power which as yet 
fully adopts the American idea. Germany desires to follow the East Asiatic 
policy of the United States; France, whose commerce with China is but one 
per cent, of the whole, intrigues for power through the monstrous demands 
of its Jesuit missionaries. Germany, like America, is adverse to ultramontane 
usurpations; it was the French Republic which destroyed the Roman repubhc 
arid garrisoned the Papal dominions. Germany adopts from us the federative 
system; France, whether empire, monarchy, or republic, adheres to the 
system of centrahzation. Germany leaves Spain to choose her own govern- 
ment and regulate her own affairs; and for 160 years France has steadily 
endeavored to subordinate Spanish interests and policy to her own. The 
relations of Germany and formerly of Prussia to England are much the same 
as ours; and they have been so for a himdred years. And Bismarck loves to 
give the United States prominence in the eyes of Europe as a balance to 
Great Britain. If we need the sohd, trusty good-will of any government in 
Europe, we can have it best with Germany; because German institutions and 
ours most nearly resemble each other; and because so many millions of Ger- 
mans have become our countrymen. This war will leave Germany the most 
powerful state in Europe, and the most free; its friendship is, therefore, most 
important to us and has its foundations in history and in nature." 



FACTORS CREATING COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS 35 

because German institutions and American most nearly resembled 
each other and because so many miUions of Germans had become 
American citizens. The war would leave Germany the most 
powerful state in Europe and the most free. Its friendship was 
therefore most important to the United States." This feeling of 
community of interests was to no small degree reciprocated by 
Bismarck, who was fond of giving the United States prominence 
in the eyes of Europe as a balance to Great Britain, and who 
referred on many occasions to the good relations existing luibroken 
since they were first inaugurated by Frederick the Great.^^ An 
event reinforcing the relationship thus outlined was the decision 
rendered by Emperor William I in 1872, who, as arbitrator between 
Great Britain and the United States on the question of the North- 
west boundary, rendered his verdict according to the American 
claims.^*' The emperor decreed that the boundary line should be 
drawn through the Haro Channel. This confirmed to the United 
States its claim to San Juan and the archipelago of islands lying 
between the continent and Vancouver Island, a claim which had 
been contested by Great Britain for more than twenty-six years. 

« Bancroft (Howe), p. 223 f. 
To Elihu B. Washburn. 

Berlin, March 5, 1869. 

« F. R., 1872, p. IV and V. (Annual Message of the President.) 

Mr. Bancroft recommended that the German Emperor be invited to act 
as arbitrator (Bancroft Mss. No. 61, Berhn, January 10, '70), and the American 
minister himself conducted the case for the United States. 



CHAPTER II 
TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

During the forty years following the unification of Germany 
there were but two treaties concluded and formally ratified between 
the Empire and the United States.^ The first of these w^as a Con- 
sular Convention concluded by Mr. Bancroft w-ith the new German 
Empire, almost at its inception, in December of 1871.^ By it the 
consuls and consular agents of each country were granted recipro- 
cally all privileges and immunities enjoyed by the agents of the 
same rank of the most-favored-nation. Customary provisions for 
the inviolability of consular archives and premises, for the filling 
of temporary vacancies and for the communications with authori- 
ties, were included. The treaty provided also for the disposal of 
the property of decedents and for the succession to inheritance 
on the basis of equality mth native citizens. Consuls of each 
nation reciprocally were given jurisdiction over disputes between 
officers and crews of ships, over the problem of deserting seamen 
and over questions of damages to vessels. It was agreed that all 
proceedings concerning the salvage of wrecked vessels should be 
in accordance with the laws of the country where the wreck 
occurred. A final article provided for the reciprocal protection of 
trade-marks — the citizens of each country enjoying, while within 
the boundaries of the other, equal protection in this respect with 
native citizens. 

The second of the treaties^ was concluded almost at the end of 
the forty years under consideration, and was limited to the subject 

1 This excludes the several agreements concluded between the two countries 
through their diplomatic representatives without congressional action. It 
excludes also the treaties to which the United States and Germany were 
signatories together with one or more other powers. 

2 Malloy, Vol I, pp. 550 ff. ^ Malloy, Vol. I, pp. 578 and 579. 



COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS 37 

of patent protection. This patent convention was concluded and 
ratified in 1909, and provided that the restrictions appUed to 
patents should in each country be the same for citizens of the other 
country as for native citizens, and that the working of a patent 
in the territory of one of the contracting parties should be con- 
sidered as equivalent to its working in the territory of the other 
party. 

In the long period between these two conventions a number of 
agreements were concluded between the two nations, but these 
did not assume the character of treaties requiring ratification. 
Of chief importance were the series of commercial agreements,^ 
occurring in 1891 (the "Saratoga Agreement"), 1900 and 1907, 
which served to adjust temporarily the trade relations, following 
changes of tariff, but which could be altered at short notice. 
There was also concluded in 1892 a Copyright Agreement^ by which 
the full benefit of the legal provisions in force in both countries 
in regard to copyright were assured to subjects and citizens of 
both countries on an equal basis. In 1901 an agreement by the 
exchange of notes'' provided for the reciprocak protection of trade- 
marks in ]\Iorocco. The consular agents of both countries in 
Morocco were instructed to give equal protection to the trade- 
marks of citizens of both countries ahke against infringements 
by United States and German citizens in that country, provided 
those trade-marks had been duly registered in the country extend- 
ing this protection. In 1905 a similar agreement^ was effected 
by exchange of notes in regard to the protection of trade-marks 
in China, the two countries guaranteeing the reciprocal protection 
against infringement in China by citizens and subjects of the 
respective nations of trade-marks duly registered in Germany 
and the United States. 

There being thus no formal treat\' of a general nature between 
the United States and the German Empire, it was necessary in 

^ Provisions of these agreements and negotiations attending their conclusion 
are treated in Chapter IV, Commercial Relations. 

5 Malloy, Vol. I, p. 557. « Malloy, Vol. I, pp. 559 and 560. 

' Malloy, Vol. I, p. 560. 



38 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

questions of broad policy to refer to the treaties formed before 
the unification of the Empire, between the United States and the 
separate states of Germany.* Of these, the one which became 
recognized as fundamental to the relationship between the two 
countries was the treaty concluded in 1828 with the kingdom of 
Prussia. This Treaty of Commerce and Xa^•igation revived a 
number of provisions^ of the former Treaty of 1799 concerning 
reciprocal rights and duties in case of war. It also revived one 
article from the earliest treaty concluded between the United 
States and Prussia, that of 1785, the renewed article containing 
the principle that "free ships make free goods, "i° a principle 
which had been omitted from the treaty of 1799 for the expressed 
reason that experience had proved that it was not sufficiently 
respected.il This article renewed from the 1785 treaty and pro- 
viding that "all things shall be adjudged free which shall be on 
board any vessel belonging to the neutral party," was modified and 
limited by one of the articles^^ taken over from the 1799 treaty, 

8 For list of these treaties see Appendix. 

^Articles XIII to XXIV inclusive, except the last paragraph in the nine- 
teenth article relating to treaties with Great Britain, were revived. (Malloy, 
Vol. II, pp. 1490 ff.) These articles provide for neutral and belligerent rights 
and duties, in case one of the contracting parties is at war with a third power, 
in case both are at war with the same power, and in case they should be at 
war with each other. See Appendix. 

" Malloy, Vol. II, p. 1481. 

ARTICLE XII. 

"If one of the contracting parties should be engaged in war with any other 
Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the subjects or citizens of the 
party remaining neuter with the belligerent Powers shall not be interrupted. 
On the contrary in that case, as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party 
may navigate freely to and from the ports and on the coasts of the belligerent 
parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things shall be 
adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging to the neutral 
party, although such things belong to an enemy of the other; and the same 
freedom shall be extended to persons who shall be on board a free vessel 
although they should be enemies to the other party, unless they be soldiers 
in actual service of such enemy." 

'1 Malloy, Vol. II, p. 1490. 
'2 Malloy, Vol. II, p. 1490. 

ARTICLE XIII (OF TREATY OF 1799). 

"And in case of one of the contracting parties being engaged in war with 
any other I'ower, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that 



PROVISIONS GOVERNING PRIVATE PROPERTY ON HIGH SEAS 39 

which provided for the right of visit and search of vessels and for 
the removal of contraband with subsequent full payment to the 
owners of the goods. 

The situation provided for in these articles renewed from the 
former Prussian treaties was furnished by the Franco-Prussian 
war. At the outbreak of the war Germany announced that private 
property on the high seas would be exempt from seizure without 
regard to reciprocity.^'^ This policy went beyond the provision 
contained in the treaty with the United States, since it included 
private property carried in enemy vessels. It was, however, later 

usually arise respecting merchandise of contraband, such as arms, ammuni- 
tion, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, 
or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall 
be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a 
loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall be lawful to stop such 
vessels and articles and detain them for such length of time as the captors 
may think necessary to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might 
ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for 
the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be 
allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or anv part of the military 
stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascer- 
tained by the current price at the place of its destination. But in the case 
supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the 
vessel stopped will dehver out the goods supposed to be of a contraband 
nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be 
carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on 
her voyage. 

All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistols, bombs, grenades, bullets, balls, 
muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, cuirasses, pikes, swords, 
belts, cartouche boxes, saddles and bridles, beyond the quantity necessary 
for the use of the ship, or beyond that which every man serving on board the 
vessel, or passenger, ought to have; and in general whatever is comprised 
under the denomination of arms and military stores, of what description 
soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband." 

13 F. R., 1870, p. 217. 

Secretary Fish wrote to Baron Gerolt, the German minister to the United 
States in regard to the announcement of German pohcy: 

"The Government of the United States receives with great pleasure the 
renewed adherence of a great and enlightened German government to the 
principle temporarily established by the treaty of 178-5, and since then advo- 
cated by this Government whenever opportunity has offered 

Coimt Bismarck's dispatch . . . shows that North Germany is willing 
to recognize this principle (even without reciprocity) in the war which has 
now unhappily broken out between that country and France. This gives 
reason to hope that the Government and people of the United States may 
soon be gratified by seeing it universally recognized as another restraining 
and harmonizing influence imposed by modern civilization upon the art of 
war." 



40 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

« 

abandoned by Germany, who re\'oked her declaration^* on the 
ground that the treatment of German merchant ships by France 
made it necessary to give up the position taken earlier in the war. 
Upon the revocation of the order, however, Bismarck assured the 
United States Government that all action toward American vessels 
would, as a matter of course, be in accordance with the provisions 
of the treaty of 1799,^^ exempting from seizure, when carried in 
American vessels, all private property except contraband. The 
latter might be removed from the vessels and used by the bellig- 
erent power if compensation were later made to the owners. In 
taking this stand Bismarck therefore based the policy of the North 
German Union in this regard on the narrower principle of Article 
XIII, revived from the treaty of 1799, rather than on the broad 
principle of "free ships make free goods" embodied in Article XII 
rcA-ived from the treaty of 1785. 

" F. R., 1871, pp. 403 ff. 

On receiving notice of the revocation of the German declaration the Ameri- 
can Secretary of State expressed to the German minister the 

"great regret with which the Government of the United States receives the 
information that circumstances have arisen which, in the opinion of the 
government of North Germany, justify its withdrawal from a position which 
the Government of the United States regarded with very great satisfaction 
as taken in the best interests of civilization." 

15 F. R., 1871, pp. 411 and 412. 

There was a misunderstanding at first as to the scope of the first declaration 
by Germany. The United States considered that since no mention had been 
made concerning contraband, the declaration exempted this form of "private 
property" also; and therefore that even though its protection when carried 
by French ships had been withdrawn, it would still be exempt from seizure 
when carried by American vessels. Bismarck, however, declared that men- 
tion of contraband had not been made in his first declaration, because it was 
assumed that "according to international usages," contraband had always 
been considered subject to seizure. He set forth that this principle had been 
endorsed by the United States itself in 1856 in regard to the declaration of 
Paris. Upon being asked to adhere to the four provisions of the Paris declara- 
tion the United States had "declared its readiness to do so only on condition 
that the property of subjects of a belligerent state should be exempt from 
capture at sea, by the war vessels of the other partj', contraband of war 
excepted." 



APPLICATION OF TREATY OF 1828 TO FRANCO-PRUSSIAN WAR 41 

The negotiations on this subject are significant aside from their 
immediate concern, because of the fact that the treaty of 1828 
was assumed without c{uestion to be binding upon the North 
German Union, although it had been conchided only with Prussia. 
The United States also assumed that its obligations as a neutral 
under that treaty were binding upon it in relation to the North 
German Union just as they would have been were Prussia alone 
involved in the war. This was illustrated in the neutrality procla- 
mation issued by President Grant, in which he set forth the rights 
and duties of American citizens as determined by the neutrality 
law of the United States and by its treaty obligations. The Presi- 
dent applied to the situation at that time the treaty privilege of 
the belligerent to carry in and out of the ports of the neutral 
without search or hindrance, any prizes captured from the enemy. 
This privilege he declared under the Prussian treaty of 1799, 
revived by the treaty of 1828, to be still in force.^^ Later in the 
intercourse between the two countries doubt was expressed at 
various times by each of the nations as to whether the treaty of 
1828 and certain other treaties formed with individual German 
States before the unification could be considered valid for the 
whole empire. 

i« F. R., 1871, p. 46. 

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA. 

A PROCLAMATION. 

(August 22, 1870 — Enjoining neutrality in the present war between France 
and the North German Confederation and its aUies.) 

"And I do further declare and proclaim that by the nineteenth article of 
the treaty of amity and commerce which was concluded between his Majesty 
the King of Prussia and the United States of America, on the 11th day of 
July, A. D. 1799, which article was revived by the treaty of May 1, a. d. 1828, 
between the same parties and is still in force, it was agreed that 'the vessels 
of war, public and private, of both parties, shall carrj' freely wheresoever 
they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being 
obliged to pay any duties, charges or fees to officers of admiralty, of the 
customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched or put under 
any legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, 
but may freely be carried out again at any time by their captors to the places 
expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel 
shall be obliged to show." 



42 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

By the treaty of 1828,'^ Prussia and the United States had 
guaranteed to each other freedom of commerce and navigation. 
There was to be no discrimination in the form of tonnage dues or 
other port charges, in the ports of either nation against the vessels 
of the other. The vessels of each country in this respect were 
placed on an equal footing with its own national vessels except 
in the case of the ships engaged in coastwise trade. Similarly 
with regard to imports it was agreed that there should be no dis- 
crimination in the form of duties placed on the products of one 
country upon their importation into the other. Though the term 
"most-favored-nation" was not used in the treaty the two coun- 
tries established their relations on this basis. The idea was 
embodied in Articles V and IX of the treaty, which read as follows: 

Article v. 

" No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation 
into the United States of any article the produce or manufacture of 
Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the 
importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of any article the produce 
or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be payable 
on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other 
foreign country. Nor shall any prohibition be imposed on the 
importation or exportation of any article the produce or manu- 
facture of the United States or of Prussia, to or from the ports of 
the United States or to or from the ports of Prussia, which shall 
not equally extend to all other nations." 

Article ix. 

"If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any 
particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately 
become common to the other party, freely where it is freely 
granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation, 
when the grant is conditional." 

It will be seen that this latter article is in a sense contradictory 
to the former. Article V, if taken literally, establishes an uncon- 

" Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 1496 ff. 



MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE UNDER TREATY OF 1828 43 

ditional most-favored-nation basis in respect to import duties. 
If this article steed alone in the treaty it would be difficult to see 
how either of the contracting parties could grant, for instance 
any tariff reduction to any third nation, without extending the 
same favor automatically and unqualifiedly to the other con- 
tracting party. Article IX, however, places an important restric- 
tion on this sweeping most-favored-nation principle. Each of 
the contracting parties can claim from the other, according to this 
article, the benefits of a privilege granted to a third nation, only 
if that privilege was extended gratuitously to that third nation. 
Otherwise there must be a bargaining. The second contracting 
party must offer to the first some favor equivalent to that offered 
by the third nation, before it can become entitled by the treaty 
to the privilege under discussion. In short, Article IX estabhshes 
the restricted most-favored-nation theory or reciprocity.^* 

Though frequently made the basis of diplomatic negotiations 
between the two countries, the treaty of 1828 was never formally 
extended to the whole German Empire. The nearest approach 
to any statutory recognition was the fact that the constitution^^ 
of the German Empire declared that all legislation concerning 
customs duties and commerce and all organization for the protec- 
tion of German trade and navigation should be under the super- 
vision of the empire. No mention was made, however, of the past 
legislation or contracts on this subject made by the individual 
States. The appHcability, therefore, of the constitutional provis- 
ions to the treaty of 1828 with Prussia, or to the similar treaty 

1* For the interpretation of these articles by the two nations see Chapter 
III "Commercial Relations." The United States held consistently to the 
principle of reciprocity. Germany's policy varied. The German Govern- 
ment at times acted on the principle of unrestricted and at times on the 
principle of restricted most-favored-nation treatment in regard to the United 
States. 

See also Sen. Doc. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Session, 

Also article on "Most-favored-nation Relations, German-American," by 
Dr. G. M. Fisk in Journal of PoKtical Economy, March, 1903, and the work 
by Richard Calwer, Berhn, 1902, entitled "Die Meistbeguenstigung der 
Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerica." 

" F. R., 1871, Article 4 (pp. 384 and 385) and x\rticle 35 (pp. 387 and 388). 



44 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

of 1S27 with the Hanseatic RepubKcs,^" is very vague, and was 
seldom referred to in the practical negotiations as evidence of the 
validity of that treaty for the whole empire. 

The fact that this important treaty had never by formal agree- 
ment been declared binding upon United Germany caused its 
validity to be questioned at various times by each of the two 
countries. Officials of each nation differed from one another in 
their opinion on this subject. In 1897 a heated discussion-^ took 
place in the Reichstag concerning the future commercial policy 
of Germany toward the United States as aft'ected by the Dingley 
tariff. In the course of the debate the binding character of the 
Prussian and Hanseatic treaties was seriously questioned. Count 
von Kanitz-Podangen, Conservative, said that the American 
I nion and Germany treated each other reciprocally as most 
favored countries, although no commercial or viost-favored-nafion 
treaty had ever taken place between the two states. (Staatengruppen.) 
He then referred to the 1827 and 1828 treaties as being — whether 
rightly or wrongly^(mit Recht oder Unrecht), considered the basis 
of the commercial relations between the tw^o countries. Person- 
ally, however, he considered that to revert to these treaties was 
legally inadmissible (nicht statthaft). The interpellation of the 
Count and his colleagues was answered by Baron von ^Nlarschall, 
Minister of State and Secretary of the Foreign Office, who declared 
himself to be of quite different opinion concerning the treaty 
under discussion. The question of the validity and of the limits 
of the region of application of these treaties, he declared, had 
never been specifically discussed^- or decided by the two countries. 

2« Malloy, Vol. I, pp. 901 ff. 

Article IX of this treaty with the Hanseatic Republics constituted a reci- 
procity clause almost identic in wording with Article IX of the treaty with 
Prussia the following year. 

21 V. R., 1895-1897, Vol. VIII, pp. 5701 ff., 213 Sitz. (May 3, 1897). 

22 Ibid., p. 5706. 

"Die Frage der Giltigkeit und des Geltungsbereichs dieses preussischen 
Vertrages ist zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Deutschland niemals 
prinzipiell zur Eroerterung mid zur Entscheidung gelangt." 

It was inaccurate to state that the subject had never been discussed, but 
correct that it had never been formally decided. 



VALIDITY OF PRUSSIAN- AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 45 

Similar treaties existed with Sweden, Norway and Denmark, and 
the government had ahvays proceeded upon the principle that 
these had not lost their validity through the founding of the Ger- 
man Empire but had been transferred, together with their rights 
and obligations, to the German Empire, in application of Articles 
4 and 35 of the Constitution which gave over to the Empire the 
entire tariff and commerce legislation. Moreover, he continued, 
these treaties had lost their territorially restricted character before 
the founding of the empire, at the time of the creation of the 
Zollverein. The principal proof, however, of the binding power of 
these treaties. Baron von Marschall declared to be the fact that 
both parties had recognized their validity through conclusive 
acts. Rights had been claimed for and obhgations fulfilled by the 
whole German Empire on the basis of certain paragraphs of this 
treaty. In 1885, for example, the chancellor had declared, apropos 
of a commercial treaty with Spain, that the United States, Sweden 
and Denmark could claim most-favored-nation privileges, through 
their special treaties with single States, which could now no longer 
be separated from the rest of the empire. Germany had repeatedly 
claimed and obtained rights from the United States on the ground 
of the Prussian treaty, and the United States had in turn recog- 
nized the treaty as a basis for claims from Germany.-^ Its binding 
character had thus been tacitly assumed by both nations. This 
fact, the Minister of State considered, estabHshed in itself the 
vahdity of the treaty. 

2^ For accounts of negotiations involving these treaties, see Chapter IV, 
"Commercial Relations." See also negotiations between Bismarck and 
Mr. Kasson (American Minister) on German Differential Raih-oad Rates, 
1884. (G. M. Fisk, Most-Favored-Nation Relations — German-American, in 
Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903.) 

In 1885 Baron von Alvensleben, the German minister, wrote to Secretary 
Bayard to claim for Germany, on the ground of the treaty, the reduced tonnage 
dues just extended by the United States to vessels from certain South Ameri- 
can countries. He stated that Article IX of the Prussian- American Treaty 
had been "in the correspondence between the cabinets of Berlin and Wash- 
ington concerning the petroleum railroad rates as well as because of the 
Spanish-American treaty concerning the trade of Cuba and Puerto Rico, 
successively asserted by both Governments to be valid for all Germany." 
(See F. R., 1885.) 



46 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

A similar debate was held in the Reichstag in 1899.-^ Again 
Count von Kanitz, as the representative of the German Conserva- 
tives, spoke against the Prussian treaty, declaring that it had 
been rendered null and void by the American tariff legislation. 
This viewpoint was seconded by Baron Herrnsheim, of the National 
Liberals, who added that it was evident that the Americans con- 
sidered the treaty to be no longer in force, since American Secre- 
taries of State Gresham and Olney had stated that there was no 
evidence for considering that the treaty concluded with Prussia 
had been extended to the German Empire. This view was at once 
contradicted by von Buelow, IMinister of State and Secretary of 
the FoT-eign Office, who declared explicitly that the commercial 
relations between Germany and the United States rested contract- 
ually (vertragsrechtlich) on the treaty of 1S2S with Prussia and 
on the similar agreements with other German seaboard States. 
The differences with America on the subject, he said, were due to 
a different conception of the scope of the most-favored-nation 
clause. This declaration of the INIinister of State was received 
with satisfaction by the more radical parties'-^ and was endorsed 
by Count von Posadowsky-Wehner, Representative of the Chan- 
cellor and Secretary of the Interior. 

In the United States there was also uncertainty as to whether 
the treaty covered more than the State of Prussia, with which it 
had been concluded. Claims had been made to the Government 
of the Empire, based on the most-favored-nation status granted 
to the United States by the treaty,^*^ which was a tacit recognition 
of its binding qualities upon the empire, and there seems never 
to have been any objection on the part of the United States to 
having the government of the empire base its claims against the 
United States on the agreement concluded by the government of 
one German State. Nevertheless, the view was held by at least 
two American Secretaries of State that the treaty could not be 



24 V. R., '95-'00, Bd. I, 30 Sitz. February 11, '99, S. 787, B. ff. 

See also Chapter on Commercial Relations. 

2^ Ibid., S. 800. See speech of Herr Richter of the Freisinnige Volkspartei. 

2« F. R., 1885, p. 443. 



APPLICATION OF 1828 TREATY TO THE GERMAN EMPIRE 47 

used by Germany as a basis for claims extending beyond the terri- 
tory of Prussia. In 1894, when Germany protested against the 
terms of the American tariff affecting the importation of German 
sugar,^^ Secretary Gresham, though admitting the justice of the 
German claim on the grounds of Articles V and IX of the 1828 
treaty, declared : " The stipulations of these two articles place the 
commercial intercourse of the United States and Prussia, not the 
entire German Empire, on the most'-favored-nation basis." He 
therefore assumed "that the German Government did not claim 
that the treaty afforded any just ground for protest against the 
additional duty on sugars not shown to be the produce or manu- 
facture of Prussia.'' This opinion of the Secretary of State was 
upheld by the United States Attorney-General. ]\Ir. Olney was 
asked to render his official opinion on the claims of Germany to be 
exempted from the payment of duty on German salt. One of the 
grounds of the German claim being based on the most-favored- 
nation provisions of the 1828 treaty, the Attorney-General ren- 
dered his decision against Germany partly on the ground of the 
invalidity of the treaty for the whole empire. 

"It should be noted," he states,-* "that while this treaty is to 
be takeii as operative as respects so much of the German Empire 
as constitutes the kingdom of Prussia, no facts or considerations 
with which I have been made acquainted justify the assumption 
that it is to be taken as effective as regards other portions of the 
empire. Neither am I informed whether the German salt, for which 
free admission into this country is demanded, is a product or 
manufacture of Prussia proper or of some other part or parts of the 
German Empire." Two years later Mr. Olney, Secretary of State, 
had occasion to pass upon the same question.^^ Referring to his 
opinion given in 1894, he wrote to Baron von Thielmann, German 
minister, as follows: 

" See Chapt. IV, Commercial Relations. Also F. R., 194, p. 239 and Sen. 
Misc. Doc. No. 52, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess. 

28 Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 52, 53rd Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 5. 

23 F. R., 1896, p. 209. 

Secretary Olney expressed by implication a request for the German Govern- 
ment's view in this matter. 
4 



48 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

"In that opinion I discussed the several grounds upon which 
you had claimed by your preceding notes that German salt is 
entitled to come into the United States free. The first of these 
grounds was the applicability of the most-favored-nation clause 
in the treaty of INIay 1, 1S28, between the United States and 
Prussia; and upon this point I remark that your note is silent, 
so that I am, as Secretary of State, still w^ithout the information 
which I lacked while Attorney-General, as to whether the treaty 
with Prussia is to be taken as effective as regards other portions 
of the Empire or whether the German salt, for which free admis- 
sion into this country is demanded, is a product or manufacture 
of Prussia proper or of some other part or parts of the German 
Empire." 

In contrast to these officials of the State Department, Congress 
seemed to have no doubts about the treaty but simply assumed its 
validity. In 1885 the Committee on Foreign Affairs recommended 
to the House for adoption the following resolution:^" 

" Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that the President of the United States be requested to take imme- 
diate steps to secure to the United States equal benefits in the 
German Empire with other nations as to all articles of commerce 
of the United States, under the most-favored-nation clause of the 
treaty of 1828, made with Prussia and now in force between the 
United States and the German Empire." 

In spite of this acknowledged uncertainty as to the validity of 
the treaty, the nations took no formal action to establish its status, 
but continued throughout this whole period to make practical 
use of it as a basis for temporary agreements to regulate their 
reciprocal commercial relations.^^ 

"It would much facilitate my examination of the subject were I informed 
of the grounds, if any, for regarding the treaty stipulation concluded with 
Prussia in 1828 as now operative with respect to the whole German Empire, 
and if this be not the case, how and to what extent the Kingdom of Prussia 
may seek to adduce its treaty with the United States in support of a claim 
for the exemption from duty on salt produced in and exported from Prussia." 

The pubhshed correspondence of the two countries gives no evidence of a 
reply from Germany to this question. 

3« House Report, No. 2682, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess. 
'1 See Chapt. IV, Commercial Relations. 
See also F. R., 1883, p. 369. 



THE BANCROFT TREATIES 49 

Another phase of the relations between the United States and 
Germany, concerning which the treaty provisions were inadequate 
and uncertain, was that of the status of the naturalized citizen 
and his rights and immunities upon his return to the land of his 
birth.^- This subject was regulated by a group of treaties con- 
cluded before the unification of the empire with the separate 
states of Baden, Bavaria, Hesse, Wurtemburg and the North 
German Union. Besides differing from one another in minor 
respects, which caused some difficulty, these treaties left unregu- 
lated the status of the former citizens of Alsace-Lorraine. Just as 
it was never formally determined whether the 1828 treaty with 
Prussia had been extended to include the whole German Empire, 
so it was never formally agreed upon by both countries whether 
or not the naturalization treaty concluded with the North German 
Union, or any of the other treaties of the group, were valid for the 
whole empire and hence governed the status of American citizens 
born in Alsace-Lorraine. The final published correspondence up 
to the year 1910 showed the tw^o governments taking opposite 
stands on the question — the German Government holding the 
treaties inapplicable^^ to former citizens of the two provinces and 
the Ignited States refusing to admit this stand.'^^ 

It is thus seen that throughout this period of forty years the 
intercourse between the two great nations, important as it was in 
volume of trade and in social and political relations, was never at 
any time adequately regulated by treaty. The only formal treaties 
covered subjects of less general importance, while tlie whole basis 
of the relationship of the two countries in their commercial inter- 
course was rendered unstable by reason of a disagreement as to 
the interpretation of the older treaties and by reason of an uncer- 
tainty as to whether they were really valid.^^ It was inevitable 



'2 For account of negotiations on this subject, see Chapter III "American 
Citizens of German Birth, their Rights in Germany." 

33 F. R., '03, p. 443 and F. R., '06, p. 652. 

'''F. R., '04, p. 319. 

35 In 1904 a Compilation of Treaties in Force was prepared under a Reso- 
lution of the United States Senate. (Sen. Doc. No. 318, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess.) 
Under treaties in force with the German Empire only two were given, the 



50 TREATY RELATIONSHIP 

that the relationship as a whole between the two nations should 
be adversely affected by these conditions. This was realized by 
the officials, of both governments, but attempts to remedy the 
situation and conclude a comprehensive treaty were defeated by 
the opposing American and German economic protection policies.-^^ 

Consular Convention of 1876 and the Commercial Agreement of 1900. The 
treaties with Prussia and the several German states were listed separately 
under thfe names of Prussia, Baden, Bavaria, etc., as still in force for those 
states — but no statement is made as to whether or not they are in force for 
the Empire. 

'^ See Chapter IV, Commercial Relations. 

The conclusion of a naturalization treaty to take the place of the "Ban- 
croft" Treaties of 1868 was apparently blocked by Germany. See Chapter 
III, "American Citizens of German Birth, their Rights in Germany." 



CHAPTER III 

a:\ierican citizens of germax birth— their 
rights ix germaxy 

The first question of important and extended diplomatic dis- 
cussion to come before the two nations after the foundation of the 
Empire was that of the rights of American citizens of German 
birth, upon their return to Germany — particularly their rights to 
exemption from military service. The efforts of Bancroft in 
behalf of these naturalized citizens resulted in the formation of a 
group of naturalization treaties^ with the X'orth German Union, 
Bavaria, Baden, Wuerttemberg and Hesse respectively, in the 
year 18G8. These are known as the "Bancroft treaties," and 
became the basis of diplomatic correspondence, lasting throughout 
the whole period of forty years. Shortly after their conclusion, it 
was evident that the treaties were, from the American stand- 
point unsatisfactory for the chief reasons that, as pointed out by 
Secretary Fish:^ 

"They are not coextensive with the limits of the Empire. The 
provisions of none of the existing treaties extend to Alsace and 
Lorraine, which form an integral part of the empire; and from 
which there has long been a large and valuable emigration to the 
United States, whose status deserves recognition and protection." 

And secondly: 

"They make different, and in some respects, conflicting pro- 
visions respecting the naturalized citizens." 

In defense of the treaties, Bancroft repHed^ that the German 
Government was not disposed to deny to the emigrants from those 



1 Sen. Doc. No. 318, 58th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. XXXVII. 

2 F. R., '73, p. 280. 3 F. R., 73, p. 287. 



52 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH 

two provinces (Alsace and Lorraine) the benefits of the treaty 
^^•ith the North German Union and that, though there M'ere 
shght differences between the treaties, they were interpreted and 
executed ahke. ... He explained at the same time that it 
would not be ad^•isable to negotiate for a single treaty ^ith the 
empire, because, being directly at the close of the Franco-Prussian 
war, the moment was a "most inauspicious one for bringing before 
the German Parliament any document exempting men of German 
birth from obedience to German mihtary law."* The auspicious 
moment apparently never came, for the Bancroft treaties with 
the five separate German States have remained in force and the 
long diplomatic discussions have centered in a changing inter- 
pretation of their clauses, and in the extent of their application. 

The treaty formed with the North German Union was the first 
to be concluded, and became the one chiefly used as the basis for 
discussions. The clauses most often brought to bear are the 
following:^ 

Article I. 

"Citizens of the North German Confederation who become 
naturalized citizens of the United States of America, and shall 
have resided uninterruptedly within the United States five years, 
shall be held by the North German Confederation to be American 
citizens, and shall be treated as such." 

Article II. 

" A naturalized citizen of the one party on return to the territory 
of the other party remains liable to trial and punishment for an 
action punishable by the laws of his original country and com- 
mitted before his emigration." 

Article IV. 

"If a German naturalized in America renews his residence in 
North Germany without the intent to return to America, he shall 
be held to have renounced his naturalization in the United States. 
. . . The intent not to return may be held to exist when 
the person naturalized in the one country resides more than two 
years in the other country." 

* F. R., 73, p. 289. ' M., Vol. II, p. 1298. 



THE BANCROFT TREATIES " 53 

The principle through which Bancroft was able to secure the 
treaties*^ was that — endorsed by Bismarck himself — of the natural 
right of emigration and the prohibition of any punishment inflicted 
because of the act of emigration itself. Before this time the 
German kingdoms had not recognized the right of subjects to 
dissolve their allegiance to their sovereign without his consent. 
The Bancroft treaties have therefore been considered "a great 
achievement of American diplomacy which has made a breach in an 
old feudal principle of monarchical states."'^ 

Although the United States, in the words of President Hayes,* 
admitted "no distinction whatever between the rights of a native 
and a naturalized citizen of the United States," the policy was 
adhered to of investigating carefully each case of molestation, and 
only those protests were forwarded to the German authorities 
which had been found by the United States Consuls to be covered 
by the treaty stipulation, /. c, when the intent to return to the 
United States had been satisfactorily demonstrated.^ Germany, 
on the other hand, reserved the right to punish (by forced military 
service, imprisonment, fine or expulsion) or to release the citizen 
in question. As reported by the United States INIinister at 
Berlin, J. C. B. Davis,^'' "Release from fine or arrest of returned 
American citizens of German birth has been granted by use of the 
royal prerogative of pardon. It has not been regarded as a right 
M'hich can be asserted and enforced under German law by the 
injured party." 

Though Germany throughout the controversies manifested a 
desire to adhere to the terms of the treaty,^^ the interpretation of 
those terms, and the fact of the discrepancies between the treaties 
signed with the separate States left room for much fluctuation of 
])olicy. As the treaty with Baden^'- contained ho two-year clause, 
former citizens of that State on their return were apt to be molested 

6 F. R., 73, p. 284.- 

' House Report No. 2590, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 5. 

8 F. R., '79, p. xiii. » F. R., '84, p. 212. 

10 F. R., '75, p. 568. n F. R., '79, p. xiii. 

12 M., Vol. I, p. 53. 



54 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERiMAN BIRTH 

upon their arrival, or within a short time thereafter, and found 
difficulty in proving their intent to return. Although the United 
States never construed the two-year clause of the treaty to mean that 
the United States citizenship was lost by the two years' residence, ^^ 
nevertheless in practice it acquiesced in Germany's right by treaty 
to expel or to force to become naturalized any former German 



13 F. R., '85, p. 397, No. 287. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Kasson. 



Department of State, 
Washington, 

January 15, 1885. 



"Under these treaties, a two years' residence in his native country of a 
citizen naturalized in the United States of America does not of itself divest 
him of his adopted citizenship. The treaties provide that when a citizen 
of either country naturalized in the other shall renew his residence in the 
country of his birth without the intent to return to his adopted country, he 
shall be held to have renounced his naturalization, and further that the 
intent not to return 'may be held to exist' after the residence in the native 
country shall exceed two years. The residence, therefore, is the only evidence 
open to rebuttal of lack of intention to return to the adopted country. The 
treaty, therefore, by itself does not work forfeiture of citizenship, and in this 
case some affirmative governmental act was necessary to show that the elder 
Klingenmeyer had through residence in Germany, without intent to return 
here, forfeited his naturalization. 

Tliis is the construction of the fourth article of the treaty of 1868, which 
has been maintained by this Department and, so far as is known, admitted 
by the German Governinent." , 

Supplement, 1913, to Senate Doc. No. 357, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess. "Treaties, 
Conventions, International Acts, etc.," p. 125. 

Later the United States seems to have modified its views slightly concerning 
the principle of the two-years' residence. In 1906 a convention on the status 
of naturahzed citizens was concluded with the South and Central American 
countries. This convention included the two-year residence principje of the 
Bancroft treaties, but it was worded so as to lay more emphasis on the two- 
year residence as evidence that the naturalized person residing in his native 
country did not intend to return to the country of his adoption. The Articles 
read as follows: 

'^ Art. I. If a citizen, a native of any of the countries signing the present 
convention and naturalized in another, shall again take up residence in his 
native country without the intention of returning to the country in which 
he has been naturalized, he will be considered as having reassumed his original 
citizenship, and as having renounced the citizenship acquired by the said 
naturalization. 

Art. II. The intention not to return will be presumed to exist when the 

naturahzed person shall have resided in his native country for more than 

two years. But this presumption may be destroyed by evidence to the 
contrary." 



TWO-YEAR RESIDENCE CLAUSE 55 

citizens after a residence of two years in Germany." It also 
acquiesced in the right of expulsion before the limit of two years 
had expired, provided that the intention of the individual not to 
return could be satisfactorily demonstrated.^^ The enforcement 
of such right was exercised by Germany mostly in the case of men 
of military age,^^ older German-Americans being allowed to reside 
indefinitelv in the Fatherland." ^^ 



" F. R., '84, p. 212, Inclosure 2 in No. 74, Mr. Kasson to Mr. Reichard. 

Legation of the United States, 

Berlin, November 14, 1884. 



"In reply to your third inquiry the legation is of the opinion that recur- 
ring visits to Germany, not prolonged beyond two years, are permissible under 
the treaty, if preceded by bona fide resumptions of residence in the United 
States, and that the residence of six months which preceded your recent return 
to Germany should be regarded as such a residence. 

In the opinion of this legation, the German Government reserved the right 
in question in order to act or decline to act upon each case as it should be 
presented at the time for action, without interference by the United States. 
We do not therefore believe that you would now obtain from them a satis- 
factory reply, and do not think it"^ advisable to transmit your application to 
them, thus calling special attention to your case and that of your children. 
The only effect, in our view of the case, of your overstaying two years would 
be to give the German authorities the right to say (without our interference) 
that you or your children, or both, must become naturalized or leave the 
country. As long as you hold to the bona fide intention of return to the 
United States to reside there as a citizen, we hold you and your minor children 
to be still American citizens." 

15 F. R., '85, p. 401. '" F. R., '84, p. 194. 

i^F. R., '83, p. 331. 

1^ Autobiography of A. D. White, Vol. I, p. 534 ff. 

" In those days an American minister at BerUn was likely to find liis personal 
relations with the German minister of foreign affairs cordial, but his official 
relations continuous war. Hardly a day passed without some skirmish 
regarding the rights of "German-Americans" in their Fatherland. The old 
story constantly recurred in new forms. Generally it was sprung by some man 
who had left Germany just at the age for entering the army, had remained 
in America just long enough to secure naturahzation, and then, without a 
thought of clischarging any of his American duties, had come back to claim 
exemption from his German duties, and to flaunt his American citizen papers 
in the face of the authorities of the province where he was born. This was 
very galling to these authorities, from the fact that such Americans were 
often inclined to glory over their old schoolmates and associates who had 
not taken this means of escaping military duty; and it was no wonder that 
these brand new citizens, if their papers were not perfectly regular, were 
sometimes held for desertion until the American representative could intervene. 

Still other cases were those where fines had been imposed upon men of this 
class for non-appearance when summoned to military duty, and an American 
minister was expected to secure their remission. 

In simple justice to Germany, it ought to be said that there is no foreign 
matter of such importance so little understood in the United States as this. 



56 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH 

The years 1884 and 1885 marked the beginnings of a more 
stringent military poHcy on the part of the Germans and the 
tendency to extend the restrictions governing former German 
subjects on their return to the country. ^^ It became the pre- 
cedent to consider that the two years' residence in Germany 
divested automatically any former German of his acquired citizen- 
ship. ^o It also extended its policy of the right of expulsion to the 
minor children of such a returning citizen. A definite ruling in 
regard to the fathers and sons in question was issued by the 
Government.-^ 

1 . " Fathers naturalized in America and returning to Germany 
to reside, and there sojourning for more than two years, are to 
be regarded as having renounced their naturalization under the 
provisions of the treaty of 1868." 

2. "But minor children of such parents born in America will be 
recognized as retaining their American citizenship uninfluenced 
by their father's renunciation of his naturalization, and they 
cannot be made to perforin military service in Germany, but their 
sojourn in Germany may be refused, under the principles of 
international law, when the same may be required in the interest 
of public order." 

The United States refused to admit the validity of either ruling. 
As expressed by Secretary of State Frelinghuysen : 

The average American, looking on the surface of things, cannot see why the 
j'oung emigrant is not allowed to go and come as he pleases. The fact is 
that German policy in that respect has Ijeen evolved in obedience to the 
instinct of national self-preservation. The German Empire, the greatest 
Continental home of civilization, is an open camp, perpetually besieged. 
Speaking in a general way, it has no natural frontiers of any sort — neither 
mountains nor wide expanses of sea. Eastward are one hundred and thirty 
miUions of people fanatically hostile as regards race, religion and imaginary 
interests; westward is another great nation of forty millions, with a hatred on 
all these points intensified by desire for revenge; northward is a vigorous race 
estranged by old quarrels; and south is a power which is largely hostile on 
racial, religious and historic grounds, and at best a very uncertain reliance. 
Under such circumstances, universal military service in Ciermany is a condi- 
tion of its existence, and evasion of this is naturally looked upon as a sort of 
treason. The real wonder is that Germany has been so moderate in her 
dealing with this question. The yearly 'budgets of military cases' in the 
archives of the American Embassy bear ample testimony to her desire to be 
just and even lenient." 

" F. R., '85, p. X. 2° F. R., '85, p. 392. 

" F. R., '85, p. 400. 



INCREASED RESTRICTIONS ON FORMER GERMAN SUBJECTS 57 

"We think it clear that the treaty cannot of itself convert an 
American citizen back again to a German, any more than it can 
make a German a citizen of the United States." 

"As to the sons of such fathers, who, being citizens by birth, 
may visit the land of their fathers' allegiance the decision of the 
German Government is just. They are original citizens in their 
own right and the treaty does not relate to them. In all respects 
they stand on the same footing as native Americans of American 
parentage. This being so, the contention of the German Govern- 
ment that such sons may be expelled from Germany on abrupt 
notice, at the pleasure of the authorities, under the alternative 
of becoming German subjects is tantamount to claiming the 
right to expel any citizen of the United States in like manner, and 
with the like alternative, which of course would conflict with 
provisions of the existing treaty." 

Count Hatzfeldt's reply"- asserted that it was a view universally 
adhered to by nations that treaties of amity and commerce did 
not abolish the recognized right of each nation to expel citizens 
considered injurious to the welfare of the State. He pointed out 
further that Germany had made an important concession to the 
United States in recognizing the American nationality of the sons 
in question of the former German citizens, since under the German 
legal \iew such sons would share the nationality of the father.^^ 
He also intimated the lenient attitude of the Government, stating 
that: 

"The Government of the United States may rather rest assured 
that the German authorities . . . will as heretofore allow 
all reasonable consideration to prevail. "^^ 

The stricter interpretation of the treaties made their defects 
more evident and there was some attempt in the United States 
to have them abrogated. During 1882 two resolutions were 
introduced in the House of Representatives-^ providing for the 
termination of the Bancroft treaties. These were referred to the 

22 F. R., '85, p. 418. 

23 F. R., '85, p. 418. 24 Y. R., '85, p. 417. 

25 Congressional Record, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. XIII, p. 428 (H. R. No. 
106) and 47th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol. XIV, p. 18. 



58, RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH 

Committee on Foreign Affairs, which reported-"^ a substitute 
resolution. This provided for the negotiation of a new naturaHz- 
ation treaty with the German Empire which should operate as a 
termination of the old treaties with the several German States 
without formal notice being given of the intention to abrogate 
them. 

i\gain, in 1SS5," the same resolution was recommended by the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs for adoption. In the report accom- 
panying the resolution the defects and virtues of the Bancroft 
treaties were both set forth. The committee considered the 
treaties to have been of great value, both in breaking down the 
old feudal principle of "once a subject, always a subject," and in 
granting substantial benefits to American citizens. ^Moreover, 
the committee considered that those benefits w^ere reciprocal only 
in name and that they were actually useful only to the United 
States, because the native American naturalized in Germany and 
returning to the United States required no protection from prose- 
cution for unauthorized emigration or for the non-fulfilment of 
military^ duty. There w^as therefore no doubt that a simple notice 
to terminate the treaties would be accepted by Germany. But 
this would leave the citizens concerned without regulated pro- 
tection. Therefore the committee did not recommend that notice 
be given to terminate the Bancroft treaties, but it did consider 
that the time had come for the " conclusion of a new treaty com- 
prising the whole German Empire, and with such modification as 
might secure a more full and satisfactory protection of the rights 
of American citizens abroad. " 

Apparently these movements by Congress were without results, 

-^ House Reports, 47th Cong, and Sess., No. 1893. 

(To accompany H. Res. 329.) 

"Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That the President of the United 
States be, and he is hereby, requested to take the necessary steps toward 
negotiating a treaty with the German Empire securing more liberal and just 
provisions in reference to the respective rights of citizens — native-born or 
naturahzed — of the United States and the German Empire." 

2" House Report No. 2590, 48th Cong., 2nd Sess. 



ATTEMPTS TO TERMINATE BANCROFT TREATIES 59 

published correspondence showing no record of negotiations for 
a new treaty at this time. The Bancroft treaties continued to be 
used as governing the rights of naturahzed Americans on their 
return to Germany. 

For several years the two governments continued to carry 
on a considerable diplomatic correspondence, repro testing and 
reasserting from the same standpoint.'-^ President Cleveland 
referred to this in his message to Congress,^^ but described the 
general relations of the two countries as having "lost none of their 
accustomed cordiality." The protests of the United States were 
changed gradually from the basis that Germany's policy of expul- 
sion was in violation of the Bancroft treaties to the basis that it 
was not friendly. As expressed by Ambassador Bayard:^" 

" While thus freely admitting the right of expulsion this Depart- 
ment holds that its arbitrary exercise cannot be regarded as con- 
sistent with existing relations . . . There must be declara- 
tions or acts (showing the intent not to return) in addition to the 
mere fact of return to the country of origin, in order to create or 
justify the conclusion that naturalization has been renounced. 
. . . Although it is not a question arising under the treaty, 
it is due to comity, as well as to the existence of the treaty, that 
reasonable grounds for expulsion should exist and be made known." 

A marked decrease in the number of cases caUing for diplomatic 
intervention followed during the next few years, a situation 
recorded with satisfaction by the United States representatives.^^ 

In 1897 the reversal of the policy of the German Government in 
regard to the treatment of the sons of German parents became 
evident through the case of Alfred Meyer.'*'- He was born in the 
United States of German parents, was brought to Germany at 
the age of four, and on reaching military age was impressed into 
the German army. In intervening in his behalf the United States 
Ambassador brought forward the ruling of the German Govern- 

28 F. R., '87, p. 370. 20 Y. R., '86, p. iv. 

3° F. R., '88, p. 420. 51 F. R., '88, p. 656. 

32 F. R., '97, p. 194. 



60 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZENS OF GERMAN BIRTH 

ment in ISSo, \vhich declared that sons by reason of their American 
birth might not be forced to serve. The reply from the Imperial 
P'o reign Office^^ was that ^Nleyer was, under the laws of Prussia, 
a Pnissian subject, and that if his birth on American soil made 
him an American citizen, then he possessed a double nationality 
and must fulfil his obligations to both countries. As it turned out, 
]Meyer was soon dismissed from the service^^ on the ground of 
physical disabihty; therefore, the United States did not press its 
protest further and this issue remained unsettled. 

Cases continued to be brought to the notice of American consuls 
during the next few^ years, but formal protest was seldom made to 
the Gennan Government in their behalf, as they seemed to indicate 
no new policy of treatment^^ and it was stated by the American 
ambassador that the number of persons molested for not having 
performed military service in Germany was a very small one 
compared to the number of naturalized Americans who each year 
returned to Germany. In the cases of fines imposed for such 
non-performance of military duty the money was nearly always 
refunded at the intervention of the American authorities. To 
decrease the number of cases of expulsion or other molestation and 
reduce to a minimum any resulting friction between the two 
countries, the United States published a notice^^ to American 
citizens formerly subjects of Germany explaining their liability 
under the military and exiDatriation laws of their native country. 
It was made evident also to the United States Government by its 
own representative in Germany that there was no intention on the 
part of the Prussian Government to discriminate against American 
citizens, and that Germans of military age returning after natural- 
ization in other countries received similar treatment.^'^ 

Efforts of the Prussian ^Minister of the Interior to curtail the 
sojourn in Prussia of former German subjects of military age 
caused the United States again to protest to the German Foreign 
Office. This protest set forth^'^ that while the United States had 

3' F. R., '97, p. 195. 34 F. R., '97, p. 2OO. 

55 F. R., '01, p. 159. 36 F. R^ '01, p. 160-. 

" F. R., '01, p. 177. 38 Y. R., '02, p. 441. 



APPLICABILITY OF TREATIES TO ALSACE-LORRAINE 61 

no sympathy with the evaders of mihtary duty, and while it did 
not contest the right of Prussia to expel undesirables, it claimed the 
right to know why any given American citizen should be so con- 
sidered. Otherwise, indiscriminate expulsion w^ould "operate as a 
deterrent to the exercise of the rights of expatriation and the 
acquisition of allegiance granted under the naturalization treaties.' ' 
A new phase of the subject was introduced by cases of the 
former citizens of Alsace-Lorraine. By these cases it became 
evident that the Government of Germany was unwilhng to admit 
that this territory was to be included under the provisions of the 
Bancroft treaties,^^ which were signed before the acquisition of 
those provinces. The United States refused to admit this non- 
applicability of the naturalization treaties to the territory of 
Alsace-Lorraine.^^ Germany contended that the United States 
had been informed of this stand definitely in 1881 and had accepted 
it without dispute at that time.^^ It is true that the subject was 
brought up in that year, but Dr. White, then American Minister, 
bears witness in his autobiography^- that the German contention 

3' F. R., '03, p. 443. 

^0 F. R., '04, p. 319. '' F. R., '06, p. 652. ■ 

« Autobiography of A. D. White, Vol. I, pp. 592 ff. 

"I immediately wrote to the minister of foreign affairs, stating the man's 
case, and sho^vnng that it came under the Bancroft treaties, or at least under 
the construction of them which the German Government up to that time 
had freely allowed. To this I received an answer that the Bancroft treaties, 
having been made before Alsace-Lorraine was annexed to the empire, did 
not apply to these new provinces, and that the youth was detained as a 
deserter. To this I repUed that, although the minister's statement was 
strictly true, the point had been waived long before in our favor; that in no 
less than eight cases the German Government had extended the benefit of 
the Bancroft treaties over Alsace-Lorraine; and that in one of these cases the 
acting minister of foreign affairs had declared the intention of the government 
to make this extension permanent." 

The German authorities still refused to free the citizen in question, and 
Dr. White perceived that Bismarck himself was behind the refusal. 

"The matter became more and more serious. The letter of the law was 
indeed on Bismarck's side; but the young man was an American citizen and 
the idea of an American citizen being held in prison was anything but pleasant 
to me, and I knew that it would be anything but pleasant to my fellow-citizens 
across the water. . . . My position was especially difficult liecause I 
dared not communicate the case fully to the American State Dejiartment of 
that period. ... I therefore stopped short with my first notification to 
the State Department — to the effect that a naturalized American had been 
imprisoned for desertion in Alsace-Lorraine, and that the legation was doing 



62 RIGHTS OF AMERICAN CITIZEN'S OF GERMAN BIRTH 

was by no means accepted without dispute by the United States. 
On the contrary the discussion of the case of an American citizen 
who was arrested by the German miUtary authorities on his return 
to his native province of Alsace, threatened to become a serious 
diplomatic incident and required skilled maneuvering on the part 
of the American Minister before the matter was adjusted. Dr. 
White pointed out to the minister of Foreign Affairs, that in at 
least eight cases the German Government had applied the Bancroft 
treaties to Alsace-Lorraine, and that "in one of these cases the 
acting INIinister of Foreign Affairs had declared the intention of 
the government to make this extension permanent." After much 
delay the German Government freed the American citizen in 
question. It did not yield, however, its declaration that the 
Bancroft treaties did not apply to the annexed provinces. As in 
several other cases, the incident was therefore closed, leaving both 
countries holding opposite vie^^'points. 

Thus it became clear to both nations that the solution of the 
problem lay in the fonuation of a new treaty which should def- 
initely place "American citizens born in Alsace-Lorraine on the 
same footing as other American citizens of German origin. " There- 
fore, instructions were given*^ to the American Ambassador to 
enter into negotiations for such a treaty with the German Govern- 

its best to secure his release. To say more than this involved danger that 
the affair might fall into the hands of sensation-mongers and result in howls 
and threats against the German Government and Bismarck; and I knew 
well that, if such howls and threats were made, Bismarck would never let 
this young Israelite out of prison as long as he lived. 

It seemed hardly the proper thing, serious as the case was, to ask for my 
passports. It was certain that, if this were done, there would come a chorus 
of blame from both sides of the Atlantic. ... I secured from Washington 
by cable a leave of absence, but, before starting, saw some of my diplomatic 
colleagues, who were wont to circulate freely and talk much, stated the 
main features of the case to them, and said that I was 'going off to enjoy 
mj^self;' that there seemed little use for an American minister in a country 
where precedents and agreements were so easily disregarded. Next day I 
started for the French Riviera. The journey was taken leisurely, with 
interesting halts at Cologne and Aix-la-Chapelle; and, as I reached the hotel 
in Paris, a telegram was handed me — 'Your man in Alsace-Lorraine is free.' 
It was evident that the chancellor had felt better and had thought more 
leniently of the matter, and I had never another difficulty of the sort during 
the remainder of my stay." 

«F. R., '07, p. 511. 



ATTEMPTS TO SECURE NEW TREATY 63 

ment on the ground that the Bancroft treaties had had "the 
greatest influence in drawing the people of the United States and 
of Germany into friendly accord." Through the following year, 
1908, no reply was received from the German Government*^ as to 
the negotiations suggested, although the German Secretary of 
Foreign Affairs had signified the willingness of his government to 
conclude such a treaty. The United States Ambassador was again 
instructed to bring the matter before the German Government. 
With these instructions, given in April, 1908, the whole corre- 
spondence on the subject ceased to be published in the United 
States Government diplomatic correspondence. It is therefore 
difficult to ascertain what the further developments were in regard 
to the long-continued problem of the rights of the naturalized 
American of German birth to freedom of sojourn in Germany. 

Tracing the course of the controversy there is evident an 
increasing strictness in the policy of the German Go^'ernment 
(particularly of the Prussian military authorities) toward the 
returning former Germans of military age, and the insistence of 
that government's right under international law to expel any 
citizen whom it considers to be undesirable. The United States 
policy became considerably modified, and in later years it admitted 
the rights claimed by Germany protesting only at a policy of 
indiscriminate expulsion. Throughout the controversy there was 
evident a spirit of willingness on the part of both countries, while 
maintaining principles, to yield in individual instances as a diplo- 
matic favor and in deference to the friendly relations between the 
two countries. 

« F. R., '08, p. 376. « F. R., '07, p. 511. 



CHAPTER IV 
COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

The commerce of the United States and the German Empire 
was never regulated by a comprehensive commercial treaty. 
Temporary agreements were concluded from time to time deter- 
mining the status of certain products of one country under the 
tariff provisions of the other, but the principles governing such 
decisions were not embodied in any formal treaty made since the 
unification of the empire. In the absence of such formal agree- 
ment the two nations used as a working basis the old treaty of 
1828 between the L^nited States and Prussia/ which placed the 
contracting parties on the basis of the "most-favored-nation" 
in all matters of commerce and navigation. The controversies 
which developed from time to time over the application of this 
treaty to the commercial legislation of the two countries, centered 
in a contrasting and, in the case of Germany varying interpreta- 
tion of the "most-favored-nation" principle.- The question was 
whether that principle required the extension to all most-favored- 
natibns, automatically, of any privilege granted to a single country 
or whether it required that extension only in return for compensa- 
tion. The policy of Germany^ was a changing one in this respect, 
the Imperial Government holding at certain periods the uncon- 
ditional, and at others offering only the conditional concept. The 
United States held consistently to the narroAver concept of recip- 

1 For the question as to the vahdity of this treaty, see Chap. II, Treaty 
Relations. 

- See Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Session. 

Also Fisk: "Most-favored-nation Relations: German-American." — Journal 
of Political Economy, March, 1903. 

Also F. R., 1911, p. 5. 

^Calwer: "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 19 ff. 



ECONOMIC BASIS OF RELATIONS 65 

rocity, i. e., no favors granted without compensating favors received. 
This, as has been shown (Chapter II) , w^as expressly provided for 
by Article IX of the treaty of 1828 with Prussia. 

The determining factor throughout the negotiations over ques- 
tions of trade has been the tariff. In the case of both Germany and 
the United States the individual subjects of diplomatic protest 
are directly or indirectly related to the changing legislation of the 
tariff or to the changing application of existing tariff provisions. 
The tariff legislation, though affected by manifold domestic forces, 
political, industrial and even psychological, has been in general 
the product of the economic character of the countries enacting it. 
The industrial development of Germany^ combined with the growth 
of American agriculture, revoluntionized the economic position 
of Germany. It was changed from a food-exporting to a food- 
importing country. Before the first decade of the empire the agri- 
cultural sections of Germany had exported considerable quantities 
of grain. Later, however, the development of the American north- 
west and the improvement of ocean transportation brought Ameri- 
can cereals into the European markets in great quantities, so that 
the German farmers lost not only their export markets, but were 
in danger of losing their home market as well. The natural result 
was the development of an agrarian protective policy. This was 
embodied in the tariff' law of 1879.-^ Protection for manufactured 
products was also increased especially by the system of premiums 
and subsidies. Two conflicting interests had to be served — German 
fanners must be protected against the overwhelming imports 
of American grain and livestock, and yet German industrials 
must receive raw materials, including foodstuff's, at a price low 
enough to enable them to compete with foreign manufacturers 
in the final selling price of their products. Count Caprivi recog- 
nized that Germany's future must be that of an industrial State 
and initiated a new^ tariff' policy wdiich took into account not only 
the agrarian interests but also the interests of the manufacturers, 
by reducing the rates of duty on raw materials and foodstuffs. 

4 Fisk, U. S.-Ger. Com., Polit. Rel., p. 1.39. 

5 Fisk, U. S.-Ger. Com., Polit. Rel., p. 141. 



66 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

The economic self-sufficiency of the United States, of the British 
Empire, and to a certain degree even of Russia, was beginning 
to create an economic danger for Germany and other IMiddle- 
European states. There developed therefore the movement toward 
a union of the nations of central Europe for mutual protection 
against the economic advantages of the other powers, particularly 
the L'nited States. This expressed itself in a series of commercial 
treaties concluded since 1892 by Germany with Middle-European 
countries — agreements which sought to abolish commercial 
barriers between them and create a greater economic independence 
for the contracting powers. The^ treaties included reductions of 
duties on agricultural products, sHght reductions of duties on 
manufactured products, and were concluded for a period of twelve 
years. As a matter of fact, it is difficult to see the immediate 
commercial advantage to Germany of these agreements since she 
proceeded to extend the advantages expressed in them to the many 
countries, including the United States, with whom she was bound 
by the principle of the "most-favored-nation." The treaties 
were, howe\Tr, the embodiment of an idea which has threatened 
at A'arious recent times to express itself much more effectively, 
that is, in the form of a INIiddle-European Tariff Union. 

The high protective policy developed b>- the United States at 
the time of the Civil War and maintained in principle ever since, 
finds its counterpart in the protective poHcy of Germany, which 
developed a little later, beginning with the tariff of 1879." There 
is, ho\Aever (up to within very recent years) the important differ- 
ence that the German protective system has been dictated by the 
Agrarian Party, whereas the protectionists of the United States 
have been the manufacturing interests. Owing to the character 
of the exports of the two countries this worked to the American 
benefit. Throughout the diplomatic protests and counter-protests 
that follow the tariff changes, the economic advantage is constantly 
with the United States. Germany could hedge in her manufactures 
with protective measures, but she must keep low or admit free 



« Fisk, Mid. Eur. Tar. Union, p. 595. 

7 Fisk, U. S.-Ger. Com., Polit. Rel., p. 144. 



RESTRICTIONS AGAINST AJVIERICAN PORK 67 

the raw products required by those industries. These raw products 
she obtained in large measure from the United States. Even in 
the case of United States' food products against which she could 
and did enact restrictive measures, she must face the opposition 
of a large and g^ow^ng portion of her own people, the industrials 
who were demanding the cheap and abimdant articles of food 
furnished by America. The United States on the other hand, 
in its strong policy of industrial protection, enacted tariff measures 
which opposed almost the complete range of German exports, 
since these consisted almost exclusively of manufactured goods. 

Such was in general the economic background for the trade 
relations between the two countries. Commercial conflicts 
brought before the diplomatic departments for solution related 
themseh'es in complicated and often very indirect fashion to the 
changing tariff enactments. 

One of the earliest and most enduring subjects of controversy 
was that over American pork and the prohibition of its importa- 
tion into Germany. This commercial conflict began with the 
imperial decree of June 25, 18S0,* prohibiting the admission into 
Germany of all kinds of pork except hams and sides of bacon. 
The reason given for the decree was an epidemic of trichinosis due 
to the eating of diseased pork. The exemption was made in the 
case of hams and sides of bacon because, through proper inspection, 
the trichinfe might be detected in these and the infected meats 
condemned. In 1882'' a request on the part of the United States 
to have this decree modified for the benefit of certain prepared 
meat products of two important meat packing companies was 
refused. In 1883^'* a measure w^as brought before the Bundesrath 
prohibiting the importation of all American pork, including hams 
and live animals. In protesting^^ the passage of this measure the 
United States stated that the assumption of the diseased condition 
of American pork was unfounded and unjust, that German trade 
interests in the admission of the pork were very great, that its 
cheapness made it an important food product for the poorer 

» F. R., '82, p. 158. ^ F. R., '82, p. 158. 

10 F. R., '83, p. 320. 11 F. R., '83, p. 320. 



68 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

classes in Germany, and that the planned reduction of United 
States' import charges would so aid German manufactured goods 
that Germany should favor the products of the United States. 
That the innocuous character of American pork might be demon- 
strated, President Arthur invited Germany^^ to "send a commission 
of experts to the United States to examine the raising and packing 
of hogs and hog products for food." This invitation was declined. 
The reason given was^^ that the prohibition was "a measure of 
internal German legislation found necessary after careful investi- 
gation on sanitary grounds and closely connected with the internal 
institutions of the country. . . . Germany by its strict and 
rigorously enforced legislation afforded the same protection to its 
people at home against all danger from German cattle and hogs, 
it could not therefore treat the foreign producers better than its 
own. An investigation of the American methods of raising hogs 
and preparing hog products by a commission of German experts 
in the United States could not effect a material change in this 
respect." It is difficult to follow this reasoning. An investigation 
by a German commission might have shown the American methods 
to be as careful and the meat as healthful as the German, in which 
case there would be no better treatment of the foreign producers. 
It is also difficult to see the applicability of the other arguments 
used, namely, that Germany made no request to England to inves- 
tigate German conditions when that country chose to impose 
restrictions on the importation of German cattle. Xor does the 
further argument seem conclusive that Austria-Hungary, whose 
cattle were also excluded from Germany, had not suggested an 
inquiry of German officials. The most justifiable of the reasons 
assigned^^ was that while a commission might find perfect order in 
the establishments it might visit, there was no law guaranteeing 
uniformity of inspection throughout the United States. ^^ 

i-F. R., '83, p. 335. 

" Sen. Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 144 ff. " Ibid., p. 153 ff. 

15 Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 144 ff. 

Secretary Frelinghuysen summed up the ground of refusal to be that 
"in a matter concerning domestic sanitary legislation, the German Govern- 
ment could not enter into any arrangement which might imply an obligation 
on its part to accept and be bound by a state of facts existing outside of its 
jurisdiction." Ibid., i)age 6. 



GERMAN PROHIBITION DECREE OF 1883 69 

In spite of these protests of the American minister and others 
from German merchants interested in the importation of American 
pork, the decree of prohibition was passed by the Bundesrath.^*' 
In trying to obtain a suspension of the prohibitory ordinance, the 
American ambassador expressed the warning that the United 
States might resort to retahatory measures against German 
products.^" The prohibition, however, went into effect. 

i« F. R., '83, p. 360. 

^^ This action on the part of Mr. Sargent was disapproved by Secretary 
Frelinghuysen and the minister was instructed to make explanation of this 
to the German Government. See the following extracts from the correspond- 
ence. 

F. R., 18S3, p. 342. (Inclosure in No. 111.) 

j\Ir. Sargent to Count Hatzfeldt. 

Legation of tihe United States, 

Berlin, February 23, 1883. 



Inasmuch as the United States are a large and growing consumer of 
German manufactures, and the food they export to Germany is a principal 
article of exchange, the laws of trade must dictate their obtaining the goods 
they import elsewhere, if the equivalent which they furnish is refused. This 
would probably result even if the Congress did not meet the issue by legisla- 
tion under the belief that another motive than the unsoundness of American 
pork products caused this exclusion. Such a behef, of course, could not 
obtain if fair investigation on the spot by German experts showed dangerous 
unsoundness to exist. 

A. A. Sargent." 
F. R., 1883, p. 356, No. 185. 

Mr. Frelinghuysen to Mr. Sargent. 

Department of State, 
Washington, March 14, 1883. 



So far as your intimation touches the operation of the laws of inter- 
national trade, it is unexceptionable. Those laws control themselves, and 
commerce must perforce work its own channels in the most natural directions ; 
but when you go further and indicate the possibility that this Government 
may resort to retaliation if its views be not assented to by Germany, you 
introduce an element which it was not intended to present. 

The action taken by this Government was unusual, and necessarily pre- 
supposed that the direct proposal of the President to the Imi)erial Govern- 
ment would be entertained in the same frank spirit in which it was proffered; 
and no doubt, it will yet receive a courteous reply, whether favorable or 
unfavorable. 

It may be that His Majesty the Emperor may decHne to send hither a 
commission as has been proposed, through unwillingness, possibly, that the 
results of its labors should have a binding effect upon his Government, such 
as might naturally be supposed to follow from a commission created by 
imperial order. The German Government has an undoul:)ted right to with- 
hold its concurrence in the suggestion of the President and the exercise of the 
right would give no occasion for offense. It is the duty of governments to 



70 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

The prohibition was not confined to Germany. Restrictive 
measures of varying degrees of severity had been enacted against 
American pork products since 1879 by France, Austria-Hungary, 
Italy, Turkey and Greece and, for a short time, by England. 
The movement, according to the Secretary of State, Freling- 
huysen,^* was at first confined to hygienic considerations, but 
soon became subjected to the pressure of the local pork industries 
in the various continental countries, the general tendency of the 
scientists becoming opposed to the prohibitive measures as unwise 
and unnecessary. 

In the year following the German prohibition decree the whole 
subject of the restrictions of European countries against American 

be jealous of the health and careful of the interests of the citizens or subjects, 
and the President does not seek to support an appeal to German sense of 
equity by any menace. 

In this view of the matter, therefore, any intimation, such as is contained 
in your note to Count Hatzfeldt, that retaliation might ensue in the event of 
a refusal, was out of place." 

Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 154, No. 98. 
Mr. von Eisendecker to Mr. Frelinghuysen. 

Imperial German Legation, 
Washington, July 27, 1883. 



The aforesaid note of Mr. Sargent made an unpleasant impression in 
Berhn, both because of its interference in the domestic affairs of Germany, 
and of its tone, which was not in harmony with the friendly relations existing 
between the two governments. The German Government is consequently 
much gratified to find that the Government of the United States does not 
adopt the position taken by its representative in his aforesaid note." 

Mr. Sargent's severe criticism of the German Government and his impugn- 
ment of its motives in issuing and maintaining the decree of prohibition 
against American pork, led finally to his recall "disguised under the name 
of transfer." See Moore's Digest of International Law, Vol. IV, p. 722; 
Autobiography of Andrew D. White, Vol. I, p. 594; and John W. Foster's 
"Practice of Diplomacy," pp. 116 and 117. 

18 Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4. 

Also President Cleveland's message to Congress, December 8, 1885. (F. R., 
1885, p. X.) 

"I regret to say that the restrictions upon the importation of our pork into 
France continue, notwithstanding the abundant demonstration of the absence 
of sanitary danger in its use; but I entertain strong hopes that, with a better 
understanding of the matter, this vexatious prohibition will be removed. It 
would be pleasing to be able to say as much with respect to Germany, Austria 
and other countries, where such food products are absolutely excluded, without 
present prospect of change." 



AMERICAN MEAT INSPECTION LAW OF 1890 71 

products was brought before the United States Congress. The 
Committee on Foreign Relations, acting on a resohition of the 
Senate, submitted a report recommending a bill which provided 
for measures of reprisal. ^'^ The President was to be authorized 
" at his discretion to exclude from the United States, by procla- 
mation, any product of any foreign state which, by unjust discrimi- 
nation, prohibits the importation into such foreign state of any 
product of the United States." S;.ich a provision was not passed 
at this time but was finally embodied in the Meat Inspection Law 
of August 30, 1890.-'^ In presenting its recommendation the 
Foreign Relations Committee had based its conclusions as to the 
general healthfulness of American pork products on the report of a 
commission which had been appointed by the President to inves- 
tigate the conditions of the swine industry in the United States 
and had testified to the generally healthful condition of the 
pork.2i 22 

" Senate Report No. 345, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 

20 U. S. Statute.s, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 'S9-'90, No. 5. 

21 House Ex. Doc. No. 106, 48th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 136. 

22 Senate Report 345, Part 2, 48th Cong., 1st Sess. 

At the time these recommendations were submitted by the Committee on 
Foreign Relations a minority report was filed by Senator Vance of North 
Carolina, Democratic member of the Committee, as follows: 

"The undersigned is not able to concur in the report of the committee, 
and is constrained by the importance of the subject to present the reasons 
for his non-concurrence. 

The matter complained of, and which the bill is designed to remedy, is the 
exclusion of our hog products from entering Germany for sale on the ground 
that they are unwholesome. In my opinion, Germany has the right to do 
this if she deems it proper, and that we are not justified in impeaching her 
motives in so doing. 

If it be true that our pork is to any extent unwholesome, we should endeavor, 
by a rigid system of inspection, to remove the cause of complaint. 

If it be that fear of trichinosis is only a pretext, and that the real reason 
for excluding our hog products is the desire to protect their own producers, 
then we are the last people on earth who ought to complain. After sur- 
rounding ourselves for more than twenty years with a protective tariff wall 
so high as to exclude virtually all the products of Germany which compete 
with ours, it is rather late for us to advocate retaliation against a Government 
which merely follows our example. In fact Germany's action is retaliation, 
and the cry of 'Stop thief cannot change the true condition of things. We 
have got to learn that we are not so great and independent as to enable us to 
defy the laws of political economy and the amenities of international trade 
with impunity. 

We have been told again and again that our true policy was to shut up 



72 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

With the continuance of the restrictions the president in a 
later message to Congress recommended^^ legislative measures 
for the prevention of the importation of swine and products of 
swine from France and Germany on the same ground of the 
unhealthful condition of the meat. Germany regarded this recom- 
mendation as purely retaliatory because of the measures in Ger- 
many against American swine products and declared that Ger- 
many's exportation to America consisted mainly of the fine types 
of sausage in the manufacture of which especial care was taken in 
Germany. It was also stated that if the United States wished the 
remo\'al of the German prohibition, the way to secure it lay not 
in reprisals but in reforming her slaughter-house and packing 
methods. 

In 1891 the subject of the withdrawal of the prohibition against 
American pork was brought before the Reichstag.^* Those favor- 
ing the withdrawal voiced their own and the United States' con- 
tention that the meat was healthy, that it was eaten in the United 
States, England and elsewhere without injury, that the German 
working people needed it as a cheap and nourishing food, that the 
United States felt keenly this discrimination against one of its 
staple products, that the decree when passed in 1SS3 was con- 
sidered to be merely a temporary measure, and most important 
of all, that the American government had just passed a law pro- 
viding for a very strict inspection of the hogs and hog products 
which should guarantee the health v condition of the meat. The 



our manufactures from the competition of the world, and that all the nations 
thus excluded would he compelled, nevertheless, to buy our breadstuff's and 
provisions — that they could not do without them. We are greatly surprised 
and indignant when one important customer says he can get along without 
our hog products, and forbids their coming in; and we propose to retaliate! 
For what? For simply and frankly forbidding them to be imported. Suppose, 
instead of doing this, Germany had imposed a duty of 100 per cent, on them, 
which as effectuallj^ prohibited their importation, what then? Where would 
be our so-called retaliation? The undersigned can see no difference whatever 
in the two methods of prohibition, so far as results are concerned, only that 
one is manly and direct, while the other is indirect and based on false pre- 
tenses." 



25 F. R., '88, p. 629. 
2^ F. R., '91, p. 502. 



EFFORTS TO SECURE WITHDRAWAL OF GERMAN PROHIBITION 73 

attitude of the German government was growing more lenient-^ 
and it implied its willingness to remove the prohibition provided 
that fullest measures for sanitary meat could be secured. It 
declared, however, that it was not yet satisfied with the methods 
of slaughtering and preparing meat in America and that the new 
law adopted by Congress was inadequate, because the inspection 
provided for was not compulsory, and was made on the meat after 
it had been boxed. 

Although the measure did not pass at this session the German 
minister a few months later intimated to the American Secretary 
of State^® that his government was willing to accept the inspection 
provided for by the new and more stringent law enacted by Con- 
gress on j\Iarch third of that year. By the new act inspection was 
made compulsory and universal throughout the United States.*" 
The inspection was made by microscope both before and after 
the slaughter of the animal and the examined products were 
clearly labelled and identified throughout all future stages of 
marketing. 

It is important at this juncture to observe the role of the tariff 
and its use by both countries to regulate reciprocal concessions. 
The highly protective IMcKinley tariff of 1890 had just been 
enacted." It had removed the duty on sugar, replacing it by 
bounties paid to domestic sugar producers. It had, however, 
provided for the possibility of the renewal of the duty by a recip- 
rocity clause giving the president power to impose by proclama- 
tion certain duties on sugar, molasses, tea, coffee and hides, if he 
considered that any country exporting these commodities "imposed 
duties on other products of the United States which . . . 
he may deem to be reciprocally unjust or unreasonable." There- 
fore, in the same interview^^ in which the German minister inti- 
mated that his government might be willing to accept the new meat 

25F. R., '91, p. 502. 
26F. R., '91, p. 511. 

" Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 276 ff. 
28 F. R., '91, p. 511. 



74 , COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

inspection law of the United States as satisfactory and admit pork 
to Germany, he also sought assurance from the Secretary of State 
that the United States' Government would not, through the new 
tariff act of October 1, 1S90, restore the duty on German sugar 
imported into the United States. The President justly contended, 
however, that since Germany excluded American pork on the 
ground of unhealthfulness, it should not make its repeal of the 
prohibition contingent on something entirely unrelated to this. 
Nevertheless, the President declared himself "disposed to treat 
with the German Government respecting commercial reciprocity 
. . . with the greatest spirit of hberality, and the prompt 
action of that government regarding the pork inspection will ha^'e 
its due weight in detemiining the terms of the reciprocity arrange- 
ment." In other words the offer to enter into a bargain was 
accepted. 

This offer resulted in the so-called Saratoga Agreement.-* It 
took the form of an exchange of declarations between Mr. von 
Muinm, then Imperial Charge d 'Affaires at Washington, and ]\Ir. 
John W. Foster, and took place at Saratoga, New York, on August 
22, 1891.^° The Imperial Government promised to admit to 
Germany American pork and pork products and to extend to the 
agricultural products of the United States the tariff concessions 
about to be granted by Germany in the treaties then in prepa- 
ration Avith several European states. The Government of the 
United States promised not to put into operation against Germany 
the provision of the meat inspection law of August 30, 1890, which 
stipulated^! "that whenever the President shall be satisfied that 
unjust discriminations are made by or under the authority of any 
foreign state against the importation to or sale in such foreign 
state of any product of the United States, he may direct that such 
products of such foreign states so discriminating against any 

2^ V. R., 1891, Anlagen Nr. 571 (also V. R., 1909, vol. 242, Anl. p. 61). 
3" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 119, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-'92, p. 110. 
Also Calwer, "Die jVIeistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," pp. 21 ff. 
" U. S. Stat., 51st Cong., 1st Sess., '89-'90, p. 415, No. 5. 



THE SARATOGA AGREEMENT ^5 

product of the United States as he may deem proper shall be 
excluded from importation into the United States." 

The Saratoga Agreement was not understood^- to supplant in 
any way the old Prussian treaty, but merely to regulate the specific 
commercial problems of that time. The assurances on the part 
of the United States that it would not impose a tax on German 
sugar confined themselves to the period of the duration of the 
IMcKinley tariff. The German concessions^^ were also operative 
only for the duration of the treaties with European countries. 

The relation of the Saratoga Agreement^"* to the principle of the 

32 V. R., 1909, Anl. Vol. 242, pp. 61 and 62. 
'" V. R., '95-'97, 21.3 Sitz. 3 Mai, '97, Vol. VIII, p. 5707. 
3^ Sen. Ex. Doc, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-'92, Nr. 119, p. 110 (also Calwer, 
"Die Meistbeguenstigung der V. St.," p. 21 ff.). 

The note directed by the German representative von Mumm to Mr. Foster 

read as follows: 

Saratoga, August 22, 1891. 
"Mr. Plenipotentiary: 

Inasmuch as the inspection of meat intended for interstate commerce in 
North America and for exportation to foreign countries has Iseen made com- 
pulsory by the act of March third, 1891, relative to the execution of that act, 
the Imperial Government is happy to announce that there is no longer any 
cause for maintaining in force the prohibition, promulgated on sanitary 
grounds in the year 1883, of the importation of hogs, pork, and sausages of 
American origin, provided that they are officially inspected according to the 
regulations of March twenty-fifth, 1891, and accompanied by the required • 
certificate. As soon, therefore, as the Government of the United States of 
America is able officially to inform the Imperial Government when the act 
of March third, 1891, will actually take effect in the manner provided by the 
regulations of March 25, 1891, so that the guaranty which is contemplated 
by the aforesaid act shall appear confirmed, viz., that no meat dangerous to 
health shall he exported, the Imperial Government will take the necessary 
prehminary measures to abolish the German prohibition of importation which 
was promulgated May sixth, 1883. 

The Imperial Government in making this declaration bases its action upon 
the supposition that, after the abolition of the aforesaid prohibition of importa- 
tion, the President of the United States of America will no longer have any 
occasion for the exercise, as regards the German Empire, of the discretion- 
ary powers conferred upon him by the Fifty-first Congress. (See Section 3 of 
the Tariff Act of October first, 1890; also public act No. 2477.) 

The Imperial Government thinks that it has the greater reason for this 
assumption, since it is jjrepared to grant to the United States of America the 
same reductions in customs duties on agricultural products that have been 
granted by it (or still are so) to Austria-Hungary and other states during the 
negotiations for the conclusion of a treaty of commerce that are now being 
conducted by Germany. 

Begging you to he pleased to inform me, in your reply to this note, whether 
the view expressed bj^ the Imperial Government as regards Section 3 of the 
tariff' act of October first, 1890, and Section 5 of the act providing for the 



76 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

"most-favored-nation" has been viewed in radically opposite 
Avays by German officials. The Imperial Chancellor, Prince von 

inspection of meat of August thirtieth, 1890, is correct, I await information 
from you as to the time when the act of March third, 1891, is to be fully 
enforced, in pursuance of the I'egulations of March twenty- fifth, 1891. 

I avail, etc., 

A. VON MtlMM." 

The German Charge d'Affaires received on the same date the following 
reply from Mr. Foster: 

Saratoga, August 22, 1891. 
"Sir: 

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of today in 
which you inform me that, when the Government of the United States shall 
be able to announce to the German Imperial Government that the ])ro visions 
of the law of March third of the present year and the regulations of the twenty- 
fifth of the same month, respecting the inspection of meat destined for inter- 
state and foreign commerce, have been practically put in operation, the 
Imperial Government will take the necessary steps for abolishing the order 
of March sixth, 1883, prohil^iting the importation into Germany of hogs, pork 
and sausages of American origin; and you further state that, in view of this 
declaration and of the further fact that the Imperial Government is willing 
to grant to the United States the same tariff reductions in agricultural pro- 
ducts which have been granted by commercial treaty negotiations with 
Austria-Hungary or which may be granted to other countries, the Imperial 
Government entertains the expectation that no cause will thereafter exist 
for the President of the United States to make use, as against the German 
Emjiire of the powers conferred upon him by the Fifty-first Congress in Sec- 
tion 3 of the tariff law of October first and section 5 of the meat inspection law 
of August thirtieth, 1890. 

It gives pleasure to announce to you that the inspection of meat in accord- 
ance with the law of March third last and of the regulations of the twenty-fifth 
of the same month, is now and for some weeks past has been in practical 
operation under the direction and at the expense of the Government of the 
United States, and that meat so inspected will be ready for exportation to 
Germany on or before the first day of next month. It is also very gratifying 
to me to give the assurance by direction of the President, that the contem- 
plated action of the Imperial Government in abohshing the order of March 
sixth, 1883, prohibiting the importation of hogs, pork and sausages of Ameri- 
can origin will remove the occasion for the exercise by the President, as 
against the German Empire of the power conferred upon him by section 5 
of the meat inspection law of the Congress of the United States of August 
thirtieth, 1890. 

I am further directed by the President to state that he accepts the action 
of the Imperial Government in proposing to grant to the agricultural products 
of the United States the same tariff reductions, on their im])ortation into 
Germany, as are granted to the similar productions of Austria-Hungary 
embraced in the commercial treaty recently negotiated with that government, 
or which may be granted by Germany to other countries, as a due reciprocity 
for the action of the Congress of the United States as contained in section 3 of 
the tariff law of October first, 1890; and that as soon as he shall be officially 
informed that the Imperial Government is prepared to decree the admission 
of the indicated products of the United States into the German Empire at the 
reductions of the general tariff proposed, the President will cause the necessary 
orders to be given to secure the continued free admission into the United 



SARATOGA AGREEMENT AND MOST-FAVORED-NATION PRINCIPLE 77 

Biielow, hekP^ that the sweeping admission of all American 
Products to the lowest rates of duty granted by the German treaties 
with European countries was evidence that Germany interpreted 
the old 1828 treaty clause at this time in the broadest sense; 
that is, that she admitted the United States to the full status of 
the "most-favored-nation." Richard Calwer, Social Democrat, 

States of the articles, the product of the German Empire enumerated in 
section 3 of said law of October 1, 1890. 

I remain, etc. 

John W. Foster, 
Special Plenipotentiary of the United States." 

Mr. Foster, to whom had been assigned the task of conducting all the 
reciprocity negotiations arising from the McKinley tariff, gives in his Memoirs 
(Vol. II, p. 6) an account of the negotiations with Von Mumm at Saratoga. 
The discussions were not to be made public until an agreement could be 
reached and a premature announcement gave President Harrison some tem- 
porary uneasiness. On September 10, 1891, he wrote to Mr. Foster (Vol. 
II, p. 14). 

"My dear General: 

I was extremely mystified when I found that General Rush (Sec'y of 
Agriculture) had talked about matters that I had explained to him with great 
care were confidential. He came here himself directly from Chicago to ask 
me on behalf of Swift and other packers there whether it would be safe for 
them to start a cargo of sugar-cured hams, etc., for German ports in view of 
the fact that it would take several weeks to get it there. I felt that as this 
matter directly touched his department, it was proper for me to tell him that 
the agreement had been reached, — but I told him how confidential the whole 
matter was; but he seems to have understood, that when the announcement 
of the admission of our pork came from Germany, the whole matter was open 
for comment. 

I have written to Mr. Wharton to say to Mr. Von Mumm that I was very 
much mortified at this mischance, and also that if he thought it desirable, a 
statement might go out from the State Department or from you to the effect 
that the reciprocity part of the negotiations had not been completed, and 
that there would be further correspondence before a general conclusion would 
be reached; but that it was hoped some general result would be reached in 
view of the friendly attitude of Germany. This would })e more nearly true 
than most diplomatic utterances and certainly than most newspaper inter- 
views; indeed it would be literally true, because we do not yet know the articles 
that are to be included and do not know the rates, and indeed do not certainly 
know that the treaty of which we are to have the benefit will be completed." 

No harm befell the negotiations, however, the tariff privileges of the German 
treaties with Austria-Hungary and other European countries were extended 
to the United States (F. R., '97, p. 176) and the agreement was hailed "as a 
great achievement in benefit of American commerce." (Foster, Dipl. Mem., 
Vol. II, p. 14.) 

35 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 62. 



78 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

member of the Reichstag, pointed out,^*' on the other hand, that 
the fact that the Imperial Government used the removal of the 
prohibition against American pork as a means of buying tariff 
concessions from the United States demonstrated a status of mere 
reciprocity betweeli the two nations." Certainly the bargaining 
character of the Saratoga Agreement was unmistakable and as 
such was contrary to an unrestricted most-favored-nation policy. 

On September 3, 1891, the decree repealing the decree excluding 
American pork was signed.^^ Proclamation was therefore not 
made imposing a tax on German sugar. 

Four years later the \Yilson tariff (1894) changed the basis 
completely.^^ The reciprocity provisions were removed.'*° The 
new law reimposed the tax on sugar.^^ Raw sugar was placed 
under an ad valorem duty of 40 per cent, and refined sugar under 
an additional specific duty of one-eighth of a cent a pound. The 

=*«Calwer, "Die Meistbeguenstigung der Ver. St.," p. 20. 
»^ Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. 

A1.SO G. M. Fisk, "Most-favored-nation Relations— German-American," 
in Journal Political Economy, March, 1903. 
F. R., 1911, p. 5. 
'^F. R., '91, p. 577. 

"The decree respecting the prohibition of the importation of swine, swine's 
flesh, and sausages of American origin, of March 6, 1883 . . . ceases to 
be in force for living swine as well as for such products as are pro\'ided with an 
official certificate stating the flesh has, in the land of origin been examined 
pursuant to the rules in force there, and has been found free from qualities 
injurious to health." 

M Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 313 

« Mclvinley, The Tariff, pp. 204 and 205. 

In introducing his bill, Mr. Wilson, Chairman of the Committee on Ways 
and Means, set forth the objections to these provisions of the McKinley 
Tariff. 

"This section," he said," has brought no appreciable advantage to American 
exporters; it is not in intention or effect a provision for reciprocitj^ but for 
retaliation. It inflicts penalties upon the American people by making them 
pay higher prices for these articles if the fiscal necessities of other nations 
comjiel them to levy duties upon the products of the United States which, in 
the opinion of the President, are reciprocally unequal and unreasonable. . . . 
Moreover, we do not believe that Congress can rightly vest in the President 
of the United States any authority or power to impose or release taxes on 
our people by proclamation or otherwise, or to suspend or disj)ense with the 
operation of a law of Congress." 

*i Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 313. 



SUGAR SURTAX OF WILSON TARIFF 79 

bounty to domestic producers was abolished, but to offset this, 
an extra duty of one-tenth of a cent a pound was placed on the 
refined sugar from those countries which paid an export bovmty 
to their sugar producers. 

This measure affected Germany especially. She protested^^ on 
the ground that such a duty was in contravention of Article 5^^ of 
the commercial treaty of 1828 between the United States and 
Prussia. 

Within two months after the Wilson Tariff' Act, Germany noti- 
fied'*-* the United States of her intention to prohibit the importa- 
tion of American cattle and fresh meats owing to the discovery 
of Texas fever in two recent shipments of cattle from the United 
States. The protest of the United States stated that this measure 
would needlessly create great injury, that the cattle affected by 
the Texas fever came from only a certain district of Texas, that 
export from this district had been prohibited and that the enforce- 
ment of such a measure would be considered in the United States 
to be unfriendly and merely retaliatory in return for the imposi- 
tion of the surtax on German sugar. The protest also explained 
that the President intended to adN-ise Congress to repeal the sugar 
tax and that this action of Germany's in regard to American cattle 
would defeat his effort. 

President Cleveland carried out this intention and recommended 
to Congress,'*^ "in the interest of the commerce of both countries, 
and to avoid even the accusation of treaty \-iolation," the repeal 
of that portion of the tariff law which laid the extra duty on sugar. 
The United States' Secretary of State (Gresham) also agreed with 
Gennany that the duty was a discrimination against a product 
of Germany*'^ and was ''an attempt to offset a domestic favor or 

42 F. R., '94, p. 236. 
« F. R., '83, p. 369. 

Article V. "Nor shall any proliibition be imposed on the importation of 
any article the produce or manufacture of the United States or of Prussia, 
to or from the ports of the United States, or to and from the ports of Prussia, 
which shall not equally extend to all other nations." 

" F. R., '94, p. 230. « McKinley, The Tariff, p. 236. 

^e F. R., '94, p. 239. 
6 



80 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

encouragement of a certain industry by the very means forbidden 
by the treaty." 

Protest was also made by Germany^'' against the imposition by 
the new tariff act of a duty on salt imported from a country which 
places a duty on salt imported from the United States. This was 
also held to be in contravention of the "most-favored-nation" 
clause of the Prussian treaty, and it was further explained that the 
duties on imported salt in Germany were only internal state taxes, 
not protecting the German domestic salt industry, and hence 
could not be considered as a duty on American salt. 

Further protests were made by both countries^ ^ and while each 
denied that its measures were enacted for purposes of retaliation,^^ 
the danger of drifting into a tariff war became evident. A warning 
of this was expressed by the United States' ambassador to Germany 
who denied at the same time, however, any unfriendly attitude 
on the part of the German Government toward the United States. 

The House of Representatives, early in the year 1895,^° passed 
a bill repealing the surtax on sugar. The bilP^ did not, however, 
pass the Senate. The tax on salt also was maintained^- as falling 
within the province of the tariff act. On the German side the pro- 
hibition of the importation of American cattle and fresh beef was 
maintained, ^^ the German defense being that the increasing pre- 
cautions against it taken by other districts of the United States 
w^ere proof of its diseased condition. The German Government 
insisted^'* that the prohibition was purely from sanitary considera- 
tions, W'as not retaliatory and had no connection with the German 
complaint against the sugar surtax. 

In 1897 the adoption of the Dingley tariff created a new set of 

" F. R., '94, p. 240. ^8 F. R., '95, p. 498. 

" F. R., '95, p. 570. 50 F. R., '95, p. 511. 

" V. R., '95-'97, 213 Sitz., 3 Mai, '97, Vol. VIII, p. 5708. 

52 F. R., '96, p. 208. 

The United States' Secretary of State took the occasion to renew the never 
settled question as to whether the provisions of the old 1828 treaty with 
Prussia were to be considered effective in other portions of the German 
Empire. (See also Chap. II, Treaty Relations.) 

53 F. R., '96, p. 165 54 Y. R., '95, Vol. I, p. 511. 



THE DINGLEY TARIFF 81 

problems for the diplomatic departments. The policy of recipro- 
city was revived.^^ The President was empowered'^'' to negotiate 
with other countries for concessions in return for which the United 
States would reduce certain duties of the new act. The articles 
upon which the United States offered to reduce its tariff' were 
argols (crude tartar), wine lees, brandies, champagne, wines, 
paintings and statuary — a list which Dr. Taussig declares Avas 
aimed to placate France^'' since the new schedule fixed consider- 
ably higher duties on silk. Section 3 then stated that — ^^ 

" Whenever the government of any country . . . producing 
and exporting to the United States the above mentioned articles, 
or any of them, shall enter into a commercial agreement with 
the United States, or make concessions in favor of the products 
or manufactures thereof which, in the judgment of the President, 
shall be reciprocal and equivalent, he is hereby autlwrized . . . 
to suspend ... by proclamation to that effect, the impo- 
sition and collection of the duties mentioned in this act, on such 
articles." 

after which proclamation the duties on those articles coming 
from the specified country might be reduced by 20 per cent, 
of their maximum duties for a period of five years. Any treaties 
arranging for such concessions must be concluded within two years 
after the passage of the act. 

The sugar tarift* was also renewed"^ and given a still more retalia- 
tory aspect by the provision that on articles from bounty-paying 
countries an additional duty should be imposed "equal to the net 
amount of such bounty or grant" paid by the foreign country to 
its domestic exporting industry. The net amount of such bounties 
was to be ascertained by the Secretary of the Treasury who should 
then regulate the assessment accordingly. In Germany's case"" 

55 Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 352 

5« U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., '97, p. 203, Sec. 3. 

" Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 353. 

58 U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 204. 

" U. S. Stat., 55th Cong., 1st Sess., '97, p. 205. 

«»F. R., '97, p. 175. 



82 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

this provision meant a hio^her sugar duty than the Wilson tariff 
surtax imposed. 

The Dingley tariff created considerable hostile sentiment in 
Germany toward the United States. By the provision that all 
sugar from bounty-paj'Jing countries should be subject to an extra 
tax equal to the net bounty paid by the exporting country, Ger- 
many was seriously affected and also felt it to be a discrimination 
against her product. In fact certain United States officials had 
so admitted in the case of the Wilson Tariff of 1894 which embodied 
the same principle. Secretary Gresham at that time stated that 
its effect''' "would fall on Germany and Austria-Hungary alone" 
and that the measure was a "discrimination against the produce 
or manufacture of such countries." President Cleveland in his 
message to Congress had emphatically recommended^'- the repeal 
of the tax and the House of Representatives had voted for its 
repeal the following year (1895). The Attorney-General, however, 
in the similar controversy over the tariff" on German salt, had 
rendered the opposite decision^^ and declared the tax on sugar to 
be perfectly consistent with the "most-favored-nation" clause, 
in the light of the longstanding American interpretation of that 
principle. He also pointed out that Germany had accepted such 
an interpretation in an international sugar conference of 18S8 
when the "representatives of both Great Britain and Germany 
expressly declared-^ . . . that the export sugar bounty of one 
country might l)e counteracted by the import sugar duty of 
another without causing any discrimination which could be 
deemed a violation of the terms of the most-favored-nation 
clause." The official opinions in the Inited States were therefore 
conflicting at this time''^ and the policies contradictory. What 
one house of Congress had repealed another Congress two years 
later had reenacted in more severe form. Although as, INIr. Olney 
had pointed out, Germany had agreed to such a principle in the 
Brussels conference of 1888, the effect was nevertheless to increase 

" F. R., '94, p. 239. ^- F. R., '94, p. x. 

63 F. R., '97, p. 178. . " F. R., '97, p. 179. 

•^'^ White. Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 134. 



EFFECT OF DINGLEY TARIFF IN GERMANY 83 

resentment in Germany, especially among those industrial classes 
directly affected by the measure. In addition to protesting 
on the ground of the treaty of 1S28, the German ambassador also 
referred to the provisions of the Saratoga Agreement of 1891, '^'^ 
stating that it was the general belief that the United States thereby 
guaranteed exemption to Germany from the duty on sugar. The 
United States, however, considered that "the said agreemenf^ 
was no longer in force at the time of the passage of the act of July 
24, 1897 (Dlngley tariff*), inasmuch as the Act of August 28, 
1894 (Wilson tariff) repealed section 3 of the act of October 1, 
1890 (]\IcKinley tariff') under which the agreement was made." 

Strong opposition was expressed in the Reichstag'''* to the pro- 
visions and increased schedule of the Dingley bill and an inter- 
pellation was addressed to the government inquiring whether the 
government, in the face of these new American terms, would con- 
tinue to grant to the United States the privileges of the treaty 
tariff". The reply of the German government was emphatically 
affirmative. Baron von iMarschall, Minister of State and Secretary 
of the Foreign office, stated that^*^'-* 

"The Confederated Governments, when they concluded the 
commercial treaty with Austria-Hungary could have no doubt 
that they were obliged to extend without further question to the 
United States the tariff' reductions granted to Austria-Hungary. 
It would have been an off'ense against good faith if, after having 
repeatedly claimed from the United States rights in our favor, 
we had then denied our concept of those rights when our own 
obligations were in question." 

Under the German concept of the unrestricted status of the 
"most-favored-nation," therefore, admission to the reduced rates 
of the treaties was still due to the United States. 

In 1898 Germany issued a decree^" prohibiting the importation 
of American fresh fruits and later extended this to dried fruits 

«s F. R., '97, p. 234. " F. R., '97, p. 179. 

68 V. R., '95-'97, 213 Sitz., 3 Mai, '97, pp. 5701 ff. '^ Ibid., p. 5709. 

"'' R. Gbl., '98, Nr. 3, p. 5. 



84 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

also, the reason gi^■en being the danger of the dissemination of the 
Sian Jose scale, ^^ the prevalence of which in America the German 
Government held to be indicated by the strict measures enacted 
against it by several American states. '^^ Dr. Andrew D. White, 
American Ambassador to Germany at this time, acknowledged 
that the publications of warning against the scale, issued by the 
United States Department of Agriculture at this period were 
sufficient excuse for alarm. "^ He directed his efforts, however, to 
demonstrating to the German Governmenf^^ that the sweeping 
character of the prohibition was unnecessary and unfair, that 

'1 F. R., '98, p. Ixxvii. 
'2 Sen. Doc. 131, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess. 

The CaUfornia State Board of Horticulture, adopted August 15, 1894, a 
regulation ruling that 

"Fruit of any kind . . . found infected with any insect or insects, or 
with any fungi, blight or other disease ... is hereby prohibited from 
being offered for sale, gift or distribution within the State." 

Agricultural Bulletin No. 3, New Series, 1896, pp. 72-74. "The San Jose 
Scale." 

"We have already shown that the San Jose scale may be spread through 
the scattering of fruit parings at certain seasons of the year, and any legisla- 
tion which is drafted with this insect in view should contain some such rule 
as the one just quoted." 

" F. R., 1898, p. 322. 

"^ Dr. Andrew D. White, Autobiography , Vol. II, p. 159. 

Dr. White refers to the fruit situation in his autobiography: 

"One morning came a storm of telegrams and letters stating that cargoes 
of American fruits had been stopped in the German harbors under the charge 
that they contained injurious insects. The German authorities were, of 
course, honest in this procedure though they were doubtless stimulated to it 
by sundry representatives of the land-owning class. Our beautiful fruits, 
especially those of Cahfornia, had come to be very extensively used through- 
out the Empire, and the German consumers had lieen growing more and more 
happy and the German producers more and more unhappy over this fact — 
when there came from the American side accounts of the scale insect dis- 
covered on pears in C/alifornia, and of severe measures taken by sundry other 
states of our Union to proliibit their importation. The result was the pro- 
hibition of our fruits in Germany, and this was carried so far that not only 
pears from Cahfornia, but all other fruits from all other parts of the country 
were at first put under the ban, and not only fresh but dried and preserved 
fruits. . . . We took pains to show the facts in the case dealing fairly 
and openly with the German Government, allowing that the importation of 
scale-infected trees and shrubs might l)e dangerous, and making no objection 
to any fair measures regarding these. The Foreign Office was reasonable 
and gradually the most vexatious of these prohibitions were removed." 



NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING DINGLEY TARIFF 85 

"vvhile there might be danger of infection from the importation of 
live shrubs and plants, this did not extend to the fresh and dried 
fruits. Upon presentation of the evidence, the German Foreign 
Office yielded in certain respects"^ and removed the restrictions 
against dried fruits, against fresh fruits in lots found uninfected, 
and removed also the requirement of inspection of American fruits 
passing through Germany in bond. The prohibition was main- 
tained against the importation of live trees, shrubs and plants 
from the United States. 

In response to the offer of the Dingley Tariff, France, Portugal 
and Italy made application to the United States'^ for admission 
to the reduced tariff schedule on the designated articles which 
formed an important part of their exports. Agreements were 
therefore concluded by the United States with these countries, 
each one granting certain reciprocal concessions^^ to Americap 
products. Germany then made her application for the extension 
of the same tariff concessions to her own exporters on the basis of 
the "most-favored-nation" clause of the Prussian treaty of 1828. 

The United States replied that it could extend these reduced 
rates only in return for reciprocal concessions from Germany. 
Taking as its basis article IX of the Prussian treaty, which read:''^ 

"If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any 
particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately 
become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely 
granted, to such other nation, or on yielding the same compen- 
sation, when the grant is conditional." 

The American Government showed that the status of the relations^^ 
between the United States and the German Empire was not one 
of the unqualified "most-favored-nation," but one of reciprocity, 
as was expressly provided for in the above article. 

75 Sen. Doc. 131, 55th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 2 ff. Also F. R., 1898, pp. 340 ff. 

'6V. R., Vol. 242, Anl, p. 62. 

" M., Vol. I, pp. 542 and 987. M., Vol. II, p. 1463. 

78 M., Vol. II, p. 1498. '9 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 62. 



86 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

In asserting this interpretation the United States could demon- 
strate a consistent line of policy held by the Union since its begin- 
ning,*^" and could cite numerous declarations by its leading states- 
men from the time of the conclusion of the Prussian treaty forward, 
to show that it had maintained the principle of reciprocity as the 
basis of and in no way inconsistent with its most-favored-nation 
agreements. There w^as one notable exception to this American 
policy in the treaty concluded with Switzerland in 1850.*^ Articles 
VIII to XII of this treaty, as well as the correspondence conducted 
at the time of its conclusion, placed the two nations on the broad 
basis of "most-favored-nation" in so unqualified a manner that 
the United States admitted the treaty to be an exception^^ to its 
otherwise uniform policy. It constituted, therefore, in reality a 
violation of the reciprocity treaties with Germany and other 
countries in that it obliged the I nited States to extend gratui- 
tously to Switzerland favors in tarifi" and commerce which it ex- 
tendefl to other nations only in return for compensation. Realizing 
this fact the American Government annulled at this time the clauses 
concerned and renewed the Swiss treaty on the narrower basis. 
By so doing the United States emphasized anew its standpoint 
that under all such treaties it was bound to extend privileges only 
in return for what it agreed to consider equivalent compensation. 

8° Sen. Doc. No. 29, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess. 

Article IX is a typically worded "equivalence clause," and similar clauses 
modifying the basic "most-favored-nation" clauses (cf. Article V) are included 
in twenty-one out of twenty-eight American commercial treaties. (Ibid., 
page 4.) Even in the case of treaties not containing this equivalence clause 
the interpretation by the United States was the same as if they had con- 
tained the clause. (Ibid., page 13.) For a compilation of precedents of the 
above interpretation as rendered by the United States State Department and 
by the Supreme Court, see the above Senate Document. For early inter- 
pretations at the time of the conclusion of the Prussian treaty, see the following : 

American State Papers: Class I, Foreign Relations, Second Series, Vol. V, 
No. 423, 18th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. (341 and 669. 

Ibid., Vol. v., No. 404, p. 883. 

Ibid., Vol. VI, No. 438, p. 208. 

Sen. Doc, 20th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. V, Serial No. 167, Doc. No. 196. 

81 Malloy, Vol. II, pp. 1766 if. ^'^ F. R., 1899, pp. 746 ff. 



INTERPRETATIONS OF MOST-FAVORED-NATION CLAUSE 87 

The German Government agreed to accept the United States' 
interpretatioai of the Prussian treaty clause, and in a note to the 
American Government formally placed the commercial relations 
of the two countries on a reciprocity basis as follows:*'^ 

" If two contracting parties are of a different opinion concerning 
their treaty obligations, the one interpreting the same in a narrower 
the other in a broader sense, then the latter must suffer a dis- 
advantage. As long as the difference of concept did not lead to 
an actual differentiation of Germany in the United States, the 
Imperial Government was in the position on the basis of the 
broader interpretation of the treaty to grant to the United States 
the complete rights of the "most-favored-nation." But after 
the Union recently had concluded with several countries special 
agreements which granted these tariff favors, while the latter were 
withheld from Germany, then there was actually no longer allotted 
to Germany on the part of the United States the rights of the 
"most-favored-nation." In order that the actual injury accruing 
to the German Empire from the treaty relationship in conse- 
quence of the difference of opinion over the mutual duties, may not 
be allowed to become a permanent one, the Imperial Government 
makes its own the narrow^er interpretation of the treaty adopted by 
America. Accordingly, however, just as Germany can lay claim 
to the favors granted by the Union to third countries, only 
in exchange for equivalent concessions, so the United States of 
America can without corresponding compensation have no title 
to the German treaty clauses w^hich Germany has granted to no 
state without compensation but only in return for particular 
treaty obligations or in return for the granting of the uncon- 
ditional status of the "most-favored-nation." 

The United States agreed to the new basis^^ for the commercial 
relations between herself and Germany and accepted the privilege 

83 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 63 (transl. by author). 

" F. R., 1878, pp. 382, 403 and 405. 

Though Germany presented this as a new basis, and appears to have so 
considered it, it was really not new but had lieen adopted as early as 1878 
when Germany acquiesced in the special reciprocity treaty between the 
United States and Hawaii. The Hawaiian representative, Mr. Carter, 
reported June 25, 1878, following his mission to Europe, the followang account 
of these negotiations in Berlin (p. 403). 

"My negotiations with that (German) government were retarded by its 
reluctance to make a commercial treaty without providing for the fullest 



88 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

of access to the German treaty tariff as a satisfactory return 
measure for the concessions provided for by the Dingley tariff. 
In acknowledging the right of Germany to adopt the same construc- 
tion as the United States of its obHgations under the treaty of 
1828, Secretary Hay pointed out^^ that this construction must 
be then appHed by Germany to all governments whose interests 
were protected by like treaty clauses. If Germany should apply 
one construction to the treaty clause when it concerned the United 
States and another broader construction when it concerned another 
country, then that fact would in itself violate the treaty as one 
nation would be receiving favors gratuitously and the United 
States only in return for compensation. In other words, it would 
be a similar situation to that of the United States and the Swiss 
treaty, a condition which had caused the I'nited States to annul 
parts of that treaty. As a matter of fact the situation ivas such as 
Secretary Hay set forth. By the treaty of Frankfurt, of 1871, ^^ 
Germany was placed on an unrestricted most-favored-nation 
basis with France and was obliged to extend to France gratui- 
tously any commercial favor granted to any other nation. This 
was therefore contradictory to the new construction adopted by 
Germany in order to place itself on a reciprocal basis with the 
United States. Whether the existence and purport of the Frankfurt 

equality in respect to import duties. They, however, finally acknowledged 
that the peculiar circumstances of our position justified them in so doing, and 
an article was framed by which it was agreed that the special advantages 
granted to the Government of the United States in consideration of equivalent 
advantages should not in any case be invoked in favor of Germany." 

8= F. R., 1899, p. 301. 

*^Calwer, " Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten," p. 18 (transla- 
tion by author). 

" Now, we stand, on the other hand, with France, on an actually unrestricted 
most-favored-nation basis. We must, according to provisions of the Frank- 
furt peace, extend to France at once (ohne weiteres) each tariff concession 
granted to England, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria and 
Russia. In connection with this relationship to France, Article IX of the 
Prussian-American Treaty loses all meaning; from the construction of the 
principle of reciprocity there follows indirectly the just claim of the United 
States to the unrestricted most -favored-nation treatment. Since all favors 
are granted tb France without any compensation, so all compensations cease 
to be due from the United States." ("So kommen auch fuer die \'ereinigten 
Staaten solche Gegenleistungen ueberhaupt nicht mehr in Betracht.") 



COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT OF 1900 89 

treaty were realized by the United States or not, no direct protest 
against it was made. 

The understanding as to their treaty relation by the two nations 
was embodied in the reciprocal commercial agreement*'^ concluded 
July 10, 1900. By this agreement the United States reduced the 
tariff rates on the following German products: argols, crude tartar, 
crude wine lees, brandies, spirits, wines, vermuth, also upon oil 
and water-color paintings, drawings and statuary. The German 
Government in return reextended to the products of the United 
States the low rates conceded by the treaties of, 1891 to 1894 to 
Belgium, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Rumania, Russia, Switzerland 
and Serbia. It also removed the inspection requirements from 
dried and evaporated fruits imported into Germany from the 
United States. 

The United States did not gain by the agreement of 1900 any 
new privileges in relation to the German tariff. Under the status 
of the "most-favored-nation" and also through the Saratoga 
Agreement she had had extended to her since the formation of the 
German commercial treaties their tariff reductions. Germany 
also did not gain actually any great advantage from the concessions 
offered by the United States since the articles enumerated consti- 
tuted less than 2 per cent, of her exports and were much more 
important to the other countries, France, Italy and Portugal, 
than to Germany. (U. S. Tariff' Commission Report, "Recipro- 
city and Commercial Treaties," 1919, Ft 5, p. 238.) The agree- 
ment, however, formally assured to the United States the privileges 
she already enjoyed and extended to Germany the most favorable 
terms permitted by the Dingley Tariff. Actually she was, therefore, 
a "most-favored-nation" even though the United States denied 
that the relations were maintained on that unqualified principle. 
Germany, in admitting the United States to the advantages regu- 
lated by the treaties then in operation with European states, ^^ did 
not agree to extend to her any further advantages which might be 
made to the same or other nations in future treaties. On the 

8' M., Vol. I, p. 558. 8^ V. R., Vol. 242, p. 64. 



90 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

whole the agreement did not cover the most important factors of 
commercial controversy between the two countries. 

It was now Germany's turn to overthrow the commercial diplo- 
matic proceedings with a new tariff. This did not happen suddenly, 
however. The proposed act was given careful and elaborate 
consideration'^'-' for three years and was then published before being 
presented to either the Bundesrath or the Reichstag for discussion 
and enactment. The period was one of "scant harvests and 
extreme industrial and commercial depression." This had caused 
an increase in the imports of grain and foodstuffs from the United 
States and a corresponding increase in the hostility of the Agrarian 
Party toward the Union.'-"' The trade balance in favor of the 
United States was creating anxiety throughout Germany^^ and in 
other European countries. There were academic discussions on 
the economic situation. Baron von Waltershausen, Professor of 
Political Economy at the Univeristy of Strasburg, pointed out in 
an elaborate essay that "the American trade balances of the three 

«» U. S. Commer. Rel., 1901, p. 262. 

» V. R., '98-00, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11 Feb., 1899, S. 783 ff. 

Count von Kanitz, leader of the agrarians, voiced the attitude of the party 
before the Reichstag. Having set forth the important development of Ameri- 
can commerce and its penetration of European countries, he continued as' 
follows (transl. by author): 

"Everything points to the fact that if this course of development is not 
interrupted the United States will gain in a short time a serious advantage 
(Uebergewicht) over the old culture-lands (Kultur-laender) of Europe, not 
only in industrial and commercial relations but also in the consideration of 
their status as a political power. If we seek the causes of this rapidly advanc- 
ing alteration, the answer is not difficult to find. It is not the greater intelli- 
gence, not the better developed spirit of enterprise or industrial diligence of 
the American population, which creates this headstart for them, but it is a 
deliberate (zielbewusst), I might almost say, reckless tariff policy, which 
has led to these conditions. . . ." 

Concering the Dingley tariff in particular he continued: 

"That is no longer the principle of the protection of national labor for 
which we German protectionists strive — here (in the Dingley Tariff) it is 
not a question of keeping domestic production in a condition to meet the 
competition for foreign countries, l)ut this policy aims at the displacement of 
foreign products and thereby are necessarily created conditions which must 
sooner or later prove to be unbearable to the nations engaged in world com- 
merce." 

31 U. S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 261. 



GERMAN TARIFF OF 1902 91 

fiscal years, 1898, 1899 and 1900 had reached the amazing total of 
$1,622,000,000— almost the war indemnity paid by France to 
Germany (1870) and had reversed the position of the Union and 
made it the creditor instead of the debtor of Europe." Councils 
were held and plans formulated for defensive measures^^ in the 
creation of a Middle European Tariff Union. This did not mate- 
rialize, partly owing to the trade rivalries between the separate 
continental powers, but the opposition to the United States was 
strong.^'^ The new German tariff, therefore, increased protection 
both to the manufacturing and agrarian classes. The American 
Consul-General at Berlin reported^^ that "it roughly doubles the 
import duties on cereals, meats and other food products, and, 
while generally favoring raw materials, increases the duties on 
practically all manufactured merchandise which is or can be pro- 
duced in Germany." Important to the country's foreign relations 
were its reciprocity provisions. In the opening article of the law^" 
the reservation is expressed that the provisions of the tariff shall 

3- Fiske, Mid. Eur. Tar. Union, p. 595 (t/ al). 

93 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. V, 157 Sitz., 1 Maerz, 1900, p. 4384. 

Evidence of this hostility was produced in the Reichstag by Kunert, a 
Social Democrat, who in opposing the anti-American pohcy of the Agrarians, 
made pubhc an instruction issued by a Prussian official, Baron von Rhein- 
baben, to the Councillors (Landraethe) and Ov6r-mayor6 of Duesseldorf on 
July 24, 1899. It concerned the treatment of foreign consuls and gave instruc- 
tions that all properly delegated foreign consuls should be allowed to ask all 
questions within the bounds of their official duties and should receive direct 
replies so long as they should not be questions of general import (allgemeiner 
Bedeutung). But in the case of American consuls, any information which 
might injure German interests was to be withheld. Under the information 
which was under no circumstances to be given to American consuls were 
classed statistical statements concerning infringements of the food-law, espe- 
cially concerning the production and sale of unwholesome food and other 
products (including toys) dangerous to health, or concerning the discoveries 
of trichina in domestic meat, and concerning human and animal diseases. 

As brought out by the Reichstag member himself, this instruction was 
not only unfair and hostile to the United States but was a confession of guilt 
on the part of Prussian officials. How extensive was the scope of the order 
was not stated, but the discussion was closed after Kunert's speech and the 
validity of the instruction was left undenied. 

9* U.S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 262. ^^ r, Qbl., 1902, p. 30.3. 



92 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

hold "in so far as the imports from particular countries are not 
regulated by other stipulations." Definite provision is then made 
for retaliatory tariff measures. Section 10 states :^^ 

"Dutiable products, which come from countries in which 
German ships or German products are treated less favorably than 
those of other countries, may be subjected in addition to the tariff 
duty, to a surtax up to double the amount of this law, or to the full 
value (of the products). Duty-free products may, under the same 
supposition, be subjected to a duty amounting to half of their' 
value. 

The measures here provided for shall be put into operation by 
Imperial order after securing the consent of the Bundesrath. The 
orders in question are to be imparted to the Reichstag at once, or, 
if it is not in session, at its next convening. They are to become 
inoperative if the Reichstag does not give its consent." 

The tariff law was enacted December 25, 1902." Its general 
application to most nations could not be made until 1904, because 
the commercial treaties concluded from 1892 to 1894 under the 
Caprivi Chancellorship did not expire until the close of 1903.^^ 
This left a period of two years in which other nations could nego- 
tiate either for separate commercial treaties, or for admission to 
the privileges of any treaties Germany might conclude. 

Germany did conclude in 1904 several important treaties of 
commerce^^ with continental countries, namely, Austria-Hungary, 
Belgium, Italy, Rumania, Russia, Serbia, and Switzerland, by 
means of which the products of those countries secured important 
tariff reductions upon importation into Germany. It then became 
very important to the United States to know what the effect of 
these treaties would be upon the standing of the United States 
under the Prussian treaty of 1828. By the "most-favored-nation" 
clause of this treaty^"" American wheat, corn and other dutiable 
merchandise had for three-quarters of a century been admitted 
to Germany at the lowest rates of duty which had been granted to 

3« R. Gbl., 1902, p. 308 (transl. by author). 

" R. Gbl., 1902, p. 303. ^s u. S. Com. Rel., 1901, p. 202. 

»» F. R., '05, p. 456. 10° F. R., '05, p. 457. 



NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWING GERMAN TARIFF OF 1902 93 

Russia, Austria, or any other nation. The commercial reciprocity 
arrangement of 1900 was also involved in the concluding of these 
new European treaties. This latter agreement was therefore 
formally terminated by Germany^'^i the following year (1905). 
The notification of its termination was accompanied, however, 
with the proposal that negotiations be undertaken for the con- 
clusion of a new treaty. 

In reporting to the Reichstag the course of the negotiations for 
the new agreement, ^°- the German Chancellor, Prince von Buelow, 
explained that the Imperial Government was well aware of the 
fact that the privileges secured from the United States by the 
agreement of 1900 in no way compensated Germany for the favors 
conceded to the United States but that it was not considered 
advisable at that time to demand further concessions from the 
United States, because of the provisory character of the agreement, 
as a method of tiding over the commercial relations between 
the two countries until the new German tariff should become 
operative at the close of 1903. He referred also to the new treaty 
between the United States and Cuba, concluded in 1902, which 
gave preferential treatment to Cuban sugar, and declared it 
incompatible with the provisions of the United States-Prussian 
treaty of 1828.i0'^ 

"1 F. R., '06, p. 640. 

10-^ V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 64. 

i°3 M., Vol. I, p. 355. 

Article VIII of United States-Cuban Treaty reads : 

"The rates of duty herein granted by the United States to the Republic of 
Cuba are and shall continue during the term of this convention preferential 
in respect to all like imports from other countries, and, in return for said 
preferential rates of duty granted to the RepubUc of Cuba by the United 
States, it is agreed that the concession herein granted on the part of the said 
Repubhc of Cuba to the products of the United States shall hkewise be, and 
shall continue, during the term of this convention, preferential in respect to 
all hke imports from other countries. Provided, That while this convention 
is in force, no sugar imported from the Republic of Cuba, and being the 
product of the soil or industry of the Repubhc of Cuba, shall be admitted 
into the United States at a reduction of duty greater than twenty per centum 
of the rates of duty thereon as provided by the tariff act of the United States 
approved July 24, 1897, and no sugar, the product of any other foreign country, 
shall be admitted by treaty or convention into the United States, while this 
convention is in force, at a lower rate of duty than that provided by the tariff 
act of the United States approved July 24, 1897." 



94 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

As will be seen this was merely a reassertion of the former 
standpoint on the part of the Gemian Government. The American- 
Cuban treaty was thoroughly reciprocal in nature, the preferential 
treatment of Cuban sugar being granted in return for preferential 
treatment by Cuba of a series of products of the United States. 
The treaty was therefore merely another example of the oft- 
expressed vieA\point of the United States that reciprocity treaties 
were in no way conflicting with most-faA-ored-nation clauses, and 
were moreover expressly provided for in the " eciuivalence clauses" 
such as article IX of the Prussian treaty. 

HaAing definitely agreed/*^^ however, to a reciprocity basis for 
the commercial relations of the two countries, the German Govern- 
ment realized^°^ that it would be necessary to enter into new nego- 
tiations — and probably further bargaining — in order to secure for 
Gennan sugar the faAorable terms granted to the Cuban sugar- 
growers. This did not seem advisable at the time so the matter 
was left until after the formal abrogation in 1905 of the 1900 
agreement. 

^Yhat was urgently needed was clear to representatives of both 
countries, namely, a comprehensive commercial treat}^ The 
American Consul-General at Berlin had written in 1900, at the 
close of his report,^''^ 

"The time is ripe for a calm, deliberate, and scientific revision 
of the present obsolete and imperfect treaties between the Republic 
and the Empire — a broad, intelligent adaptation of their relations 
in all that pertains to reciprocal trade, naturalized citizenship, and 
other vexed and irritating questions, to the new and vastly enlarged 
positions which both countries have won since the present treaties 
were framed." 

During the summer of 1905 the German Ambassador in Wash- 
ington took up the matter informally with President Roosevelt. 
According to the account given by Chancellor von Buelow,^**' 
the President had declared himself "in principle agreed to the 

"" V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. p. 63. i"^ V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. ,391, p. 64. 

"« U. S. Com. Rel., 1900, Vol. II, p. 268. 

i°" V. R., Vol. 242, Nr. 391, p. 65 (transl. by author). 



EFFORTS TO CONCLUDE COMMERCIAL TREATY 95 

German proposition, and that he had in mind the sending of a 
commission of experts to Berhn for the introduction of the nego- 
tiations. Later, however, the President reached the decision that 
the conclusion of a tariff treaty, with the sentiment then prevailing 
in the Senate, was not obtainable and he then gave up the dis- 
patching of a tariff commission." 

The German Goverimient nevertheless decided to put the ques- 
tion formally before the American Government,^*** and therefore 
presented in November of 1905 through its ambassador in Wash- 
ington a note containing proposals for the conclusion of a compre- 
hensive commercial treaty. The treaty proposals sought to gain 
some modification of the rates of the Dingley tariff, and also altera- 
tions in the customs collection procedure, in return for which 
certain of the privileges provided for in the new German treaties 
should be extended to the United States. The American Govern- 
ment made no formal reply to the German note but President 
Roosevelt and Secretary Root stated to the German ambassador 
that a reduction in the tariff would not be possible at the time. 
They proposed, however, that Germany, in return for concessions 
in the matter of customs procedure, should extend to the United 
States in advance the new German treaty tariff, so that through 
such a temporary regulation of commercial relations both govern- 
ments would be given the opportunity for proceeding with nego- 
tiations for the commercial treaty. To this the German Govern- 
ment agreed. Accordingly, on March 1, 1906, Germany independ- 
ently extended to the United States^°^ (until further notice, but 
not for longer than until the 30th of June, 1907) those tariff con- 
cessions embodied in the treaties of 1904 and 1905 concluded with 
the seven states mentioned in the 1900 agreement. The United 
States also independently extended to Germany once more the 
tariff' reductions on argols, wines, brandies, art works, etc., pro- 
vided for in section 3 of the Dingley tariff. It also put in opera- 
tion certain changes in the customs procedure which tended to 

108 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 65 (these proposals are not published in 
the United States Foreign Relations Series). 
"9 R. Gbl., 1906, p. 355. 

7 



96 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

relax the regulations objected to by Germany. ^lore radical 
alterations in the customs administration requiring congressional 
action were recommended to Congress but did not secure enactment. 
Negotiations were continued and resulted in the sending of a 
tariff commission to Germany in November, 1906."" The Amer- 
ican commissioners were not given treaty-making powers by their 
home government; therefore the conferences which took place 
could be only discussions not binding to either country — of the 
basis and details of such a commercial treaty as might be possible 
for the two countries to conclude. It was found that a compre- 
hensive commercial treaty was not possible at that time. Only 
such American concessions could be obtained as could be granted 
by the President without action by Congress."^ Therefore the 

"0 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 66. 

"1 House Journal, 59th Cong., 2nd Sess., 1906-1907. 

An indication that certain members of Congress feared that the Executive 
would overstep its authority in these negotiations with Germany is contained 
in a resolution introduced into the House by Mr. Randall, of Texas, March 
2, 1907 (H. Res. 829). 

"Whereas it is currently reported that negotiations have been entered into 
by the executive department of the United States, and under its direction, 
with the Government of the German Empire affecting commerce between 
Germany and the United States and the tariffs and regulations on and con- 
cerning the same, thereby changing the conchtion of trade between the coun- 
tries and affecting the revenues of this Government received from the import 
duties without the action of Congress: Therefore be it 

Resolved, That the President of the United States is hereljy requested, if 
not incompatible with the public interest, to direct the Secretary 
of State to report to him for the information of the House 
First: What agreement or agreements, if any, have been entered into 
between the authorities of the United States and the German 
Government, or their agents or representatives, affecting the 
tariff of the two countries in reference to imports, or the 
tariff on, or regulations thereof, which directly or indirectly 
affect the revenues or import duties of this Government. 
Second: What propositions, if any, have been made by either party 
or its agents looking to any change in the tariff charges or 
trade regulations between Germany and the United States 
affecting either directly or indirectly the revenues of this 
Government or its trade relations with Germany. 
Third: That all papers and documents, correspondence, or regulations 
on the matter herein inquired about, in the jiossession of 
the State Department be furnished for the information of 
the House." 

Mr. Watson made the point of order that the resolution was not privileged. 
The Speaker sustained the point of order. The resolution was referred to the 
Committee on Ways and Means, reported adversely and tabled. 



COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT OF 1907 97 

representatives decided that an agreement might be formed on the 
basis of the provisional measnres enacted by both countries in 
June of that year. The conference, therefore, resulted in an exten- 
sion of that agreement. The German decree, when finally passed 
by the Reichstag and Bundesrath,^^- admitted the United States' 
products to the greater part of the reduced rates granted to the 
continental countries, without any statement as to date of ter- 
mination of this agreement, which was to be valid "until further 
change." The United States responded immediately by a procla- 
mation issued by President Roosevelt, which extended to Germany, 
"during the continuance in force of the said concessions by the 
Government of Germany" the reduced rates on the German 
products, as provided by the Dingley Tariff, and also certain 
favorable changes in customs administration, such as could be 
made without action by Congress. A formal agreement,"^ cover- 
ing these reciprocal concessions was signed at Washington, April 
22, 1907,"'* and at Levico, May 2, 1907. It was expressly stated 
in the introduction that the agreement was a temporary one for 
the purpose of adjusting the commercial relations between the 
two countries until a comprehensive commercial treaty could be 
agreed upon. The agreement was accompanied by a promise on 
the part of the President"^ that he would recommend to Congress 
the enactment of an amendment to the customs administra- 
tion act which should alter certain of the customs collection 
regulations"'' complained of by Germany. The recommendation 
was made but did not secure passage. 

The 1907 agreement expressed the relations between the two 
countries more definitely as those of pure reciprocity than any of 
the former agreements. The United States presented a list of 
articles on which it was willing to reduce its tariff rate in Germany's 
favor — it also made less exacting certain of the regulations in the 
procedure of customs collection. Germany in return extended to 

"2 F. R., '06, p. 645 ff . 113 F. R., '07, p. 477. 

114 M., Vol. I, p. 564. 

See also Sen. Doc, 1907-1908, Vol. VII, No. 185, 60th Cong., 1st Sess. 

115 V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 403, p. 2309. ^'^ M., Vol. I., p. 575. 



98 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

the United States most of the tariff concessions provided for in 
her tariff' treaties with Euroi>ean countries. Dr. Delbrueck, 
Prussian INIinister of State, and Secretary of the Interior/^^ stated 
that Germany had withheld from the United States the tariff' 
concessions on goods forming only 3i per cent, of the total 
imports,'^'' whereas the concessions made by the United States 
were of little value to Germany, except in the case of the modifi- 
cations of the customs regulation, which were not to be under- 
estimated. 

The reciprocity agreement of 1907 was not long in operation. 
Within two years came the enactment of the Payne tariff' (August 
5, 1909), changing once more the basis of the commercial relations 
of the United States with other countries. The law of 1909 
established a maximum and minimum tariff". The schedule as pub- 
lished constituted the minimum tariff — that same schedule plus a 
duty of 25 per cent, ad valorem constituted the maximum tariff. 
The maximum tariff was to 'go into effect for all countries (except 
Cuba) on INIarch 31, 1910, unless other countries should prove 
themselves entitled to the minimum rates by evidence of no dis- 
crimination against the products of the United States. The 
minimum tariff' was to be granted — ^^^ 

" Whenever . . . the President shall be satisfied . . . 
that the government of any foreign country imposes no terms or 
restrictions, either in the way of tariff' rates, or provisions, trade 
or other regulations, charges, exactions, or in any other manner, 
directly or indirectly, upon the importation into or the sale in 
such . . . foreign country of any . . . product of the 
United States, which unduly discriminates against the United 
States or the products thereof, and that such foreign country pays 
no export bounty or imposes no export duty or prohibition upon 
the exportation of any article to the I'nited States which unduly 
discriminates against the United States or the products thereof, 
and that such foreign country accords to the . . . products 
of the United States treatment which is reciprocal and equivalent." 

1" V. R., Vol. 259, 31 Sitz., 5. Feb., 1910, p. 1081. 

118 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl., '09-' 11, Nr. 213. 

1" U. S. Stat., 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, p. 82 



THE PAYNE-ALDRICH TARIFF 99 

In addition to the maximum tariff, especial provision was made 
to offset export bounties paid by producing countries, Section 6 
provides •P'^ 

"That whenever any country . . . shall pay or bestow, 
directly or indirectly any bounty or grant upon the exportation 
of any article . . . and such article ... is dutiable 
under the provisions of this act, then, upon the importation of 
any such article . . . into the United States . . . there 
shall be levied and paid ... in addition to the duties other- 
wise imposed by this act, an additional duty ec[ual to the net 
amount of such bounty or grant." 

The reciprocity arrangements provided for in the Dingley 
tariff' were thus repealed^-^ and the President was given authority 
to terminate all agreements made under them. It became the 
immediate duty of the foreign ambassadors in Washington to bid 
for the admission of their countries to the minimum tariff'. During 
November of 1909 Ambassador von Bernstorff' conducted nego- 
tiations^-- with Secretary Knox concerning the new regulation of 
the commercial relations between the two countries. The law 
left open only the one alternative; therefore Germany's objective, 
so far as the law itself was concerned, could be only that of the 
admission of German products to the rates of the minimum tariff'. 
Germany also sought, however, to have continued in force those 
alterations in the customs regulations secured by the past agree- 
ment, with the exception of the first of the provisions concerning 
the place of valuation of certain articles which was definitely 
established by the new law to be based on the market value in 
America. Germany also sought to have established separate 
provisions (Einzelbestimmungen) concerning the labelling of 
goods.^2^ This was refused in theory though an approach to it in 
practice was declared probable. 

121 U. S. Stat., 61st Cong., 1st Sess., 1909, p. 82. 

121 F. R., 1909, p. 270 ff. 

122 V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 15.57 ff. 

123 V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 6 (of Denkschrift). 



100 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

The American demands as finally formulated were^-* 

"1. The granting of all the German treaty tariff reductions, or 
equivalent compensations through the granting of tariff reductions 
over and beyond the treaty tariff clauses up to date. 

2. The admission of American pork according to the proceedings 
of the official trichina inspection in Germany, but without the 
accompaniment of the certificate (still required) demonstrating 
the completion of microscopic trichina inspection in the United 
States. 

3. The admission of American cattle for immediate slaughter." 

Concerning the last two demands, Germany declared that they 
were sanitary measures determined by the health conditions in 
the separate countries. Similar regulations existed in all countries, 
not the least of these being the United States, by whose import 
prohibitions Germany especially was affected. Among other 
things the importation of live cattle from Germany was forbidden 
whereas that from other countries was admitted. The Imperial 
Government could not (therefore) treat concerning (auf — eingehen) 
the two above mentioned demands within the scope of tariff nego- 
tiations. But in order to give proof of her friendly intentions 
(Gesinnungen) tow^ard America, the Imperial Government was 
ready in case the Union should bring up the dispensing of the 
trichina test for separate discussion, to work toward the disposal 
of this subject according to the sense of the American wishes. ^-^ 
Concerning the importation of American cattle, on the other hand, 
the Imperial Government could neither give any prospect of con- 
cessions, nor enter into any negotiations. 

Dr. Delbrueck reported to the Reichstag the result of the 
negotiations, as follows ■}-'^ 

"The American Government declared that in case that the 
German treaty tariff should be extended unrestrictedly to the 
United States, that the cattle question was to be wholly eliminated 
from the negotiations; that the benefits of the American minimum 

12^ V. R., 1911, Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 6 (of Denkschrift) transl. by author. 

125 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 1557 ff. 

126 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 226, p. 1560 (transl by author.). 



NEGOTIATIONS FOLLOWINCx THE PAYNE TARIFF 101 

tariff were to be extended to Germany after the thirty-first of 
March, and that the customs regulation provisions of the 1907 
commercial agreement (with the exception of the first, providing 
for the valuation of goods at their export price) were to remain in 
force; that this extension of the minimum tariff' to Germany 
assured the latter the treatment accorded to the "most-favored- 
nation;" that the customs administration provisions of the United 
States would be applied to German goods in a friendly and con- 
ciliatory spirit." 

In framing the Payne-Aldrich tariff on which the above agree- 
ment was based, the effect of the anti-trust agitation and the anti- 
protection movement was clearly felt.^-^ The principle by which 
those preparing the schedule were guided was that of adjusting 
the duties merely to equal the differences between the cost of 
production at home and abroad, and give a reasonable profit to 
American industries. Sincere efforts were made on the part of 
the Committee of Ways and Means to obtain reliable information 
as to these productions costs. Detailed instructions were sent 
out^-'^ to the principal American consular officers throughout the 
world to 'return full reports concerning industries, labor conditions, 
cost of production, prices, exports to the United States and foreign 
tariff's. Since the petitioners for higher duties were at this time 
holding up the Germans rather than the English as rivals,^^^ the 
reports concerning conditions in Germany became especially 
important. As the American Consul-General at Berlin reported 
that the information sought by the Ways and jMeans Committee 
could best be obtained through diplomatic channels, the matter 
was presented directly to the Gennan Government through the 
American Ambassador at Berlin. The German Government 
responded favorably, and through the German Chambers of Com- 
merce it obtained voluminous information which it sent to the 
United States^^° with the understanding that the names of the 
individual establishments furnishing the data, would not be dis- 

1" Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 370. 

1^^ Sen. Doc. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Sess. (German Manufactures.) 

129 Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 370. 

"0 Sen. Doc. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 



102 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

closed, and that the information would not be used for adminis- 
trative purposes but purely as a basis for the proposed legislation.^^* 

Feeling that fresh and reliable information as to production 
costs in Germany would defeat the efforts of those seeking to raise 
the tariff schedule in America, the German Government put forth 
special effort in the matter, furnished additional copies of the 
documents so that the needs of both the Committee on Ways and 
Means and of the Committee of Finance of the Senate were sup- 
plied. Due appreciation of the courtesy was expressed by the 
State Department but after the information was handed over to 
the Finance Committee of the Senate nothing further was heard 
of it*^- — it was neither printed nor published until August after 
the adjournment of Congress. 

The final regulating of the relations consequent to the Payne 
tariff was formulated in a German law as follows:*" 

1" Sen. Doo. 99, 61st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 

In forwarding the information, Baron von Schoen, Imperial Secretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, protested against what he alleged were the mis- 
statements made in the hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means 
relative to the costs of production in Germany. He declared that 

"In the comparative tables on wages in the United States of America and 
Germany data concerning the German concUtions have in many cases been 
utilized which cover conditions of many years ago, and no longer have any 
significance for the present day. In calculating American wages the highest 
rates have been taken as a basis while in computing German wages the lowest 
rates have been taken; the increase in cost of German production by social 
burdens has been left out of consideration; the comparison of absolute earn- 
ings gives an inaccurate impression, because the work accomplished by 
American laborers is perceptibly greater than that of the German laborers, 
partly in itself and partly through the more comprehensive employment of 
machine work. If wages for piecework and for the manufacture of the sepa- 
rate articles are calculated the difference between the German and American 
wages is perceptibly less than would appear from the statements concerning 
wages on time. ... A number of firms which complained of insufficient 
tariff protection before the Committee on Ways and ]\Ieans underbid German 
manufacturers in the interior market of Germany, as well as in the American 
market. ... In many cases inaccurate statements have been made 
concerning the extent and duration of female and child labor, in contradiction 
to regulations now in force in Germany." 

"2 Taussig, Tariff His. of U. S., p. 371. 

Professor Taussig considered that the information was too damaging to 
the arguments of the high protection advocates for them to seek to place it 
at the disposal of their opponents. 

133 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl. Nr. 213, p. 1557 (3 Feb., 1910). 



COMMERCIAL AGREEMENT OF 1910 103 

" The Bundesrath is empowered, upon the importation of products 
of the United States of America into the German customs territory, 
to grant in suitable measure, the application of the tariff pro- 
visions conceded by the commercial treaties now in force (geltend). 

This provision shall remain in force as long as the products of 
the German Empire and of the countries or divisions belonging 
to the same customs territory shall not be subjected to higher 
tariff duties than are provided for in article I of the American 
Tariff Law of August 5th, 1909 {i. e., the minimum tariff). 

If on the part of the United States of America, the principles 
of the customs procedure (as provided for under B to F of the 
note to the Commercial Agreement of 1907) should not be main- 
tained, or should the United States of America through laws, 
treaties with third countries, or in any other way connected with 
the exchange of goods between the German Empire and the 
United States permit changes to affect the present situation to the 
detriment of Germany, then the Bundesrath shall, according to 
its judgment, withdraw entire or in part, the privileges granted 
to the products of the United States." 

In the United States the agreement was embodied in a procla- 
mation^^^ declaring the rates of the minimum tariff' to be in force 
for German products so long as the German Empire imposed no 
terms or restrictions which should unduly discriminate against the 
United States. 

The relations between the two countries were thus adjusted once 
more on a definitely provisional basis. Any alteration of policy 
or any concession to a third nation on the part of either Germany 
or the United States, might be construed by the other country 
as a discrimination, sufficient to overthrow the entire agreement. 
Germany carefully preserved for herself the possibility, through 
decision of the Bundesrath, of withdrawing her concessions should 
any change in the situation be made which she considered detri- 
mental to her interests. The United States armed itself with the 
weapon of the maximum tariff' to be used, after ninety days' notice, 
against any nation considered to be discriminating unduly against 
United States' products or industries. The power to use this 
weapon w^as placed entirely in the hands of the President. Thus 

"^ Stat, of U. S., 1909-1910, Pt. II, 61st Cong., 2nd Sess.. Proclamation, p. 33. 



104 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

each nation was equipped for a tariff war should it decide to enter 
upon such a contest. Neither the United States nor Gennany 
sought such an outcome and both countries gave evidence of 
sincere desire to avoid it. President Taft emphasized his hberal 
poHcy in regard to the maximum and minimum clause in the 
tariff' act in his message to Congress (December 7, 1909).^^^ Speak- 
ing of the general possibilities of these provisions, he declared: 

"Fear has been expressed that this power conferred and duty 
imposed on the Executive is likely to lead to a tariff war. I beg 
to express the hope and belief that no such result need be antici- 
pated. The discretion granted to the Executive by the terms 
'unduly discriminatory' is wide. In order that the maximum duty 
shall be charged against the imports from a country, it is necessary 
that he shall find on the part of that country not only discrimi- 
nation in its laws, or the practice under them, against the trade of 
the United States, but that the discriminations found shall be 
undue; that is, without good and fair reason. I conceive that this 
power was reposed in the President with the hope that the maxi- 
mum duties might never be applied in any case, but that the 
power to apply them would enable the President and the State 
Department through friendly negotiations to secure the elimin- 
ation from the laws and the practice under them of any foreign 
country of that which is unduly discriminatory. No one is seeking 
a tariff war or a condition in which the spirit of retaliation shall be 
aroused." 

President Taft demonstrated the sincerity of his words by 
issuing one hundred and thirty-four proclamations,^^^ extending 
the rates of the minimum tariff to practically the whole commercial 
W'Orld. Germany in turn interpreted her law in liberal fashion,^^^ 
and granted to the United States the benefit of her complete treaty 
tariff'. She also, after securing the agreement to discuss the subject 
apart from the tariff' negotiations, ^^^ acceded to the American 
demand in the matter of the requirements for the trichina inspec- 
tion of American pork. In concluding his account of the negotia- 
tions with the United States, Dr. Delbrueck, Prussian Minister 

"5 F. R., 1909, p. xxvi. "6 p. R., 1910, p. xvi. 

' V. R., Vol. 259, 31 Sitz., 5 Feb, 1910, p. 1083. 
V. R., Vol. 273, Anl., 1909-1911, Nr. 213. 



138 



RECIPROCAL APPLICATION OF MINIMUM TARIFFS 105 

of State, speaking for the Imperial Chancellor, stated to the 
Reichstag/^^ 

" I do not believe that we shall be obliged to make use of this 
power (i. e. of withdrawing the treaty tariff privileges from the 
United States) ; for I am inclined to the firm hope that, since we 
after stubborn, lengthy, and difficult negotiations, have come to 
an agreement, that the United States of American will carry out in 
the spirit of conciliation and liberal approach (Entgegenkommen) 
the concessions made to us, as accords with the excellent relations 
which obtain between the United States of America and the 
friendly related (dem diesem befreundeten) German Empire." 

The Payne-Aldrich Tariff left no room for bargaining to deter- 
mine whether the concessions offered by one nation were equivalent 
to those offered by the other. The United States extended to 
Germany the lowest rates of dutj^ provided for in its legislation. 
Germany extended to the United States the lowest rates provided 
for in its commercial treaties. The Tariff Act of 1909 left a^^'' 
"high scheme of rates" and showed an "extremely intolerant 
attitude on foreign trade" yet as a whole, it was "less aggressively 
'protectionist' than previous Republican measures," and it was 
executed by the administration with the greatest moderation 
permitted under its provisions. 

« The following year the United States entered upon the nego- 
tiations for reciprocity with Canada, looking to sweeping reduc- 
tions in import duties on the part of both countries to the extent, 
almost, of the development of a tariff' union of English-speaking 
North America. Germany kept close watch over the proceedings, 
preparing, should the agreement be consummated, to make a 
vigorous protest against these concessions to Canada^^^ on the 
ground that they were an infringement of the principle of the 
"most-favored-nation" which regulated the relations between 
the German Empire and the United States. The comprehensive 
character of the reductions proposed is shown in the summary of 

139 V. R., Vol. 273, Anl., 1909-1911, Nr. 213 (transl. by author). 

"0 Taussig, Tariff Hist, of U. S., p. 407. 

"1 V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz. 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D. 



106 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

the effect of the schedules as submitted to Congress.'^- Ninety 
per cent, of the total imports into the United States from Canada 
were to be affected by the agreement, 14 per cent, to have import 
duties reduced, and 7(3 per cent, to be admitted entirely free. On 
the Canadian side the proportion of reduction was not so great. 
Thirty-six per cent, of the total import into Canada from the 
United States was to be affected, 19 per cent, to have duties 
reduced, and 16 per cent, to be admitted free. That the terms to 
Canada were to be most liberal was emphasized by President Taft 
in his message to Congress, January 26, 1911, recommending the 
ratification of the agreement. 



143 



"While equivalency should be sought in an arrangement of 
this character," he declared, "an exact balance of financial gain 
is neither imperative nor attainable. No yardstick can measure 
the benefits to the two peoples of this freer commercial inter- 
course and no agreement should be judged wholly by custom house 
statistics." 

His desire to create a very special relationship with Canada is 
still more strongly emphasized later in the same speech, in which 
he declares,^^^ 

"Our common boundary line of three thousand miles in itself 
must make a radical distinction between our commercial treat- 
ment of Canada and of any other country." 

Germany therefore considered that the agreement would con- 
stitute a differentiation against her products, and that she would 
be entitled under the status of "most-favored-nation" to claim 
her share in the concessions. It was not considered expedient, 
however, to make formal protest until the agreement should have 
been consummated by action of Congress and the Canadian Par- 
liament. The Canadian reciprocity measure was again the Cuban 
situation reproduced on a large scale. Had it passed there would 

i« House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, pp. 90 and 91. 

i« House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, p. 11. 

'^< House Doc, 62nd Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. IX, pp. 90 and 91. 



CANADIAN RECIPROCITY MEASURE 107 

have been sweeping concessions exchanged. Under the United 
States' long-practiced construction of the principle definitely 
asserted in the Prussian treaty this constituted no violation of its 
most-favored-nation relations with other countries. Germany 
had, at the time of the agreement of 1900, definitely accepted this 
reciprocity basis; it was therefore a reversal of policy for her to 
claim a share in the privileges which the United States was prepar- 
ing to extend to Canada, unless she were prepared to offer to the 
United States some equivalence. Since the measure was finally 
blocked by the Canadian Parliament, no action was taken by 
Germany at that time. Later, however, finding that the United 
States had put into operation a part of the agreement relating to 
wood-pulp and paper/^^ she made protest. The negotiations did 
not lead to any overturning of the status quo, or to the removal 
of the United States from the benefit of the German treaty tariff, 
but the result was seen in the two new commercial treaties formed 
by Germany at this time with Sweden and Japan, granting to 
these countries special commercial concessions. The new con- 
cessions were not extended on the "most-favored-nation" principle 
to the United States. 

The commercial relations of the two countries at the close of 
1910 were therefore admitted by both to be on the strict basis of 
reciprocity. In spite of tariffs the quantity of trade was enormous. 
Next to the United Kingdom, Germany constituted the best 
customer of the United States,!**^ and, next to the United Kingdom, 
the United States constituted the best customer of Germany. 
The formal agreements were of a very temporary character. Dr. 
Delbrueck, Secretary of State for Internal Aft'airs, summed up 
the relationship before the Reichstag as follows:"'^ 

"I will refer here to the commercial-political relations in which 
we stand toward the United States of America. Between the 
two countries there exists no treaty. The commercial-political 

i« V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz., 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D. 

i« U. S. Com. Rel., 1909, p. 91. 

1*' V. R., Vol. 283, 19 Sitz., 4 Maerz, 1912, p. 445 D (transL). 



108 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

relations are regulated independently (autonom) by each side on 
the basis of diplomatic agreements; the regulation is not for long 
periods, but can be altered at short notice. The United States 
of America have on their part given us that which they at the 
time (i. e., agreement of 1910) considered to be their "most- 
favored-nation" privilege, that is, their so-called minimum tariff; 
and we on our part gave to the United States our entire treaty 
tariff, which at that time meant our "most-favored-nation" 
privilege." 

The need for a comprehensive commercial treaty had been 
acknowledged by representatives of both nations,"^ and attempts 
had been made to arrange such a treaty; but without success.^^^ 
It seems to have been the opinion that the treaty involved tariff 
reductions, and this the prevailing protection sentiment of both 
countries made impossible. The tendency in each case was a firm 
maintenance of the existing protective legislation, coupled with a 
willingness to make such concessions as were possible outside the 
bound any- of that legislation. The presidents of the United States 
frequently extended to Germany concessions both in tariff duties, 
and in customs administration, up to the point where action by 
Congress was required, and there all German demands were 
blocked. ^^o 

On the other hand the United States Congress was no more 
determined and unyielding in its protection policy than was the 

"8 U. S. Com. Rel., 1900, Vol. II, p. 268. Also, Senate Journal, o9th Cong., 
2nd Sess., 1906-1907. Petitions and Memorials, December 13, 1906. 

"A petition of the New York Branch of the National League of Commission 
Merchants praying the negotiation of a treaty between German}- and the 
United States looking to the establishment of better trade relations, etc.; 
referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations." 

i«V. R., Vol. 242, Anl. Nr. 391, p. 65 ff. 
i5« V. R., Vol. 260, 58 Sitz., 15 Mai., 1910 (transl. by author). 
Count von Kanitz (Conservative) gave before the Reichstag the situation 
from the viewpoint of the German Conservatives. 

"First," he stated, "the Americans set up a tariff with unduly high rates, 
sharpen up their customs administration regulations, and then say afterward, 
'Now, that is our law, that we can't alter, we can't depart from that.' That 
is an extraordinarily comfortable method of obtaining a favorable exchange 
of goods with other countries, and I should think it might be recommended 
that we make use of this procedure ourselves." 



NEED OF COMPREHENSIVE COMMERCIAL TREATY 109 

German Government in its corresponding measures. The demands 
of the Social Democrats for lowering of the tariff rates on food- 
stuffs were met with flat refusal. Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg announced to the Reichstag/^^ 

"These attacks against our economic policy the Government 
will meet with determined opposition as heretofore. As I have 
repeatedly declared from this place, the stubborn and determined 
maintaining of our economic policy is matter of well-founded con- 
viction on the part of the Confederated Governments." 

Yet once outside the bounds of the German law, the Imperial 
Government like that of the United States, showed willingness to 
make concessions through diplomatic channels. Special com- 
mercial treaties had been concluded with the neighboring states for 
mutual ecbnomic advantage, yet the tariff reductions provided 
for in those treaties were (except in the agreement of 1907 when a 
part of the reductions was withheld) uniformly extended to the 
United States. This was done too, in the face of considerable 
protest from German Conservatives,^^- who were wont to give 
vehement expression in the Reichstag to their views on what they 
termed American tariff chicanery. 

The prohibition of American products on sanitary ground was 
a constant" subject of diplomatic negotiations. In this the German 
Government was especially unyielding, and while the American 
Government always acquiesced in Germany's right to exclude any 
products which were found to be injurious to the health of the 
community, it often protested on the ground that the fact of 
unwholesomeness did not exist, and was unjustly so determined 
by the German authorities. It took eight years to secure the 
removal of the prohibition against the importation of American 
pork, and, while Germany consistently waited^^^ until the United 
States had enacted a strict meat inspection law before the pro- 
hibition was withdrawn, she then destroyed her argument, based 
on sanitary grounds, by making the removal of the prohibition 

151V. R., Vol. 268, 195 Sitz., October 25, 1911, p. 7511 (transl. by author). 
152 V. R., Vol. 260, 58 Sitz., 15 Maerz, 1910, p. 2132. 
''153F. R., '91, p. 511. 



110 COMMERCIAL RELATIONS 

contingent upon certain reciprocal concessions on the part of the 
United States in the Saratoga Agreement. Later, in 1894, a pro- 
hibition was enacted against the importation of American cattle 
on the ground of the prevalence of Texas fever, and this restriction 
still existed in 1910. In answer to the Social-Democrats' clamor 
for the removal of such restrictions, the Chancellor von Bethmann- 
Hollweg reiterated that the exclusion of the cattle and the rigid 
meat inspection law complained of were sanitary measures that 
could not possibly be sacrificed for the sake of cheaper meat. He 
then proceeded to undermine the argument derived from health 
considerations by setting forth the advantages accruing to the 
cattle industry from the Imperial Government's policy.^^* 

"Gentlemen," he continued, "you are always complaining of 
an undue protection of our cattle industry. Please consider at 
the same time, that German agriculture under this protection has 
succeeded in satisfying from within the country 95 per cent, of 
the entire meat needs. Moreover, in the last decade, the meat 
consumption in Germany has so increased that we scarcely lag 
behind that of England . . . This comparison does not 
encourage me to make experiments which would injure our cattle 
industry, and gradually bring us to a great dependency on foreign 
countries." 

Such prohibitions were the chief ground of American protests 
to Germany in the commercial field. Such statements as the Chan- 
cellor's, as well as the terms of the Saratoga Agreement show that 
sanitary reasons were at least not the only grounds for restrictive 
measures. The chief grounds of German protests to the United 
States were the extra duties laid on sugar to ofl'set German domestic 
bounties, and the special concessions made by the United States 
to Cuba and later to Canada, both of which Germany incorrectly 
considered contrary to the Treaty of 1828. ^Yhat caused most 
hostility toward the United States, however, throughout Germany 
was not a grievance that could be handled by diplomacy. It was, 
namely, the growing preponderance of the American trade balance 
against Germany, the penetration of certain American industries 

l5n^ R., Vol. 208, 195 Sitz., October 23, 1911, p. 7.514 (transl. by author). 



CHIEF CAUSES OF COMMERCIAL CONTROVERSY 111 

into the German Empire, and the aggravating reaUzation of the 
increasing economic dependence of Germany upon certain raw 
]jrofkicts of the United States. Dr. Stresemann, advocating a 
Hberal policy before the Reichstag, pictures the helplessness of the 
situation. ^^^ 

" That is the colossal strength of the United States, which they 
practice . . . against us. They say ' Xow what can you 
really do? If you want to lay duties on our cotton, then do it, 
then you only make dearer the raw material which you need; 
and if you wish to lay duties on our copper and petroleum, then 
do it, then you have only to pay more for the articles of your 
household and of the electric industry.' In these facts we can at 
present alter nothing, they lie in the conditions of nature, and so 
also in economic affairs one is reminded of the Goethe saying: 

' America, thou hast it better 
Than our continent, the ancient.' " 

Apart from this natural economic situation it has thus been 
shown that the chief basis of controversy over the regulation of the 
commercial relations between the two countries lay in their con- 
trasting interpretations of the "most-favored-nation" principle. 
The United States was correct in its stand that the Prussian treaty 
on which the relations were based, stipulated clearly in Article IX 
for a principle of reciprocity ; it was also consistent in its applica- 
tion of that principle. Germany's standpoint that the two nations 
stood on a basis of vniconditional most-favored-nation treatment 
therefore ignored the existence of the equivalence clause. It is 
true that the German Government for the most part during this 
period practiced that standpoint in favor of the United States as 
well as using it as a basis of claims for its own benefit. Neverthe- 
less, the unconditional principle was not consonant with the treaty, 
was departed from at times, as in the Saratoga Agreement by Ger- 
many, and was, as we have seen, finally abandoned by the Imperial 
Go\'ernment, which agreed to recognize the interpretation of the 
United States. 

155 V. R., Vol. 264, 125 Sitz., February 11, 1911, p. 4579 D (transl. by author). 

"Amerika, du hast es besser 
Als unser Kontinent, der Alte." 



CHAPTER V 

SAIVIOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN 
THE PACIFIC 

The single instance in the course of the relations between the 
United States and the German Empire in which citizens of one 
nation came into conflict with the citizens of the other on a common 
territory is that of the Samoan Islands.' Here no ^lonroe Doctrine 
operated to determine the policy of the United States. But the 
conflict between individual commercial interests, and between 
radically opposite government policies, together with the presence 
of an excitable and irresponsible native population, created a 
situation provoking controversy for over twenty years. It is also 
exceptional in the foreign policy of the United States as an 
instance in which the country departed from its traditions and 
united with other nations in a joint administration over a neutral 
territory outside the western hemisphere. 

The Samoan Islands are situated in the southwest Pacific- 
directly on the route taken by steamers plying between the United 
States' Pacific ports and the British Australasian colonies. The 
island of Tutuila contains in Pago-Pago one of the most perfectly 
land-locked harbors in the Pacific Ocean, 1600 miles from Auck- 
land, New Zealand, in the steamer lanes between Australia and 
San Francisco or Vancouver via Hawaii.^ The three main islands, 
Savaii, Upolu and Tutuila, comprise together an area of a little over 

1 The term Navigators' Islands has been frequently applied to this group, 
but the native name Samoa is now almost universally adopted. 

2 The Islands are located between latitude 13° 30' and 14° 30' south, and 
and between longitude 168° and 173° west. (Report of A. B. Steinberger, 
Special Commissioner to the Samoan Islands, 1873, House Ex. Doc, No. 161, 
44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 3.) 

' Extract of Report upon the Condition of the Samoan Islands, by John 
B. Thurston, Acting High Commissioner of the Western Pacific, Inclosure 
in No. 96. Correspondence respecting the affairs of Samoa, 1885-1889, 
A. & P. LXXXVI (C-5629). 



THE SAMOAN ISLANDS 113 

1000 square miles/ the first two being much the largest of the group 
but lacking good harbors. Apia and Saluafata, both on the Island 
of Upolu, are merely anchorages giving shelter from the easterly 
trade winds but open to the full force of the severe hurricanes to 
which the islands are subject. The latter physical factor was 
destined at one time to play an important diplomatic role. Com- 
mercially the most important product of the islands is copra,^ 
the dried meat of the cocoanut, which is gathered by the natives, 
shipped in large quantities to Europe and the oil then extracted 
and used in the manufacture of the best grade of tandles,*^ and the 
residue made into oil-cakes as food for cattle. The real com- 
mercial development of the island may be considered to have begun 
about the year 1857, wdien the powerful firm of Godefft"oy, of 
Hamburg, established at Apia the headquarters for their large 
trade in the tropical products of the Pacific Ocean. ^ The success- 
ful enterprises of this firm on the hitherto unclaimed islands be- 
came the basis for the interest claims of the German Government 
throughout the history of the Samoan controversy. That con- 
troversy was, through its entire duration, a three-sided one, 
involving continuously the German Empire, Great Britain and the 
United States. The interests of the first two were commercial 
and strategic, of the third almost entirely strategic, for the pro- 
tection of trade routes. 

^ Ibid., Savaii, the largest island of the group, contains approximately 
32.5,000 acres, a large part of which, however, is unfit for cultivation and the 
rest has fertile but stony soil. It contains no harbors. Parts of the island 
reach an altitude of 5000 feet. Upolu, containing approximately 170,000 
acres, has a large area of fertile soil and has been most highly developed 
commercially. It contains the harbors, so-called, of Saluafata and Apia, the 
latter being the trade entrepot for the islands, the headquarters of native 
government and foreign representatives, and the scene of most of the political 
Conflicts between the powers. 

^ Steinberger Report, p. 41. House Ex. Doc, No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st 
Sess., No. 3. 

^ A little cotton is also exported, and the islands, especially Upolu, abound 
in tropical foodstuffs, breadfruit, bananas, coffee, oranges, limes, sugar-cane, 
pine-apples, and other of the typical south sea island products. (Wakeman 
Report, included in Steinberger Report, pp. 7 ff.) 

'Thurston report: A. & P. LXXXVI (C-5629) p. 63. 



114 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

The diplomatic history of the Samoan question covers nearly 
thirty years, from about 1872 to 1899. It divides itself readily 
into three main periods, that of the conclusion of the treaties 
between the Samoan Government and each of the three powers 
about 187*9; the period of the General Act of Berlin concluded by 
the three powers in 1889; and the period closing with the division 
of the islands between the German Empire and the United States 
in 1899. 

The diplomacy connected with the islands may be considered to 
have begun in the year 1872, when Commander R. W. Meade, of 
the U. S. S. "Xarragansett," anchored at Pago-Pago, on the 
island of Tutuila,^ and on his own initiative concluded with the 
native chief of the bay an agreement" by which the exclusive 

* This action was taken under orders of Rear-Admiral John A. Winslow, 
Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific station, then at Honoluki. On Januarj' 
21, 1872, Meade wrote to the Secretary of the Nav>': 

"As important American interests are at stake at Tirtuila in the Navigators', 
Islands, (I) shall, in obedience to the Admiral's orders, proceed thither, survey 
the harbor of Pago-Pago, and locate a coal depot for the American steamers. 
I think some kind of treaty with the native chiefs will be necessary to frustrate 
foreign influence which is at present very active in this matter, seeking to 
secure the harbor." 

(From Commanders' Letters, January-April, 1872, No. 51, as cjuoted by 
C. O. Paullin in "Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778- 
1883," p. 350.) 

3 House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6. 

"Agreement between Maunga, Great Chief of the Bay of Pagopago, of the 
Island of Tutuila, residing at Pagopago, and the Government of the United 
States of America, represented by Richard W. Meade, Esquire, Commander 
of the United States ship of war, Narragansett, now lying at anchor in the 
harbor of Pagopago, witnesseth: That I, Maunga, Great Chief of the Bay 
of Pagopago, of the Island of Tutuila, being desirous for the interest and 
welfare of myself, my successors, and people, to have the friendship and 
protection of the great Government of the United States of America, do, by 
virtue of the power vested in me, hereby freely and voluntarily grant to the 
United States of America, now represented by Richard W. Meade, Esquire, 
commanding the United States ship of war Narragansett, at present lying 
at anchor in the harbor of Pagopago, the exclusive privilege of establisliing in 
the said harbor of Pago]mgo, Island of Tutuila, a naval station, for the use and 
convenience of the vessels of the United States Government. And I hereby 
further agree that I will not grant the like privilege to any other power or 
potentate. 

Signed and sealed this 17th day of February, a. d., 1872 at Pagopago, 
Island of Tutuila. 

Oau O Maga. 

Richard W. Meade, Commander, United States Navy." 



MEADE AGREEMENT OF 1872 115 

privilege of establishing a naval station in the harbor of Pago-Pago 
was granted to the United States. A letter registering indirect 
protest was sent to the Chief of Tutuila by the German Consul 
Weber, who claimed that certain of the land on Tutuila had already 
been sold to a German subject, that he would protect that claim 
and that he could not at present recognize the new port regulations 
of Pago-Pago (instituted by ^leade). ^Meade's agreement having 
been made without authorization by the United States Govern- 
ment, was not valid, but President Grant considered that the 
advantages held forth in the concession were so great that the sub- 
ject shoukl be placed before the Senate for consideration. He 
wished, however, to avoid the obligations involved in a protectorate 
over the islands. He therefore suggested that the Senate devise 
some modification of the obligation of protection after which he 
could recommend the agreement for favorable consideration. His 
message and its accompanying documents were presented in 
Executive Session of the Senate and ordered to be printed in 
confidence for its use.'" The Senate seems to have taken no action 

in House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 6. 

■'(Confidential.) Executive, I. Forty-second Congress, Second Session. 
Message from the President of the United States, transmitting an agreement 
between the great chief of the Island of Tutuila and Commander Richard W. 
Meade, of the United States Navy, conferring upon the Government of the 
United States the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval station in the 
dominions of that chief, for the equivalent of protecting those dominions. 

May 22nd, 1872, Read: Agreement read the first time, and together with 
the message and accompanying documents, ordered to be printed in confi- 
dence for the use of the Senate. 
To the Senate of the United States: 

I transmit to the Senate for its consideration an agreement between the 
great chief of the island of Tutuila, one of the Samoan group in the South 
Pacific and Commander R. W. Meade, commanding the United States steamer 
Narragansett, bearing the date of February last. This instrument proposes to 
■confer upon this Government the exclusive privilege of establishing a naval 
station in the dominions of that chief for the equivalent of protecting those 
dominions. 

A copy of a letter of the 15th instant, and of its accompaniment, addressed 
by the Secretary of the Navy to the Secretary of State, descriptive of Tutuila 
and of other islands of the group, and of a letter in the nature of a protest from 
a person claiming to be consul of the North German Confederation in that 
quarter, are also herewith transmitted. No report has yet been received from 
Commander Meade on the subject. Although he was without special instruc- 
tions or authority to enter into such an agreement, the advantages of the con- 
cessions which it proposes to make are so great, in view of the advantageous 
position of Tutuila, especially as a coaling station for steamers between San 



116 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

on the agreement,'^ but in the following year, at the suggestion 
of certain "highly respectable commercial persons," the State 
Department despatched Colonel H. B. Steinberger as special 
commissioner to investigate the general conditions of the islands. 
He Avas informed in confidence of the agreement made by Com- 
mander Meade and its submission to the vSenate, and was instructed 
to secure information as to the conditions offered by the islands, 
for such a naAal station. His instructions emphasized the private 
informal character of his mission and the necessity of avoiding all 
discussion in regard to it.^- He was also instructed to caution the 
natives against granting their lands away to foreigners. 

Francisco and Australia, that I should not hesitate to recommend its approval 
but for the protection on the part of the United States which it seems to imply. 
With some modification of the obligation of protection which the agreement 
imports, it is recommended to the favorable consideration of the Senate. 

U. S. Grant. 
Washington, May 22nd, 1872." 
11 F. R., 1894, p. 505. 
1'-^ House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. 

No. 4. Mr. Fish to Mr. Steinberger. 

Department of State, 
Washington, March 29, 1873. 



"The points to which you will especially chrect your attention are: 

1. The number of islands constituting the group and the extent of each. 

2. The number of inhabitants, both aboriginal and from abroad. 

3. The nature and quantity of the agricultural and other production. 

4. The harljors suitable for vessels engaged in long voyages by sea. 

On the 17th of February, 1872, Commander Richarcf W. Meade of the Navy 
concluded and signed with Oau O Maga, the great chief of the Bay of Pagopago, 
an agreement granting this Government the privilege of establishing a naval 
station in the harlwr of Pagopago, Island of Tutuila. Though Commander 
Meade had no authoritj' to enter into this agreement, the President thought 
proper to submit the instrument to the Senate. A copy of the confidential 
document containing it is herewith communicated in confidence for your 
information. It is not unlikely that perhaps in the not distant future the 
interests of the United States may require not only a naval station in the 
Samoan group, but a harl:)or where their steam and other vessels also may 
freely and securely frequent. Full and accurate information in regard to the 
islands will be necessary to enable the Government here to determine as to the 
measures which may be advisable toward obtaining that object. 

In the course of your communications with the chiefs in the islands, you 
will caution them against making grants of their land to individual foreigners. 

The European nations, who colonized tliis hemisphere, have usually regarded 
such grants from the aborigines as invalid, and in all probability the rule will 
be held to apply to the Samoan group. It is expected that you will l)e speci- 
ally cautious to avoid conversation, official or otherwsie, with any persons 
respecting the relations between this and any other country. You are to 
bear in mind that you are not a regular diplomatic agent, formally accredited 



STEINBERGER's first mission to SAMOA 117 

Colonel Steinberger spent several months in Samoa, made a 
thorough investigation of the islands and held conferences with the 
leading chiefs. His emphasis of the fact that the United States 
Government did not want their lands, ^^ and his reiterated caution 
against selling their lands to individual foreigners, won the con- 
fidence of the Samoans, who accorded him signal honors. The 
native leaders were at that time engaged in forming a government 
for the islands, and the laws being then drawn up were presented 
to Steinberger, who consulted with the English and German 
consuls and returned the laws in modified form to the chiefs. The 
Samoan flag was then raised at Mulinuu and was officially recog- 
nized by the foreign consuls.^* It was a source of gratification to 
Steinberger to have the German Consul join with the others in 
this action because, knowing his control of a great commercial 
monopoly in Samoa, Steinberger had doubted his willingness to 
recognize the native government and its laws. Steinberger after- 
ward claimed to be mainly instrumental in creating that govern- 
ment.^^ The impression made by Steinberger on the leaders of the 
islands was so favorable that they sent through him an appeal to 
the "Principal Chief of the American Government "^^ to annex 
Samoa to the United States. It was their full belief that he had 
been sent for this purpose. Their appeal was seconded by letters 
from a number of the foreign residents of Samoa, and Steinberger, 
himself in favor of extending protection to the islands, promised 
to convey their petitions to the President. It was evidently the 
conviction of at least one of the chiefs, Malietoa, that the union 
had already taken place. ^^ 

to another government, but an informal one, of a special and confidential 
character, appointed for the sole purpose of obtaining full and accurate infor- 
mation in regard to the Navigators' Islands. Even regular diplomatic agents 
are required to be reticent in regard to the affairs of their own government 
and are by law, forbidden to correspond in regard to the public affairs of any 
foreign government with any private person, with any newspaper or other 
periodical, or otherwise than with the proper officers of the United States. 
This interdict will be particularly observed by you." 

•' Steinberger Report. Inclosure A 2, p. 54 '^ Ibid., p. 49. 

15 House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 12, p. 71 

1^ Steinberger Report. Inclosure D 1, p. 56 i' Iliid., Inclosure E. 



118 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Steinberger's report was praised by the Secretary of State, Fish, 
as being "replete with novel and valuable information," showing 
the commissioner to have been a " diligent and judicious observer.^* 
Steinberger set forth his personal interest in the Samoan people, 
asserting that it would mean much for their welfare to have 
extended to them the American protection which they sought. 
If the Government did not deem it advisable at this moment to 
establish a protectorate over the islands, it should at least send a 
minister or commissioner with power to treat with their new 
government as that of an independent people. ^^ He himself 
wished to be that commissioner, owing to his personal interest in 
the Samoans, and the fact that they had petitioned the President 
for his return. He also wrote a letter of guidance and counsel to 
the Samoans, assuring them that the Government of the United 
States had received their gifts (considered by them to be symbols 
of their country itself), and was then considering their petition.^'' 
This letter he requested j\Ir. Fish to have endorsed by the State 
Department, but the Secretary of State declined on the ground 
that such an act would be "contrary to the usual practice of the 
Department. "21 The petitions for annexation, it was felt, could 
not be granted at this time. The Government was sensible of the 
value of Samoa strategically and commercially, but public senti- 
ment in the United States was strongly opposed to annexing 
further territory, especially at so great a distance and inhabited 
by a different race as contrary to American tradition. Neverthe- 
less, it was considered important to retain the good-will of the 
Samoans, and Steinberger was authorized to return to the islands, 
bearing to the chiefs gifts and the assurances of the interest which 
the United States held in the happiness and welfare of the islands. -- 

18 House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 10, p. 69. 

13 Ibid., No. 12, p. 71 ^o ibid., No. 14, Inclosure 2, p. 73. 

21 Ibid., No. 15, p. 74. 

2abid.,No. 17, p. 76. 

Mr. Fish to Mr. Steinberger. 

Departaient of State, 
Washington, December 11, 1874. 
"Sir: 

The President having determined to authorize you again to proceed to 
the Samoan group in the character of a special agent of the United States, 



steinberger's second mission 119 

^Ir. Steinberger's interest in the natives of Samoa led him to 
enter into relations with them which involved the United States 

you will embark for those islands at San Francisco in a man of war, on board 
of which the Secretary of the Navy has been requested to direct you to be 
provided with a passage. The expense attending this and of your mission 
generally must be borne by yourself, and will in no event be recognized as a 
proper charge against the Government. Pursuant to the suggestion con- 
tained in your letter from Baltimore of the nineteenth of November last, the 
President has addressed the accompanying sealed communication to the 
Taimua or Pule of Samoa, a copy of which is also furnished for your informa- 
tion. You will make proper arrangements for presenting the original. 

The special passport with which you are also herewith provided describes 
your official character. 

I annex here a list of articles which have been furnished by several of the 
Departments, which will be entrusted to you as presents as suggested by you. 

There is no doubt from your report and from the information received 
from other sources, that the Samoan group is naturally fertile and has many 
resources. Its position, too, in the Pacific is commanding, and particularly 
important to us. It is more than doubtful, however, whether these consider- 
ations would be sufficient to satisfy our people that the annexation of those 
islands to the United States is essential to our safety and prosperity. In 
any event, supposing that the general sentiment should be favorable to such 
a measure, I am not aware that it has received such an expression as would 
require an acknowledgement by the Government, and warrant measures on 
our part accordingly. It is deemed inexpedient without such a call from 
the public to originate such a measure adverse to the usual traditions of the 
Government, and which therefore, probably would not receive such a sanction 
as would be likely to secure its success. Under these circumstances, your 
functions will be limited to observing and reporting upon Samoan affairs, and 
to impressing those in authority there with the lively interest which we take 
in their happiness and welfare. 

Hamilton Fish." 

(Inclosure) 



Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, to their High- 
nesses, the Taimua and Pule, or Principal Chiefs of Samoa. 
"Great and Good Friends: 

I have received through Col. A. B. Steinberger, whom I sent to your 
islands as a special agent of the United States, the interesting letter of the 
third of October, 1873, which you were pleased to address to me. I am 
gratified to learn from that communication that peace prevailed in j-our 
country. This is among the greatest blessings vouchsafed to nations, and 
I hope that your enjoyment of it may be without interruption. You also 
inform me that the Samoan Government had adopted a flag. This is an 
interesting event in your history. My prayer is that, as it is an emblem of 
your unity and independence, these may ever remain inviolable except by the 
consent of your people. 

Your course generally, as reported to me by Colonel Steinberger, deserves 
my cordial approval and encouragement, which I offer you. I trust that 
you will persevere in well-doing. Although the chief city of the United 
States, whence I am writing to you, is far away from your islands, being 
near the coast of the Atlantic Ocean, our territory extends to the shores of 
the other ocean in which your islands lie, at not a m^ch greater distance from 
San Francisco than is the city of Washington, which is our capital. Being 
then, as you are, much nearer to us than to any European nation, on this 



120 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

to a degree not intended by the Government. Reports began to 
be circulated that the Samoans considered that he had promised 
them the protection of the United States. He was also said to have 
assumed the right to levy tonnage dues and to have given a native 
chief the right to examine ship registers — without consulting any 
foreign consul on the subject. ^^ These accusations Steinberger 
denied and furnished evidence refuting them.-^ Nevertheless, he 
wrote that he had accepted the position of premier of the kingdom, 
that he had the entire confidence of the native popvilation and 
asked for the passage of a bill by Congress authorizing him, as an 
American citizen, to hold office under a foreign government.--' He 
was throughout his stay in Samoa in open conflict with the Ameri- 
can Consul Mr. S. S. Foster, who finally addressed a note-'' to the 
Government, at the request of certain British residents, inquiring 
as to Steinberger's status, whether he had been authorized to form 
a government in the islands and whether the United States 
Government sustained him in his acts. Shortly after this Stein- 
berger tendered his resignation. The Department of State 
notified the American Consul that Colonel Steinberger's visits had 
no diplomatic or political significance whatever, that he had not 
been authorized by the United States to form a govermnent in 
Samoa or to pledge the United States to sustain any government 
he might be instrumental in forming." 

account alone it would be natural, were there no other reasons, that we should 
take a lively interest in your welfare and in all that concerns j'ou. 

The 'staff,' the 'fly-flap,' and the 'sacred mat' which you entrusted to 
Colonel Steinberger, were safely dehvered l)y him, and were duly received 
by me in the spirit with which they were offered. You may be assured that 
I am duly sensil>le of the significance of these gifts. 

Colonel Steinberger's course during his first mission has so far met my 
approval and he seems to have made himself so acceptable to you that I have 
authorized him again to visit you, for the purpose of informing me of the 
progress of your affairs since he left you. I pray you therefore to receive him 
kindly, and to continue to him the good-will which you showed on the former 
occasion. I pray God to have you in His safe and holy keeping. Written at 
Washington, this 11th day of December, 1874. 

Ulysses S. Grakt." 

-'' House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 21, p. 78. 
2^ Ibid., No. 22, p. 80., 25 1]^[±^ ^o. '23, p. 81. 

2« Ibid., No. 26, p. 1'24. 27 Ibid., No. 27, p. 125. 



STEINBERGER's regime in SAMOA 121 

It is quite evident from the reports submitted by Steinberger 
that the annexation of the islands by the United States would have 
been acceptable to the natives at this time. The increase of the 
German and British commercial interests, the exploitation of 
Samoan lands and labor at the hands of German and British 
monopolist companies had led the Samoans to look for the pro- 
tection of some strong power, and the United States, with its 
small trade in the islands, seemed to them at once innocuous and 
yet strong enough to afford protection. It was also quite evident 
that in spite of an executive and a navy department in favor of 
annexation, the public opinion of the United States would refuse 
to tolerate the idea. When rumors began to be circulated con- 
cerning Steinberger's activities in Samoa, Congress at once took 
notice and the House of Representatives passed a resolution^** 
instructing the Committee on Foreign Affairs to inquire into the 
extent and character of the power conferred on Steinberger by the 
Government. It was in execution of this inquiry that the reports 
and correspondence concerning the Steinberger missions were 
published, which showed that Steinberger himself was no longer in 
the service and which demonstrated to Congress that the State 
Department had effectively disavowed any of his acts which 
pledged the United States to the support of any government he 
might assist in forming in Samoa. 

The Steinberger regime in Samoa had the result of antagoniz- 
ing the natives against other foreign residents, creating hostility 
against himself as a usurper of power and opponent of the interests 
of the white residents, and there also arose an opposition party 
among the native Samoans. The Taimua party based its claims 
on the Constitution established by Steinberger; the Puletua re- 
fused to recognize that Constitution as having any binding power 
over them.^^ The dissension between the native factions was 
considered by the Germans to endanger the persons and property 
of their subjects on the islands and attempts were made by them 
to reconcile the two factions. The failure of these efforts they 

28 House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 21, p. 1. 
" V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 2.39, p. 53. 



122 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

assigned to the fact that the Taimiia party, in spite of the resig- 
nation of Steinberger and the disavowal of his pohtical activities 
by the United States, still believed that the United States would 
give them material support. Such a belief is explainable by the 
fact that the presents taken back to the Samoans by Steinberger 
from the United States Government consisted of a small supply of 
arms and ammunition and a few small cannon.^'' The Imperial 
German Government, therefore, instructed its consul at Apia to 
invite the opposing parties to come to an arrangement and to 
request the American and British consuls to lend their assistance 
in the reconstruction. It was distinctly stated in this request^^ 
that the German Government did not intend to interfere with the 
independence of Samoa, but that it wished only to see the estab- 
lishment of a stable government as necessary to the large German 
interests at stake in the islands. The British acting consul agreed 
to cooperate in this cause, which he deemed also to the interest of 
British subjects.^- Mr. Griffin, the United States Consul, however, 
refused on the ground that he had no authority from his govern- 
ment to unite with his colleagues or any other persons for the 
purpose indicated, that he would, nevertheless, make known to 
the President the wishes of the German Consul and await instruc- 
tions.-^^ This refusal, though in accord with the long-standing 
American policy against joint action, the Germans declared 
strengthened the confidence of the Taimua party and made the 
settlement of hostihties more difficult. Griffin's general attitude 
in Samoa, however, and especially his leanings toward annexation, 
were found to be purely personal and not expressive of the policy 
of the United States Government.^^ The Taimua party now turned 
for support to both the United States and England, sending almost 
simultaneously to the President and to the Queen petitions to 
extend to the islands the protection of their governments.^^ The 
German Government became alarmed and instituted proceedings 



30 House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 17, p. 76. 
•^1 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 37 32 jhid., p. 43. 

33 Ibid., p. 44. 34ii^ia., p. 51. 

3= Ibid., Denkschrift, p. xv. 



GERMAN AGREEMENT OF 1877 WITH SAMOAN CHIEFS 123 

in Washington and London and also in Samoa itself looking to 
the maintenance of equal treatment of German interests in the 
islands. In Samoa it concluded with each of the warring factions, 
the Taimua and the Puletua, agreements providing against injury 
to German possessions in case of the outbreak of hostilities and 
promising on the part of the leading chiefs not to give to any other 
go\'ernment privileges not extended also to that of Germany.^" To 
make this more emphatic a letter was framed by the Imperial 
German Consul, Theodore Weber, and Captain Hassenpflug, of 
S. M. S. "Augusta," confirming in detail the German rights 
in Samoa and guaranteeing them against any possible infringe- 
ment.^^ The letter ignored any soverign rights of the natives and 

36 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, pp. 67 and 68. 

4. "Wir werden in keiner Weise die deiitsche Regierung zuruecksetzen 
oder irgend einer anderen fremden Regierung Vorrechte vor der deutschen 
gewaehren. 

Wir beharren gaenzlich bei allem, was wir den deutschen Vertretern in 
jener Beziehung geschrieben haben, in Uebereinstimmung mit den uns in 
ihrem (den deutschen Vertretern) Briefe an uns vom 24 Mai angezeigten 
Punkten." 

The above article was inchided in both agreements which were signed 
on Jul}' 3rd and 5th respectively (1877) for the Taimua t)y twenty-eight 
chiefs and for the Puletua by Malietoa. 

" A. & P., 1889 (C-5629), No. 96. Thurston Report. Inclosure 2, p. 76. 

Captain Hassenpflug and Mr. Weber to the Taiinua and Faipule of Samoa 
(Translation bv source.) 

Apia, May 24th, 1878 (? 1877). 
"Chieftains: 

We have received your various written and verbal declarations that 
you intend to grant no privileges whatever in these islands to any foreign 
nation in preference to ours but that you mean to put all foreign governments 
on the same footing and in nowise slight the German Government; moreover, 
that you will give no foreigner a privileged position in a Government of these 
islands. 

We have received the same promises, namely, to put the foreign nations 
represented here in Samoa on an equal footing, from the Chieftains of the 
Puletua. 

Furthermore, on the occasion of our conference with you on the 15th of this 
month, we told you why the Germans and their interests in Samoa must not 
be regarded as on sufferance, but as possessing rights, and that a one-sided 
political arrangement of affairs in Samoa without seeking counsel of the 
German Government was therefore untenable. 

We now inform you that we shall hold you to the promises given to us, and 
that we shall insist upon our rights. 

For these reasons we now protest hereby in the most decisive and solemn 
manner, against any steps whatever whereby one or more foreign governments. 



124 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

dictated that they should make no one-sided poHtical arrange- 
ment with another power without seeking counsel of the German 
Government. Agreement to the terms stated in the letter was 
embodied in the general agreement with the chiefs. 

In both London^* and Washington the German representatives 
secured expression of the denial of any policy of annexation and 
the promise that the consuls of each nation in Samoa should be 
instructed to cooperate with the German representatives in their 
efforts to establish peace and order in the islands. In the United 
States the annexation proposition was presented both by Consul 
Griffin who returned to the United States in the summer of 1S77 
and by a special native commissioner Le Mamea, sent over for the 
purpose by the Taimua party of Samoa. Both were unsuccessful. 

excluding the German Government, may be called to the Protectorate of these 
islands, or whereby an annexation of these islands may be brought about, as 
well as against any other such steps whatever whereby German interests might 
in any way whatever be injured or prejudiced, whether by arrangement of 
Samoa pohtical relations without asking advice of the Consular and ^Maritime 
Representatives of Germany, or by granting a privileged position to the 
Representatives of other governments or to other foreigners, or in any other 
way whatever. 

We protest against all such steps in virtue of our instructions from the 
Imperial Government for so long as until the said Government intimates its 
concurrence in such steps. 

The Consular and Maritime Representatives of the 
Imperial German Government in Samoa, 

Hassenpflug, Captain of Corvette, Commander of 
H.M.S. "Augusta." 

Th. Weger, Imperial German Consul. 

38 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 69. Lord Derby assured the German 
Ambassador that if the English representative of his own accord carried on 
annexation policy in Samoa, or gave the impression of so doing, that such 
action did not conform to the instructions sent him from London. . . . This 
probably referred to the action of Mr. Liardet, British consul in Samoa who, 
following a collision between the Taimua and some of the sailors of H.M.S. 
"Barracouta" proceeded to levy heavy damage claims and who asserted that 
as surety for those claims he held the islands in the name of Her Majesty (p. 
73 also p. 76). Lord Derby promised that the British consul would be 
instructed to act in concert with his German colleague and assist him as far 
as possible in his undertaking. In Washington von Thielmann received 
assurance that Secretary Evarts had already sent similar instructions to the 
American consul, Mr. Griffin, namely, that in case of intervention to estabhsh 
order in Samoa he should lend his assistance to the German and British 
representatives (Ibid., p. 57). 



AMERICAN REJECTION OF ANNEXATION PROPOSALS 125 

Secretary of State Evarts assured Baron von Thielmann^'' that the 
I .nited States poHcy in regard to Samoa was one of a strict non- 
interference with the domestic politics of the Islands, desiring 
only that peace and order be restored by the establishment of a 
stable, independent native government. In reference to the 
mission of Le ]Mamea, Assistant Secretary Seward informed the 
German Ambassador von Schloezer that the United States was con- 
sidering concluding a commercial treaty with Samoa but that the 
propos'al to take over the islands as a protectorate could under no 
circumstances be accepted — the United States wanted trade but 
not dominion,^*^ and that if there were people in Apia who believed 

^' Ibid., No. 9, Anl. I, p. 53. To Baron von Thielmann, His Imperial Ger- 
man Majesty's Charge d' Affaires: 

Department of State, Washington, 
15 June, 1877. 



"In reply to your note I have the honor to inform you that your assumption 
that the Government of the United States is as desirous as your own to pro- 
mote commerce in the South Sea Islands, is correct. The comparatively 
short distance from our shores to the most productive of those islands, would 
justify our Government in taking an even deeper interest in their development 
than any European Government, and that interest is felt. You are also 
correct in your belief that expectation of receiving aid from the United State?, 
which you allege is entertained by one party of the Islands, is without founda- 
tion. 

The course which has been pursued by the United States in its dealings 
with these islands has been to constantly and consistently advise their consuls 
to pursue a policy of absolute non-interference with the domestic politics and 
government of the Samoan Islands. The United States — the same as Ger- 
many and Great Britain — do not desire the triumph of any particular party, 
but the restoration of peace and order; and this Government further desires 
that peace and order be restored by the establishment of a firm, stable, inde- 
pendent native government that will command the respect and support of 
natives and foreigners. There is nothing in any of the instructions of the 
Department to our Consuls at Apia to warrant any one party on the Island 5 
more than another, to beheve that the Government was favorable to their 
cause; and the Department would regret to have such an impression prevail. 
. . . . It is hoped that the course pursued by this Government, which 
is in accordance with its long-established policy of strict non-interference 
with the poHtical affairs of other nations and peoples, will convince the 
Imperial Government that so far as it could consistently do so, the United 
States had anticipated the desires of that Government in reference to affairs 
in the Samoan Islands. 

Wm. M. Evarts." 

« V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 77 

No. 19. Der Kaiserliche Gesandte an das Auswaertige Amt. 

Washington, den 3. Januar, 1878. 
"Aus Eurer Excellenz hohen Erlassen vom 15. November und 7. Dezember 



126 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

that the United States would ever take the islands under its juris- 
diction, or even under its protection, those people were mistaken. 
Mr. Seward gives in his "Reminiscences" an interesting account*' 
of the mission of Le Mamea and the reception of his proposal by 
the United States. Although the President, Secretary Evarts and 
the Navy Department were in favor of accepting the proposal, 
they realized that the sentiment of Congress and of the people at 
large would oppose it vigorously. The Alaska purchase was still 
the object of criticism and ridicule, the Panama canal had been 
allowed to fall into the hands of France, and the proposals to 
acquire Santo Domingo and the Danish West Indies had been 
decisively rejected. As Seward himself expressed it, "It seemed 
to be considered a mark of patriotism to oppose any addition to 
our own country." The Samoan ambassador was gravely dis- 
appointed, but finally agreed to let Seward draw up the treaty as 
he thought best, asking in return for Pago-Pago, the best harbor 
in Samoa, only the assurances of the peace and friendship of the 
United States. This Seward agreed to do, as it seemed to him that 

V. J. betreffend die Samoa-Inseln, habe igh dem Unterstaatssekretaer Seward 
die geeigneten Mittheilungen gemacht. 

Inzwschen ist hier Le Mamea, der Abgesandte der Samoa Taimua, ein- 
getroffen und- hat durch seine schoene imposante Erscheinung und durch 
sein dezentes Auftreten einen vorteilhaften Eindruck im Staatsdepartment 
gemacht. Zu der Neujahrskour im "Weissen Hause" war Le Mamea mit 
dem diplomatischen Korps eingeladen. 

Heute sagte mir Herr Seward Folgendes: 

'Le Mamea wuenscht mit uns einen Freundschafts- und Handelsvertrag 
abzuschliessen, und wir sind jetzt nicht mehr abgeneigt auf diesen Vorschlag 
einzugehen da ein solcher Vertrag unserem Handel nur nuetzen nicht schaden 
kann 

Die Taimua wuenscht aber auch,. dass wir das Protektorat ueber die Samoa 
Inseln uebernehmen sollen, und auf diesen Antrag werden wir uns keinenfalls 
einlassen. 

Die Vereinigten Staaten befinden sich jenen Insehi gegenueber in einer 
ganz gleichen Lage wie Deutschland. Wir wollen ebensowenig wie die 
deutsche Regiervmg dort ein Protektorat ausueben, wir wollen keine Kolonien 
haben, wir wuenschen nur Handel zu treiben; we want only trade no dominion. 
Wenn es Leute in Apia giebt die glauben, dass wir jemals die Inseln unter 
unsere Botmaessigkeit oder auch nur unter unseren Schutz nehmen wuerden, 
so irren sie sich. Der Sinn des Amerikas geht nicht auf solche Erwerbungen.' 

(gez.) 

SCHLOEZER." 

^1 Seward, Frederick W., "Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and 
Diplomat, 1830-1915," p. 437 ff. (See Appendix.) 



AMERICAN TREATY WITH SAMOA, 1878 127 

he might persuade the Senate to accept a harbor provided the 
country did not have to pay auAlhing for it nor to promise to 
protect it. After several revisions the treaty was finally concluded 
January 16, 18 78.^^ Provision was made in the treaty for the 
United States to establish a naval station in the harbor of Pago- 
Pago. Article VI placed the United States on " the most-favored- 
nation" basis in relation to Samoa. The only article which in any 
way recognized or embodied the desire of the Samoans for the 
protection of the United States was Article Y, which read: 

"If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen or shall 
hereafter arise, between the Samoan Government and stny other 
other government in amity with the United States, the government 
of the latter will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting 
those differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation." 

This article was apparently included in the treaty as a matter of 
courtesy and evidence of the friendly attitude of the United States 
in return for the favors granted by the Samoans. It was not looked 
upon as a serious obligation entered into by the United States; 
nor was much public interest shown in the treaty as a whole. 
Secretary of State Gresham, writing in 1894*^ of the Samoan 
Treaty says: 

"The impression produced by a discriminating examination of 
them {i. e., x\rticles II and V) is that they were in,spired rather by 
an amiable desire on the part of our Government, not to appear to 
be wholly insensible to the friendly advances of the Samoans than 
by any supposition that the character of our relations to Samoa 
greatly concerned us. Indeed it is quite clear that in the five years 
that had elapsed since Steinberger was first sent out to gather 
information in regard to the islands, the Government and people 
of the United States had made such small progress toward a con- 
ception of the importance of the group that, if the Samoans had 
not been incited by our local representatives to send an ambas- 
sador to Washington to obtain a treaty, none would have been 
made." 

« U. S. Statutes at Large, 45th Cong., 1877-1879, Vol. XX, p. 204. (See 
Appendix.) 

« F. R., 1894, Appendix I, p. 506. 
9 



128 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

The attitude of Germany toward the islands was not similarly 
indifferent. Protection of German commercial interests in the 
great archipelago of the south seas had admittedly become the 
subject of increased solicitude on the part of the Imperial Govern- 
ment.^^ In view of the development of German trade with the 
islands of the South-Pacific — a trade which was acknowledged at 
various times by both British and American authorities to be 
greater than that of any other nation'*^ — the German Government 
considered it a duty not to leave the German enterprises in the 
Pacific entirely to their fate and had entered upon the practice of 
maintaining one or more German war-vessels continuously in that 
region.^*' Therefore, when news i-eached the islands that a treaty 
had been formed between Samoa and the United States granting 
to the latter special privileges in the harbor of Pago-Pago, the 
German representatives considered that the moment had come*^ 
for them to lay claim to the promises accorded to them in their 
agreement made in ISTV with the assembled chiefs of Samoa, '^ 
and to demand equal or compensating privileges through a com- 
mercial treaty. Their claim met with a policy of delay amounting 
to virtual refusal on the part of the Taimua and Faipule, constitut- 
ing the principal native government of Samoa, as the chiefs were 
anxiously waiting for the return of their ambassador Le Mamea 
from the United States to see to what extent he had pledged 
their country to America before they should conclude any fiu'ther 
agreement with Germany. The German Consul Weber finally 
considered that the agreement was being refused recognition by 
the Samoans and ordered the seizure of the ports of Saluafata^^ 
and Falealii to be held as security until the Samoans should decide 
to abide by their agreement of 1S77 and grant to Germany equiva- 
lent privileges to those extended to the United States. Notice was 



« V. R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239. Denkschrift, p. xiii. 
« House Ex. Doc. No. 161, 44th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 85; also Thurston 
Report, A. & P., 1889 (C-5629), p. 72 (especially p. 168). 
^« V. R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239. Denkschrift, p. xiii. 
" V. R., 1879, Anl. Vol. VI, Nr. 239. Denkschrift, p. xvii. 
^* Ibid., p. 67 (see Appendix). 
« Ibid., pp. 121 and 122; also pp. 137 and 138. 



BRITISH AND GERMAN MEASURES T(3 SECURE TREATIES 129 

sent to both the American and British Consuls of the reason for 
the action and declaration was made that there would be no 
interference with private property and foreign interests and that 
for the sake of avoiding such interference the harbor of Apia had 
not been included in these measures. 

Preceding this event there had been considerable friction 
between the foreign consuls on the islands, especially between the 
American and German representatives. At the request of the 
British consul, Sir Arthur Gordon, the German consul, j\Ir. Weber, 
had agreed to unite with him in seeking to conclude with the 
Samoan Government, a convention**^ which should obtain from the 
Taimua certain concessions with regard to the local government 
of the town of Apia. The concessions planned by the convention 
were considered by the British consul to be in the interest of all the 
foreign residents in the islands. On being requested to join in this 
action, the American consul, ]Mr. Griffin, had refused, stating that 
he had been instructed by his Government "not to take part with 
the representatives of other nations nor to interfere in any way with 
the governmental affairs of Samoa. "^^ This seems somewhat at 
variance with the instructions which Secretary Evarts declared 
to the German representative at Washington he had given to 
Griffin on his return to Samoa,*^ namely, that he should assist his 
colleagues in any undertakings making for the establishment of 
peace and order in the islands. It is quite possible, however, that 
the American consul did not consider the convention as an mider- 
taking making for peace and order. In his assertion, of the policy 
of non-interference with the native Samoan Government, he was 
correctly carrying out the United States' oft-expressed policy. 
The British consul having met with delay and refusal in the pro- 
jected convention with the Samoan Government, presented it 
once more modified in certain respects to the Taimua with the 
threat that within twenty-four hours force would be used to 
exact such guarantees as might be considered necessary .^^ There- 
upon the Samoan Government appealed to the United States 

50 Ibid., p. 89. =1 Ibid., p. 92. 

5-' Ibid., p. 57, also p. 113. ^^ ibj^i^ p nO. 



130 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Consul and Mr. Griffin hoisted the American flag at MiiHnuu over 
that of the Samoan Government. Upon the German consul's 
request for an explanation, he stated''' that he had taken that action 
to protect the Governments both of the United States and of 
Samoa from further indignities at the hands of the British repre- 
sentatives, that Sir Arthur Gordon's attempt to force upon the 
people of Samoa a treaty obnoxious to them was sufficient justi- 
fication for his act. He added that, while he had been instructed 
not to interfere in the governmental affairs of Samoa, he had not 
been instructed to refuse to take the islands under the protection of 
the United States under such conditions as now prevailed, and that 
the American flag was raised iit the unanimous request of the 
Taimua and Faipule (upper and lower houses of the native Samoan 
Government). This action, though technically contradictory to 
the consul's instructions and disavowed by the American Govern- 
ment, was in general character consonant with the American 
policy of prevention of encroachments upon the rights of the natives. 
Such was the state of affairs when the German Consul seized 
the ports of Saluafata and Faleahi for the purpose of claiming 
most-favored-nation treatment as guaranteed by its agreement of 
1877. The American Consul Griffin protested against the seizure 
of the ports as without justification and as contrary to inter- 
national usage.^'^ The German agreement, with the chiefs, on which 
the seizure was based Griffin declared to have been "only a tem- 
porary matter made during the time of war for the protection of 
foreign property in Samoa. "^"^ The British acting consul, Robert 
Swanston, took a different stand requesting to be provided with a 
copy of the agreement" and afterward testifying to its validity as 
an instrument. In several instances at this time it is noticeable 

'* Ibid., pp. 104 and 107. ^^ n^i^^ p i24. 

*^ There is nothing in the agreement to indicate its temporary character 
and the conditions of signing seem to have l:)een formal and regular (Ibid, 
p. 136). Yet it is strange that it seemed to be unfamiliar a year later lioth 
to the British Acting Consul in Samoa (Ibid., p. 125) and to Lord Salisbury 
himself (Ibid., p. 136), each having requested. to be furnished with a copy of 
the agreement. 

" Ibid., pp. 125 and 133, also p. 87. 



COOPERATION OF GREAT BRITAIN AND GERMANi' 131 

that the British and German pohcies coincided in regard to their 
procedure in the protection of their interests in the islands.^* 
Especially in the German efforts to obtain a commercial treaty with 
Samoa was the British support evident, Lord Salisbury instructing 
the British consul to lend his whole influence to the support ("mit 
seinem ganzen Einfluss zu unterstuetzen ") of the German efforts 
to conclude a treaty with Samoa." The German consul was 
instructed reciprocally to assist the British representative to 
obtain a similar treaty for Great Britain. There seems to have 
been little compunction on the part of either of the two nations 
against using force against the natives to obtain the conventions 
desired. 

^leanwhile the Samoan ambassador Le Mamea had returned 
to the islands bearing with him the eagerly sought treaty with 
the United States. He was brought back to Samoa on the U. S. S. 
"Adams" and was accompanied by a special commissioner from 
the United States, ]Mr. Gustavus Goward,'^° who attended the 
ceremonies of the ratification of the treaty by the Taimua and 
Faipule, addressed the assembled chiefs, and later superintended 
the transfer of the harbor of Pago-Pago to the United States 
according to the provisions of the treaty. As e\idence of the 
transfer, he erected the American flag on Goat Island commanding 
the harbor. 

58 Ibid., p. 89. 

Sir Arthur Gordon to His Imperial German Majesty's Consul for Samoa. 

Apia, 16th February, 1878. 



"Not only does it appear to me that the interest of all foreign residents 
in Samoa are, in substance identical, but I am aware that the Government of 
Her Britannic Majesty are entirely in accord as to the policy to be pursued 
with regard to those interests. Whatever, therefore, be your decision as to 
this request, I shall at least have the satisfaction of knowing that in any case 
we have the same object in view." 

(See also Ibid., p. 93 (Anl. D), p. 112, No. 25, p. 87). 

59 Ibid., p. 142. 

*" For Mr. Goward's report on his mission to Samoa see Senate Executive 
Documents No. 2, 46th Congress, 1st Session. A resolution calling for the 
report was adopted by the Senate, March 3rd, 1879, the Senate immediately 
thereafter entered into Executive Session. (See Senate Journal, 46th 
Congress, 3rd Session, 1878-1879, p. 487.) 



132 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

INIr. Goward was enthusiastically received by the Samoans, 
whose delight over the treaty seems to have been quite spon- 
taneous.*'^ In return he set forth to them the good-will of the 
United States, the first nation to conclude a treaty with Samoa, 
which it thereby recognized to be an independent nation. He 
drew attention to the fact that the treaty had been ratified by 
the Samoan Government, free from influence or force on the part 
of the United States. In case of trouble the United States — as 
stipulated by the treaty — stood ready to extend its good offices, 
Samoa having the honor to be the first place so far distant which 
had induced the United States to so extend its active influence. 
The Samoans were apparently entirely satisfied with the treaty 
and seemed to consider that Le Mamea had gained for them what 
they had sought.''^ Mr. Griffin announced to them that they now 

" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 2. 

s^Goward Report, No. 1. "The Reception of the Treaty with Samoa." 
(Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. .3.) 

"On receiving the ratified treaty, I replied as follows: 

"'Great is the love which America Ijears to Samoa strengthened by your 
action this day in the ratification of the treaty I hold in my hand. The first 
instrument of the kind in your history, it is a living testimony of the love and 
high respect in which you hold the guardian of your choice. Of America's 
vast extent of country, power, wealth, resources, and population your late 
ambassador, Mamea, will tell vou. After many years of petition, at last 
America, in her faith in the brotherhood of mankind, has heard your pathetic 
appeals, and seven thousand miles away has stretched forth her powerful 
hand to your aid. She recognizes your assembled rulers and chiefs, the Taimua, 
and Faipule, as the Samoan Government, and Samoa itself as an indejjendent 
nation among other nations of the earth such as England, Germany, and 
France, entitled with them to the courtesies and rights known to international 
law. Other people like yourselves, struggling for independence and national 
position, have in vain sought for her powerful aid and recognition. You 
have the honor to be the first to induce her to extend her good offices and 
active influence to islands so far distant. She does this in the hope that 
the faith she has in you has not been misplaced, and that you prove yourselves 
as worthy of confidence in the future as today you make manifest. By 
such treaties nations with each other bind more closely the ties of friendship 
and increase their commercial intercourse. So it will be in this case, creiiting 
pul:)lic prosperity and advancing your progress. The voluntary readiness 
and unanimity with which you have ratified this treaty, free from influence 
or force on our part, will be a most pleasing duty for me to report to the 
['nited States Government. For the welcome and expressions of gratitude 
to which you have given utterance, be pleased to accept thanks.' 

"Consul Griffin remarked, in closing the interview, that they now had what 
they had asked for, and that everything had come to pass as he had foretold 
them; they could always rely on the American Government as sure to keep 
its promise and as bearing good will towards them." 



RECEPTION OF AMERICAN TREATY 



133 



had what they had wished for, which was misleading in view of 
the fact that they had asked for annexation. Just what their 
understanding was of their relationship to the United States 
through the treaty is not clear but it was at least feared by the 
German Consul*'^ that they considered themselves to be under 
American protection, although the treaty did not provide for such 
a status. The fear as to just how the Samoan enthusiasm for the 
United States might affect commercial interests of Germany and 
Great Britain in the islands expressed itself in an attitude of 
coolness on the part of the German and British Consuls toward 
the American commissioner. They absented themselves from the 
celebrations in honor of the treaty and the criticisms of their press 
were adverse. INIr. Goward expressed satisfaction that he had been 
able to secure prompt ratification of the treaty by the Samoan 
Government, thus preventing active interference by other foreign 
officials.*^* From the viewpoint of the German Consul, INIr. Gow- 
ard 's attitude seemed high-handed and unfriendly to German 
interests. In an inter\dew*^^ Mr. Goward had told Herr Weber 
that he considered the German agreement of 1877 to be terminated 
(erledigt); that Article IV {i. e., granting to Germany most-favored- 

«3 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 88. 

Der Kaiserliche Konsul an das Auswaertige Amt. 



"Heute kam mir seine (Mr. Maudslay, British Consular Superintendent) 
Korrespondenz mit Herrn Griffin zu Gesicht, woraus hervorgeht, dass die 
Taimua sich unter amerikanischen Schutz stellen und anscheinend nur durch 
Vermittelung des Mr. Griffin mit dem englischen Vertreter verhandeln woUten 
indem Herr Griffin auf Grund des abgeschlossenen Traktats das Recht der 
Intervention, l^eansprucht und den englischen Vertretern quasi das Recht 
abspricht, direkt mit den samoanischen Autoritaeten zu verhandeln, bezie- 
hungsweise Repressalien anzuwenden. Der englische Vertreter wird selbst- 
redend heirvon keine Notiz nehmen. 

Es wuerde fuer alle Besitzenden auf Samoa hoechst unheilvoU sein wenn 
der Traktat Amerikas eine solche Interpretation zulassen und dieselbe von 
anderen Staaten anerkannt werden soUte. 

Aus den bisher bekannt gewordenen Inhalt jenes Traktats ist solches 
indess nicht herauszulesen, und waere ja ein soldier Anspruch auch nicht 
denkbar, wenn die Amerikanische Regierung nicht ausdruecklich eine Pro- 
tektorat ueber Samoa erwirbt." (gez.) Th. Weber. 

6^ Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10. 
« V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 115. 



134 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

nation privileges in Samoa) could only be considered as polite 
phraseology; it was not at all necessary for Samoa to conclude 
treaties with the other nations represented there. The German 
Consul replied that the German inhabitants of the island had 
earned for themselves the right to a voice in the affairs of the 
Samoan Islands and that, while they never claimed anything 
which could be considered to be a restriction of the treaty rights 
of other nations, nevertheless, equality of treatment in Samoa had 
become Germany's unquestioned right. After inquiring into the 
conditions of the treaty which the Germans proposed to conclude 
with Samoa, ]\Ir. Goward offered to act as intermediary. This 
Herr Weber promptly refused as incompatible with the dignity of 
the Imperial Government and of the status of German interests 
in the islands. jNIeanwhile the German warships continued to hold 
possession of the harbors of Saluafata and Falealii until the German 
treaty could be consummated. 

The actions of the American Consul and of Mr. Goward were 
only examples of that overzealousness on the part of local officials 
(of each of the three nations) which became a typical cause of 
international -troubles in Samoa.*^" The hoisting of the American 
flag over the Samoan flag at Mulinuu by Mr. Griffin was dis- 
avowed by the Government of the United States. ]\Ir. Griffin 
himself was transferred to the Fiji Islands and Secretary Seward 
gave the German ambassador at Washington to understand that 
the instructions given to the new consul, Mr. Dawson would 
prevent the repetition of such occurrences.''^ 

On his return to the United States, ]\Ir. Goward presented a 
report of his mission and included in it a review of the commercial 
developments in Samoa and his impressions as to the value of the 
islands. He emphasized the importance of the harbor at Pago- 
Pago, which had just come into the possession of the United States. 
He pronounced it the most important harbor in the south seas,"* 
being large enough to hold the fleets of several nations, and at the 

«« F. R., '94, p. 507. 

"V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 141; also p. xviii of Denkschrift. 

«« Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 15. 



GOWARD REPORT 135 

same lime, so lantl-locked as to be secure from hurricanes and 
storm and easy of defense from land or sea attacks. As a con- 
clusion to the whole report of his mission to Samoa, he repeats his 
convictions of the importance of Pago-Pago to the United States 
. HI the following terms :«3 QxA^U^'^ ^pCC CO'^^ 

"To Pago-Pago harbor in itself attention has been called with 
reference to its topographical features, its capacity, its internal 
fitness for a naval station and its possession by the United States. 
Additional allusion should be made to its general importance. In 
a naval point of view it is the key position to the Samoan Group, 
and likewise to Central Polynesia, admirably located for the pro- 
tection of American commerce, upon the increase in those waters. 
The Samoan Archipelago is now, by reason of its geographical 
position in the center of Polynesia, lying in the course of vessels 
from San Francisco to Auckland, from Panama to Sydney, and 
from Valparaiso to China and Japan, and from the fact of being 
outside the hurricane track, the most valuable group in the South 
Pacific. Situated half way between Honolulu anfl Auckland, 
Pago-Pago would be a most convenient stopping place or coaling 
station for vessels or steamers either for supplies or the exchange 
of commodities. Should a naval station and the adjuncts that 
accompany be established, and the Pacific mail steamers make it a 
port of call, it would necessarily become the controlling commercial 
point in that part of Polynesia. These are ends most worthy of 
accomplishment, from the results that would follow, in the civil- 
ization of the natives, in the starting of profitable industries, and 
the establishment of factories and plantations on the different 
islands. With trade connections throughout the south seas, this 
wealth of products would be augmented and naturally fall into 
the hands of Americans interesting themselves, who would find a 
market for their commodities in the nearest American port of 
San Francisco. This is a commercial matter of such paramount 
importance to the merchants of the Pacific States as to call for 
their immediate attention and action." 

63 Sen. Ex. Doc. Nc. 2, 46th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 29. 



136 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Goward's testimony was endorsed shortly afterward by the 
German minister in Washington, who, in announcing to Seward 
the consummation of the German treaty, admitted that the 
United States had secured the best harbor in Samoa. ^^ In spite of 
such praise, however, the pubHc in the United States took Httle 
interest in the new harbor, the House of Representatives refused 
to vote it a coalyard and it remained deserted and undeveloped for 
a number of years. 

After considerable difficulty and delay — which were declared 
due to the opposition of rival influences in the islands — the German 
Consul and the commander of the German warship "Ariadne" 
succeeded in obtaining from the Samoans the long-sought treaty. ^^ 
Immediately on its signature they raised the siege of the harbors 
and saluted the Samoan Government. 

The German treaty with Samoa^^ had as its underlying motive 
the securing for the German Empire of all the privileges of the 
most-favored-nation in relations with the island group. It was 
therefore openh' admitted that it had been modelled to a consider- 
able extent on the recent treaty between Samoa and the United 
States." The latter country having been granted the harbor of 
Pago-Pago, the Germans chose for themselves that of Saluafata, 
obtaining in that harbor the exclusive right to establish a naval 
or coaling station for German ships. ^^ It was expressly stipulated, 

'" F. W. Seward, "Reminiscences of a Wartime Statesman and Diplomat,'' 
p. 440. (See also Appendix.) 

"1 V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 179. 

« Ibid., p. 1. '3 Ibid., p. 185. 

'^ Ibid., p. 1. 

Artikel V 

"Es soil den deutschen Kriegschiffen freistehen, in den Hafen von Saluafata 
einzulaufen, daselbst zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und 
auszubessern, und der deutschen Regierung soil es ferner freistehen, in jenem 
Hafen nach eigenem Ermessen alle fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren 
Besatzungen nuetzlichen Einrichtungen und Anordnungen zu treffen. 

Die Samoa Regierung ist ferner damit einverstanden, dass die deutsche 
Regierung an den Ufern jenes Hafens Gebaude Zwecks Lagerung von Kohlen 
und irgend anderen Bedarfsgegenstaende fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und 
deren Besatzungen errichtet. Es soil der deutschen Regierung auch freistehen, 
auf dem Lande wo die Stationsgebaeude errichtet werden ihre Flagge aufzu- 
ziehen, jedoch soil die Oberhoheit der Samoa Regierung uel)er den Hafen von 
Saluafata dadurch in keiner Weise geschmaelert oder l^eeintraechtigt werden, 



GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 137 

however, that the sovereignty of the Samoan Go\'ernment over the 
harbor should be in no wise diminished or affected by the con- 
cession." Sahiafata was chosen because it offered protection to 
vessels throughout the whole year, whereas Apia lay open to the 
full force of the hurricanes during the stormy season. But, Apia 
being the commercial center of the islands, it was considered 
necessary to guarantee that place a free and independent develop- 
ment, so that a special clause was inserted providing against any 
future curtailment of German rights in Apia harbor. Other 
clauses of the treaty provided for mutual freedom of intercourse, 
or guaranteed to Germany equal commercial treatment with all 
other nations in Samoa. Article VIII,'*' however, involved a 
principle somewhat different from any contained in the American 
treaty. It provided that all laws, regulations and taxes to which 
Germans on the islands might be subjected were to be submitted 

andererseits aber verpfiichtet diese auch nichts zu thun, wodurch die der 
deutschen Regierung in diesem Artikel gewaehrten Rechte irgendwie werthlos 
gemacht oder beeintraechtigt werden koennten. Auch soil durch die in diesem 
Artikel der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten Rechte der Hafen von Saluafata 
den Kriegs- oder Handelsschiffen derjenigen Nationen welchen der Samoa 
Regierung ihre Haefen offenhaelt nicht verschlossen werden, jedoch darf die 
Regierung von Samoa in Bezug auf diesen Hafen und seine Ufer keiner anderen 
Nation gleiche Rechte, wie die der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten, hewilligen. 
Es soil den deutschen Kriegsschiffen ferner freistehen, auch in alle anderen 
Plaetze, Haefen, und Gewaesser Samoas einzulaufen daselbst zu ankern, zu 
verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und auszuliessern, nach Massgabe etwaiger, 
zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen zu vereinbarenden Gesetze, unci 
verspricht die Samoa Regierung hier ferner, dass sie keiner anderen Nation in 
irgend einer Weise irgendwelche Vorrechte vor der deutschen Regierung in 
Bezug auf den Hafen von Apia und dessen Ufer bewilligen will, sondern 
dass die deutsche Regierung auch in dieser Beziehung mit anderen Nationen 
immer gleichberechtigt sein soil." 

" Consul Weber stated that this stipulation was inserted because of instruc- 
tions from his government (V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. 187). 
There is no corresponding reservation in the article governing the transfer of 
Pago-Pago to the United States. (See Appendix, or U. S. Statutes at Large, 
45th Congress, 1877-1879, Vol. xx, p. 704.) 

"« V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 239, p. vii. 

Article VIII 

"Alle Gesetze und Verordnungen, welchen die in Samoa sich aufhaltenden 
deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen sich zu unterwerfen, sowie 
alle Steuern und Abgaben, welche dieselben demgemaess der Samoa Regierung 
zu entrichten haben, sollen von dem deutschen Konsul oder anderen zu dem 
Zwecke von der deutschen Regierung ernannten Personen zusammen mit 



138 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

to the German Consul or other German representative, who should 
discuss them with the Samoan official, and after this had taken 
place, those laws were to become valid only after they had received 
the sanction of the German Government. This Consul Weber 
considered to be a necessary measure" to assure to the Imperial 
Government the right to exert over the regulation of affairs in 
Samoa an influence which he held to be justified by the condition 
of affairs there. The Imperial Government, he considered, could 
not reject such a limited participation without laying the present 
German interests there open to foreign influence. The pre- 
dominance of German developments in Samoa, resulting in the 
great proportion of taxes being paid by German subjects, made it, 
he said, fitting and necessary that the Germans should have a voice 
in questions of taxation. The clause seems to have met with no 
great objection from the Samoans or from the other foreign nations 
interested, yet it distinctly compromises the autonomy of the 
Samoan Government. Another clause of the treaty (Article VI) ^'^ 
secured for the Germans living in Samoa definite title to all their 
lands purchased up to that date and stipulated against any further 
question as to the validity of their possession. The treaty was 
considered by the German Government" to be well suited to the 
protection of German interests in the immediate Samoan group, 
but that it would have little effect unless completed by other 
treaties or agreements with the other island groups, for the com- 
merce of which Samoa served as a point of distribution. The labor 
supply for the plantations on Samoa had to be secured from the 
other islands of Polynesia,'^" consequently there was keen rivalry 
between the competing companies — especially between the Ger- 
man and English firms— in securing and importing workers. In 
the case of islands which had become definitely protectorates of 



Beamten der Samoa-Regicrung berathen werden, ebenso alle zweckdienstlichen 
Massregeln, um die Beobachtung solcher Gesetze und Verordnungen durch 
die Deutsche!! in Samoa herl^eizufuehren, jedoch sollen alle solche geniein- 
schaftlich von den Beamten der beiderseitigen Regierungen berathenen und 
vereinbarten Gesetze und Massnahmen erst nach erlangter Bestaetigung 
derselben durch die deutsche Regierung in Kraft treten." 

" V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anl. Nr. 2,39, p. 188. "^ Ibid., p. vi. 

"9 Ibid., Denkschrift, p. xx. »" Ibid., p. 209. 



GERMAN TREATIES WITH POLYNESIAN CHIEFS 139 

Great Britain, the inhabitants were not permitted to emigrate to 
any but British possessions and Great Britain secured thereby a 
monopoly of the labor supply in those regions. ^^ It was therefore 
held important to keep open to German firms the sources of 
plantation labor in the Pacific and Consul Weber was sent on a 
cruise throughout Pol\niesia, forming with the chiefs treaties or 
agreements, the main tenor of which was to prevent any other 
nations from securing a monopoly and to assure for Germany 
most-favored-nation treatment in all respects. Where the inhabi- 
tants were nf)t sufficiently civilized to make a written agreement 
possible, the site for a coaling station was purchased. The policy, 
however, as expressly stipulated in the instructions of the foreign 
office^^ was to avoid the actual purchasing of harbors and to secure 
merely the use of them for German naval vessels; to secure equal 
treatment of German interests, but nowhere to conclude agree- 
ments which should interfere with the freedom of intercourse 
of other nations in those islands. In summing up the German 
policy in the Pacific at this time, the Secretary of the Foreign Office 
declared*^ before the Reichstag that all the agreements concluded 

«i Ibid., p. 174, also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 73, par. 183. 

*2 Ibid., Denkschrift, p. xix. 

s' V. R., 1879, Vol. II, 58 Sitz., 13 Juni, 1879, p. 1602. 

^'on Buelow (Bevollmaechtigter zum Bundesrath, Staatssekretaer des 
Auswaertigen Amts, Staatsminister). 



"Es wuerden aber diese Vertraege auf nichts anderes hinauslaufen, als auf 
ein gleiches Recht fuer alle; wir wollten kein Monopol, keine Ausschliessung 
anderer. Somit naehmen wir fuer diese Niederlassungen einfach das Recht 
in Anspruch, dass dasjenige, was durch die treue deutsche Arbeit, durch 
den ehrenwerthen tuechtigen Unternehmungsgeist dort gegruendet und in 
erfreulicher Weise entwickelt sei, auch das Recht behalte, was es durch seinen 
Ursprung erworben und in der Stille entwickelt habe, naemhch, das gleiche 
Recht mit Allen, 8chutz gegen unberechtigte Konkurrenten, die zum Xach- 
theil des deutschen Handels und der deutschen Xiederlassungen gereichten: 
Das ist in jedem der Schriftstuecke, die abgedruckt und beigefuegt sind, als 
leitender Gedanke mehr oder weniger zum Ausdruck gebracht, uns ist dies der 
leitende Gedanke geblieben. • 



Ich betrachte es als ein glueckliches Anzeichen fuer das Gelingen der sich 
daran knuepfenden Bestrebungen fuer die Aufrechterhaltung dieses Vertrages, 
dass wir gleichzeitig mit dem Abschluss desselben von Seiten der beiden 
grossen befreundeten Seemaechte, welche gleichfalls Interessen in Samoa haben 
und vertreten, die Anerkennung und freundliche Anerkennung bekommen 
haben, dass Vertraege dieser Art der rechte Weg seien, um der Unsicherheit 



140 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

aimed at nothing further than an equal right for all — that Germany 
wished to found no colonies and to establish no monopolies but only 
to make certain that German commerce should enjoy good and 
equal rights with that of any other nation. Moreover, he con- 
sidered it as a happy evidence of the success of the treaty that he 
had received from both of the other interested powers, friendly 
recognition that treaties of this sort were the right way to end 
uncertainties and solve the problems involved. 

Upon the conclusion of the German treaty with Samoa, Herr 
Weber, the German Consul, following his instructions, set about 
assisting the British Consul to obtain a treaty for Great Britain.*^ 
While the negotiations were in progress an event occurred which 
revealefl rather clearly the contrasting attitudes of the foreign 
representatives toward the Government of Samoa. '^■' The Taimua 
and Faipule sent out an invitation to the three consuls to meet 
them in conference concerning the making of certain laws and 
especially to ask the consuls for their opinion as to the advisability 
of taking into the government as adviser a certain American 
gentleman then residing in Apia. Herr Weber stated that he was 
opposed to the Samoans taking any foreigner into their govern- 
ment as adviser, believing that it would give rise to difficulties as 
in the time of Steinberger. Moreover, such an adviser should have 
the endorsement of the three governments, Germany, England 
and America, which could not w'ell be done until the Samoan 

ein Ende zu machen. Ich bin ueljerzeugt, dass gerade die freie Gleichberecht- 
igung, die sich nicht weiter in die inneren Verhaeltnisse einniischt als zur 
Aufrechterhaltung und Durchfuehrung des Vertrags, zur Sicherstellung der 
erworbenen Privatrechte, der freien Ein- und Ausfuhr noethig ist der einzige 
Weg ist, die grosse Konkurrenz der Nationen wie ich schon erwaehnte, gerade 
an diesem Punkte der Suedsee mehr und mehr friedlich auszugleichen. 



So viel ueber diesen Vertrag, nieine Herren. Was aber im uebrigen die 
weiteren Entwuerfe und Vorbereitungen zu Vertraegen oder wie man sie 
nennen will, mit den umliegenden kleinen Inseln angeht, die Sie in der sehr 
interessanten Rundfahrt des Herrn J\apitaen von Werner beschrieben finden, 
so glaube ich, darauf verweisen zu duerfen dass die Sache noch nicht abge- 
schlossen ist,- dass aber dieselben Grundsaetze, welche fuer diesen heutigen 
Vertrag leitend gevvesen sind, auch da gelt end bleiben: wir wollen keine 
Kolonien dort gruenden, wir wollen kein Monopol gegen andere haben, wir 
wollen nur feststellen, soweit man es feststellen kann, dass deutsche Schifffahrt 
und Handel dort gutes Recht und gleiches Recht haben." 

«lbid., p. 190. 85iiji(i., p. 191. 



BRITISH-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 141 

Government had made some form of agreement with England. 
In the meantime the consuls of the three powers would be glad to 
lend their assistance and advice to the Samoan Government in 
framing new laws or regulations for the islands. The British 
acting consul,**^ Air. Swanson, expressed a similar opinion, stating 
that while his country had no defined relations with the Samoan 
Government, which had the right to appoint what officials it chose, 
nevertheless, he thought that the service of foreigners in the 
government was not needed and would probably create jealousy 
and trouble. The United States Consul, ]Mr. Dawson, however, 
was emphatic in his assertion of their right to do as they pleased. 
The United States had recognized the Samoans as a free and 
independent nation — as such they had the right to avail them- 
selves of any assistance they wished or to take fifty foreigners into 
their service if they saw fit to do so. On the expediency of so 
doing, however, he refused to commit himself or to give any 
advice. 

The British treaty with Samoa was finally consummated toward 
the end of the same year.^^ This was also based on the general 
principle of securing for British subjects and their interests equal 
rights and privileges with subjects of all other foreign nations in 
Samoa. The British also secured for themselves the right to 
establish a naval and coaling station in the islands in any harbor 
except that of Apia, Saluafata, or " that part of the harbor of Pago- 
Pago which may be hereafter selected by the Government of the 
United States as a station." Great Britain was also guaranteed 
the peaceable possession of all lands purchased by her subjects 
from the Samoans in regular manner— but the possibility of dis- 
pute was admitted and its settlement provided for by a mixed 
commission of Samoan and British officials. This difi'ered radically 
from the German clause which practically prevented all investi- 
gation of disputed titles up to the date of the treaty^* and estab- 
Hshed the firm of Goddefroy in full possession of all the lands 

«6 Ibid., p. 192. 

" Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, Vol. XV, p. 334 ff. (See Appendix.) 

8SA. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 63. 



142 s.\moa: the united states and germant: in the pacific 

claimed by them and disputed by other nationals. Like the 
Germans, the British insisted on a determining voice in the 
municipal laws and police regulations as they affected British 
subjects, Article VII stipulating that British subjects would be 
instructed to observe "such of the existing municipal laws and 
police regulations of Samoa as may be hereafter agreed upon by 
agreement between the Government of Her Britannic ^Majesty 
and that of the Samoan State." Like the corresponding German 
clause, this was a limitation of the sovereignty of the Samoan 
Go\-ernment. 

The British-Samoan Treaty was concluded with King Malietoa, 
lately restored to power and recognized by the three Treaty Powers 
as de facto ruler. The German treaty harl been concluded with two 
houses of Samoa, the Taimua and Faipule, who had for two years 
without a king held the reins of government. 

There is nothing in either the British or German treaties which 
parallels the clause in the American treaty providing for the 
friendly intervention or the exercise of good offices in case of 
troubles arising between Samoa and a third nation. This clause 
placed the United States in the unique position of a kind of volun- 
tary protector of the independence of Samoa. 

Very shortly after the signing of the British Treaty a general 
con\-ention*^ was drawn up between the Government of Samoa 
and the Consuls of the Powers, providing for the neutralization of 
the district of Apia, the town and harbor being placed under the 
go^'ernment of a municipal board consisting of the consuls of those 



»5 House Ex. Doc, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 1887-1888, Vol. XXVIII, No. 238, 
p. 132. Convention of September 2nd, 1879, also Il)id., pp. 9 and 10. Secre- 
tary Baj'ard, in 1885, defended the Municipal Convention in his instructions 
to Consul Greenebaum (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 10). 

"The municipality of Apia," he wrote, "is not such a protectorate; it is a 
compact for the administration of a settlement largely peopled by aliens, 
whose established interests there are entitled to the security which such an 
arrangement affords. While it is true that the Municipality Convention was 
intended to exert a moral influence in favor of stable and good government 
in the islands, you must, as the American consul, be careful to distinguish 
between its special and local aims, and anj^ idea of a tripartite protectorate to 
which this Government mav be deemed a i)artv." 

(See also House Ex. Doc." No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 30.) 



APIA MUNICIPAL CONVENTION 143 

nations having treaty relations with vSamoa. The municipal 
board was given power to make and enforce regulations concerning 
peace and order, public works, sanitation, taxation and other 
subjects of public concern within the territory designated, and such 
regulations were to be binding on all persons within the district. 
In time of war this district was to be held as neutral territory be- 
tween the warring factions and the municipal council was empow- 
ered to take what measure it considered necessary to protect that 
neutrality. Having thus taken into their own hands the govern- 
ment of the principal port of the islands, the representatives pro- 
ceeded to give better appearance to their act by providing that the 
Samoan flag should wave over the building where the municipal 
council held its meetings and the territorial integrity of Samoa 
was to be considered in no way prejudiced. The convention was 
drawn between Samoa and Great Britain, the other two nations 
acceding to the articles of the convention through separate articles 
to that effect. The American representatives (Consul Dawson and 
Captain Chandler of the U. S. S. "Lackawanna") acceded to the 
agreement merely provisionally, subject to the approval of the 
United States Government. The convention was never ratified 
by the United States Government. In practice, however, the 
American consuls took their due part in the administration of the 
district of Apia according to the provisions of the convention, so 
that it was tacitly accepted by all. 

This convention may be considered to conclude the early period 
of Samoan diplomacy — the period of the treaties. Each of the 
three great nations having commercial or strategic interests in the 
islands had placed itself by formal agreement with the inhabitants 
on a basis of equality of treatment with the other powers repre- 
sented there. Each nation had formally acknowdedged the inde- 
pendence of Samoa. Yet Great Britain and Germany in the same 
treaties in which they announced that independence, had compro- 
mised it through the clauses providing for their control over the 
Samoan legislation affecting British and German subjects. The 
United States' treaty contained no provision for American over- 
sight or control over domestic legislation in Samoa even where 
American citizens might be affected. The Convention establishing 

10 



144 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

the Municipality of Apia placed the administration of that locality 
entirely in control of the representatives of the three powers, and 
constituted therefore a curtailment of Samoan native rule within 
the prescribed area. The United States, by taking part in this 
consular government of Apia, shared in the foreign control over 
this part of the island, but never became formally a signatory to 
the convention. 

The following period is marked by increased disor/iep throughout 
the islands. The frequent conflicts between the native chiefs 
were now increased in importance by the support given to one side 
or another by the foreign firms established there. What would 
have been a petty war between one Samoan chieftain and another 
became much more serious when one of those chieftains was con- 
sidered to be the champion of German interests and his opponent 
the champion of American or British interests — then the strife 
became an affair of the consuls and finally of the home govern- 
ments. The treaties having definitely granted equal treatment to 
each of those governments, there was the increased tendency on the 
part of foreign residents to work the native factions for national 
ends, or at least to consider national interests to be invoh'ed in the 
ordinary commercial rivalries.^'' 

^° According to Robert Louis Stevenson, the celebrated chronicler of events 
in Samoa, this was especially true of the great German firm of Goddefroy & 
Co., now bearing the title of "Deutsche Handels- und Plantagengesellschaft 
fuer Sued See Inseln zu Hamburg." ("A Footnote to History — Eight Years 
of Trouble in Samoa," in "Letters and Miscellanies of Robert Louis Steven- 
son, Vol. XIX, p. 396.) 

"The firm is Gulliver among the Lilliputs; and it must not be forgotten 
that while the small, independent traders are fighting for their own hand and 
inflamed with the usual jealousy against corporations, the Germans are inspired 
with a sense of the greatness of their affairs and interests. The thought of 
the money sunk, the sight of these costly and beautiful plantations menaced 
yearly by the returning forest, and the responsibihty of administering with 
one hand so many conjunct fortunes, might well nerve the manager of such 
a company for desperate and questionable deeds. Upon this scale, commer- 
cial sharpness has an air of patriotism, and I can imagine the man, so far 
from higghng over the scourge for a few Solomon Islanders, prepared to oppress 
rival firms, overthrow inconvenient monarchs, and let loose the dogs of war. 
Whatever he may decide, he will not want for backing. Every clerk will be 
eager to be up and strike a blow; and most Germans in the grouj), whatever 
they may babble of the firm over the walnuts arfd the wine, will rally around 
the national concern at the approach of difficulty. They are so few — I am 
ashamed to give their number, it were to challenge contradiction — they are 



FOREIGN EXECUTIVE COUNCIL 145 

The chief cause of native disturbance was rivalry over the 
kingship of Samoa. There seems to have been almost never a 
king who had the sanction of all Samoa. There were always on 
hand one or more chiefs aspiring to make themselves king and only 
looking for a sufficient following or sufficient ammunition to start 
a revolution. So that, when a foreign commercial firm considered 
that the monarch then in power was opposing its interests, it had 
no. trouble in finding rival candidates to oppose him and his 
measures. 

In 1879, by the action of the German Captain Deinhard in 
agreement with the American and British representatives, the 
chiefs of the rival factions were induced to meet on board the 
"Bismarck," then at anchor at Apia, and sign an agreement''^ 
to end hostilities. They also reaffirmed the ratification of the 
American, German and British treaties with Samoa, together with 
the municipal convention, and appointed as king (for his lifetime) 
Malietoa Talavou, wdth his nephew Malietoa Laupepa as regent. 
A new flag was adopted which should belong to no particular king 
but should show the unity of all Samoa. The opposing party, 
though having signed the agreement, wias not long in repudiating 
it, and civil war again threatened and the consuls of the three 
nations deemed it advisable to give active support to the ruler 
whom they had recognized. They therefore concluded with the 
king an agreement^'-' to support him during his lifetime as head of 
the Samoan Government, to agree upon his successor and to 
establish immediately an executive council for the king. This 
executive council was to consist of an American citizen, a German 
and a British subject, wdio should be nominated by the three 
consuls from among the residents of Samoa and who should hold 

so few, and the amount of national capital buried at their feet is so vast, 
that we must not wonder if they seem oppressed with greatness and the sense 
of empire. Other whites take part in our babbles while temper holds out, 
with a certain schoolboy entertainment. In the Germans alone, no trace of 
humor is to be observed, and their solemnity is accompanied by a touchiness 
often beyond beUef. Patriotism flies in arms about a hen; and if you com- 
ment upon the color of a Dutch umbrella, you have cast a stone against the 
German Emperor." 

31 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 201 ff. 

32 Ibid., p. 207 f. 



146 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

respectively the offices of minister of justice, minister of finance 
and mi^iister of public works. The three nations were explicitly 
referred to as ''the three protecting powers." The agreement was 
formed at the proposal of the German Government and the consuls 
of the other two nations received instructions to unite with their 
colleagues in an agreement to protect the government of Malietoa. 
However, when completed the agreement was not formally con- 
firmed by the Treaty Powers. ^^ The British Government con- 
sidered that such an arrangement would practically give over the 
administration of the islands to the three governments represented 
by the Executive Council. Nevertheless the agreement was put 
into effect as a working arrangement, the British and American 
governments reserving the right''^ to withdraw from it at any time. 
The stand taken by the United States was that the agreement was 
to be looked upon, not as a treaty "but simply as a scheme of 
arrangement between the consular body and the government of 
the islands for the protection of the interests of foreigners." 
"The three advisers" were selected, and assisted the legislative 
body to pass certain laws regulating quarantine, prohibiting the 
sale of ammunition, intoxicants, etc., after which they withdrew 
temporarily and seem never to have resumed their functions in 
relation to the native government. As salaried ministers of the 
Samoan Government and at the same time, citizens of foreign 
nations, the three advisers constituted an anomaly in what had 
been declared to be an autonomous government. 

Another outbreak of the insurgent party resulted in a second 
reconciliation through the efforts of the foreign consuls and another 
agreement was signed,^'' this time on board a United States vessel, 
the "Lackawanna," and was known as the Lackawanna peace. 
By it the chiefs of both parties and the consuls of all three nations 
declared INIalietoa Laupepa to be King of Samoa and his rival 
Tupua Tamasese to be \'ice-King^'^ — a compromise created to make 

S3 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 65. * 

■■•4 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 149. "^ l\y^^l^^ p_ 208. 

°« R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 375. 

"By the Lackawanna treaty, Laupepa was confirmed king and Tamasese 
set l)y his side in the nondescript office of vice-king. The compromise was. 



NEW ZEALAND ANNEXATION MOVEMENTS 147 

the peace but not likely to preserve it. The arrangement, never- 
theless, served to maintain outward tranquillity in the islands for 
several years. 

Forces were at work in Samoa, however, which made future 
conflict unavoidable. These were the activities of individuals 
working either secretly or openly for the annexation of the island 
group to their own governments. One of the earliest of these 
agitators^'' to take definite part in such a project was a certain ]\Ir. 
Lundon, former representative of the New Zealand Assembly, 
who visited the islands in 1SS3 and sent home reports setting forth 
the unsatisfactory condition of the Samoan Government, and urg- 
ing the annexation of the islands to New Zealand. While in Samoa 
he sought to influence the native chiefs in favor of this scheme 
and advised them several times at meetings of their parliament to 
secure for themselves annexation to New Zealand. King Malietoa 
thereupon addressed an appeal to Queen Victoria to unite the 
islands to the British Empire. \1t. Lundon was not alone in his 
policy but represented a movement prevailing in his home country 
for drawing into the system of British Pacific colonies the scattered 
groups of small islands not yet definitely claimed by any other 
European power. In 1SS3 the Assembly of Xew Zealand passed 
what is called the "permissive annexation act" to provide for this 
expansion of the rule of the larger colonies over the archipelago 
of the Southern Pacific. Such a measure, however, required the 
sanction of the British Government, and negotiations between 
New Zealand and the Foreign Office on this subject extended 
tliroughout the year 1884.^* The propaganda among the Samoan 

I am told, not without precedent; but it lacked all appearance of success. To 
the constitution of Samoa, which was already all wheels and no horses the 
consuls had added a fifth wheel. In addition to the old conundrum 'Who 
is King?' they had supplied a new one, 'What is the Vice-king?'" 

" House Ex. Doc. No. '238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 158 ff. 

^* Ibid., p. 159. Governor Jervois of New Zealand in forwarding the 
annexation bill then under consideration, wrote to the British Secretary 
recommending : 

"That the British Government should, under existing circumstances take 
steps for the establishment of its rule over such islands in the Pacific as are 
not already occupied by or under the protection of a foreign power, and the 
occupation of which by any foreign power would be detrimental to the interests 
of Australasia." 



148 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

natives was not without effect and a second appeal was sent out 
by Malietoa to Queen Victoria to take the islands under her 
sovereignty and save them from other governments, which they 
feared desired to take possession of the country.^^ 

]\Ieanwhile Germany was still more active. The German 
Government had advanced to even more positive support of 
its interests overseas, and had caused to be introduced in the 
Reichstag^"" a measure for the rescue of the business of the firm 
of Goddefroy and Company, which dominated the commercial 
developments in Samoa and which had fallen heavily in debt. 
The bill provided for the guarantee of a certain amount of interest 
on the bonds of a new company which was to take over the business 
of the Goddefroys, to maintain and to extend it. Those in favor 
of the measure stated that its object was to protect German com- 
mercial enterprise against American and British competition. It 
finally came out that the measure had the strong backing of the 
government. In spite of this it was defeated, the members of the 
Reichstag offering determined opposition to what they sensed to be 
a step leading toward the development of a navy, whereas they 
felt already overburdened with taxes for the support of the army. 
The effort meeting defeat had therefore no effect in Samoa, but is 
significant as indicating the beginning of a government expansion 
policy. 

Further efforts in this same dii'ection were shown by the vigor 
with which the Germans were pushing their interests in the islands. 
The rule of IVIalietoa was characterized by the customary laxness 
of the native kings when questions of law and order were con- 
cerned, and there had been a long line of depredations and petty 
crimes which had gone unpunished and under which the German 
residents on their great plantations were the chief sufferers. There- 
fore these grievances, though there was nothing new in principle 
about them, were made the basis of vigorous protest on the part 
of Dr. Stuebel, the German Consul.'"^ It is quite probable that 



^^ Ibid., p. 209. (Inclosure D.) Malietoa had received no reply to the 
appeal sent to the Queen the j'ear before. 
"" F. R., f880, pp. 427 and 428. 
'«' House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 113 ff, also p. 210. 



GERMAN-SAMOAN COUNCIL OF STATE 149 

the New Zealand annexation movement may have determined his 
aggressive action. ^^^ At any rate he summed up his grievances 
against MaHetoa — particularly the latter 's refusal, or continued 
neglect, to punish some native Samoans who had been guilty of 
certain crimes against the persons and property of German 
subjects. He stated that through these crimes and the neglect 
to punish them the Samoan Government had been for many 
months violating the regulations of the German-Samoan treaty 
of 1879. It was, therefore, necessary that they obey those regu- 
lations and, as provided for in the treaty (Article VII), conclude a 
special agreement for the carrying out of the punishment of 
offenders. The continued refusal to conclude such an agreement 
he held to be also a violation of the treaty. The presence of two 
German warships in the harbor had its intended effect and Malietoa 
and the Vice-King Tamasese signed the agreement which had 
been prepared for them. This took place on November 10, 1884, 
under extraordinary procedure. The agreement was read once 
to Malietoa by an interpreter, but the German Consul refused to 
leave the king a copy of the instrument for consideration either 
before or after his signing it.^''^ The treaty provided^"* for the 
establishment of a German-Samoan Council of State which should 
consist of the German Consul (or his representative), two Samoans 
to be chosen respectively by the king and vice-king in cooperation 
with the Taimua and Faipule, and two Germans to be appointed 
by the German Consul. This German-Samoan Council was to 
deliberate and decide upon all laws and regulations relating to the 

"2 V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck Nr. 167, p. 702. In a letter to 
Bismarck, August 8, 1883, he referred to the annexation of the islands by 
New Zealand as a danger threatening very seriously the German interests in 
the South Pacific. He admitted that the danger would probably be deferred 
until the British commercial hold was stronger on the islands, and that the 
probable policy of the British Government would be to put a restraining hand 
on Australian chauvinism until that time. 

103 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 113 ff., also p. 210. 

"^ The treaty was forwarded to the British Government in January, 1885, 
by Bismarck at the request of the British Ambassador in Berlin (V. R., 1885, 
Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 726 f.), and in February, 1885, was sent 
to the U. S. Secretary of State, Mr. Frehnghuysen (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 
50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5.). 



150 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

common interests of the Samoan Government and the German 
subjects residing in Samoa. The Council was to draw up especially 
legal provisions pertaining to the punishable acts of Samoans which 
affected the persons, employees or property of German subjects. 
These provisions were then to be issued as laws after being signed 
by the king and vice-king, and it was to be stated in the preamble 
that the law was decreed after receiving the endorsement of the 
German-Sam oan State Council. The king was to appoint, in 
agreement with the German Consul a German official of the 
Samoan Government who was to be the secretary and adviser of 
the king in all affairs which concerned the Germans living in Samoa. 
He was also to have supervision over the imprisonment of offenders 
and a new prison was to be built for the purpose — the necessary 
police officers were under his command. The expenses entailed in 
carrying out the provisions of the agreement were to be met 
from the income from the labor of prisoners and from taxes paid 
by the German subjects. The Imperial Government was given 
the right of cancelling the treaty after six months' notice — no 
provision was made for annulment by the Government of Samoa. 
It is quite evident that under this treaty there would have 
been little left to the native government that was Samoan. It is 
also evident that it destroyed temporarily the equality of status of 
the three powers established for them by the three treaties of 1878 
to 1879. In order to restore the United States and Britain to an 
equal status in the island, it would have been necessary to establish 
similar American-Samoan and British-Samoan Councils — some- 
thing which was possible so far as the treaty was concerned. 
King IVIalietoa was well aware that vigorous protests would be 
made by the British and American Governments. Immediately 
after signing the treaty he renewed his urgent petition to the 
British Government for annexation, ^"^ explaining that he was not 
responsible for the agreement, that he had signed it only through 
fear of the Germans and that he would end it as soon as Her 
Majesty should take over the islands. He also sent to the United 
States Consul a similar apology for the treaty, declaring that it 

105 House Ex. Doc. No. 2.38, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 210. 



EFFORTS TO SECURE ANNEXATION TO GREAT BRITAIN 151 

was made against his will and should not be held against him. He 
appealed to the American Consul for aid, as the German Consul 
had been threatening him because of his petition to the Queen of 
England for annexation. 

In response to the inquiry of Lord Granville the German 
Ambassador in London declared'^*^ in defense of the agreement that 
its stipulations were all within the provisions of the German 
Samoan treaty of 1879 and infringed neither the independence of 
the island group nor the rights of other nations there. The 
benefits of better order in the islands, which it was the aim of the 
treaty to secure, the Ambassador said, would be shared by citizens 
of the other treaty powers, w'hile the costs of the enactment of its 
provisions were to be borne by Germans only. The German 
Government, therefore, trusted that its efforts to secure 
better order in the islands would not be opposed from other 
quarters. 

JMalietoa, still hoping for British protection, proceeded to dis- 
regard the German treaty, which he declared he had signed only 
to keep the peace, and taking a bolder stand, passed an act through 
the native parliament^^^ announcing the annexation of the Samoan 
group of islands to the colony of New Zealand. The German 
Consul, Dr. Stuebel, hereupon took things into his own hands. 
Publishing a list of his complaints against the actions of the king — 
his continued refusal to deliver certain escaped Samoan convicts, 
his expressed insults against Germany, and his generally hostile 
attitude, Dr. Stuebel proceeded to take possession of the muni- 
cipality of Apia — so far as the rights of sovereignty of King 
Malietoa were concerned — and, as evidence thereof, he hoisted the 
German flag at Mulinuu point.^^^ The British and American 
consuls at once protested against Dr. Stuebel's action as a ^■iolation 
of the ^Municipal Convention of 1879, which had placed the admin- 
istration of the municipality of Apia in the hands of the municipal 
council acting under the sovereignty and flag of the Samoan 

"« V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 726; also House Ex. 
Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5. 

1" House Ex. Doc. No. 2.38, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 211. 

los Ibid., p. 212, also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. I. 



152 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Government. The situation had now become acute and was refer- 
red to the home governments. 

IMeanwhile negotiations were taking place between the British 
and German Foreign Offices in regard to the whole subject of their 
colonial interests, both in Africa and in the Pacific. ^"^ The system 
of recruiting laborers from the small islands to work on the culti- 
vated ])lantations of the Samoan, Tonga and other groups had 
caused sharp rivalry between the large firms controlling the trade 
in those regions, rivalry which now and then developed into open 
physical conflict.^^^ INIoreover, Germany had definitely entered 
upon the policy (which Bismarck denied to be a colonial one in 
the sense of the French system) — of giving government protection 
to German commercial enterprise wherever that had definitely 
established itself through the diligence of German subjects. '^^ 

^°^ For accounts of the development of German interests in various islands 
of the South Pacific. See V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 6.3, 
"Deutsche Interessen in der Suedsee I;" or Weissbuch, Erster Theil, 1885; 
also V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, "Deutsche Interessen 
in der Suedsee II." 

"" V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, No. 167, p. 693 ff. 

Case of British laborer ship "Stanley" and the destruction of the Hernsheim 
station by its crew. 

Ill V. R., 1884, Vol. II, p. 1061 If. 

Bismarck, Imperial Chancellor, before the Reichstag, June 26, 1884: 
. . . "Ich wiederhole, dass ich gegen Kolonien . . . ich will sagen 
nach dem System, wie die Meisten im vorigen Jahrhundert waren, was man 
jetzt das franzoesische System nennen koennte, — gegen Kolonien, die als 
Unterlage ein Stueck Land schaffen und dann Auswanderer herbeizuziehen 
suchen, Beamte anstellen und Garnisonen errichten, — dass ich meine fruehere 
Abneigung gegen diese Art Kolonization, die fuer andere Laender nuetzlich 
sein mag, fuer uns aber nicht ausfuehrbar ist, heute noch nicht aufgegeben 
habe. Ich glaube, dass man Kolonial projekte nicht kuenstlich schaffen kann. 

Etwas ganz anderes ist die Frage, ob es zweckmaessig, und zweitens, ob es 
die Pflicht des deutschen Reiches ist, denjenigen seiner Unterthanen die solchen 
Unternehmungen im Vertrauen auf des Reiches Schutz sich hingeben, diesen 
Reichsschutz zu gewaehren imd ihnen gewisse Beihilfen in ihren Kolonial- 
bestretiungen zu leisten um denjenigen Gebilden, die aus den Ueberschues- 
sigen Saeften des gesammten deutschen Koerpers naturgemaess heraus- 
wachsen, in fremden Laendern Pflege und Schutz angedeihen zu lassen. Und 
das bejahe ich, allerdings mit weniger Sicherheit vom Standpunkt der Zweck- 
maessigkek . . . ich nicht voraussehen was daraus wird . . ., aber 
mit unbedmgter Sicherheit vom Standpunkte der staatlichen Pfiicht. 



Meine von Seiner Majestaet dem Kaiser gebilligte Absicht ist, die Verant- 
wortlichkeit fuer die materielle Enti^nckelung der Kolonie ebenso wie ihr 
Entstehen der Thaetigkeit und dem Unternehmungsgeiste unserer seefahren- 



DIVISION OF BRITISH-GERMAN COLONIAL SPHERES, 1886 153 

The expansion projects of the New Zealanders increased the ten- 
sion. It was soon seen by both governments that in order to 
prevent further friction it would be necessary to come to some 
definite agreement defining the status of each nation in certain 
specific groups of islands, and also to determine on some geographic 
division of the South Pacific which should regulate the future 
developments of British and German commerce there. ^^- The 
opening proposal for such an understanding w^as made by Germany 
to England and was received cordially by Lord Granville, who 
declared^^^ emphatically that England cherished no jealousy 
toward German colonization enterprises and was in no way 
unappreciative of the important position which Germany held on 
some of the South Sea islands. The British Government would 
therefore be very glad to define in which parts the influence of the 
one country and in which parts that of the other predominated. 

den und handeltreibenden Mitbuerger zu ueberlassen und weniger in der 
Form der Annektierung von ueberseeischen Provinzen an das deutsche 
Reich vorzugehen als in der Form von Gewaehrung von Freibriefen nach 
Gestalt der englischen Royal-charters im Anschkiss an die ruhmreiche Lauf- 
bahn, welche die enghsche Kaufmannschaft bei Gruendung der ostincUschen 
Kompagnie zurueckgelegt hat, und (hoert! hoert! rechts) den Interessenten der 
Kolonie zugleich das Regieren derselben im wesenthchen zu uei^erlassen und 
ihnen nur die Moeghchkeit europaeischer Jurisdiktion fuer Europaeer und 
desjenigen Schutzes zu gewaehren, den wir ohne stehende Garnison dort 
leisten koennen. 



Unsere Absicht ist nicht Pro\'inzen zu gruenden, sondern kaufmaennische 
Unternehmungen, aber in der hoechsten Entwickelung auch solche die sich 
eine Souveraenitaet, eine schliesslich dem deutschen Reich lehnbar bleibende, 
unter seiner Protektion stehende kaufmaennische Souveraenitaet erwerben, 
zu schuetzen in ihrer freien Entwickehing, sowohl gegen che Angriffe aus der 
unmittell)aren Xachbarschaft als auch gegen Bedrueckung und Schaedigung 
von Seiten anderer europaeischen Maechte. Im uebrigen hoffen wir dass der 
Baum durch die Thaetigkeit der Gaertner, die ihn pflanzen, auch im Ganzen 
gedeihen wird, und wenn er es nicht thut, so ist die Pflanze eine Verfehlte, 
und es trifft der Schade weniger das Reich denn die Kosten sind nicht bedeu- 
tend, die wir verlangen, sondern die Unternehmer, die sich in ihren Unterneh- 
mungen vergriffen haben. Das ist der Unterschied: bei dem System welches 
ich das Franzoesische nannte, ^^ill die Staatsregierung jedesmal beurtheilen, 
ob das Unternehmen ein Richtiges ist, und ein Gedeihen in Aussicht stellt; 
bei diesem System ueberlassen wir dem Handel, dem Privatmann die Wahl, 
imd wenn wir sehen, dass der Baum Wurzel schlaegt anwaechst und gedeiht, 
und den Schutz des Reiches anruft so stehen wir ihm bei, und ich sehe auch 
nicht ein, wie wir ihm das rechtmaessig versagen koennen." 

112 V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 711. 

113 Ibid., p. 712, No. 23; also House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., 
p. 162. 



154 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

As to Samoa, the two governments exchanged assurances that each 
had no interest to annex this group and the activities of New 
Zealand toward acquiring the islands were halted by word from 
the British F'oreign Office stating that the German Government 
had given and received assurance that the independence of Samoa 
would be maintained. Negotiations on the general subject of 
Pacific possessions extended throughout two years (18S4-1SS6). 
During this time a series of flag-hoistings took place in the South 
Pacific. England, led by the demands of Australia, occupied the 
south coast of New Guinea and Germany immediately took 
possession of the north coast"^ — up to the already estabhshed 
Dutch possessions.^^^ Spain, after a controversy with Germany, i^*^ 
gained acknowledged sovereignty over the Carolines and Pelew 
group, F'rance gained the New Plebrides and finally the British- 
German negotiations were consummated in the agreement of 
April (3, 1886,^^'' dividing between them the Western Pacific. A 
line of demarcation was established, running irregularly from 15° 
north latitude to 30° south latitude. Germany agreed "not to 
make acquisitions of territory, accept protectorates, or interfere 
with the extension of British influence to the East, Southeast, 
or South of the said conventional line" and to give up any acquisi- 
tions already estabhshed there. Great Britain reciprocally made 
the same promises for the region West, Northwest and North of 
the demarcation line. As the part of the Pacific so partitioned 
included the Samoan Islands, these, together with the Tonga 
Islands and the Island of Niue (Savage Island), were exempted 
from the provisions of the treaty and were to be continued as a 

11^ V. R., 1885, Anal. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 718. The corres- 
pondence over the seizure of the New Guinea coasts shows a more aggressive 
colonial policy than that outlined by Bismarck to the Reichstag the preceding 
year. Bismarck at this time declares: 

"Wir beabsichtigen nunmehr, wie in Westafrika so auch in der Suedsee, 
diejenigen Gebiete welche durch vorherrschende Ausbreitung des deutschen 
Handels oder in Folge der Vorbereitungen zu dieser als geeignet dazu 
erscheinen, unter den direkten Schutz des Reichs zu stellen." 

"5 Ibid., p. 716, No. 36. 

ii« House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 112. 

"" V. R., lS85-'86, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 291, p. 1570. 



AMERICAN POLICY IN NORTH PACIFIC 155 

neutral region. Any other islands within the designated area 
were also exempted if they were at this time under the protection 
or sovereignty of any other civilized power than Germany or Great 
Britain. Following the provisions of the treaty,"^ Great Britain 
took possession of the Kemadec Islands and Germany annexed 
the ^Marshall, Brown and Providence groups. ^^^ 

While these events were taking place in the South Pacific, the 
United States was establishing its trade control in the North. In 
1884 it concluded with Hawaii a supplementary conventions-^ 
renewing for seven years tJie reciprocity treaty of 1875, which had 
made those islands commercially a part of what might be called 
an American tariff union and estabhshed Hawaii as the sugar 
plantation of the Pacific coast. Three years previous to the 
treaty renewal, an attempt of Great Britain to secure with the 
native government of Hawaii a convention granting to the Hindu 
coolie laborers the right of British consular jurisdiction in the 
Hawaiian Islands, met with determined opposition from the 
Government of the United States. In the negotiations concerning 
this subject the Secretary of State, Blaine, stated emphatically 
that the United States considered the Hawaiian Islands as "a 
member of the American system of states. "^^^ Having gained 

118 V. R., 188o-'86, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 291, p. 1572. This 
agreement was complemented by a second providing for reciprocal freedom 
of trade and commerce in the German and British possessions and protector- 
ates in the Western Pacific. All past land claims of the subjects of either 
nation when living in a protectorate of the other nation, were to be referred 
to a mixed German-British Commission. Both governments agreed not to 
estabhsh any penal settlements in or transport convicts to the Western Pacific. 

lis House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 112 f. 

12° F. R., 1894, p. 170. 

I'-i F. R., 1881, p. 636 f. 



No. 401. Mr. Blaine to Mr. Comly. 



Department of State, 

Washington, December 1, 1881. 



"I have spoken of the Pacific Coast line given to the American Union by the 
cession of CaUfornia in 1848, as little inferior in extent and superior in natural 
wealth, to the Atlantic sea-board of the original Union. Since that time our 
domain on the Pacific has been vastly increased by the purchase of Alaska. 
Taking San Francisco as the commercial center on the western slope, a line 



156 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

a "legitimately dominant influence in the North Pacific," he 
declared, the United States would not allow that influence to be 
decreased by any hostile element. The Hawaiian Islands were so 
situated that they held strategic control of the North Pacific and 
therefore the possession of them became a question of policy 
strictly American. The Secretary outlined what he considered to 
be the commercial domain of the Western coast. It was included 
between a line drawn northwest from San Francisco to the Aleutian 
Islands and a line southwest from that city to Honolulu. The 
Hawaiian Islands, therefore, he considered tcf be the key to the 
maritime dominion of the Pacific states, just as Cuba was the key 
to the Gulf trade, and the extension of commercial empire westward 
from the Pacific states was as important to their development as 
would be their connection with the eastern seaboard by an isthmian 
canal. 
From such evidence of a definitely formed Pacific policy on the 

drawn northwestwardly to the Aleutian group, marks our Pacific border 
almost to the confines of Asia. A corresponding line drawn southwest wardly 
from San Francisco to Honolulu marks the natural hmit of the ocean belt 
within which our trade with the oriental countries must flow, and is, more- 
over, the direct line of communication between the United States and Aus- 
tralasia. Within this belt lies the commercial domain of our western coast. 

I have had recent occasion to set forth the vitally integral importance of our 
Pacific possessions, in a circular letter addressed on the twenty-fourth of June 
last, to our representatives in Europe, touching the necessary guarantees of 
the proposed Panama Canal as a purely American waterway to l)e treated as 
part of our own coast line. The extension of commercial empire westward 
from those states is no less vitally important to their development than is 
their communication with the Eastern coast by the Isthmian channel. And 
when we survey the stupendous progress made by the western coast during 
the thirty years of its national hfe as a part of our dominion, its enormous 
increase of population, its vast resources of agriculture and mines, and its 
boundless enterprise it is not easy to set a limit to its commercial activity 
or forsee a check to its maritime supremacy in the waters of the Orient, so 
long as those waters afford, as now, a free and neutral scope for our Pacific 
trade. 

In thirty years the United States has acquired a legitimately dominant 
influence in the North Pacific, which it can never consent to see decreased 
by the intrusion therein of any element of influence hostile to its own. The 
situation of the Hawaiian Islands, giving them the strategic control of the 
North Pacific, brings their possession within the range of questions of purely 
American policy, as much so as that of the Isthmus itself. Hence the neces- 
sity as recognized in our existing treaty relations, of drawing the ties of inti- 
mate relationship l)etween us and the Hawaiian Islands so as to make them 
practically a part of the American sj-stem without derogation of their absolute 
independence." 

James G. Blaine. 



DISTURBANCES IN THE ISLANDS, 1886 157 

fUM^ ^^^^ <^^J^ . r> ^' ^'^^ f^r«»t-^ A^C fO' ^ \\X 

part of all three governments^-^ it is clear that the Samoan Islands, 
being one of the few remaining unclaimed groups of importance in 
the Pacific, were bound to become the object of conflicting com- 
mercial and political aspirations, and the subject of considerable 
diplomatic controversy. 

The events in the islands during 1885 and 1886 were such as to 
require adjustment by the home governments. The action of the 
German Consul, Dr. Stuebel, in hoisting the German flag over 
x4pia was promptly disavowed by Bismarck,^-^ who declared that 
the German Government was wholly ignorant of the action, had 
no intention of violating the agreement with the United States and 
England nor of establishing a protectorate over the islands, but 
on the contrary, would maintain that agreement and adhere to the 
status quo. In spite of this disavowal by the home govern- 
ment the German corporation, dominating the trade of the islands, 
continued its controversy with ]Malietoa and ordered the king to 
remove his seat of government from ]\Iulinuu point, which Islv. 
Weber claimed to be land belonging to the German Company. 
On the king's refusal the German Consul, Dr. Stuebel, with an 
armed force from the German naval vessel "Albatross," proceeded 
to Mulinuu and removed the Samoan flag. Protests against this 
act were made by the American and British consuls and it was again 
disavowed^-^ by the German Government, which gave assurance 
that it was without information on the matter, but that it would 
"maintain all previous agreements and would adhere to the 
status quo."^-'^ Meantime the former Vice-king, Tamasese, had 

^-' The views of the Reichstag at this time did not keep pace with the pohcy 
of colonization as outlined by the Chancellor. In considering the Imperial 
Budget for the year 1885-'86, the Reichstag twice voted down measures to 
increase the appropriation for government officials in the South Seas — even 
though it was declared by supporters of the measure that such failure to 
support the Government policy would seriously affect the negotiations then 
taking place in London on the subject of German and British colonization 
spheres. (See Reichstag discussion, V. R., 1885, Vol. I, pp. 395-405, 16. 
Dezember, 1884; and Vol. Ill, pp. 1539-1587, 4. Maerz, 1885.) 

123 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Bess., p. 4. 

124 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. II. 

125 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 16. Mr. Pendleton, 
American Minister at Berhn, reported to Secretary Bayard an interview with 



158 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

broken away from the government and, with the assistance of the 
German subjects in the islands, had become again a formidable 
rival of ]\Ialietoa and a new war was imminent. Malietoa now 
appealed to the American Consul for protection,i26 basing his plea 
on Article V of the Samoan-American treaty of 1878, which 
promised that in case of trouble betw^een Samoa and another 
power, the United States would use its good offices to obtain 
settlement. INIr. Greenebaume without instructions accepted 
Malietoa's request and hoisted the American flag over that of 
Samoa at Apia. A protest was made by the German Consul and 
the act of its consul was in turn disavowed by the American 
Government.!" 

It was now realized that some definite plan should be agreed 
upon by the three governments for restoring order in the islands. 
Secretary Bayard suggested, therefore, that the German and 
British ministers at Washington be authorized to confer with him 
on the subject — that in the meantime three new consuls should be 
appointed and sent to Samoa, and a war vessel of each nation be 
maintained at the islands for two years. He also suggested that 
there should be a joint declaration made by the three Powers 
declaring against annexation or establishment of a protectorate 
by any of the three Powers. 

The suggestion^^^ resulted in the sending of three commissioners 

Count Herbert Bismarck concerning occurrences in Samoa. The latter stated 
to Mr. Pendleton: 

"While, therefore, I can give you no information as to the facts, only 
conjectures, which may perhaps be entirely without foundation, I can say 
to you, as I said already a week ago to the British Ambassador, that, what- 
ever may have occurred, we intend to maintain the status as it has heretofore 
existed. We have been satisfied with that; it has been satisfactory to the 
three Governments; we have neither interest nor desire to change it; but if we 
had, we would take no step, make no movement, without frankly consulting 
in advance the United States and Great Britain. If any wrong has been 
done it shall be righted, and reparation shall be made; and nothing shall be 
allowed to change the relative positions of these governments." 

'■'' Ibid., pp. 25 and 26. '-' Ibid., p. 19. 

12S A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 18 ff. Two months before Sec- 
retary Bayard made his suggestion that the three powers hold a conference 
on the Samoan question, Germany and Great Britain at the invitation of the 
Earl of Rosebery had already made arrangements for an Anglo-German 



COMMISSIONS TO SAMOA, 1886 159 

to the islands to report to their home governments the actual 
conditions there, preparatory to a conference of the three govern- 
ments on plans for the administration of Samoa. The basis of 
this inquiry as set forth by Secretary Bayard^-'* was to be "a 
thorough examination into the condition of the group and the 
causes of the recent disorders and discontent there, with a view to 
finding a permanent remedy; a report to be drawn up by each 
commissioner for his respective government; and a status of neu- 
trality to be maintained by the joint counsel and influence of the 
three Powers, excluding annexation or predominance by any one 
power, and promoting the autonomy and peaceful government of 
the group by the native authority." The inquiry, according to 
Secretary Bayard's view, was to be conducted jointly. The British 
Government accepted this basis unqualifiedly ,^^° the German 
Government "agreed generally," but did not approve of providing 
the commissioners with joint instructions. Also it did not contem- 
plate that the three commissioners should hold joint sittings and 
furnish a joint report, but, on the contrary, that each should 
examine the situation for himself and report separately to his 
own government. The German commissioner was, however, 
instructed to communicate freely and frankly with the other 
commissioners. It was arranged that all three consuls should 

inquiry into conditions in Samoa. At Bismarck's suggestion the Commis- 
sioners selected for the enterprise were Mr. John B. Thurston, British High 
Commissioner of the Western Pacific, and Mr. Travers, His imjierial Majesty's 
Consul-General in Australia. When the invitation came from the United 
States it was decided to adhere to the proposed inquiry by Commissioners 
already selected and to invite the American Government to send a Commis- 
sioner also. Count Hatzfeldt in agreeing to this suggested to the Earl of 
Rosebery that it would be "desirable that Messrs. Thurston and Travers 
should exchange views confidentially, with regard to their course in the 
matter" (Ibid., p. 27). 

123 Ibid., p. 35, No. 49. 

>3o Ibid., pp. 36 and 37, also p. 39, No. 58. For instructions on this basis 
to the British Consul see Ibid., p. 41. The American Commissioner Mr. 
Bates, of Delaware, was selected l)y Secretary Bayard because his personal 
acquaintance with the man enabled the Secretary to place implicit confidence 
in him. Mr. Bates had never taken any pubhc part in politics in the United 
States nor had he held any diplomatic or consular post. 
11 



160 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

leave Samoa'^^ after the arrival of the commissioners.^^- Mr. 
Bates, the American commissioner, was authorized to disavow^^^ 
the action of Consul Greenebaume in assuming a protectorate 
over Samoa, and Secretary Bayard set forth in his instructions 
that the Government of the United States was unwilling to 

'^1 Ibid., p. 44 ff. Inclosure in No. 76. Extract from the New York Herald 
of August 20, 1886. Our Representative in Samoa. Consul Greenebaum's 
Explanation not satisfactory. (From our Regular Correspondent.) 

Washington, August 19, 1886. 
"A few weeks ago Mr. Bates, of Wilmington, Delaware, was appointed by 
Secretary Bayard as a Special Agent of the State Department to proceed to 
the Samoan Islands and endeavor to restore the character of the Consulate 
to its former position of neutral relations with the Samoan Chiefs. Yesterday 
Mr. Greenebaum, of San Francisco, who has been the consul there for some 
time, arrived in Washington as it appears, under the orders of the State 
Department, to explain, if possible, the allegations made against him of 
having ignored his instructions not to take part in any local strife which was 
known to exist among the hostile chiefs on that island. He left today for 
San Francisco, and will not, it is said, return to Samoa, his explanation not 
being satisfactory to the Secretary. It is alleged that, almost immediately upon 
arriving at Samoa, he began to take sides with one of the factions, and carried 
his interference so far as to provoke the opposition of the consuls of other 
nations. He will be permitted to resign and his resignation is expected to be 
forwarded on his arrival in San Francisco." 

Mr. Bayard later told the British Ambassador that Mr. Greenebaum had 
not been dismissed but that his commission had expired and the President 
had not seen fit "to renew it (Ibid., p. 47). F. R., 1886, p. ix. President 
Cleveland stated in his Message to Congress, December 6, 1886: 

"Civil perturbations in the Samoan Islands have, during the past few 
years been a source of considerable embarrassment to the three governments, 
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, whose relations and extra- 
territorial rights in that important group are guaranteed by treaties. The 
weakness of the native administration and the conflict of opposing interests 
in the islands have led King MaUetoa to seek aUiance or protection in some 
one quarter regardless of the distinct engagements whereby no one of the 
three treaty powers may acquire any paramomit or exclusive interest. In 
May last Malietoa offered to place Samoa under the protection of the United 
States, and the late Consul without authority assumed to grant it. The 
proceeding was promptly disavowed and the overzealous official recalled. 
Special agents of the three governments have been deputed to examine the 
situation in the Islands. With a change in the representatives of all three 
powers, and a harmonious understanding between them, the peace prosperity, 
autonomous administration, and neutrality of Samoa can hardly fail to be 
secured." 

"2 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-o629), p. 104, No. 97. The American and 
German Consuls left the islands before the arrival of the American and British 
Commissioners. The fact was deprecated by Mr. Thurston, British Com- 
missioner because it gave no opportunity of acquiring direct information 
from Mr. Greenebaum and Dr. Stuebel whom Mr. Thurston considered to 
be almost entirely responsible for the recent state of affairs in Samoa. 

"3 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 31. 



INSTRUCTIONS TO AMERICAN COMMISSIONER 161 

assume such a protectorate "either for itseh' alone or under any 
joint arrangement whereby the native authority of Samoa would 
be replaced by a permanent tripartite government of the powers." 
He admitted that it would probably be necessary temporarily 
to undertake some joint arrangement to preserve order, for which 
the continued presence at Apia of a naval vessel of each of the 
powers in turn would suffice. In respect to the foreign interests 
throughout the whole group of islands, the secretary considered 
that the municipal arrangement at Apia, by which the presidency 
of the board was held in turn by each of the three consuls, might 
constitute the best solution for the administration of the islands. 
Beyond this no one of the powers should have "the slightest 
concern in the personality at the head of the Samoan native 
government." 

The three commissioners soon found important differences in 
their understanding of their instructions.^^^ Mr, Thurston and Mr. 

134 Ibid., p. 139 (Appendix A). 

"Mr. Thurston's stay in Samoa was of less than two weeks' duration. As 
his position in Fiji is such that under the consular system of his Government 
the correspondence of the Apia consulate had passed under his eye, he was 
doubtless famihar with the general course of events in Samoa, and felt it 
unnecessary to spend more time there. Nevertheless I regretted very much 
his early departure. There were some points on which further and frequent 
conferences between Mr. Travers and myself led often to modification and, in 
some instances, coincidence of views. I am convinced also that Mr. Travers' 
views upon which our original cUfference rested chd vmdergo considerable 
change. Toward the end of my stay he discussed with me the possible 
details of a native Government to an extent necessarily involving the idea 
of autonomy, which at first he considered impracticable. It was, it is true, 
such a government as would depend for its inspiration and strength upon 
the presence in it of white men. 

Mr. Travers also modified his previously expressed view by assenting 
that our conferences and expressions of views to each other might be com- 
municated to our respective Governments. This permission, however, was 
of less value, since these conferences were under his determination, mere 
informal conversations; and any view which he expressed to me he did not 
feel bound to adhere to, but considered them liable to change on further 
reflection. 



Before leaving this subject, I desire to express the satisfaction which I 
derived from my intercourse with l)oth of the commissioners. I was deeply 
impressed with the ability and fidelity with which these gentlemen approached 
the consideration of the subject referred to us. Our relations were of the 
most agreeable character, and resulted in sentiments of respect and friendly 
regard on my part which I am glad to beUeve were reciprocated. With the 
exception of Mr. Thurston's brief sojourn at Apia, and the difficulty exper- 
ienced by Mr. Travers, under his instructions, of fully coinciding with our 
views as to the investigation, I could have desired nothing more with respect 
to either of them." 



162 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Bates considered that their \'ery presence there simultaneously 
implied that their investigations were to be undertaken jointly 
even though their reports were to be separate. INIr. Travers, 
however, considered that their investigations also were to be 
entirely independent and that they had no official relations with 
each other. The British and American commissioners also consid- 
ered that they were there to plan the establishment of an auto- 
nomous native government to be supported by the joint influence 
of the three powers; the Gennan commissioner did not state his 
instructions in this regard, but was emphatic in declaring his 
own view that "no autonomous native government was at all 
practicable." INIr. Bates relates, however, that during their stay 
on the islands and as a result of frequent conference the German 
commissioner considerably modified his views. 

Each commissioner presented to his home government a plan of 
his own for the administration of Samoa. The German Commis- 
sioner, Mr. Travers, framed his plan^^^ on the principle that the 
government of the country must be "placed in the hands of but 
one of the treaty powers, by the consent of the others." In view 
of the predominance of German interests, of the service rendered 
by Germany in developing the islands and of the fact that German 
subjects paid half of the taxes in Samoa, the control of the country 
belonged properly to Germany. He therefore drew up a plan 
placing the administration of the islands in the hands of a chief 
officer or administrator to be appointed by the German Govern- 
ment. His three chief assistants, a chief justice, director of finance 
and a judge of first instance, were also to be appointed by the Ger- 
man Government. The duties of the native king were to be purely 
representative and the native assembly was to be permitted to 
meet for public discussion of matters of general interest according 
to old Samoan custom, but it was not to have a deciding vote, 
and its resolutions were to receive such consideration as might be 
practicable. The ^Municipal Council was to be abolished. ]\Ir. 
Travers's plan was in brief that of placing Samoa under Germany 
as a mandatory, but he considered that such a plan would not 

"5 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 263 ff. 



COMMISSIONEKS' PLANS FOR SOMOAN ADMINISTRATION 163 

"exclude either the Enghbh or the American Governments from 
active participation in the remodeUng of the pohtical affairs of 
Samoa or from a decisive influence in the subsequent control of the 
Government itself." 

The British Commissioner, Mr. Thurston, considered^^'^ that 
although the interests of Europeans in Samoa could not as yet be 
entrusted to a native government, that "an earnest attempt to 
establish the present native government on an improved footing 
was at least worthy of trial." Such a government, however, would 
require the active participation of representatives of the three 
powers, and ^Ir. Thurston elaborated a plan for an administration 
by a council consisting of a king, a vice-king, chiefs from several 
districts, and three foreign officials to be appointed, respectively, 
by Great Britain, Germany and the United States. These officials 
were also to have seats in the low^er house, or legislative body. 
The ^Municipal Council was to be retained and to consist of nine 
members, of whom the consuls of the Treaty Powers were each to 
appoint three. In general the right of foreign subjects to juris- 
diction of their own consuls was to be continued. ]Mr. Thurston's 
plan^^^ thus maintained the idea of equality of representation of the 

136 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-o629), p. 74, also p. 102. 
"^ Ibid., p. 75. (Mr. Thurston's Report.) 

"224. In closing this Report I cannot but express regret that the recom- 
mendations I have the honor of submitting for the consideration of Her 
Majesty's Government should not have met with the concurrence of the 
German Commissioner. 

225. The task of devising a scheme of government for a native community, 
distracted by internal jealousies, and bewildered by foreign influences and 
intervention of long duration, could not at the outset promise any higher 
degree of success. 

226. But the difficulties inseparable from such a problem were not lessened 
when, of the three Commissioners appointed to visit Samoa and report to their 
respective Governments upon its conditions and requirements, one was indis- 
posed to join in a task he regarded as futile, and, moreover, not within the 
scope of his instructions; and another, though approaching the subject with 
a lively and earnest interest, was unable to make any substantive proposals 
owing to inexperience of "native character and capabilities. 

227. With the assistance of three foreign members of Government and a 
Magistrate, for whose services the revenue of the native Government should 
without difficulty be able to pay, I think it possible that a native Government 
might in time be established on a satisfactory footing. 

228. It would, however, be necessary for the Powers interested in Samoa 
to continue an executive support to the native Government through their 
naval authorities, for in the beginning every Chief who fancied himself shghted 
would proclaim that he had 'left the king' and then proceed to hoist a flag of 
his own." 



164 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANTT IN THE PACIFIC 

powers in Samoa— it also gave more semblance of autonomy to 
the native government, but it was semblance merely, as the pres- 
ence of three foreigners with voting power, in the highest executive 
council of the country was hardly compatible with the idea of an 
independent government. Moreover, Mr. Thurston stated 
emphatically^'^'^ that without assistance the natives of Polynesia 
were "neither capable of forming nor maintaining any form of 
government worthy of the name." 

]Mr. Bates, the American Commissioner, feeling bound by his 
instructions to frame some scheme for triangular control of the 
native government, drew up a plan not^^'* unlike that of ]\Ir. 
Thurston in that it established a nominee of each of the three 
powers as member of a council which was to constitute the real 
executive power in the islands. The foreign officers were also to 
have a voice in the lower legislative body. Unlike Mr. Thurston, 
Mr. Bates considered it better to abolish the present municipal 
government of Apia. IVIr. Bates, however, felt considerably 
restricted by his instructions and expressed his conviction that the 
extent of intervention on the part of the powers must be more 
systematic and comprehensive than seemed to have been contem- 
plated by his instructions, which looked toward the establishment 
of a native government of some force with oversight rather than 
administration by the three powers. Mr. Bates, however, realized 
that the real function of the powers would necessarily be that of 
actual administration of the government of Samoa. Moreover, 
Mr. Bates, having obeyed his instructions and outlined his plan 
for participation of the three governments, proceeded to confess 
his lack of faith in the plan. He stated that he shared Mr. Travers' 
apprehension of the dangers of tripartite control, that it would 
create constant international dissensions, as was evidenced by 
the failure of the former attempt at government by the three 
consuls. He therefore agreed with the German Commissioner 
that administration by one power would be the best plan, but 
disagreed with him in concluding that that power should be Ger- 



"« Ibid., p. 68. 

'3'' House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 186 ff. 



VIEWS OF AMERICAN COMMISSIONER 165 

many. The concentration of German interests almost entirely 
in one company made it possible for that firm to dominate German 
local officials in Samoa and sway measures to their own interest. 
Then, too, the use of the German language in the Government 
would make it very difficult for the British and American residents 
who did not understand German, whereas most of the Germans 
understood English, which would therefore not create the same 
hardship. ^Moreover, if it were true, as Mr. Travers emphasized 
and INIr, Thurston questioned, that German interests so greatly 
predominated in the islands, that, according to Mr. Bates, was 
an additional reason why Germany should not be allowed to 
control the government. Moreover there were also reasons in 
the American Commissioner's opinion why this control should 
not be given over to Great Britain. Chief among these was that 
Great Britain, like Germany, was pursuing a policy of annexation 
in the South Pacific ; therefore, even under the most guarded treaty, 
the United States should not allow the absolute control of the 
Samoan Government to pass into the hands of either of these 
powers. The final conclusion therefore of ]\Ir. Bates was that the 
only real solution of the problem lay in assigning the administra- 
tion of the islands to the United States. The recognized absence 
of any disposition on the part of the American Government to 
acquire territory in that region, and its national policy of abstain- 
ing from intervention he considered to be reasons justifying the 
choice of the United States for that function, a choice which he 
believed would best satisfy the native population. 

While the three governments were thus equipping themselves 
with information on Samoa and otherwise preparing for the con- 
ference in Washington, which should solve the Samoan problem, 
events were taking place on the islands which were destined to 
affect the coming negotiations directly and indirectly, Malietoa 
was still the recognized native king, but the revolutionary forces 
under the rival chief, Tamasese, the former vice-king, were gaining 
in strength tlirough the assistance, as was declared by Malietoa, 
of the Germans,^^° especially Mr. Weber, director of the great 

"« Ibid., p. 24. Report of Commander B. F. Day, U.S.S. Mohican, May 
28, 1886, also p. 48 and p. 229. 



166 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

German company. There appeared also at this time as assistant or 
advisor to the rebel chief Tamasese, a certain Captain Brandeis,'^' 
former Captain of Bavarian artillery, who was reported to be 
lately connected with the German consulate and to be now giving 
military instruction to the insurgents. To jMalietoa's protest 
against the activities of Brandeis, the new German Consul replied 
that Captain Brandeis had no appointment of a military character, 
but was, as a private individual, peaceably assisting the govern- 
ment of Leulumoega (i. e., the Tamasese government), and the 
Consul trusted that his labors would be for the blessing of Samoa. ^■*- 

"1 R. L. S., p. 410. (Letters and Miscellanies of R. L. S.. Vol. XIX.) 
i« A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 119. 
M. Becker to the King of Samoa. 

German Consulate, Apia, February 10, 18S7. 
(Translation by source.) 
"Your Majesty: 

I am in receipt of the letter stamped with your Government seal, dated 
the ;31st January, from Mr. William Coe, complaining about Brandeis, a 
German gentleman gone to Leulumoega in a military character, now in sedi- 
tious relations to the Samoan Government, and attempting insurrections, 
requesting me to do something to Brandeis. 

The contents of a letter delivered to you on the 12th November, 1886, I 
have informed Your ^lajesty that my Government has instructed me that 
when I assumed my duties in the German Consulate to write similar letters 
to Tuiaana Tamasese, the same as to you. 

Be it well known by your Majesty in relation to the above letter, that the 
Government of the Emperor of Germany is in friendly relations with the 
Leulumoega Government as it is with your Government. The letter with 
the seal sent to the German Consulate greatly surprises me in calling the 
Government of Leulumoega 'rebels.' In the future, I therefore request your 
Majesty to prohibit Mr. Wilham Coe to say no more bad words like that; 
for again if he says any more bad words like that in the future, it will be my 
duty to inform my Government, and the letters which you will receive from 
my Government, you will not like their contents. 

I assure you that I have nothing to do with the gentleman Brandeis, for 
I am not instructed by the German laws to prohibit any German gentleman 
coming here on his own business, and find an appointment among some 
gentlemen who are in friendly relations with the German Government. 

I have therefore to inform your Majesty that I will always be ready to 
attend to those subjects that you may write to me upon. I shall at once 
dispatch the Vice-consul to Leulumoega to get information in relation to the 
doings of the gentleman Brandeis; should he find the work of the above 
gentleman unsatisfactory, then shall the Vice-consul speak to him. 

Again, be it well known that the gentleman Brandeis has no appointment 
in a military character, but resides peaceably assisting the Government of 
Leulumoega in their work, for Brandeis is a quiet sensible gentleman, and I 
trust his lal:)or at Leulumoega will do a great deal of ^ood for the blessings of 
Samoa, and remain in peace 

May you live, 

I am, <fec., 

(Signed) Becker, German Consul. 



ACTIVITIES OF CAPTAIN BRANDEIS 167 

In installing the new consul, the German Government gave him 
instructions to write similar letters to Malietoa and Tamasese. 
To this equal recognition of both and to the reports of the activities 
of Brandeis, Secretary Bayard made vigorous protest, '■'^ and 
received the reply that the German Government was not aware of 
Mr. Brandeis's relations with the German consulate or wath 
Tamasese and had received no information from Malietoa con- 
cerning his activitiog.^" As to the chief Tamasese, however, the 

i« House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 43. 
No. 36. Mr. Bayard to Mr. von Alvensleben. 

Department op State, 

Washington, March 2, 1887. 
"Sir: 

It is proper I should acquaint you with the purport of a dispatch just 
received at the Department and dated January 31, 1887, from the American 
Vice-consul at Apia. It is stated in substance that a Mr. Brandeis, lately 
connected with the German consulate at Apia, has been sent under pay and 
with the title of General to give miUtary instruction to Tamasese in promo- 
tion of his rebellion against the Government of Malietoa. The Vice-consul 
further states that this action has been made the subject of earnest remon- 
strance by Malietoa to the Imperial Government. 

I trust that the just and benevolent plan of cooperation by the three 
powers will not be allowed to be impeded by any such inconsistent and male- 
ficent action as has been so reported, and if any such steps have been taken 
that your Government will promptly check such actions by its officials, or 
under color of their approval. 

Accept Sir, &c., 

T. F. Bayard." 

i« Ibid., p. 50. 

No. 39. Mr. von Alvensleben to Mr. Bayard. 

(Translation by source.) 

Imperial German Legation, 

Washington, April 11th, 1887. 
(Received April 15.) 

"The undersigned Imperial German Envoy Extraordinary and Minister 
Plenipotentiary has brought the polite note of the Hon. Thomas F. Bayard, 
Secretary of State of the United States, bearing the date of March 2, 1887, 
and relating to Samoa, to the notice of his high Government, and has been 
authorized to make the following reply thereto: 

The Imperial Government is not aware that a certain Mr. Brandeis at 
Apia sustains or has sustained relations with the German consulate at that 
place, or that he has become associated with Chief Tamasese. The Imperial 
Government, moreover, has received no information concerning any repre- 
sentation made by Chief Malietoa on account of what has been done by Mr. 
Brandeis. 

The reference made in the note of the honorable Mr. Bayard to a rebellion 
of Tamasese against Malietoa's Government furnishes occasion for the remark 
that a formal agreement was signed at the instance and in the presence of 
the German, American and British consuls, on the 8th of June last, on board 



168 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

German Government replied that the strength of his support 
in Samoa warranted its recognition of his government as of equal 
status with that of Malietoa and that that recognition had prac- 
tically been accorded liim by the American and British Consuls 
the preceding June when they had influenced Tamasese and Mal- 
ietoa to come on board the U. S. S. "Mohican" and sign a formal 
agreement of peace and friendship. Yet it agreed that the ques- 
tion of sovereignty in Samoa should be reserved for the coming 
conference to decide and that in the meantime there was no occa- 
sion for any one of the powers to interfere in Samoan party ques- 
tions."" It was agreed upon by all three powers that their consuls 
on the islands should be instructed to maintain the status quo 
during the sessions of the conference. 

A movement from another quarter at this juncture complicated 
the situation on the islands. King Ivalakaua, of Hawaii, sponta- 

of the U.S.S. "Mohican," by the representatives of the opposing parties in 
Samoa, viz., that of MaUetoa and that of Tamasese to the effect that both 
parties should thenceforth hve on terms of friendship with each other. The 
de facto existence and the equaUty of Tamasese's party was consequently 
considered, both by the native and the foreign population of the Samoan 
Islands, as having been recognized, so that the term "rebellion" does seem 
appropriate in the case to either party. It appears, however, from a tabular 
statement prepared by Mr. Travers, the Imperial Consul General, while he 
was in Samoa that Tamasese's adherents are, at the present time, nearly 
four times as numerous as those of Malietoa. 

The Imperial Government shares the view that all propositions looking 
to a settlement of the question of sovereignty in Samoa should be reserved for 
the consideration of the conference of the three treaty powers which is to 
meet at Washington, and that there is no occasion for any one of the treaty 
powers to interfex'e, without the cooperation of the others, in existing party 
questions. 

The undersigned avails, etc., 

H. V. Al%'ensleben." 

(See also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 115 f.) 

i« A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 134. 

No. 133. Count Hatzfeldt to the Marquis of SaUsbury. (Translation by 

ource.) 

German Embassy, June 20, 1887. 



"The Imperial Government, who are equally desirous with Her Majesty's 
Government to preserve the status quo in Samoa, will, accordingly, again 
instruct their consul at Apia in the sense desired by Lord Salisbury and they 
hope that analogous instructions will be sent to the British Representative." 

(See also House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 56 and 57.) 



HAWAIIAN EXPEDITION 169 

neoiisly outfitted and sent an expedition of his own to Samoa,"'' 
seeking to form with King MaUetoa an aUiance which should be 
the starting-point of a confederation of the still independent 
Polynesian communities and should assist in establishing their 
permanent autonomy. The mission, headed by a Mr. John E. 
Bush, a half-caste Hawaiian, former member of the Hawaiian 
cabinet, was received with much cordiality and display by King 
IVIalietoa, and preparations were made for maintaining permanent 
relations between the two island monarchs. In presenting plans 
for establishing definite treaty relations with Samoa, Mr. Bush 
stated to King Malietoa that he " believed the British Government 
to be aware of his mission, and that he had the support of the 
United States." The Convention was thereafter signed and rati- 
fied by the two kings, "^ binding each other " to enter into a political 
confederation" and to conform to such measures as might be 
agreed upon to carry such a confederation into effect. Shortly 
after this INIr. Carter, the Hawaiian minister at Washington, 
requested to be allowed to represent the interests of Samoa as well 
as those of his own country,"^ and presented proper credentials 
from King Malietoa for this purpose. Previous to this the 
Hawaiian Goverimient, anxious to pursue a"^ policy in accord 
with that of the United States, had appointed as its Vice-Consul 
at Apia, ]Mr. Greenebaume, the former American Consul, who 
had returned to the islands privately after his former commission 
expired, and whom the Hawaiian Government beheved to be still 
the American consular representative there. All of these events 
worked together to create the impression in the minds of the 
German representatives that the Hawaiian mission had behind it 
the support, or at least the approval, of the United States. ^^° 
At the request of the German Government the British minister 

i« House Ex. Doc. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 39 ff., also A. and P., 1889, 
LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 117 ff. 

i-i' A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 125. 

'« House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40 f. 

1" Ibid., p. 38. Secretary Bayard assured the Hawaiian Government that 
Mr. Greeneljaum was no longer in the service of the United States and MaUetoa 
refused to receive liim as the Hawaiian Vice-consul. 

150 A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 126. 



170 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

at Washington was directed to unite with his German colleao;iie, 
requesting the United States to join with Great Britain and Ger- 
many in opposing the action of Ha^vaii in Samoa. The apprehen- 
sion in regard to the United States' policy on this subject was 
reheved by Secretary Bayard, who showed that he had been con- 
sistently opposing the Hawaiian interference all along.^^^ He had 
told ■Mr. Carter, the Hawaiian minister, that the President was 
not prepared to receive him as the accredited representative of 
the King of Samoa and urged him to prevent King Kalakaua 
from intervening in Samoan affairs, a course which he asserted 
would be injudicious and involve Hawaii in questions whose origin 
was beyond Hawaiian control.^^- As a result of the opposition 
encountered, King Kalakaua recalled unconditionally his mission 
to Samoa and thus terminated the Hawaiian-Polynesian policy. 

Such was in general the situation in the islands when the repre- 
sentatives of the three powers entered into formal conference on 
the subject in Washington in the summer of 1887. The British 
and German ministers. Sir Lionel Sackville-West and Baron von 
Alvensleben, represented their respective countries in a series of 
conferences with ]Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, as the represen- 
tative of the United States. ^^'^ At the first meeting of the Confer- 
ence, each representative read a memorandum^^^ presenting the 

151 A. & P.; 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 135. 

'5^' House Ex. Doc. No. 2.38, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 51 to 54, inclusive. 

'5' The Protocols of the six conferences held were, by agreement, kept 
confidential for two years and finally published in February, 18S9 (Sen. 
Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess.), after a resolution passed by the 
House of Representatives requested their transmission, if not incompatible 
with the pubUc interest. (House Misc. Doc. No. 108, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess.) 
The Secretary of Sta^e had previously reques'ted the British and German 
Governments for permission to publish the protocols but the permission had 
been refuged. 

i^"* Secretary Bayard's plan had been previously submitted to the two 
ministers and was embodied in the protocol as if read at the conference. He 
suggested that the plans of the other two representatives be handed to him 
in the same way. Mr. von Alvensleben, however, objected, stating that his 
Government had sent him general instructions before knowing Mr. Bayard's 
suggestions, that "those instructions, therefore, did not cover all the differ- 
ent points suggested," that he would read his memorandum but could not 



WASHINGTON CONFERENCE, 1887 171 

plan of his government for the administration of Samoa. The plan 
presented by Secretary Bayard proceeded from the basis of the 
independence and autonomy of the island kingdom " free from the 
control or preponderating infliienx^e of an}- foreign Government." 
His arrangement therefore placed the executive power in Samoa in 
the hands of a mixed council of Samcans and foreign representa- 
tives. There should be a king and a vice-king, INIalietoa and 
Tamasese to be recognized in these offices (as heretofore), and these, 
together with chiefs from several districts and a minister from 
each of the Treaty powers should constitute the executive body 
of the government. The three ministers mentioned were to be 
appointed by the king upon nomination by the powers and were 
to have seats also in the lower legislative body of the government. 
Another essential feature of the plan was the organization of a land 
commission before whom all claims of title to land were to be 
presented and whose decision was to be final. This land commis- 
sion was to consist of five members appointed by the King, three 
of these to be nominated, one each, by the treaty powers, and the 
remaining two to be chosen by the king. In general Bayard's 
plan, except for the estabKshment of the Land Commission, 
offered little that was new in principle from the system attempted 
in 1S79, when a representative of each power was made an official 
of the Samoan Government. ^^^ 

Mr. von Alvensleben then presented the plan of Germany, ^^^ 
whose view as stated in the preamble was also based on the under- 
standing "that the independence of Samoa under a native govern- 
ment was to be maintained, and that no monopolies should be 
created there by any foreign power." His first stipulation was for a 
new election in Samoa. Claiming that JMalietoa had notoriously 
violated his treaties with Germany, and that " a completely organ- 
ized counter-government" had been formed under Tamasese, 

give it out of his hand. The British Minister also decHned to give a copy 
of the memorandum he had prepared. Both agreed, however, that steno- 
graphic accounts of their statements as read should be embodied in the pro- 
tocols of the conference. (Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2tid Sess., p. 5.) 

155 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 208. 

•55 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 7. 



172 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

von Alvensleben asserted that a new election of king would have 
to take place "according to the customs of the country" — this 
election to be "freely made by the chiefs and people of Samoa." 
After this election purely Samoan affairs were to be conducted 
as hitherto by the king and his native consul whose powers were 
to be defined by special agreement. The significant element of the 
German plan, however, lay in the arrangement for the exercise of 
control of this native government by one of the treaty powers. 
This was to be secured through an official called " adviser to the 
king," who should act as the mandatory of the three treaty powers 
and have control over all measures concerning public order and the 
security of the property of foreign residents. This adviser or prime 
minister, was " to be nominated by the treaty power having for the 
time being the preponderating interests in Samoa," but his nomi- 
nation should have the approval of the other two powers. The 
first adviser so appointed was to serve for five years, when 
there should be a new appointment made upon the same condi- 
tions. As the German interests in Samoa outweighed at present 
those of the other two powers, the first "ad\-iser to the king" 
should be nominated by Germany. In order, however, to avoid 
any misapprehension which might arise because of this placing 
of the representative of one of the powers in the most prominent 
position of the Samoan Government, it was recommended that the 
equality of treatment to be accorded still to all of the treaty 
powers be acknowledged by some new^ formal declaration to that 
effect. 

The plan of the British representative^" coincided in its main 
features with that of Germany. Sir Lionel West also asserted in 
behalf of his government that it was understood that no one of the 
three powers desired to found a colony in the islands, to obtain a 
commercial monopoly or to destroy the independence of Samoa. 
As a result of the investigations of the three commissioners, how- 
ever, it was evident that the intervention of the three powers 
would have to take the form of actual administration, and it was 

1" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 8 and 9. 



BRITISH SUPPORT OF GERMAN POLICY _ 173 

also evident from the reports of the commissioners that the tri- 
partite control, such as had existed to greater or less degree hitherto 
was impracticable. The solution, therefore, seemed to lie in the 
alternate control of the islands for a limited period by one of 
the three nations. In the choice of which power should first act 
as mandatory, Her Majesty's Government considered " that pre- 
ponderating commercial interests should be taken into considera- 
tion." jNIoreover, since INIr. Thurston, ]\Ir. Travers and ]Mr. 
Bates all agreed that this preponderance was possessed by Ger- 
many, Her IVIajesty's Government was ready " to consent to the 
mandatory power being exercised by the German representative 
for the first term of five years," absolute equality of treatment in 
commerce and all other matters being secured to the three powers. 
Sir Lionel also presented a plan for the establishment of an inter- 
national Land Court to dispose of claims of title to land in Samoa, 
which claims were to be first investigated by a land commission. 
In respect to the matter of kingship, it was evident that although 
]\Ialietoa had long been recognized by the powers and Tamasese 
denied that recognition, nevertheless, the situation was now such 
that a new election was imperative. In case of such an election. 
Her Majesty's Government expressed no opinion, either favorable 
or adverse, to INIalietoa. 

It is thus evident that the British and German policies were in 
accord in the most important feature, namely, the administration 
of the islands by one power, and that power — because of prepon- 
derance of commercial interests — Germany. Secretary Bayard's 
policy involved the opposite principle, namely, the constant equal 
participation of the three powers in the administration of the 
islands and also the reducing of that participation to a minimum 
in order to give as much opportunity as possible for native inde- 
pendence. 

In opposing the idea that " preponderating commercial interests " 
should serve as a basis for any plan for governing Samoa, Secretary 
Bayard pointed out that the chief importance of the islands lay in 
their geographic position, directly in the path of a Pacific commerce 
just being developed. The recent developments of the American 
Northwest and the plans for the isthmian canal all gave a new 



174 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

importance to these islands from the viewpoint of the United 
States. Moreoyer, the European nations, Great Britain, Germany, 
France and Spain had already absorbed nearly all the important 
island groups in Polynesia, whereas the United States, with its 
long Pacific coast-line, had not secured a foot of territory in that 
region. There was therefore something in question beyond the 
value of land and products and for this reason the United States 
wished to secure this group of islands for the "common use of 
nations." Aon Alvensleben and Sir Lionel contended that the 
mandatory plan in no way contradicted this idea. But Secretary 
Bayard pointed out that the German minister had stated in his 
memorandum^^^ that, 

" It cannot be expected that she (Germany) should consent to 
remain more or less excluded from the efficient control of the 
country, and have it pass to one of the two powers who have less 
interests." 

Here Secretary Bayard showed was a "clear proposition of 
inequality." 

" If Germany could not be expected to consent to remain more or 
less excluded, how could she expect another power to remain so? 
There was upon the very proposition of exclusion the mark of 
inequality which is in contradiction to the idea with which the 
conference began." 

The British representative then replied that the mandatory plan 
itself was not based on the principle of preponderating interests, 
but was conceived of as the best means of securing a stable govern- 
ment in the islands, the tripartite control having proved a failure 
as was testified to by all three commissioners after their investiga- 
tions in the islands. Her IMajesty's Government was willing, 
"seeing the great interest Germany has in Samoa, to accord to 
the German representative the first term of five years as mandatory 
of the other two powers," and did not see that any exclusive con- 
ies Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 12 ff. and 38 ff. 



CONTRASTING POLICIES 175 

trol was involved in the arrangement, as the mandatory power 
could only be exercised with the consent of the other two powers, 
so.that it seemed a matter of small importance which power should 
be the first to exercise it. 

The problem of a method of adjusting conflicting land-claims 
was also discussed at length in the conferences but, as the organi- 
zations proposed for this purpose took their character from the 
general plan of government, the national policies conflicted on this 
subject also. 

Finally, considering that there was no hope of agreement, because 
as he viewed it, the German plan, acquiesced in by Great Britain, 
made the preponderance of interests and consequent inequality 
of influence " the actual basis and controlling principle of the whole 
scheme of government," Secretary Bayard proposed that the con- 
ference adjourn until autumn, in order that the German and British 
ministers might submit the protocols of the conference to their 
respective governments and receive from them "instructions of a 
more definite character." 

The conference was therefore adjourned without result except 
to show the differences of principle actuating the policies of the 
three powers. With Germany and Great Britain the principle was 
the natural outgrowth of a colonial policy of extending the protec- 
tion of the State over commercial developments once definitely 
established in regions unclaimed by any civilized power. Bismarck 
had stated definitely in^^^ 1884: 

"^Ye intend, moreover, as in \Yest Africa, so also in the South 
Seas to place under the direct protection of the Empire those 
regions which, through the predominating extension of German 
trade or in consequence of the preparations for this, seem fitted 
for it." 

Secretary Bayard's stand was more of a defense against a feared 
aggression in a region which he held to be important to the United 
States by reason of its geographic position. His method was 



15" V. R., 1885, Anl. Vol. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 167, p. 718. (Author's trans- 
lation.^ 
12 



176 s,\aioA: the united states and Germany in the pacific 

therefore to insist on a maximum of autonomy for Samoa. In 
pursuing this Hne of poHcy he was forced to ignore and act in 
contradiction to the advice of the American Commissioner, ]Mr. 
Bates, who had, from his experience on the islands, come to the 
conchision that a strictly independent native government was an 
impossibility and a tripartite government impracticable. Mr. 
Bates even considered that the United States' policy in the Samoan 
question should be governed by the Monroe Doctrine which, as 
originally stated, applied not merely to the continent but to the 
whole Western Hemisphere, and therefore included nearly all of 
Polynesia. Secretary Bayard w^as also forced to take the seemingly 
inconsistent stand of checking the Hawaiian movements. ^^"^ If 
the United States stood for the independence of the small native 

'«o House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., Lst Sess., pp. 52, 54 and 60; also 
pp. 101 to 105 inclusive. For Mr. Bates' application of the Monroe Doctrine 
to Polynesia, see F. R., 1889, p. 276 f. 

(Extract from Mr. Bates' Report) 

"American Intervention in the Pacific. 

"To return to the subject of sole control. Whether our Government would 
be willing to undertake it, even with the consent of the other powers, is a 
question which, of course, I cannot determine. 

I do not believe that a vigorous and decided interest in the welfare of these 
native communities would be in opposition to the declared policy of our 
Government, but that it would fall within the limits of exceptions, not only 
well defined, but which have been enumerated and adhered to by successive 
officers in charge of our foreign affairs, of all parties. 



The enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine first qualified the general policy 
of non-intervention and prescribed the limits to which it was to be thereafter 
confined. This public notice to the world that we would not submit to an 
extension of the European system to this hemisphere, or to the establishment 
upon it of European colonies in addition to those then existing, was put upon 
the express ground that we should regard such action as dangerous to our 
peace and safety. 

The true limitation, therefore, of the doctrine of non-intervention with the 
operations of any European powers was thus stated. It was that such action 
should not be permitted as might be considered by us dangerous to our peace 
and safety. 

It would he impossible, in view of the marvelous growth of the United 
States in population and its resources, and the extension of its territory, 
both by acquisition and settlement, that the limitation by President Monroe 
should at all periods of our history be geographically the same. 

Although perhaps there exists — at least to some extent — a popular impres- 
sion that the Monroe Doctrine was intended to apply to acquisitions by 
foreign powers upon this continent, neither the terms in which the doctrine 
was originally stated nor the action of our Government since, will be found to 
justify any such conclusion. A very early application of the spirit of this 
doctrine to a country not embraced in the continent will be found in our 
diplomatic correspondence respecting Cuba; and while the United States have 



SECRETARY BAYARD 's POLICY 177 

governments in the Pacific, it would be expected to encourage the 
enterprise of one of the strongest native kings in his attempt to 
confederate with and strengthen the other Polynesian monarchs 
as against encroachments of all foreigners. The Secretary evi- 
dently feared, however, that such a movement on the part of 
Hawaii, which was so closely bound economically by treaty to the 
United States, would be misinterpreted and cause the colonizing 
powers to seek more definite control over Samoa. 

The two years following the Washington conference represent 
the period of greatest tension between the three governments in 
reference to the Samoan question. Bismarck agreed^^' nominally 

refused to interfere with the possession of that island by Spain, it was declared 
more than sixty years ago by Mr. Clay, and has been repeated in substance 
many times since, that we would not consent to the occupation of Cuba and 
Porto Rico by any other European power. 

So in the Pacific. As the extension of our commerce and the settlement 
of our Pacific coast made it apparent that the possession by a European power 
of the Sandwich Islands would be dangerous to our peace and safety — indeed, 
more so than would be true as to the South American Republics — our Govern- 
ment has not hesitated to declare that their conquest or occupation by one 
of the great powers of Europe would be a result which we would not hesitate to 
prevent V)y force of arms if necessary. This statement has been repeated 
substantially though in different terms, by Mr. Webster, Mr. Legare, Mr. 
Clayton, Mr. Marcy, Mr. Fish, Mr. Blaine, Mr. Frelinghuysen, and yourself. 

The relation of the Samoan group to the future commerce of the Pacific 
is the same in kind, though at present less in degree, as that of the Hawaiian 
group. 



The intelUgent foresight of our Goverment has, at a time when the future 
of that region was much less certain than it is now, secured exclusive rights 
on the island of Tutuila in a harbor probably not equalled and certainly not 

surpassed in the Pacific Having thus long ago acquired this 

foothold in the South Pacific, it would be short-sighted indeed if we were to 
permit the advantage of this action to slip away from us by leaving the way 
open to European domination in this group. 

It is because of the conviction that the situation in these islands reqviires 
more active intervention in their domestic affairs than was contemplated by 
my instructions to secure to our own people the rights and privileges which 
naturally belong to them that, while reporting the best plan I could devise in 
accordance with the instructions. I have been constrained to go beyond it 
and to urge more independent action on the part of this Government than 
has been heretofore contemplated." 

1" Ibid., pp. 59 and 60. (For German original see Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter 
Theil, No. 5.) 

No. 54. Prince von Bismarck to Mr. von Alvensleben. (Left at the 
Department of State by Mr. von .Alvensleben, August 29, 1887. (Transla- 
tion by source.) 

Varzin, August 7, 1887. 
(Received August 29.) 
"Mr. Bayard has dechned to agree to the German-EngUsh proposition 
to appoint one adviser to the Samoan Government as the representative of 



178 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

in view of Secretary Bayard's objections, to drop the German- 
English plan and take into closer consideration the American 

the treaty powers, and has proposed instead the institution of an executive 
council, consisting of the King of Samoa, a native official, and three represen- 
tatives of the treaty powers (i. e., one to be nominated by each). In the 
course of the discussions on this proposition it has been pointed out by the 
German as well as by the English plenipotentiary that under such a compo- 
sition of the executive, the unsettled and lawless condition of affairs which 
has hitherto prevailed in Samoa would continue, and that a uniform adminis- 
tration of the Samoan Government, ofTering sufficient guarantees for public 
peace and order, would thereby be rendered illusory. 

The Imperial Government, while maintaining these views, and although 
it would have been considered desirable if also the United States Government 
could have convinced itself of the practical advantages of the German-English 
proposition, is nevertheless prepared, in view of the objections raised by Mr. 
Bayard, to drop that point, because Germany has no treaty claim upon the 
consent of America to the proposed institution, and because we are endeavor- 
ing to regulate the relations of the interested powers to Samoa in a common 
understanding with the Government of the United States, connected by 
friendship with Germany. 

The Imperial Government does not see in the American count er-]5roposition 
any redress of the now existing evils; it does not aim, notwithstanding the pre- 
ponderance of German interests over those of other nations in Samoa, at the 
exercise of a stronger influence with regard to the affairs of the islands than 
England and America, unless such influence would, in the common interest 
of the three nations, be willingly conceded to it, as has been done by Great 
Britain, and as we were in hope would be done by the United States, too. 
This hope having proved to be erroneous, we consider, as we have done 
hitherto, the now existing equaHty of rights of the three nations, as the acknowl- 
edged basis of their relations to Samoa. "We do not, however, anticipate a 
favorable result from a participation of the so-called King and of one of his 
officials in the negotiations of the consuls, neither for the affairs themselves, 
nor for the agreement of the powers and their consuls between each other. 

The Imperial Government agrees, therefore, to the adjournment of the 
conference proposed by Mr. Bayard and will, jointly with the British Govern- 
ment, take into closer consideration the American counter-proposition of a 
common control of the Samoan Government to be exercised by the three 
treaty powers. 

The Imperial Government is, however, unable to renounce an immediate 
reparation for the insults against His Majesty the Emperor and the national 
honor committed l)y partisans of Malietoa, on the 22nd of March last, on 
the occasion of His Majesty's birthday, by the ill-treatment of German citi- 
zens in Samoa and bj' violence inflicted upon them. We also must obtain 
due satisfaction for the thefts and robberies committee on German plantations, 
which have hitherto remained unpunished, and for the systematical refusal 
of legal protection in cases of criminal ofTenses committed by Samoans against 
German subjects; and, furthermore, we must obtain sufficient guaranties that 
our treaties with Samoa be in future respected and the German interests there 
duly protected. The latter are in consequence of the uncalled-for inter- 
meddling of the Hawaiian Government in the political affairs of Samoa, now 
menaced by imminent outbreak of a civil war, endangering life and property 
of the Germans residing there. 

Under these circumstances and having convinced ourselves, to out regret 
that our representatives in Apia do not enjoy the expected support of their 
colleagues in cases of disagreements and disputes with Malietoa, we have to 
consider it our duty to indejiendently protect our own interests and rights and 
to obtain the satisfaction and reparation which is due to our national honor. 



Bismarck's view of American plan 179 

counter-proposition, but he stated plainly that he saw in it no 
solution for the existing evils. While agreeing to the adjourn- 
ment of the conference, and acknowledging as hitherto the equality 
of rights of the three nations in Samoa, Germany could not, 
he declared, "renounce an immediate reparation for the insults 
against His Majesty the Emperor and the national honor com- 
mitted by partisans of Malietoa." If the king were either unwilling 
or not powerful enough, to give Germany the necessary satisfac- 
tion for the past and sufficient guarantees for the future, the 
Imperial Government would feel obliged to declare war on him 
personally. And if the king of Hawaii should interfere in favor 
of Malietoa, then the former would be entering into a state of war 
with Germany. 

We shall therefore if Malietoa is either not willing or not powerful enough 
to give us the oecessary satisfaction for the past and sufficient guaranties for 
the future, feel obliged to declare war on him, and refuse to recognize his 
government. In case Hawaii, whose King acts according to financial princi- 
ples which it is not desirable to extend to Samoa, should try to interfere in 
favor of Malietoa, the King of the Sandwich Islands woidd thereby enter 
into (a) state of war with us. 

The Imperial Government is, of course, far from intending to bring about 
any change in the poUtical relations which the three powers represented there 
and connected by friendship entertain to Samoa; on the contrary, we maintain 
unaltered the existing treaties and stipulations between us and the Govern- 
ments of Great Britain and the United States with regard to that group of 
islands, as well as the equality of rights of the treaty powers. We shall also 
in the future continue our endeavors to arrive at an understanding about the 
necessary reforms in order to establish a lasting peace on the Samoan Islands, 
in the interest of the foreign and native population. But we are unable to 
allow the dignity of the German Empire and the security of the German sub- 
jects to be any longer slighted in such a manner as has been done l)y Mahetoa. 

I respectfully request you to bring the foregoing remarks to the notice of 
Mr. Bayard and, if he desires it, to leave a copy of them in his hands. 

V. Bismarck." 

Count Bismarck later terminated negotiations concerning Bavard's plan. 
(Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 6 to 9.) 

Memorandum handed to Bayard by Baron v. Zedwitz, November 4th, 1887. 

"If therefore, the American Government cannot be convinced of the prac- 
tical advantages of the German-Enghsh proposition, and if it regards the 
carrying out of the same as dangerous to the independence and neutrality 
of Samoa, and as a deviation from the traditional policy of the United States 
in the Pacific Ocean, the Imperial Government has no desire to adhere to the 
plan and renew the discussion thereof. The Imperial Government, however, 
for the reasons stated, considers the counter-propositions made by Mr. Bayarcl 
during the conference for an executive branch of the government composed 
of five members as impracticable, and is unable to regard the same as sufficient 
ground for further negotiations. 

Count Bismarck." 



180 s.uioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific 

The especial insult referred to by Bismarck was the affair of 
the Emperor's birthday, when a conflict occurred between some 
of the followers of Malietoa and the German residents who were 
in the act of celebrating the birthday of the Emperor. The 
reports^"- as to the seriousness of the conflict vary widely according 
to their source, the German consul emphasizing the gravity of the 
event, the American and British reports minimizing the whole 
affair. Germany, however, made it the occasion for entering upon 
an aggressive policy against Malietoa. A heavy fine and abject 
apology for this and past offenses were demanded^'^^ of the king, 
and when these were not obtained, war was declared against him.^*^^ 
Great Britain offered her conciliation but this was declined by 
Germany. Malietoa fled inland. Tamasese was transported to 
Apia in a German man-of-war and saluted as King oT Samoa. 
The American and British consuls immediately issued a proclama- 
tioni*^^ stating that they and their governments did not recognize 
Tamasese as King but would continue as heretofore to recognize 
]Malietoa — they urged the Samoans, however, to submit and 
await the deliberations of the nations. The pursuit of iNIalietoa 
continued and he later surrendered and was carried into exile on 

1^- For accounts of the "affair of March 22nd," the Emperor's birthday, see 
Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 3. (Becker to Bismarck.) R. L. S., 
Vol. XIX, p. 418 ff. A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 149. 

163 House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 67 ff. 

164 That the German Government did not expect MaUetoa to comply with 
the demands, nor exhausted effort to have him do so, is evident from the 
following. (A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 138, No. 143. 

The Marquis of Sahsbury to Sir E. Malet. 

Foreign Office, August 15th, 1887. 
(Extract.) 

"The German Ambassador called ujjon me today, and left with me the 
dispatch of which I enclose an extract, explaining the policy which the German 
Government ])ropose to adoj^t toward Samoa. 

I asked the Ambassador whether it would not be possible to give directions 
to the British Consul to take steps for removing the differences between 
King Malieta and Germany, by including the former to meet the demands of 
Germany as far as they were well founded. 

His Excellency said that such a course might be adopted later but that it 
would be inconvenient for the present that any instructions should be given 
wliich might jjrematurely announce the intentions which the Chancellor had 
confidentially explained." 

165 Ibid., p. 147. 



GERMAN WAR AGAINST MALIETOA 181 

board a German war-vessel. Meantime Tamasese was being 
established in the kingship. The "gentleman Brandeis," who had 
been quietly assisting him in the organization of his forces, now 
became his prime minister^"'' and assisted him in the organization 
of his government. Throughout one year Samoa was under their 
regime. The American Consul, jMr. Sewall, offered constant and 
determined opposition, refusing to recognize the new ruler in any 
manner, and declining to serve on the IMunicipal Council" under 
the flag of Tamasese, thus eventually causing the abandonment of 
the municipal government of xApia.^'^* The British Consul, on the 
other hand, was instructed^'^'-' to recognize Tamasese as the de 
facto ruler of Samoa and to enter into such communication with 
him as the situation required. He was also instructed to observe 
strict neutrality as between the Gennan and i\.merican authorities 
on the islands. In addition to this Sir Lionel West, the British 
Ambassador in Washington, was instructed^'''' to use his influence 
to induce the Government of the United States "to address to 
their Consul pacific and conciliatory instructions." The United 
States Consul Sewall was later instructed by Secretary Bayard 
to preserve strict " neutrality between the Malietoa and Tamasese 
parties, but to uphold all rights of the United States.""^ 

The war against ^Malietoa had involved almost no bloodshed and 
very slight military measures, but Bismarck realized that such 

"" Ibid., p. 173. 

'«' A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 163, No. 180 and p. 170, No. 189. 
The American Consul Sewall protested against the assumption of rule of 
Tamasese over the municipality of Apia as a violation of the Municipal 
Convention of 1879 (House Ex. Doc. No. 238, 50th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 91). 
The German Consul, Becker, declared it necessary to consider that convention 
in abeyance liecause the American Consul, Sewall, had refused to consent to 
the continuance in office of the present magistrate, and had refused to attend 
meetings of the Municipal Board. Mr. Becker asserted that it was not -the 
German Commander (as alleged by Mr. Sewall) but the Samoan Government 
that had taken over the administration of Apia. Moreover, he pointed out 
that the Convention of 1879, on which Mr. Sewall based his protest, had not 
been ratified by the United States. 

'ss A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 172; also Weissbuch, 1889, Vol. V, 
No. 7. 

i«^ Ibid., pp. 169, 172 and 173. "« Ibid., p. 158. 

"1 Weissbuch, Fuenfter Theil, No. 12. 



182 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

measures as had been taken were creating a hostile opinion among 
the other powers. He therefore instructed the German Consul/^' 
as soon as he thought it possible, to remove the German marines 
from Apia. Their presence there, Bismarck wrote to ]\lr. Becker, 
was giving the American and Australian press just the excuse 
wanted to cast suspicion on the German policy in the Pacific, and 
to accuse it of aggression against the treaty rights of others in 
Samoa. The Chancellor had hoped that the removal of the hostile 
Malietoa and the installation of Tamasese, who was friendly to 
Germany, would be sufficient assurance of the protection of German 
subjects and their interests. As long as the mihtary occupation 
lasted, the consul was to avoid anything which would give that 
occupation any other character than merely a measure of support 
of the newly recognized king. Any further action, moreover, was 
to be taken not in the name of Germany nor in reference to special 
German interests but in the name of the present Samoan govern- 
ment, the support of which the Chancellor wrote would be for 
the interest of all. 

This reveals completely the part played by the German Govern- 
ment to further German interests in the islands. The king hostile 
to Germany was removed and replaced by a chieftain friendly 
to German interests and well controlled by a German advisor as 
his prime minister. This having been accomplished, it was neces- 
sary to seek to overcome the hostility aroused among the other 
powers. The chancellor therefore ordered the immediate removal 
of the signs of force by which the coup had been accomplished and 
directed that the support of the new regime should be rendered as 
to a government thoroughly Samoan. 

The Tamasese-Brandeis regime lasted approximately a year and 
accounts are cohtradictory^^^ as to whether intrinsically it was 

"3 Weissbuch, Fuenfter Theil, No. 13. 

"3R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 439. Mr. Stevenson refers to the severe but 
salutary laws enacted, the roads built, beacons set up, instruction given to 
the natives in agricultural methods, and in the raising of cacao and other 
products to relieve the dependence on the one product, copra. In general he 
writes, "The more I learn of his brief term of rule, the more I learn to admire 
him and to wish we had his like." In contrast see also Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 
50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 159. 



TAMASESE-BRANDEIS REGIME 183 

mostly good or evil. But all seem to agree that the rule was not 
Samoan but thoroughly German. This fact and the strict regula- 
tions enforced made his rule unpopular with native Samoans 
and the creation of a new opposition party was the natural result. 
This opposition centered in the person of Mataafa, a chief of the 
old Malietoa party. According to the allegations of the Germans, 
it was supported by the American Consul and certain British 
residents. ^"^ Through whatever causes, the opposition grew and 
the situation now became the reverse of that under ^Nlahetoa, 
the German representatives in Samoa now rallying to the support 
of the de facto king, the American representatives lending more or 
less active support to the opposition forces under Mataafa.^''^ 

"^ R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 432 f. 

"The white enemies of the new regime were of two classes. In the first 
stood Moors and the employees of McArthur, the two cliief rivals of the 
firm, who saw with jealousy a clerk (or a so-called clerk) of their competitors 
advanced to power. The second class, that of the officials numbered at first 
exactly one, Wilson, the English Acting-consul, is understood to have held 
strict orders to help Germany. Commander Leary of the Adams, the Ameri- 
can Captain, when he arrived, on the 16th October and for some time after, 
seemed devoted to the German interests and spent his days with the German 
officer, Captain von Widersheim, who was deservedlj^ beloved by all who 
knew him. There remains the American Consul-general, Harold Marsh 
Sewall, a young man of high spirit and a generous disposition. He had 
obeyed the orders of his government with a grudge; and looked back on his 
past action with regret almost to be called repentance. From the moment 
of the declaration of war against Laupepa, we find him standing forth in 
bold, consistent, and sometimes rather captious opposition, stirring up his 
government at home with clear and forcible dispatches and on the spot grasp- 
ing at every opportunity to thrust a stick into the German wheels. For 
some while he and Moors fought their difficult battle in conjunction; in the 
course of which first one and then the other, paid a visit home to reason with 
authorities in Washington; and during the Consul's absence there was found 
an American clerk in Apia, William Blacklock, to perform the duties of the 
office with remarkable ability and courage. The three names just brought 
together, Sewall, Moors, and Blacklock, make the head and front of the 
opposition; if Tamasese fell, if Brandeis was driven forth, if the Treaty of 
Berlin was signed, theirs is the blame or the credit:" 

"5 R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 494; also Weissbuch, 1S89, Fuenfter Theil, No. 27. 

No. 27. 

Berlin, den 24. Nov., 1888. 
Bismarck to Konsul Knappe. 



"Wegen der Unterstuetzing, welche der Kommandant des amerikanischen 
Kriegsschiffes und der amerikanische Konsulatsverweser den Aufstaendischen 
gewaehrt haben, sind Vorstellungen in Washington erhoben worden. Die 
beiden amerikanischen Beamten haben in Folge dessen Weisung erhalten, eine 
Einmischung in den Aufstand und Konflikte mit deutschen Behoerden zu 



184 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

The situation was more serious this time because of the presence 
of the naval forces of each nation now stationed at the islands in 
anticipation of the threatening troubles. ^^^ The German and 
American commanders took active part in the situation, backing 
their consuls. The period is referred to as that of the "Furor 
Consularis.""^ The Tamasese forces were routed and Mataafa 
proclaimed king."^ Finally, German marines landed for the pro- 
tection of the German plantations were attacked by Mataafa 
forces at Fangalii and lost more than fifty men, 40 per cent, of their 
number. Germany then prepared to take action in earnest and 
declared war on the Mataafa forces. In announcing the state of 
war, Bismarck declared^^^ that the German armed forces were 

vermeiden imd, falls Schwierigkeiten entstehen, neue Instruktionen abzu- 
warten. 

Was unsere eigene Haltung in Samoa betrifft, so handelt es sich in erster 
Linie darum, die Reichsangehoerigen und deren Interessen warksam zu 
schuetzen. Es wuerden uns allerdings erwaienscht sein, Tamasese zii halten, 
wenn dies aiser in Hinblick auf die Stimmung der einheimischen Bevoel- 
kerung nicht angaengig ist, erscheint es als angezeigt, wenn thunlich, einen 
Vergleich zwischen Tamasese und Mataafa zu Stande zu bringen. Tamasese 
wuerden hierbei moeglischst guenstige Bedingungen zu sichern sein." 

See also Ibid., Nos. 32, 33, 34 and 36. 

i'6 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 137. Rear Admiral 
Kimberley was instructed to keep one of his ships continuously in Samoan 
waters and to give her commanding officer full instructions "to intervene 
vigorously, should occasion arise, to protect the persons and property of 
American citizens there residing." Count Arco, German Minister, informed 
Secretary Bayard (Ibid., p. 161) that the German fleet was being dispatched 
to Samoa owing to the unsettled condition of affairs in the islands, but had 
no definite information as to any specific oljject for this. 

i"Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, SOth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 161. Instructions 
were sent by both the German and American Governments to their consuls 
to endeavor to avoid all friction or conflict of interests between the citizens 
of the two governments in their business operations in those islands. (See 
also Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 28 and No. 29. After the defeat of 
Tamasese by the Mataafa forces, the German Consul was instructed to con- 
fine his efforts to the protection of the life and property of German subjects 
(Ibid., p. 162). 

"8 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 31, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 125. 

i"8 House Ex. Doc. No. 118, SOth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 15. 

No. 4 (e). Prince Bismarck to Count von Arco-Valley. 

(Translation by source.) 

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 

Berlin, January 13, 1889. 
"I have already notified Your Excellency that, according to telegraphic 



GERMAN WAR AGAINST MATAAFA FORCES 183 

instructed to avoid all injury to neutral commerce and property 
and that all treaty rights of Americans and British in Samoa would 
be preserved, and that the military measures^^° had in view only 
the punishment of the murderers of German soldiers. The German 
Consul, Dr. Knappe, however, being personally eager for annexa- 
tion, adopted measures of unauthorized vigor'^^ and placed the 

communications from Apia on the 18th December of last year, a detachment 
of German naval forces which had landed at the requisition of the Imperial 
Consul for the protection of the German settlements which were endangered 
by the conflicts between the native parties there, was attacked by armed 
Samoans belonging to the party of Chief Mataafa. This unprovoked attack 
is said to have taken place under the leadership of an American named Klein. 
On this occasion more than fifty German soldiers and officers were killed and 
wounded. In consequence of this we have been transplanted from the 
territory of mediatorial negotiations, Ijy which the Imperial Consul in Apia 
was trying to reconcile the contending parties, and for which he had sought 
the cooperation of his English and American colleagues, into a state of war 
with the assailants, to our regret. 

We shall carry on the contest which has been forced upon us l)_y Mataafa 
and his followers, with the utmost consideration for English and American 
interests. Our military measures have in view only the punishment of the 
murderers of German soldiers and the protection of our countrymen and their 
property. As they, on their part, are at war with Tamasese, our interference 
will necessarily assume the character of assistance to Tamasese. 

In the endeavor for the just punishment of a murderous crime we hope 
for the cooperation of the treaty powers in Samoa in friendsliij) with us, and 
we ask the Government of the United States to be good enough to furnish 
the consuls, and the commander of its ships of war in Samoa, with suitable 
instructions. Our armed forces there are instructed to avoid and to prevent 
all injury to neutral commerce and property, and to adopt measures of reprisal 
and destruction only against the followers of the party which initiated the 
contest against our troops by a murderous attack. 

We shall of course abide by the agreements with America and England 
with respect to Samoa, and pay due regard under all circumstances to the 
rights of those powers as estabhshed by treaty. 

I beg Your Excellency to bring this communication to Mr. Bayard's knowl- 
edge by reading it to him, and to leave a copy of it with him if he requests it. 

Von Bismarck." 

1^" Bismarck empowered the German representative to call upon German 
warships for aid provided the outlook for success was assured. (See Weissbuch, 
1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 33.) 

Bismarck to Gen. Konsul, Sydney. 

23. Dez., 1888. 

"Ich ermaechtige Sie gegen Aufstaendische, welche deutsches Eigenthum 
schaedigen, Huelfe unserer Kriegsschiffe nach zu suchen, falls Aussicht auf 
Erfolg gesichert ist." 

181 Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 35. Dr. Knappe was eager for 
direct annexation of the islands and wrote to Bismarck that if it were possible 
to annex the islands the German forces present in Samoa would be suffi- 
cient to restore order. Bismarck replied (Ibid., No. 37) that owing to the 
agreement with America and England, annexation was out of the question 
(" SelbstverstaendUch ausgeschlossen ") . 



186 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

whole islands under martial law. Protests were made imme- 
diately^*- by the American and British Consuls and their Govern- 
ments, who refused to permit the jurisdiction over their respective 
citizens in Samoa to be transferred to that of the German represen- 
tatives in the islands. When news of the action of Dr. Knapps 
reached Germany, Bismarck immediately disavowed his measures, 
and administered a sharp rebuke to the Consul. ^^^ The Chancellor 
declared the protest of the other nations to be "grounded," that 
Dr. Knappe had overstepped his authority and that his assump- 
tion of control over Samoa was entirely contradictory to the policy 
of Germany,^'^'* and in violation of the formal treaty with England. 

182 House Ex. Doc. No. 119, oOth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3; also A. & P., 
1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 281, No. 325. 

183 V. R., 1888-89, Anl. Bd. VI, Aktenstueck, Nr. 210, S. 1235. 

Telegramm. 

Berlin, den 31. Janimr, 1889. 
"Folgendes an Konsul in Apia zu uebermitteln: 

Unter Bezugnahme auf Telegramm vom 23. Januar, Ijemerke ich, dass Ihnen 
kein Recht zusteht, Fremde der Gerichtsixarkeit ihrer Konsuln zu entziehn. 
Der Widerspruch Ihrer englischen Kollegen gegen die getroffenen Alassnah- 
men ist begruendet. Bei Konflikten welche aus diesem Anlass entstehen, 
^viierden Sie Sich im Unrecht befinden. Die von Ihnen gestellte Forderung, 
betreffend Uebernahme der Verwaltung Samoas durch Deutschland, liegt 
ausserhalb Ihrer Instruktionen und unserer Ziele. Nelimen Sie dieselben alsbald 
zurvxeck. Abgesehen von Auslieferung der verbreeherischen Angreifer ist keine 
Forderung zu stellen, zu der Sie nicht ermaechtigt sind. Falls Ihr Telegramm 
hier richtig verstanden wird, kann ich Ihr Verhalten nicht gutheissen. 

gez. 

Von Bismarck." 
18* Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 41. 

Bismarck to von der Golz (K. Vizeadmiral, Kommandierenden Admiral). 

Berlin, 5. Felx, 1SS9. 



"Auch Amerika gegenueber sind wir in Samoa, wenn nicht vertragsmaessig 
gebunden, doch in amtlicher, durch Internationale Verhandlungen anerkannter 
Kenntnis der Vertragsrechte, welche Amerika Samoa gegenueber besitzt, 
und haben bisher keinen Anlass in diese Amerikanisch-samoanischen \'er- 
traege einzugreifen. Ich glaube deshalb, dass der Protest der englischen imd 
amerikanischen Konsuln zu Gunsten des Verbleibens ihrer Landsleute unter 
ihrer konsularischen Jurisdiktion ein berechtigter ist, soweit die Betheiligten 
nicht etwa durch Beistand, Foerderung oder Anstiftung unserer Angreifer sich 
der Sache derselben anschliessen. Wenn vom deutschen Konsulat das Ver- 
langen nach Uebertragung der Verwaltung in der That ausges]irochen sein 
sollte, so wuerde ich das bedauern, weil es mit unseren Abmachungen und 
Zusicherungen England und Amerika gegenueber in Widerspruch stehen 
wuerde und daher nicht aufrecht erhalten werden koennte. Je schwieriger in 
Samoa die in Betracht kommenden voelkerrechtlichen Fragen liegen, um so 
mehr ist fuer unser Verhalten befreundeten Maechten gegenueber die genaue 



Bismarck's disavowal of knappe's measures 187 

Moreover, in respect to the United States, though not bound by 
any formal treaty, Germany had recognized officially the rights 

Inhaltung der Grenzlinien unserer Rechte geboten; je fester wir innerhalb 
derselljen unsere Rechte zu vertreten und durchzufuehren entschlossen sind, 
iim so sicherer muss jede Ueberschreitung vermieden werden." 

That Bismarck's disavowal of the action of Consul Knappe relieved a tense 
situation and served to allay the indignation of the United States is shown in 
the following insti'uctions from Secretary Blaine to the American delegates at 
the Berlin Conference. 

"I do not desire to embarrass your discussion of the restoration of the 
status quo by reference to the incidents which accompanied the declaration 
of martial law by the German authorities. But these incidents cannot be 
passed over in silence, if such silence is to be interpreted as acquiescence 
either in the rightfulness or necessity of that measure. Such a declaration 
appears to the President to have lieen in direct violation of that equal and 
friendly cooperation which had been previously recognized as the principle 
of action for the treaty powers, and equally contradictory of the conditions 
upon which the conference was instituted. But, aside from these considera- 
tions, the manner and the method by which the German naval authorities 
proclaimed their intention of carrying this declaration into effect, could onty 
tend to evoke irritation and bitterness over questions which might well be 
the subject of grave international discussion. So trenchant were the inva- 
sions of the rights of American citizens in Samoa, and so apparent was the 
purpose to disregard the dignity of the flag which protected them, that, if 
immediate resentment of such treatment had culminated in forcible resistance, 
this Government while deeply regretting so unfortvuiate an occurrence, would 
have found it impossible not to have sympathized with the natural indigna- 
tion which prompted such a course. 



Had not the Government of the United States believed that the objection- 
able proceedings were due to the hasty and too pronounced zeal of German 
naval officers, and not to the orders or the wishes of the authorities at Berlin, 
an earnest and \'igorous protest would have been made against the assump- 
tion of such power. In this belief, the President is content to overlook the 
ofTense, and refers to 'it now lest silence on his part should be misconstrued 
by the German Government. You will therefore, be careful in any reference 
which you maj"^ make to the subject, to employ a friendly tone, and to assume 
that the proceedings referred to were at no time authorized by the Imperial 
Government." 

In order to avoid danger of naval conflict upon the reciuest of consuls in 
the future, Germany enacted by Imperial Decree, March 19, 1889, the following 
regulation ; 

"The Commander of a ship of war is thereby bound in the future to test 
the legal and political bearing of any request made of him by any German 
Representative abroad, when the latter has no authorization or instruction 
from the Foreign Office to show; failing this, the Commander is to wait a 
higher decision, in case he does not share the view of the Consul as to the 
necessity of taking active measures of a warhke nature." 

Bismarck stated that this Imperial Decree was occasioned by the recent 
events in Samoa where an unauthorized consular request and an unquestioning 
compliance with the same, have resulted in much loss of life, and serious 
injiny to German interests, and have, moreover, menaced us with quarrels 



188 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

of that country in Samoa as secured by its treaty of 187S. There- 
fore a change in the pohtical status of Samoa without the agree- 
ment of both these nations was not to be contemplated. ^^^ 

During the hostiHties against IVIataafa the American Commander 
at Apia called for reinforcements on the ground that American 
property and lives were in danger from the action of the German 
forces against Mataafa. The Government responded by ordering 
Admiral Kimberly,!^'' Commander of the United States' naval 

with friendly Powers, without any vahd and sufficient reasons existing for 
recourse to warhke proceedings. 

For further condemnation of Consul Knappe's actions bj^ Bismarck see the 
latter's letter of March 9, 1889, to Dr. Stuebel. (V. R., 1888-89, Anl. Bd. V, 
Aktenstueck, Nr. 138, S. 890.) 

185 Weissbuch, 1889, Fuenfter Theil, No. 47. 

i8« Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, oOth Cong., 2nd Sess., pp. 21 and 22, No. 14. 

Mr. Whitney, Secretary of the Navy, to Admiral Kimberly. 

(Inclosure in No. 14 — telegram.) 

Navy Department, January 11, 1889. 

"Commander Mullan of the Nipsic, telegraphs, by way of Auckland, New 
Zealand, that a force was landed at Samoa from the German fleet, which 
resulted in an engagement between the troops of Mataafa and the German 
forces and the defeat of the latter. He reports that the Germans in retalia- 
tion bombarded towns, disregarding protests and neutral rights, and that 
the projierty and lives of American citizens are in danger. He strongly urges 
the sending of reenforcements. The German Government claims that the 
German forces were first attacked, and that war now exists between Germany 
and that portion of the natives of Samoa, engaged in the attack upon the 
Germans. The German Government invites this Government in the common 
interest to join in establishing order in Samoa, giving assurance of careful 
respect for our treaty rights. The United States Government is willing to 
cooperate in restoring Samoan autonomy, as recognized and agreed to ]:)y 
Germany, Great Britain, and the United States, and has so informed the 
German Government. 

You will at once proceed to Samoa and extend full protection and defense 
to American citizens and property. You will consult with the American 
vice-consul, examine his archives, and otherwise inform yourself as to the 
situation and all recent occurrences. Protest against the subjugation and 
displacement of native government of Samoa by Germany as in violation 
of positive agreement and understanding between treaty powers, but inform 
the representatives of the German and British Governments of your readiness 
to cooperate in causing all treaty rights to be respected and in restoring 
peace and order on the basis of a recognition of Samoan independence. 
Endeavor to prevent exi;reme measures against the Samoans and bring about 
a peaceful settlement. If such arrangement can be made upon that basis you 
will report the same for approval and you will inform this Government as 
soon as possible after your arrival in Samoa, of the condition of affairs and 
the prospect of peaceful adjustment, and whether Germany was acting 
impartially between the opposing native forces when the late conflict 
occurred. 

Whitney. " 



INSTRUCTIONS TO ADMIRAL KIMBERLY 189 

forces in the Pacific to proceed in his flagship, the Trenton, to 
Apia. He was instructed "to extend full protection and defense 
to American citizens and property," to "protest against the sub- 
jugation and displacement of native government of Samoa by 
Germany," but to inform the German and British representatives 
of his readiness to cooperate in restoring peace and order on the 
basis of Samoan independence. The whole correspondence on 
the Samoan question was communicated by President Cleveland 
to Congress^" for its consideration. The President declared that 

1" Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 68, oOth Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 2. 

Message to Congress. 

January 16, 1889. 

"On the second of April, 1888, I transmitted to the House of Representa- 
tives, in response to a resolution passed by that body, a report from the Secre- 
tary of State relating to the condition of affairs in the Samoan Islands, to- 
gether with numerous letters, dispatches, and the documents connected with 
the subject, which gave a history of all cUsorders in that locality up to that 
date. On the 21st day of December, 1888, this information was supplemented 
by the transmission to the Congress of such further correspondence and 
documents as extended this liistory to that time. 

I now submit a report from the Secretary of State, with later correspondence 
and cUspatches exhibiting the progress of the disturbances in Samoa up to the 
present date. 

The information thus laid before the Congress is of much importance since 
it has relation to the preservation of American interests and the protection 
of American citizens and their property in a distant locality and under an 
unstable and unsatisfactory government. 

In the midst of the disturbances which have arisen at Samoa, such powers 
have been exercised as seemed to be within the executive control under our 
Constitution and laws, and which appear to accord with our national policy 
and traditions, to restore tranquillity and secure the safety of our citizens. 

Through negotiations and agreement with Great Britain and Germany 
which, with our own Government, constitute the treaty powers interested in 
Samoan peace and quiet, the attempt has been made to define more clearly 
the part which these powers should assume in the government of that country, 
while at the same time its autonomy has been insisted upon. 

These negotiations were at one time interrupted by such action on the 
part of the German Government as appeared to be inconsistent with their 
further continuance. 

Germany, however, still asserts, as from the first she has done, that she has 
no desire or intention to, overturn the native Samoan Government or to 
ignore our treaty rights, and she still invites our Government to join her in 
restoring peace and quiet. But thus far her propositions on this subject 
seem to lead to such a preponderance of German power in Samoa as was 
never contemplated by us and is inconsistent with every prior agreement or 
understanding, while her recent conduct as between native warring factions 
gives rise to the suspicion that she is not content with a neutral position. 

Acting mthin the restraints which our constitution and laws have placed 
upon the executive power, I have insisted that the autonomy and independ- 
ence of Samoa should he scrupulously preserved according to the treaties 
made with Samoa by the powers named and their agreements and understand- 
ing with each other. I have protested against every act apparently tending 



190 yAMoA: the united states and germant: in the pacific 

the German proposition and actions aimed at a preponderance of 
German power and indicated that Germany was not content with a 
neutral position. Much feehng was aroused and an appropriation 
of a half million dollars was voted for the protection of United 
States' interests in Samoa/^^ In addition one hundred thousand 
was appropriated for the development of the harbor of Pago- 

in an opposite direction, and during the existence of internal disturbance one 
or more vessels of war have been kept in Samoan waters to protect American 
citizens and property. 

These things will abundantly appear from the correspondence and papers 
which have been sulamitted to the Congress. 

A recent collision between the forces from a German man-of-war stationed 
in Samoan waters and a body of natives rendered the situation so delicate 
and critical that the warship Trenton, under the immediate command of 
Admiral Kimberly, was ordered to join the Nipsic, already at Samoa, for the 
better protection of the persons and property of our citizens, and in further- 
ance of efforts to restore order and safety. 

The attention of the Congress is especially called to the instructions given 
to Admiral Kimberly, dated on the 11th instant, and the letter of the Secretary 
of State to the German Minister, dated the 12th instant, which will be found 
among the papers submitted. 

By means of the papers and documents heretofore submitted and those 
wliich accompany this communication, the precise situation of affairs in 
Samoa is laid before the Congress and such executive action as has been taken 
is full}' exhibited. 

The views of the Executive in respect of the just poUcy to be pursued with 
regard to this group of islands, which lie in the direct highway of a growing 
and important commerce between Australia and the United States, have fovmd 
expression in the correspondence and documents which have thus been fully 
communicated to the Congress, and the subject in its present stage is sub- 
mitted to the wider discretion conferred by the Constitution upon the legis- 
lative branch of the Government. 

Grover Cleveland." 

Executive Mansion, 
January 15, 1889. 

188 Congressional Record, Vol. XX, Part 2, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1283. 
The Committee on Appropriations reported, January 29, 1889, to insert in 
the Diplomatic and Consular Appropriation bill the following: 

"For the execution of the obhgations and the protection of the interests 
of the United States, existing under the treaty between the United States 
and the Government of the Samoan Islands, $500,000, or so much thereof as 
may be necessary, to be expended under the direction of the President, this 
appropriation to be immediately available. 

For the survey, improvement, and occupation of the bay and harbor of 
Pago-Pago in the Island of Tutuila, Samoa, and for the construction of the 
necessary wharves and buildings for such occupation, and for a coaling station 
therein, under the direction of the President, $100,000, this a])propriation 
to be immediately available." 

For Congressional discussion of the Samoan situation, see Ibid., pp. 1283 ff. 
(January 29, 1889) and pp. 1325 ff. (January 30, 1889). 



CONGRESSIONAL MEASURES 191 

Pago^^'-' which had remained as it was when first transferred to the 
United States in 1878. 

ReaHzing that affairs in the islands had reached a critical stage/^*^ 
Bismarck concluded that it was important for the three powers to 
come to an agreement concerning the future of Samoa. He there- 
fore proposed to Lord Salisbury^^^ that the British Government 
unite with him in inviting the American Government to continue 
in Berlin the conference begun in Washington and to renew the 

18!) Congressional Record, Vol. XX, Part 2, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 1290, 
January 29, 1889. Senator Sherman, of Ohio, after the lengthy discussion 
on the Samoan correspondence and situation, set forth the following recom- 
mendation: 

"Mr. President, the conclusions to which I have come, without wearying 
the Senate any further, are that the first thing to V)e done is to assert our 
jjower and occupancy and possession of the Bay of Pago-Pago, and so much 
of the shores of the Island of Tutuila as is necessary for a coaling station. 
This is a mere rocky island, comparatively, of a few square miles, but it 
possesses this magnificent harbor, and one of the amendments of this l)ill 
proposes that we shall take possession of it, occupy it, erect a coaling station 
there and such other Imildings as may be necessary. That ought to be done 
immediately, because it is manifest that whatever may happen in regard to 
controversies in the South Sea Islands, having secured by law and by treaty 
a foothold there, we ought to secure that, and not treat it as we have done 
our privileges in the Hawaiian Islands. The Government of the United 
States undertook, or started to do it some time ago, but without saying 
anything in respect to the mode in which it was defeated it was finally dropped 
out of the appropriation bill on the score of economy. If we had had a foot- 
hold in this liay as firmly and as strongly as the Germans have theirs in their 
bay, I believe American interests would not be so endangered as they are 
today. 

It needs no war to protect the nation's rights. The mere assertion of those 
rights, a due regard for them, the expenditure of money there, the storing of 
coal there, the landing of vessels there — all these are an assertion of power far 
more powerful, far more influential than protocols or diplomatic correspond- 
ence. That we ought to do." 

19° Carl Schurz, "Speeches, etc.," Vol. V, p. 1. (Also see Appendix.) 
Count von Arco- Valley, German Minister at Washington, consulted Senatoi 
Schurz on the Samoan question. The Senator, speaking as a private citizen, 
recommended that Count Arco advise his Government to allow the publica- 
tion of the protocols of the conference of 1887, which it had hitherto refused 
to do. The Senator recommended also that the German Government accom- 
pany its invitation to the conference in Berlin with the frank statement that 
the basis of the negotiations would be the autonomy of Samoa and the main- 
tenance of all treaty rights. Count Arco informed Mr. Schurz that he would 
report these views to his Government. Both of these actions were taken by 
the German Government in arranging the Berlin Conference. 

191 Weissbuch, 1889, Achter Theil, No. 1; also A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI 
(C-5629), p. 276, No. 316. 
13 



192 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

attempt to end the hostilities in Samoa. In making this proposi- 
tion the German minister was instructed to assure Lord SaHsbury 
that Germany did not aim to gain the islands for herself, nor to 
put in question the equality of rights of the three powers there. 
On receiving the acceptance of Great Britain, Bismarck then sub- 
mitted to Secretary Bayard^^^ his proposal that the United States 
" resume with Germany and the British Government the consulta- 
tion regarding the Samoan question." In extending this invitation, 
the Chancellor declared that "any supposition that Germany 
would not feel satisfied with a neutral position in the Samoan 
Islands" was unfounded and that it was not Germajiy's intention 
"to put in question the independence of the island group, nor the 
equal rights of the treaty powers." On this basis Secretary Bayard 
accepted the invitation on the part of the United States, ^^'^ with 
the added suggestion that the three treaty powers at once instruct 
their officers in Samoa to suspend all belligerent action pending 
the decision of the conference. Unless the free election of a new 
king by the natives should alter them, affairs in Samoa were 
to remain in statu quo during the negotiations between the 
powers. The proposals for the conference and Germany's assur- 
ance that autonomy of the islands and equality of representation 
of the powers should be the basis of the negotiations relieved to a 
great degree the tension between the Governments of the United 
States and Germany. Possibility of hostilities betw^een the naval 
forces stationed at the islands was suddenly prevented by a great 
natural catastrophe, the famous hurricane of ISIarch 16, 1SS9, 
which destroyed the entire naval forces of the United States and 
Germany then stationed in the harbor of Apia.^^^ 

"2 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 3, No. 3. 

"3 Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 102, 50th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 4, No. 4. 

19^ R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 541 ff. The naval vessels of the three powers 
then anchored in Apia harbor were (American) the Trenton, Nipsic, and 
Vandalia; (German) the Adler, Eber, and Olga; (British) the CaUiope. Of 
thirteen vessels assembled in the harbor the Calliope was the sole sm-vivor. 

After a vivid description of the storm Mr. Stevenson concludes : 

"Thus in what seemed the very article of war, and within the duration of 
a single day, the sword arm of each of the two angry jiowers was broken, their 
formidable ships reduced to junk; their disciplined hundreds to a horde of 



THE CONFERENCE OF BERLIN 193 

The possible factors for danger having thus been removed, the 
Conference of BerHn was opened under favorable auspices which 
were soon reahzed in the success of the negotiators^ ^^ in reaching 
terms of agreement. The American delegates were furnished with 
the following instructions:^^" 

castaways, fed with difficulty, and the fear of whose misconduct marred the 
sleep of their commanders. Both paused aghast; both had time to recognize 
that not the whole Samoan Archipelago was worth the loss in men and costly 
ships already suffered. The so-called hurricane of March 16th made thus 
a marking epoch in world history; cUrectly and at once it brought about the 
congress and treaty of Berlin; indirectly and by a process still continuing, 
it founded the modern Navy of the States. Coming years and other historians 
will declare the influence of that." 

"5 Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 181, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7. 
The Plenipotentiaries were as follows: 
The United States: 

Mr. John A. Kassox, of Iowa (Former Minister to Germany). 

Mr. William Walter Phelps, of New Jersey (Minister to 

Germany). 
Mr. George H. Bates, of Delaware (U. S. Commissioner to Samoa, 
1886). 
Germany : 

Count Herbert Bismarck (Minister of State, Secretary of State of 

Foreign Affairs). 
Baron von Holstein (Actual Privy Councillor of Legation). 
Dr. Krauel (Privy Councillor of Legation). 
Great Britain: 

Sir Edward Baldwin Malet (British Ambassador to Germany). 
Charles St'ewart Scott (British Envoy Extraordinary and Min- 
ister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Confederation). 
Joseph Archer Crowe (British Commercial Attache for Europe). 
i*"* For instructions to the United States delegates see F. R., 1889, pp. 195 ff ., 
also resume of these instructions as presented by Secretary Blaine to Congress . 
(Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., Lst Sess., pp. 1 to 6.) 

"They were instructed to be governed in the fulfilment of their mission by 
the most earnest assurance that the Government of the United States desired 
a speedy and amiable solution of all the questions involved; that, while it 
would steachly maintain its full equality of right and consideration in any 
disposition of these questions, it was as much influenced by an anxious desire 
to secure to the people of Samoa the conditions of a healthy, prosperous, 
civilized life as it was bound by its duty to protect the rights and interests 
of its own citizens wherever their spirit of lawful enterprise might carry 
them; that, in the cooperation of the three governments, the President hoped 
and believed that frank and friendly consultation Vould strengthen their 
respect for each other, and the result prove that it was not the wish of any 
of them to subordinate the rights of the native Samoans to the exigencies of a 
grasping commerce, or to the political amlMtion of territorial extension on the 
part of any one of the powers maintaining treaty relations with them. They 
were further instructed that in consenting, at the request of the Emperor of 



194 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

1. They were to ask for the restoration of the status quu^^'^ "in 
order that the disturbance of the equal rights of the powers in 
Samoa, which had been caused by the intervention^'-*^ of Germany 
and the deportation of Mahetoa Laupepa, might be removed — 
and their footing of equahty restored. 

•2. They were to strive for "the organization of a stable govern- 
mental system for the islands whereby native independence and 
autonomy should be preserved free from the control or the pre- 
ponderating influence of any foreign government. "^^'■* Any inter- 
vention of the three powers should be temporary merely and 
"avowedly preparatory to the restoration of as complete inde- 
pendence and autonomy as was practicable." 

3. They were to secure the settlement of the land question on 
some equitable and comprehensive basis A\'hich would save a 
reasonable proportion of the territory for the natives. 

4. They were to prohibit or regulate the importation 'and sale 
of firearms and alcoholic liquors. 

German^', to reopen at Berlin, the adjourned proceedings of the Conference 
of Washington of 1887, the President, while thus manifesting his entire con- 
fidence in the motives and purposes of the German Government desired it to 
be borne in mind that the step was the continuance merely of the efforts 
alread,v made toward an adjustment of pending questions, and not the initia- 
tion of a new conference on another basis, inasmuch as the Government of 
the United States could not admit the conditions directly influencing the 
deliberations of the conference of Washington to have been changed by any 
subsequent occurrences in the South Pacific " 

1" Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 3. 

"The restoration of the status quo however, was not to be submitted 
as an ultimatvun which would close the conference or prevent the President 
from considering any plan pvit forward as a substitute." 

"s Ibid., p. 3. 

"While the President was unwilling to consider that action of Germany, 
which immediately followed the suspension of the conferences at Washington 
as intentionally derogatory either to the dignity or the interests of the other 
treaty powers, yet he could not but regard it, under all the circumstances, as 
an abrupt breach of the joint relations of the three powers to each other and 
to the Government of Samoa, and impossible to reconcile with the frank and 
friendly declaration of the German Government, preliminary to the meeting 
of the conference of 1887, that it intended to maintain the status as it had 
theretofore existed and had neither interest nor desire to change an arrange- 
ment found satisfactory to the three governments." 

133 Ibid., p. 3. 

"Besides these evils necessarily attending the subordination of Samoan 
independence to any one predominant ahen interest, the United States could 
not consent to the institution of any form of government in those islands, 
subject, directly or indirectly, to influences which in the contingencies of the 
futiu'e might check or control the use or development of the right acquired on 
the part of the I'nited States by lawful treaty to establish a naval station at 
Pago-Pago and to control its harlor to that end." 



INSTRUCTIONS TO AMERICAN DELEGATES 195 

5. They were to use their own judgment on the subject of 
renewing the municipal administration of Apia. 

The result of the conference-"" was in the main "entirely in 
accord with the instructions under which the American pleni- 
potentiaries acted. "-"^ Provision was made first of all that the 
islands of Samoa should be considered a neutral territory in which 
the citizens and subjects of the three signatory powers were to 
have equal rights of residence, trade and personal protection. 
Neither of the powers was to exercise any separate control over the 
islands which were recognized as having an independent govern- 
ment. The natives of the islands were acknowledged to have 
the free right to elect a king or choose their forms of Governn:(ent 
according to their ow^n laws and customs. In view of the disturbed 
conditions in the islands, however, an immediate election was 
considered inadvisable, therefore it was decided to restore to 
Samoa as king the former monarch Malietoa Laupepa, who had 
been recognized by all three powers in former years. It was pro- 
vided that Malietoa's successor should be duly elected according 
to the laws and customs of Samoa.-"- 

-^^ Ibid., p. 4. There were altogether nine formal conferences held in 
Berlin between April 29 and June 14, 1889. The results were embodied in an 
agreement known as the General Act of the Conference of Berlin signed at 
Berlin, June 14, 1889. 

201 F. R., 1889, pp. 353 ff., also Sen. Misc. Doc. No. 81, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., 
p. 6 ff. 

202 R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 561. 

"In the Berlin Act, the three powers recognize, on the threshold, 'the 
independence of the Samoan Government and the free right of the natives 
to elect their chief or king and choose their form of government.' True the 
text continues that, 'in view of the difficulties that would surround an election 
in the present disordered condition of the Government, ]Malietoa Laupepa 
shall be recognized as king unless the three powers shall by common accord 
otherwise declare.' But perhaps few natives have followed it so far, and 
even those who have, were possibly cast all abroad again by the next clause, 
' and his successor shall be duly elected according to the laws and customs of 
Samoa.' The right to elect, freely given in one sentence, was suspended in 
the next, and a line or so further on appeared to be reconveyed by a side 
wind." 

Sen. Misc. Doc, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, No. 81, p. 43. One exception 
was made in the event of such an election. At Count Bismarck's request it 
was agreed in the fifth session of the conference (and emliodied in the protocol), 
that in view of the outrages committed upon German soldiers the Chief 
Mataafa should not be eligible to the kingship of Samoa. 



196 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

The problem of foreign assistance to the native government 
was adjusted in the Act by the estabhshment of a Supreme Court 
for Samoa under the jurisdiction of a single judge termed the Chief 
Justice. He was to be nominated by the three treaty powers, or 
if they could not agree, by the King of Sweden and Norway,-"^ 
and his decisions were to be final. The jurisdiction of the Supreme 
Court was to include all questions arising under the General Act, 
including questions of rightful kingship, questions of the powers 
claimed by any king or chief in the exercise of his office, contro- 
^'ersies between the Samoan GoAcrnment and any one of the treaty- 
powers, and all civil suits except those of crimes of those foreigners 
who were still under the jurisdiction of their own consuls. 

For the settlement of the land question the General Act pro- 
vided that all future alienation of Samoan lands to foreigners 
should, with certain exceptions,^"'* be prohibited. To adjust all dis- 
putes as to land titles a land commission was to be appointed, to 
consist of three persons, one named by each of the treaty powers. 
These were to be assisted by a "natives' advocate," appointed 
by the ruler of Samoa with the approval of the Chief Justice. The 
labors of the commission were to be closed in two years or sooner 
if practicable. 

The municipality of x\pia was redefined and placed under the 
jurisdiction of a INIunicipal Council elected by the residents of the 
district, and a magistrate appointed by the Council. The consuls 
were not to be eligible as Councillors but all regulations passed 
by the Council were to be submitted to them for unanimous 
ap])roval before becoming laws. Should agreement of the three 
consuls not be reached, the matter in dispute was to be referred 

203 F. R., 1889, p. 417. It was first arranged that the Chief Justice of 
Samoa was to be named by the Lord Chief Justice of England and to be of 
English professional experience, ])ut the United States Government objected 
to giving "one of the three signatory nationaUties an appointment entaihng 
so much political importance," and made the suggestion finally embodied 
in this article of the treaty. 

2M F. R., 1889, p. 357 f. Town lots in the Municipality of Apia might still 
be bought by foreigners, and agricultural tracts might be leased for not over 
forty years, all purchases and leases to first receive the approval of the Chief 
Justice. 



GENERAL ACT OF BERLIN, 18S9 197 

to the Chief Justice for final decision. The President of the 
Municipal Council was to be agreed upon by all three powers, or 
failing this, was to be selected from the nationals of Sweden, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, ]\Iexico, or Brazil, and nominated by 
the ruler of his own nation. 

Further agreements were made concerning methods of raising 
reA'enue, the regulation of the sale of firearms and alcoholic liquors, 
etc., and inasmuch as certain of these conflicted with the several 
treaties of the Powers with Samoa, it was provided that in all cases 
of such conflict the present act should be considered binding, after 
the Government of Samoa should have given its formal assent to 
the Act. 

The Conference of Berlin did much to relieve the immediate 
difficulties of the Samoan question. The negotiations were con- 
ducted in a spirit of cooperation^"^ and the basic principles being 
agreed upon by all three nations, there was little serious difficulty 
in creating a plan of government involving those principles. The 

2°^ F. R., 1889, p. 419. Mr. Kasson, American representative, paid the fol- 
lowing tribute to Count Bismarck. 

" 'I should neglect a duty, which is both an obligation and a pleasure, if I 
failed to express on the part of the American plenipotentiaries our apprecia- 
tion of the important service, which His Excellency, Count Bismarck has 
rendered by his fairness and impartiality as our presiding officer. The con- 
ciliatory attitude which he has maintained, and the friendly spirit in which 
he has conducted the business of the conference have exercised the most 
beneficial influence on the deliberations which now touch their end, and 
demand our frank recognition.' 

' I believe that I interpret the sentiments of all the plenipotentiaries when 
I beg His Excellency to convey with him the assurance not only of our high 
appreciation of the official ciualities which he has so usefully displayed through- 
out our proceedings, but also of the jjersonal traits associated with them 
which have added a charm to official functions.' 

Sir E. Malet said: 

'On behalf of the British plenipotentiaries I am anxious to say that we 
most cordially associate ourselves to the expressions which have fallen from 
]Mr. Kasson, and that we desire that his words should be considered as coming 
equally from us.' 

Count Bismarck was anxious to express his warmest gratitude for the very 
flattering words addressed to him by Mr. Kasson and Sir E. Malet. He appre- 
ciated and valued very highly the complimentary expressions uttered t)y them; 
but he considered that, if the conference had been able to perform work which 
would prove satisfactory to the governments concerned, it was mainly due to 
the loyal and conciliatory attitude of each and all of the plenipotentiaries and 
to the large amount of good work which they had done." 



198 sa^ioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific 

salient feature of the conference was the acquiescence of Germany-^'"' 
in the demands of the United States. In response to the request 
of Secretary Bayard,'-'^'^ the warfare against the ^Nlataafa forces 
was stopped and the losses sustained by German forces in the 
islands .were left unexpiated. The Tamasese government was 
entirely abandoned. Throughout the Conference equality of 
representation of the three countries was emphasized and all 
effort to utilize the "preponderating interests" of Germany in 
Samoa to obtain special treatment was abandoned. The situation 
on the islands was relieved by Germany's restoration of the former 
king Malietoa Laupepa and reestablishment of the status quo.-'^^ 

2»« R. L. S., Vol. XIX, p. 555. 

"It was agreed so far as might be to obliterate two years of blundering; and 
to resume in 1889 and at Berlin those negotiations which had been so unhappily 
broken off at Washington in 1887. The example thus offered by Germany is 
rare in history: in the career of Prince Bismarck, so far as I am instructed, 
it should stand unique. On a review of these two years of blundering, bullying, 
and failure in a little isle in the Pacific, he seems magnanimously to have 
owned his policy was in the wrong. He left Fangalii unexpiated; suffered 
that house of cards, the Tamasese government, to fall by its own frailty and 
without remark or lamentation, left the Samoan question openly and fairly 
to the conference; and in. the meanwhile, to allay the local heats engendered 
by Becker and Knappe, he sent to Apia that invaluable public servant. Dr. 
Stuebel. I should be a dishonest man if I did not here bear testimony to 
the loyalty since shown by the Germans in Samoa." 

Secretary Bayard himself testified to this attitude in a letter to Senator 
Schurz. (From "Speeches," etc., Schurz, Vol. V, p. 16.) 

From Thomas F. Bayard. 

Departaient of State, 

Washington, February 28th, 18S9. 



"Now that I have succeeded in attracting Prince Bismarck's attention to 
the real condition of Samoa, I find his views and disposition very much as I 
expected them to Vje — moderate and conciliatory. As I wrote you, the shop- 
keepers at Samoa got hold of official power and abused it, and the scene is so 
distant that the mischief was done before the facts were known." .... 

20^ F. R., 1889, p. 194. 

-^* F. R., 1889, p. 198. If this had not been done, there would have been 
vigorous opposition on the part of the United States, as is evident from the 
following instructions to the American delegates. 

"The President hopes that these opinions will receive the consideration to 
which he thinks them entitled. You will submit them to the conference 
with temperate firmness. If it be urged, as it may be, that this forcil)le 
intervention has had consequences which practical good sense cannot dis- 
regard, because they can not l)e undone, you will say that the restoration of 
status quo is necessary to place the treaty powers upon their footing of eqiiality. 



FEATURES AND EFFECTS OF BERLIN CONFERENCE 199 

The participation of the European nations in the administration 
of Samoa was focussed in the powers of the Chief Justice, but the 
disinterested character of that officer was secured by the stipula- 
tion that he be approved by all three powers or be appointed by 
a neutral nation. In transmitting the agreement to the Senate 
for ratification President Harrison declared, 

"I am pleased to find in this general act an honorable, just, and 
equal settlement of the cjuestions which have arisen during the 
past few years between the three powers having treaty relations 
with and rights in the Samoan Islands." 

From other viewpoints than that of solving temporarily a diffi- 
cult diplomatic situation, the Berhn agreement was not so success- 
ful. In the first place it was a self-contradictory instrument. 
Starting out with a broad declaration of the independence of the 
Samoan Government, it then proceeded to draw up a scheme of 
administration which gave merely nominal recognition to the native 
executive and placed all real powers in the hands of foreign officers. 
For instance, the natives were declared to have the free right to 
elect their own king according to their own custom, but any 
question over the rightful election was to be decided by the Chief 
Justice. Moreover, any question as to the validity of the powers 
claimed by the native king was also to be decided by that foreign 
officer. In all civil suits between natives and foreigners the Chief 
Justice had the final decision and might apply the code of the 
United States, England or Germany as he thought most appro- 
priate. The municipality of Apia was recreated and placed under 
the control of the foreign residents there. The Act was therefore 

and does not prevent the treaty powers and Samoa from making any changes 
in the future which justice and an unselfish interest may suggest as necessary. 
The desire of the Government of the United States to see status quo reestab- 
hshed as the basis for future deHberation and action in no way commits it to the 
partisan support of any plan or person. 

You will not submit this proposition as an ultimatum which would close 
the conference or prevent the President from considering any plan which 
may be suggested as a substitute. But shotild the i^roposition be rejected, 
you will not accept such conclusion except ad referendum. You will com- 
municate such result as promptly as possible, and the President will then 
decide upon the course which he deems it his duty to adopt, and you will be 
instructed accordingly." 



200 smioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific 

in no sense a guarantee of the independence-"^ of the islands but 
rather a regulation of the foreign limitations placed upon that 
independence. 

From the viewpoint of American foreign policy, the Berlin 
General Act was exceptional. It committed the United States by 
formal agreement to active participation with European powers in 
the administration of a neutral territory many thousands of miles 
distant from its shores. Even the plan submitted by Secretary 
Bayard at the Washington Conference, involving, as it did, a 
much slighter participation of the Powers, was declared by his 
successor. Secretary Blaine,-^*^ to go beyond the President's desires 
and to be out of harmony with the established policy of the United 
States Government. The General Act, however, was an actual 
tripartite government,^^^ a system which was not only contrary 

203 F. R., 1894, p. 511. Secretary of State Gresham stated in 1894, in his 
report on "Affairs in the Samoan Islands:" 

"It is obvious that the machinery thus devised for the government of the 
islands is inaccurately styled an 'autonomous government.' It is true that 
in the first article of the act the contracting parties declare that they 'recog- 
nize the independence of the Samoan Government and the free right of the 
natives to elect their chief or King and choose their form of government 
according to their own laws and customs.' This declaration, however, only 
adds force to the fact that we may look in vain in all the comprehensive 
framework of the treaty for a single provision that secures to the nominal 
and unsalaried King or to the natives either independence or any substantial 
part in the exercise of the Government. All these powers are in reality dis- 
charged by foreign officials actually chosen bj^ the treaty powers and backed up 
by their force and their funds. The so-called 'autonomous government' is 
more than a joint protectorate. It is in substance and in form a tripartite 
foreign government, imposed upon the natives and supported and administered 
jointly by the three treaty powers. Such is the arrangement to which the 
United States, in the pursuit of its new pohcy, has committed itself for the 
purpose of securing the so-called neutrality of these distant islands." 

2'° F. R., 1889, p. 201. Referring to Bayard's plan, Blaine declared in his 
instructions to the delegates to the Berlin Conference: 

"This scheme goes beyond the principle upon which the President desires 
to see our relations with the Samoan Government based, and is not in har- 
mony with the estabhshed policy of this Government. For if it is not a 
joint protectorate, to which there are such grave and obvious objections, it 
is hardly less than that and does not in any event promise efficient action." 

2'i Ibid., p. 202. No provision was made that this government should be 
temporary in character and preparatory merely to restoring complete self- 
government to the natives, although the American delegates were instructed 
that it was the earnest desire of the President that any intervention in Samoa 



RELATION OF BERLIN ACT TO AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 201 

to American foreign policy but contrary also to the advice of all 
the commissioners sent to Samoa in 1886. Each of these men had 
declared that a simultaneous participation of the three powers 
in the administration of Samoa had been proved to be impractic- 
able and a source of international controversies. No provision 
was made that this government should be temporary in character, 
although this was the earnest desire of the American President. 

The conclusion of the General Act of Berlin may be considered 
to complete the second period of the Samoan diplomatic history. 
The eciuality of rights of the three nations in the island group had 
been expressed ten years before in the separate treaties of each 
power with Samoa. That equality was now made emphatic by 
formal treaty between the three powers, with the acquiescence 
of Samoa. During the intervening decade, the commercial and 
political interests of the three nations in the islands had developed. 
German commerce there had grown and with the strengthening 
of German colonial policy, that commerce received increasingly 
the support of the Imperial Government and its military forces. 
The United States, through the general increase in its Pacific 
trade, and through the plans for an isthmian canal, had become 
increasingly conscious of the importance of these islands to its 
commercial future in the Pacific. Therefore, the State Depart- 
ment opposed decisively any measures which it considered would 
in any way jeopardize its status of equality in Samoa and especially 
its hold over the harbor of Pago-Pago. In instructing the Ameri- 
can delegates to the Conference at Berlin, Secretary Blaine had 
declared-^" that "In any question involving present or future 

should be merely temporarj-. Lord Salisbury stated in his instructions to 
the British Plenipotentiaries: 

"The reports which have been sent in to their governments by the respec- 
tive Consuls-General, and the impressions which have been left by past 
experience in these islands do not leave to us much hope of the successful 
conduct of affairs by an aboriginal government acting under the simultaneous 
impulse of three rival but coordinate powers." 

(A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), No. 9, p. 6.) 

212 Ibid., p. 201. In opposing the plan of placing the islands under any one 
power as mandatory, the Secretary of State had asserted the following policy: 

"The obUgation of the Government of the United States in the South 
Pacific is to protect the rights and interests of our citizens who may be resi- 



202 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

relations in the Pacific, this Government cannot accept even 
temporary subordination and must regard it as inconsistent with 
that international consideration and dignity to which the United 
States, by continental position and expanding interests, must 
always be entitled." Great Britain, while maintaining all rights 
of British subjects and their interests in wSamoa, had played the 
role of mediator between Germany and the United States. Annexa- 
tion measures had been attempted by the British colonies, particu- 
larly New Zealand, but the home government, having come to 
an understanding with Germany on the division of spheres of 
interest in the South Seas, had discouraged the aspirations of the 
colonies and had given sanction to the German policy in Samoa.-^^ 

dent there and engaged in any lawful pursuit. We have no desire to dominate, 
and every wish to develop a stable and just government. If there have l)een 
troubles and annoyance, they have not proceeded from any groundless hostility 
of the Samoan Government or the Samoan people. They have arisen and 
been fostered into mischievous activity by the avarice and eagerness of com- 
peting merchants and land speculators, and the irregular conduct of foreign 
officials who are, perhaps naturally and excusaVjly but most injudiciously, 
sympathetic with the prejudices and interests of their immediate constituents, 
the resident foreigners. To convert the assumed supremacy of any one of 
these contesting interests into a legahzed government of these islands, does not, 
in the opinion of the President, promise any relief from the embarrassing 
dissensions which at present disturb the orderly condition of things. 

But there are other reasons why the Government of the United States can- 
not accept this scheme of subordination. The interests of the United States 
require the possession of a naval station in these remote parts of the Pacific, 
and by a treaty with the lawful authorities of Samoa they have been put in 
control of the harbor of Pago-Pago for these purposes. We cannot consent 
to the institution of any form of government in Samoa subject directly or 
indirectly to influences which in the contingencies of the future might check 
or control the use or the development of this American right. Nor can the 
Government of the United States forget, what we are satisfied the other treaty 
powers will cordially recognize, that our interest in the Pacific is steadily 
increasing; that our commerce with the East is developing largely and rapidly; 
and that the certainty of an early opening of an Isthmian transit from the 
Atlantic to the Pacific (under American protection) must create changes in 
which no power can be more directly interested than the United States. And 
in any question involving present or future relations in the Pacific, this govern- 
ment cannot accept even temporary suborcUnation, and must regard it as 
inconsistent with that international consideration and dignity to which the 
United States by continental position and expanding interests must always 
be entitled." 

"3 House Ex. Doc. No. 23S, oOth Cong., 1st Sess., p. 61, No. 56. 
Mr. Sewall to Mr. Porter. 

Consulate General of the United States, 
Apia, Samoa, August 15, 1887. (Received Sept. 12.) 
"Sir: 

I have the honor to report that although, for reasons set forth elsewhere, 
there has been no meeting of the municipal board since my arrival here, the 



BRITISH-GERMAN ACCORD ON SAMOAN QUESTION 203 

In reply to an interrogation concerning the Samoan situation, Sir 
J'. Ferguson, British Under Secretary of State for Foreign Afi'airs, 
had declared to the House of Commons in 1888-^^ that he could 
not tell what the future of Samoa would be. The German people 
formed some of the best colonists in the British possessions. It 
was not suprising " that the Government of Germany, with people 
spread all over the world, should have settled to some extent in 
colonies of their own, rather than altogether in those of Great 
Britain and the United States." The British people "ought not 
to view with jealousy the advent of the civilized powers to colonies 
adjacent to their own." In instructing the British plenipoten- 
tiaries to the Berlin Conference, Lord Salisbury declared that the 
object of Her Majesty's Government in taking part in the con- 
ference was merely to secure a stable government which could 
maintain tranquillity there and that the British interests in Samoa 
were "commercial and not political. "-^^ 

The German Chancellor openly acknowledged the British- 
union Ijetween the British and German consuls in support of the German 
candidate for municipal magistrate continues. The British pro-consul acts 
against his personal judgment but under personal instructions to support 
the German candidate for six months from April last. 

These are not the first instructions from the British Government to its 
representative here that have strengthened the German hand and tended 
to German domination in Samoa. 

As early as April, 1886, Dr. Stuebel, German Consul-general informed Mr. 
Ruge, the associate German representative on the board, that Count Hatz- 
feldt had written Berlin that the British foreign office had instructed its 
representative here to act with the Germans. 

In September, 1886, written instructions to this effect were exhibited by the 
British consul. These instructions went further and instructed him to 
request the then magistrate, a British subject, to resign. I enclose a copy 
of an extract from a letter called forth by this action, written by Sir Robert 
Stout, Premier of New Zealand, to Sir F. D. Bell, agent general for that colony 
in London. 

There is from another source confirmation of Enghsh support of the 
Germans, and indirect encouragement to the rebels here. In a letter referred 
to in my dispatch numbered 10, written by Meisake, interpreter and clerk 
at the German consulate, dated June 1, 1887, and addressed to Mataafa, 
Chief of Atua, it is affirmed that, 'by will of Great Britain and Germany, 
Germany's desires here will be approved and carried out.' 

I have, etc., 

Habold M. Sewall." 

(See also inclosure — account of interview between the British Minister, 
Sir E. Malet, and Prince Bismarck.) 
"4 F. R., 1889, pp. 184 and 185. 
215 A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), No. 9, p. 6. 



204 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

German Entente on the colonial question. In an address before 
the Reichstag in 1889 Bismarck announced -^^^ ' 

"In Zanzibar as in Samoa we are in absolute unity with the 
English Government and with it we are going hand in hand,^!'' 
and I am firmly resolved to hold fast to these relations." 

In further emphasis he continued: 

"This impression is, according to my political conception, the 
chief thing — just as in other colonies, in Samoa for example — I 
hold unquestionably to the accord with the English Government, 
and to the resolve, as soon as we are in agreement with the same, to 
go forward together, and as soon as we are that no longer, to 
refrain or to act with restraint. I consider England as the old, 



2i« V. R., 1889, Bd. Ill, 27. Sitz., 26. Januar, 1889, S. 618 (B.) and S., 619 (B). 
This speech was rendered during the first discussion of a bill concerning slave 
traffic and protection of German interests in East Africa. (Translation by 
author.) 

21' A. & P., 1889, LXXXVI (C-5629), p. 279, No. 322. Lord SaUsbury took 
exception to this statement by the Chancellor as hable to misconstruction, and 
expressed the following modification as his view of the situation. 

No. 322. The Marquis of Salisbury to Sir. E. Malet. 

Foreign Office, January 29, 1889. 
"Sir: 

In speaking to Count Hatzfeldt today, I referred to the speech deUvered 
by the Chancellor in the Reichstag on Sunday last. I expressed the satisfac- 
tion with which I had read the language apphed by the Chancellor to the value 
which he attached to the good understanding between the two governments. 

The only comment which it was at all necessary for me to make, other than 
that of entire sympathy and concurrence, apphed to a remark of his Highness, 
as to the attitutle of the two countries with respect to Samoa. 

His statement, that in regard to that matter the Governments of Great 
Britain and Germany were going hand in hand, might be open to miscon- 
struction. 

It was entirely correct to say that our views were in agreement as to the 
arrangement to be put in force for the government of these islands in the 
future, but in the conflict which existed at present between the German 
Government and a certain portion of the inhabitants, it could not be said 
that we were going hand in hand with Germany. We were maintaining an 
attitude entirely neutral, and were in no degree concerned in or responsible 
for the action which the German Government thought it right to take. 

Count Hatzfeldt expressed himself entirelj^ in accord with me as to the 
accuracy of the correction and said that he had no doubt that when the 
Chancellor used that expression, he was speaking of the more permanent 
arrangement with respect to which the views of the two governments were 
the same. 

I am, &c., 

(Signed) Salisbury." 



OPERATION OF THE GENERAL ACT 205 

traditional ally, with whom we have no conflicting interests; 
when I say ally, that is to be taken in a diplomatic sense; we have 
no treaties with England; but I wish to hold fast also in colonial 
questions to the feeling which we have had with England for at 
least one hundred and fifty years. (Bravo on the left.) And if 
it were to be shown to me that we were losing that, then I would 
become cautious and seek to prevent the loss." 

The third period of Samoan diplomacy was characterized by the 
difficulties of putting into operation the stipulations of the General 
Act."^^ At the base of these difficulties was the reluctance of the 
natives to submit to a centralized government, or to the restric- 
tions of any government. Being averse to taxes, coercive measures 
were required to collect these — the warrants of the Supreme Court 
went unheeded and the Treaty Powers were compelled to send 
men-of-wa,r to enforce the rulings of the court. In 18P3 revolu- 
tions broke out again requiring the armed interference of all three 
of the treaty powers. ^"'^ In order to uphold the rule of Malietoa, 
and the order of the islands, Mataafa and several insurgent chiefs 
were deported to the Marshall Islands and retained there at the 
expense of the three governments. Difficulties also arose concern- 
ing the powers of the Chief Justice'^-" as in conflict with those of 
the President of the IVIunicipal Council, who had been given by 
the Treaty the power to act as adviser to the native king. The 
relationship of the Chief Justice to the Consuls was also a source of 

-'* F. R., '94, p. 511. For diplomatic correspondence on this period, see 
also A. & P., 1890, LXXXI (C-5907), and 1893, CIX (C-6973). 

219 F. R., 189-4, p. 512 and p. 594 ff. The British and German Governments 
agreed to disarm the natives by force, but the United States objected on the 
gromid that such measures were unnecessary and Ukely to frustrate the good 
effects of the Berhn Conference. (Ibid., pp. 651 and 655.) 

220 F. R., 1894, p. 512. The first Chief Justice, Mr. Cederkranz, was a 
Swede, appointed according to the terms of the treaty by the King of Sweden 
and Norway. The President of the Municipal Council was a German subject 
Baron Senfft von Pilsach. Both of these became involved in difficulties con- 
nected with their powers, with questions of currency and the management 
of the Treasury, etc., and resigned. Mr. Henry C. Ide, an American, former 
member of the Land Commission, was proposed by Germany and endorsed by 
aU three governments as Mr. Cederkranz' successor in the position of Chief 
Justice. Mr. Schmidt, former German Vice-consul at Apia became President 
of the Municipal Council. 



206 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

difficulty-i Qg ^yas the power of the President of the IMunicipal 
Council over the native treasury.--- 

The troubles culminated, at the death of the old king INIalietoa. 
Great Britain suggested even before this occurred, that in view of 
possible troubles arising from this event, the Treaty Powers should 
consider arrangements for the selection of his successor. ^^^ The 
United States maintained that the Berlin Treaty clearly stated the 
right of the Samoans to elect their own king according to their 
own custom, and that the United States would abide by this and 
would support the choice of the people. The British Government 
concurred in supporting the treaty stipulations, but suggested 
that the treaty powers through their consuls might arrange the 
manner of procedure. Germany shared this view, but the United 
States considered it "undue influence and violation of the treaty." 
Meantime as an offset to certain groups of the natives, who were 
assembling against the old king, the former chief Mataafa and his 
companions were, by agreement of the three powers, brought 
back to Samoa after signing a promise that they would remain 
loyal to ]\Ialietoa and his successors. At the death of the old king, 
however, this agreement was ignored and Mataafa claimed the 
kingship,"'* his opponent being the king's son Malietoa Tanu. 
Following the provisions of the Berlin Act, the matter was placed 
in the hands of the Chief Justice, who rendered the decision that 
Mataafa had at the time of the Berlin Conference been declared 
to be ineligible for the kingship,^-^ which should therefore fall to 
INIalietoa Tanu. The adherents of Mataafa refused to accept the 
decision, declared war, defeated the Malietoa forces in conflicts 
involving considerable damage to the property of Europeans, and 
established themselves in possession of* the Government. The 
Chief Justice and Malietoa Tanu himself were given refuge on 

2^' F. R., 1894, p. 735 ff. 222 f. R., 1895, (2), pp. 1136 ff. 

2" F. R., 1899, pp. 605 ff. 224 a. & P., 1899, CX (C-9506), p. 2. 

2" Sen. Misc. Doc, 51st Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. II, No. 81, p. 43. This 
stipulation was brought forward by Count Bismarck during the fifth session 
of the Conference; it was approved by the British representative, and no 
objections were raised by the American. See note 202, also A. & P., 1899, 
CX (C-9506), p. 3. 



INSURRECTION OF MATAAFA 207 

board the British war vesseh After several conferences l^etween 
the foreign consuls, the naval commanders, the Chief Justice and 
the President of the INIunicipal Council, it was decided to recog- 
nize ]Mataafa and his party, then in de facto possession of the 
government, to constitute the Provisional Government of Samoa, 
pending instructions from the three Treaty Powers.^^'' Notwith- 
standing this decision, the American and British forces at Apia, 
desiring to support the decision of the Chief Justice, and thus 
enforce the provisions of the Berlin Act, gave active assistance to 
the ]Malietoa forces.-^ ]\Ialietoa adherents were brought from 
various parts of the island to Apia and furnished with arms and 
ammunition. For the protection of American and British citizens 
and property in Apia, marines and sailors patrolled the streets and 
the American naval vessel "Philadelphia," assisted by the British 
ships "Porpoise" and "Royalist," opened fire across Apia, bom- 
l)arding the Mataafa forces behind the town. Damages caused by 
these activities were later made the subject of international arbi- 
tration.-"^ The INIataafa forces were in great strength and it was 
evident that the local officials were unable to control the situation, 
which meant that the authority of the Berlin Act was being defied. 
The island affairs claimed, therefore, once more the intervention 
of the home governments. 

226 A. & P., 1899, CX (C-9506), p. 3. 

2" Sen. Doc. No. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 9, also F. R., 1899, p. 616. 

2*8 F. R., 1889, p. 670 ff. By exchange of notes, August 23rd, 1899, the 
German and British Governments agreed to suVjmit to arbitration the chxims 
presented by individuals or companies for damages inflicted V)y the military 
action of British or German officers at Samoa at this time; The United 
States accepted the invitation to cooperate in this settlement, and became 
signatory to a convention for this purpose, November 7, 1899. The King 
of Sweden and Norway accepted the role of arbitrator. The decision rendered 
l)y Oscar II, on October 14, 1902 (See M., II, p. 1595 or F. R., 1902, p. 444) 
was in favor of Germany. The military action of the British and American 
forces on the islands at the time of the revolution was considered unwarranted, 
and the British and American Governments were, therefore held responsible 
for the losses incurred through these activities. The amount of claims allowed 
was finally placed at $40,000, of which the United States and Great Britain 
each paid S20,000. (See Sen. Doc. No. 85, 59th Cong., 1st Sess., Vol. III.) 
14 



208 s.uioa: the united states and Germany in the pacific 

By agreement of the three powers--^ a second Samoan Commis- 
sion was sent to the islands for the purpose of "restoring tran- 
quillity and order therein." Identic instructions-^^ were issued to 
the commissioners, directing them to undertake the provisional 
Government of the islands, for which purpose they were to exercise 
supreme authority in Samoa. Consular and naval officers were 
ordered to submit to their decisions, which were not necessarily 
to be governed by the Berlin Act. No act of the commissioners, 
however, was to be valid unless acceded to by all three.-^^ After 
securing temporarily a condition of peace in the islands they were 
to consider plans necessary for the future government of Samoa or 
for the modification of the Berlin Act. Though its purpose was, 
in the main, the same as that of the Commission sent by the three 
governments to the islands in 1SS6, the conditions of procedure 
were very different. The Commission of 1899 was given temporary 
sovereignty in Samoa, and the unity of action on the part of the 
three members was not only recommended but required. 

The work of the Commission in Samoa was efficient and success- 
ful.-^- The two rival native factions were induced to surrender 
their arms and ammunition to the Commissioners and to disband 
their forces. The former decision of the Chief Justice that Malietoa 
Tanu was the rightful king, was upheld as a matter of principle, 
but to solve the immediate practical difficulties, the office of king 
was abolished entirely. This met with approval from the natives, 

229Witte, Emil, "Ten Years of German-American Diplomacy," p. 54 f. 
According to Mr. Witte, at tliis time an attache at the German Embassy, 
the suggestion of sending the commission was first made privatel}" by Lord 
Pauncefote, the British Ambassador at Washington. Von Holleben, German 
Ambassador, quickly secured the consent of his Government to the plan and 
also the consent of Secretary Hay. According to this author, Lord Paunce- 
fote wished a simple plurahty vote to determine the vaHdity of any resolutions 
of the Commissioners. Von Holleben, however, insisted that unanimity be 
secured before action of any kind should be taken. 
230 F. R., 1899, p. 614 ff. 

^^ F. R., 1899, p. 615. The Commissioners appointed were as follows: 
For Great Britain: Mr. C. N. E. Eliot, C. B., Second Secretary of the 

British Embassy in Washington. 
For Germany : Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, Counselor of Legation and 

First Secretary of the Emljassy at Washington. 
For the United States: Mr. Bartlett Tripp. 
2'2 F. R., 1899, pp. 621 ff. 



JOINT COMMISSION OF 1899 209 

for whom tribal organization under High Chiefs was the normal 
form of society, the kingship having been an artificial creation 
producefl under the influence of foreigners. The Commissioners 
then gave tlieir attention to a careful study of conditions in the 
islands, the causes for the prolonged difficulties in Samoa and 
finally agreed upon recommendations which they considered would 
be "if not entirely satisfactory, at least workable." Using the 
General Act of BerHn as a basis, they introduced a number of 
modifications, the most important of which, besides the removal 
of the native king, were the abolishment of consular jurisdiction, 
and the establishment of the executive power in the hands of an 
administrator, to be chosen from some disinterested power and 
assisted by a council of delegates from the three governments. 
Having framed this scheme as the best one they could devise 
under the tripartite principle of control, the commissioners then 
recorded in their joint report their opinion'-'^'^ that " the only natural 
and normal form of government for these islands, and the only 
system which can assure permanent prosperity and tranquillity, 
is a government by one power." The American Commissioner, 
Mr. Tripp, reemphasized this viewpoint in his private report to 
Secretary Hay.-^^ 

"I am by no means sanguine," he wrote, "that the form pro- 
posed will produce the effect desired, for, while I have no doubt 
that any' one of the great powers could easily govern these islands 
in the manner proposed, I fear their ability to do so when acting 
together, and I cannot forbear to impress upon my Government 
not only the propriety but the necessity of dissolving this partner- 
ship of nations which has no precedent for its creation nor reason 
for its continuance. It w411 produce national jealousies and 
endanger the friendly relations that have so long existed between 
the powers. Considerations of national welfare should terminate 
this unusual alliance at the earliest moment that it can be done 
with proper regard for the rights and interests of the powers 
concerned." 

A similar stand in opposition to the joint control over Samoa 
was taken five years previous by Secretary of State, Gresham. 
Concluding a report to Congress on Samoan aft*airs,^^° he stated : 

233 F. R., 1899,p. 638. 234 n^ij^ p_ 659, 

235 F. R., 1894, p. 513. Earlier in the report (p. 509) Secretary Gresham 



210 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

" Soberly surveying the history of our relations with Samoa we 
well may inquire what we have gained by our departure from our 
established policy beyond the expenses, the responsibilities, and 
the entanglements that have so far been its only fruits. One of the 
greatest difficulties in dealing with matters that lie at a distance 
is the fact that the imagination is no longer restrained by the con- 
templation of objects in their real proportions. Our experience 
in the case of Samoa serves to show that for our usual exemption 
from the consequences of this infirmity, we are indebted to the 
wise policy that had previously preserved us from such engage- 
ments as those embodied in the General Act of Berlin, which, 
besides involving us in an entangling alliance, has utterly failed to 
correct, if indeed it has not aggravated, the very evils which it was 
designed to prevent." 

The objections to tripartite control over the island group had 
many times found expression by British and German officials and 
special commissioners. Therefore, when after the report of the 
Commission of ISOQ,-^*^ the move was made to dissolve the " entang- 
ling alliance," it found favorable sentiment in all three countries. 

gave further expression to his disapjiroval of the participation of the United 
States in the administration of Samoa. 

"In reviewing this chapter in the history of our relations to Samoa, fraught 
with so much peril to our 'safety and prosperity,' we look in vain for any 
compensating advantage. So far as the departure from our early and con- 
servative policy had produced any appreciable result, it had been one of 
unmitigated disadvantage. It certainly cannot be maintained that the 
condition of the natives was improved by our interference. On the other 
hand, no interest of our own had been promoted. The whole trade of the 
islands is of small value, and of this only an insignificant part is mth the 
United States. We have never found it necessary to interfere in the affairs of a 
foreign country in order to trade with it." 

^■'^ Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 220. Concerning the results of the 
Commission, Secretary Hay, wrote to Henry White, September 9, 1899. 

"We are on the best of terms about Samoa; Sternburg backed up Tripp in 
everj^hing. It was rather the English Commissioner who was offish. The 
Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us — on liis own terms, 
bien entendu." 

The American Commissioner also wTote of von Sternburg (F. R., 1899, p. 
634): 

"I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the German member of the 
Commission. With one less experienced, less honorable and conscientious, 
representing the great Empire of Germany, our task would not only have been 
difficult, but I fear a hopeless and unprofitable one." 



PARTITION OF THE ISLANDS 211 

The move was made by the German Goverameut. It strongly 
urged^" the partition of the Islands, " the United States to retain 
Tutuila and adjacent islets, and England and Germany to divide 
the rest." Secretary Hay replied immediately that the President 
was "disposed to regard this proposition favorably if details could 
be satisfactorily arranged with due regard to the national interests'-^^ 
and to the welfare of the inhabitants." ]\Ieantime the German and 
British governments were negotiating concerning the disposition 
between them of the remainder of the group — the difficulty being, 
as Lord Salisbury stated, that there were " three parties to divide 
and really only two islands to be divided." For after setting apart 
Tutuila for the United States, the only other island of value w^as 
Upolu on which Apia was situated. The result of the negotiations 
was the conclusion of a preliminary agreement'-^'^ between Great 

2" F. R., 1899, p. 663 ff. 

2^^ F. R., 1899, p. 662. The American Commissioner, Mr. Tripp, in his 
final, individual report to Secretary Hay, expressed the opinion that the 
American national interest in Samoa centered in the island of Tutuila. , 

"The importance of the Samoan Islands, however, lies not so much in their 
commercial advantage as in their geographical location. They ai'e in the 
great future pathway of commerce, and their importance in this respect can 
not be overestimated. ... I cannot impress upon my Government too 
strongly the necessity of its undivided possession of this harbor (Pago-Pago). 
It is the only one worthy of the name on the islands. . . . The harbor 
and the entire island should be under our individual control. A coaling 
station within the harbor, or the harbor alone would be of little value. The 
modern coaling station must be fortified, and to do this the adjoining bay of 
Leone must be had with its connecting peninsvila. In short the whole island 
must be had; and it would, in my judgment, be a wise pohcy to give our allies 
and the world to be informed that our interests in Samoa center most closely 
about Pago-Pago and the island of Tutuila, and that we should not look with 
favor upon any effort on the part of any nation to interfere with our rights 
or make them less availalile for future requirements of the nation, by curtail- 
ment of our interests in the harbor or in the island itself. Negotiations 
between England and Germany have been several times had to exchange the 
the individual interests of the one for the sole possession of other island 
properties. So far as I am informed, the proposition has been only to sur- 
render to Great Britain the German interests. This Germany will probably 
decline to do so long as the German firm retains its interests in the large 
German plantations; but recently, it is said, large offers have been made by 
British capitalists for these properties. Should this result be brought about, 
it would undoubtedly follow that Germany would exchange her Samoan 
interests for some British island interests, and the United States, which has 
so long been the buffer power between these two great nations, would be in a 
position to ask for a severance of the joint rule we have so long maintained 
contrary to all our former national policies and traditions." 

259 F. R., 1899, p. 665. 



212 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

Britain and Germany, in which a new settlement of many out- 
standing colonial issues was made. Both countries renounced their 
rights over Tutuila and Great Britain renounced all rights in the 
Samoan group, receiving in return from Germany the renuncia- 
tion of the latter's rights in the Tonga and parts of the Solomon 
Islands.-4o 

The preliminary agreement between Great Britain and Germany 
was followed a few weeks later by a Convention of all three powers 
concluded in Washington, December 2, 1899.-*^ The General 
Act of Berlin and all previous treaties, conventions and agree- 
ments, relating to Samoa were annulled. Germany renounced in 
fa\-or of the United States all rights over the Island of Tutuila 
and all other islands of the Samoan group east of Longitude 171 
west of Greenwich. Great Britain made a similar renunciation 
in favor of the United States. Reciprocally thereupon the United 
States renounced in favor of Germany all rights and claims over 
the Islands of Upolu and Savii and all other Islands of the Samoan 
group west of Longitude 171 west of Greenwich. It was further 
agreed that the three signatory powers were to continue to enjoy 
all pri^•iIeges in the Samoan group "equal to those enjoyed by the 
soA'ereign power in all ports which may be open to the commerce 
of either of them." 

In surveying the Samoan situation as a whole, the conclusion 
is evident that this outcome though taken on the initiative of 
Germany was favorable to the United States. Although possessing 
what the United States Secretary of State acknowledged to be 
"only an insignificant part" of the trade of the Samoan Islands, 
it secured full control over a part of the island group which, though 
less in area than that retained by Germany, contained "the finest 
harbor in the South Pacific." Secretary Hay-*'- considered Tutuila 

2*» Thayer, "Life of Hay," Vol. II, p. 281. (See footnote No. 242.) 
■-'" F. R., 1899, p. 667. The Convention was signed by the following pleni- 
potentiaries: 

For the United States: John Hay (Secretary of State). 

For Germany: Von Holleben (German Ambassador). 

For Great Britain: Lord Pauncefote (British Ambassador). 
2« Thayer, "Life of Hay," Vol. II, p. 281. 



CONVENTIONS OF 1899 213 

to be " infinitely the most important of the islands " and the most 
useful to the United States, and declared that the United States 
Navy Department, which had for a long time been anxious for 
this solution, was delighted with the outcome of the negotiations. 
In addition to the fact of the value of Tutuila, was the fact that 
the United States, having Httle commercial interests in the islands 

Hav to Joseph H. Choate. 

November 28, 1899. 

"I was kept quite in the dark up to the last moment as to the arrangement 
made between Germany and Enghind. The newspapers have announced, 
without the least reserve, that England was to keep Samoa and Germany 
get the Gilbert and Solomon Islands, or, as the boys ^^ith a natural reminis- 
cence of the 'opera bouffe,' called them, 'The Gilbert and Sullivan.' I should 
have been glad if you had squandered a little of the public money, letting 
me know by telegraph the true state of the case. It is a satisfaction to me 
to know that Lord Salisljury assured you that equal rights as to trade and 
commerce would he reserved for the other Powers in Samoa, and of this he 
was informed by j'our letter before the German Embassy received the authentic 
news that the arrangement had l)een made. Germany, it is true, has been 
excessively anxious to have the matter concluded before the Emperor's visit 
to England, and, in the intense anxiety, I am inclined to think they have 
somewhat lost sight of their material interests in the case. . . . 

Our interests in the archipelago were very meager always excepting our 
interests in Pago-Pago, which was of the most vital importance. It is 
the finest harbor in the Pacific and absolutely indispensal)le to us. The 
general impression in the country was that we already owned the harbor, 
but this, as j'ou know, was not true. . . . Seeing the intense anxiety of 
the Emperor that the negotiations should be hastened, I sent at Ws personal 
request the dispatches which you have received; assured that all our interests 
would be safeguarded and knowing also that in case the arrangement proposed 
was not satisfactory, we always had the power of a peremptory veto. . . . 

Our Navy Department has for a long time been very anxious for this consum- 
mation, and of course, they are delighted with it. Tutuila, though the 
smallest of the islands, is infinitely the most imi)ortant and the most useful 
to us. The argument from size, which the Sun makes so much of, is hardly 
worth a moment's consideration. An acre of land at the corner of Broad and 
Wall Streets is worth something like a million acres in Nevada. The proof 
that size has nothing to do with the case is that Savaii, by far the largest of 
the islands, was considered by Germany and by England as entirely worthless. 
My own opinion is that Germany has the le^st valuable bargain of the three 
and that she was led by her sentimental eagerness into a bad trade." 

Secretary Hay also gave public expression to his satisfaction over the out- 
come of the Samoan question in an address before the New York Chamber of 
Commerce, November 19, 1901. 

"We consider our interests in the Pacific Ocean as great now as those of 
any other power and destined to indefinite development. We have opened 
our doors to the people of Hawaii; we have accepted the responsibility of 
the Philippines which Providence imposed upon us; we have put an end 
to the embarrassing condominium in which we were involved in iSamoa, and 
while abandoning none of our commercial rights in the entire group, we have 
estal)lished our flag and our authority in Tutuila, which gives us the finest 
liarbor in the South Seas." 



214 SAMOA: THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY IN THE PACIFIC 

renounced to Germany, and retaining still equal opportunities to 
trade there, lest practically nothing in the transfer. Secretary 
Hay considered that Germany had made "the least valuable 
bargain of the three," and was probably led into doing it by her 
eagerness to have the Samoan and other colonial questions settled 
with the British Government before the Emperor's visit to England. 
Whatever the reasons, the proposition was the result of an arrange- 
ment between Germany and England. The United States merely 
accepted the offer made by agreement of the other two powers. 

The whole of the third period of Samoan diplomacy was charac- 
terized by better feeling between the treaty powers in regard to 
their interests in the islands. Germany, at the time of the Berlin 
treaty, apparently abandoned all attempts to make her "pre- 
ponderating interests" the basis of policies of administration in 
the islands. There continued to be the participation of the white 
residents of Samoa according to their nationalities in the disputes 
of native factions. But the representation of the three powers 
had been fairly well regulated by the Berlin Act, so that, although 
defective as a means to control the native Samoans, it was not 
without value in relieving friction between the foreign govern- 
ments. Its failure, however, as a practical means for maintaining 
law and order in the islands, gave renewed evidence to the powers^^^ 
of the difficulties of continuing a tripartite government there. 
There was therefore little opposition when the plan of division 
was presented by Germany. By the removal of a long continued 
source of controversy, this solution had a favorable effect on the 
relations between that country and the United States. 

The long history of the Samoan controversy gives a clear 
demonstration of the contrasting foreign policies of Germany and 
the United States. With Germany the Samoan Islands and the 
German commercial developments there were merely a factor of 
a great expansion system, a factor therefore to be both supported 
and utilized by the home Government toward that end. The 
United States' object in the islands w^as the retention unquestioned 



2«F. R., 1899, p. XXVI ff. (President McKinlcy's Annual Message to 
Congress.) 



CONTRASTING POLICIES OF GERMANY AND UNITED STATES 215 

and unlimited of the harbor of Pago-Pago as a protective point 
for trade ah-eady established between the American west coast 
and the British colonies, and for the increased trade expected after 
the building of an Isthmian Canal. The American policy was 
also directed toward preserving the independence of the islands. 
As we have seen, therefore, throughout both the negotiations of 
the home governments and the activities in Samoa, the American 
policy was on the defensive. The German Government, on the 
other hand took constantly the offensive in measures in and con- 
cerning the islands. The contrast is marked in the treatment of 
the native Samoans. The German authorities dictated terms to 
the native kings and did not hesitate to resort to military measures 
if their terms were not promptly met. The American representa- 
tives at no time exacted by force concessions from the Samoans. 
The different attitudes of the two nations toward self-government 
were demonstrated. With the Germans the problem was always 
as to how a strong government could be secured. With the Ameri- 
cans the problem was how an independent native government-'** 
might be maintained. The Germans do not appear to have mis- 
ruled the Samoans. Reports from non-German sources testify to 
the well-kept plantations and the general well-being of the workers, 
but the rule was to be thoroughly German and favorable to German 
interests. The rights of the natives did not factor in the measures 
adopted. The effect was clearly reflected in the measures initiated 
from time to time by the Samoan chiefs. Several attempts were 
made by them to secure annexation of the Islands by either Great 
Britain or the United States. But there is no record of a Samoan 
king or council appealing for annexation to Germany. 

2" Root, "Military and Colonial Policy of the United States," pp. 161 and 
162. Mr. Root, American Secretary of War, voices clearly the American 
Government's principles of colonization. In his report for 1899 on Cuba, 
Porto Rico and the Philippines, the Secretary writes: 

"I assume, also, that the obUgations correlative to this great power are 
of the highest character, and that it is our unquestioned duty to make the 
interests of the people over whom we assert sovereignty, the first and con- 
trolling consideration in all legislation and administration which concerns 
them, and to give them, to the greatest possible extent, individual freedom, 
self-government in accordance with their capacity, just and equal laws, and 
opportunity for education, for profitable industry, and for development in 
civilization." 



CHAPTER VI 

THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

The years from 1897 thraiigh 1900 represent the time of greatest 
friction between the United States and Germany in the forty-year 
period under consideration. Dr. Andrew D. White, who was sent 
on his second mission to Germany in 1897, testifies in his Auto- 
biography to the marked change of sentiment in that comitry from 
the time of his earlier mission in 1879. ^ At that time the cordial 
relations of 1870^ still prevailed. I'pon his second arrival in 
Berlin, however, he fomid public opinion generally adverse to the 
United States, and among some classes bitterly hostile. The 
German press was overwhelmingly an ti- American and featured 
whenever possible accounts of administrative frauds and scandals 
in the United States. The American press replied in kind, pub- 
lished anti-German articles and editorials, and republished the 
anti-American editorials from German newspapers.^ The hostile 
attitude toward the United States was not confined to the press 
and to the rival commercial interests, but was shared by men who 
stood high at German imiversities and who had once been warm 
friends of America.^ 

1 White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 144 ff. 

^ See Chapter I, Relations between the United States and the German 
Empire, 1870. 

^Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, pp. 30 ff. V. R., '98-'00, 30 
Sitz., 11 Feb., '99, p. 808. 

* See Chapter IV, Commercial Relations. Commercial Relations of the 
United States, 1899, Vol. VII, p. 244. Mr. Frank H. Mason, American 
Consul General at Berlin, wrote the follomng comment in his report of 
September 20, 1899. 

"It is not to be denied or overlooked that while the attitude of the Imperial 
Government towards our country has l)een uniformlj- correct, there is in certain 
business circles here a feeling of enmity and resentment which did not exist 
prior to 1898. The heavy balance of trade which the United States now 



CAUSES OF FRICTION 217 

A number of causes combined to create this hostile atmosphere. 
Fundamental was the increasing economic rivalry between the 
two countries and the legislative measures enacted by the two 
governments to protect their rival trade interests seemed to come 
to a head at this time. The American cattle-raisers and meat- 
packers were eml^ittered by the German decrees of prohibition 
against their product, and the American fruit-growers had a similar 
grievance. American life insurance companies were excluded 
from Prussia. American lumber and oil interests were protesting 
at the preferential rates granted by German government-owned 
railways to products from Austria and Russia.^ On the other 
hand German sugar-growers resented the American surtax on 
sugar from bounty-paying countries which they considered a 
discrimination. German manufacturers who had considered the 
INIcKinley tariff as ruinous to their interests were bitterly hostile 
over the new Dingley tariff, which went still further. At the same 
time they were so dependent on American raw materials that they 
could not retaliate effectively against the United States. The 
Agrarians were American rivals of long standing and the increase 
of American food exports increased their opposition and their 
demands on the government for restrictive measures. There was 
also a widespread fear of American commercial penetration of 
Germany and an anxiety over the trade balance in favor of the 
United States. Almost the only class as such which showed any 

holds against the Fatherland, the decline in textile exports and the sharpened 
customs regulations against undervaluation, the concessions recently granted 
to France, and above all, the enorn^ous growth of American manufactured 
exports, the aggressive competition of American metal and other products in 
South American and Eastern markets — all these weigh heaAaly on the hearts 
of the people here, and will be heard from when the new tariff and treaties 
come to open debate in the Reichstag. What most enlightened thinkers 
expect, or at least hope for, is that out of all these mutations will come a 
broad, hberal, compre^iensively framed treaty, or series of treaties, between 
the United States and Germany, in which all the vexed and irritating questions 
relating to naturalized citizenship, countervailing duties, and port charges 
on vessels shall l)e regulated and liberal justice to imjjorts of food products 
secured by reciprocal concessions and embodied in permanent conventions 
between the two countries." 

5 See F. R., 1896, 1897, 1898 and 1900 for correspondence on these subjects. 
Also, see Fisk, G. M., in Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903, pp. 
223 ff., and White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 158 ff. 



218 , THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

sympathy ^vith the United States was that of the Social Democrats 
and other radicals.'^ 

In the poUtical field a number of important questions were still 
pending. The $amoan situation had not yet received its solution 
through the division of the islands and was still a source of friction. 
In China, Germany had taken Kiao-chao and, with the subsequent 
seizures by the other European Powers, the dismemberment of 
that empire was threatened and the United States had not yet 
secured from any of these nations a declaration agreeing to main- 
tain the integrity of China and to establish the "open door" to 
commerce there. 

The mcst immediate and direct factor, however, in creating 
unfriendly relations between the United States and Germany at 
this time was the attitude taken by Germany during the war with 
Spain. From the very outbreak of the war the public sentiment 
in Germany was pro-Spanish and the United States was looked 
upon as the oppressor of a small nation in a war unjustly provoked.^ 
The cause of the Cubans, so appealing to the public in the United 
States, seems to have been totally disregarded. This was true 
not only in the case of Germany but throughout the continent of 
Europe, and significant evidence of the general attitude was given 
in the joint note^ presented to President McKinley by the repre- 

« V. R., '98-00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., 98 S., 27 D. Von Halle: "Deutsch- 
land und die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten Staaten," Preussische 
Jahrbiiecher, Bd. 107, 1902, p. 205. 

'V. R., '98-00, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., '98 S., 25 D. White: Autobiog- 
raphy, Vol. II, p. 168. Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 30 ff. 

«F. R., '98, pp. 740 and 741. 

Joint Note of the Powers 

Washington, April 6, 1898. 

"The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, France, 
• Great Britain, Italy and Russia, duly authorized in that behalf, address, in 
the name of their respective Governments, a jiressing ap]3eal to the feelings 
of humanity and moderation of the President and of the American people in 
their existing differences with Spain. They earnestly hope that further nego- 
tiations will lead to an agreement which, while securing the maintenance of 
peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the reestablishment of order 
in Cuba. 

The Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely disinterested 



SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF SPAIN 219 

sentatives of the six powers, Great Britain, Germany, France, 
Austria-Hungary, Russia and Italy, appealing to him to maintain 
peace. This note was presented by the powers on the grounds of 
humanity. President McKinley's reply was in substance that 
the United States shared their wish for peace, but if it should 
declare war, it would be on the same grounds of humanity. John 
Hay, then Ambassador to Great Britain, testified" to the anti- 
American sentiment on the continent, where he declared sym- 
pathies were openly against the United States. This he con- 
trasted \nth English public sentiment, which was predominantly 
pro- American.^ 

character of this representation will be fully recognized and a])preciated by 
the American nation. 

Julian Pauncefote, Holleben, 

For Great Britain. For Germany. 

Jules Cambon, von Hengelmueller, 

For France. For Austria-Hungary. 

De Wollant, G. C. Vinci, 

For Russia. For Italy." 

The President's Reply 

"The Government of the United States recognizes the good will which has 
prompted the friendly communication of the representatives of Germany, 
Austria-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Italy, and Russia, as set forth in 
the address of your excellencies, and shares the hope therein expressed that 
the outcome of the situation in Cuba may be the maintenance of peace between 
the United States and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the 
reestablishment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition 
of disturbance there, wliich so deeply injures the interests and menaces the 
tranquillity of the American nation by the character and consequences of the 
struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides shocking its sentiment of humanity. 

The Government of the United States appreciates the humanitarian and 
disinterested character of the communication now made on behalf of the powers 
named, and for its jjart is confident that equal appreciation will be shown 
for its own earnest and unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by 
ending a situation the indefinite prolongation of which has become insufferable." 

That the note of the Powers was not presented in more vigorous form is 
said to have been due to the influence of England. A similar address was 
presented two days later by the same nations at Madrid, supporting the 
Pope's plea for an armistice. Spain yielded and ordered hostihties in Cuba 
suspended. (See Benton: "International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish- 
American War," p. 89.) 

^ Letters and Diaries of John Hay, Vol. Ill, pp. 119 ff. 

Hay to H. Cabot Lodge. 

American Embassy, 

London, April, 1898. 
"Dear Lodge: 

I do not know whether you especially value the friendship and sympathy 
of this country. I think it important and desirable in the present state of 



220 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Germany <lrew upon herself in particular the resentment of the 
United States because of her actions in the Far East. ]Many 
Americans were convinced that Germany intended to rob the 
United States of the fruits of victory and seize the Philippines. ^"^ 
The immediate cause of this feeling on the part of the public was 
the Dewey-von Diederichs episode in ]Manila Bay. 

Though extensively featured by the press and causing so much 
hostile feehng, especially in the United States, the story was not 
told by the chief actors until fifteen years afterward, when Admiral 
Dewey published his Autobiography and Admiral von Diederichs 
replied with his own account" of the controversy. Admiral 

things, — as it is the only European country whose sympathies are not openly 
against us. We will not waste time in discussing whether the origin of this 
feeling is wholly selfish or not. Its existence is beyond question. I find it 
wherever I go — not only in the Press, but in private conversation. For the 
first time in my hfe I find the 'drawing room' sentiment altogether with us. 
If we wanted it, — which, of course, we do not, we could have the practical 
assistance of the British Navy, — on the do ut des principle naturally. 

I think, in the near future, this sentiment, even if it amounts to nothing 
more, is valuable to us. . . . 

You may imagine what it is to be, absolutely without light or instruction, 
compelled to act from day to day on my own judgment, and at no moment 
sure of the wishes of the Department. What I should have done, if the 
feeling here had been imfriendly instead of cordially sympathetic, it is hard 
to say. The commonest phrase is here: 'I wish you would take Cuba at 
once. We wouldn't have stood it this long.' 

And of course no power on earth would have shown such patience, and such 
scrupulous regard for law." 

Ibid. Hay to H. Cabot Lodge. 

American Embassy, 

London, May 25, 1S98. 
"My dear Lodge: 

The state of feeling here is the best I have ever known. From every 
quarter, the evidences of it come to me. The royal family, by habit and 
tradition, are most careful not to break the rules of strict neutrahty, but even 
among them I find nothing but hearty kindness, and, so far as is consistent 
with propriety — sympathy. Among the political leaders on l)oth sides, I find 
not only sympathy but a somewhat eager desire that ' the other fellows ' shall not 
seem the more friendly. Chamberlain's startling speech was partly due to a 
conversation I had with him, in which I hoped he would not let the opposition 
have a monopoly of expression of good-will to America. He is greatly pleased 
with the reception his speech met with on our side, and says ' he don't care 
a hang that they say about it on the Continent.' " 

i» V. R., '9S-'00, 30 Sitz., 11 Feb., '99, p. 791, p. 808. 

^1 Von Diederichs: A Statement of Events in Manila Bay: Translated by 
permission from Marine Rundschau and published in Journal of the Royal 
United Service In-stitution, Vol. LIX, No. 4.37, August, 1914, pp. 421 to 446 
inclusive. 



DEWEY-VON DIEDERICHS EPISODE 221 

Dewey calls his chapter "A Period of Anxiety." The Spanish 
fleet had been defeated but the battle had depleted Dewey's stores 
of amminiition to such an extent that he could not ha\'e met the 
emergencies of another engagement, and in this situation he was 
confronted with the knowledge that a stronger Spanish squadron 
was on its way and with the realization that another nation was 
assembling a powerful fleet in ]Manila harbor. That nation, more- 
over, was showing itself determined to ignore his authority and 
inclined to fraternize with the Spanish officials in Manila. Having 
decided to allow visiting naval vessels every privilege admitted 
under international law to neutrals in a blockaded harbor, Dewey 
permitted all foreign ships of war to enter the harbor, insisting only 
on the right of boarding them to establish their identity. The 
British, French and Japanese vessels acquiesced, and on their 
first entrance to the harbor reported to Dewey and asked where 
they might anchor. German vessels, on the other hand, omitted 
this etiquette and moved about the harbor as they chose, taking 
soundings. On its entering the harbor at night Dewey found it 
necessary at times to halt a German vessel by firing a shot across 
its bow. The German officers frequently visited the Spanish troops 
and outposts, where they were paid marked attention — the talk 
of the town of ^Manila being that Germany would intervene in 
favor of Spain. Yice-Admiral von Diederichs himself had paid an 
official visit to the Spanish captain-general, who returned his call 
at night. According to Dewey no other senior foreign naval 

Admiral Dewey had not even made mention of the controversy in his 
reports to the Department. In his autobiography he states (Chap. XVII, p. 
252): 

"At a dinner given me at the White House upon my return home President 
Mclvinley mentioned the repeated statements in the press about the friction 
in my relations with Vice-Admiral von Diederichs, in command of the German 
Asiatic squadron. 

'There is no record of it at all on the files,' he said. 

'No, Mr. President,' I answered. 'As I was on the spot and familiar with 
the situation from day to day, it seemed best that I look after it myself, at 
a time when you had worries enough of your own.' " 

Dr. White, American Ambassador to Germany has stated that no explana- 
tions of the episode were sought from the German Government by the United 
States. (Washington Post, April 17, 1907, cited by Latane, America as 
World Power, p. 38.) 



222 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

officer had made such an official exchange of visits with the 
Spanish chief of command. Most disturbing to the American 
commander, however, was the fact of the increasing number of 
German naval vessels which kept arriving in the harbor. Within 
one week there were five German men-of-war in INIanila harbor, 
two of them having a heavier displacement than any of Dewey's 
own ships. Beside these a German transport, the "Darmstadt," 
had arrived bringing as relief crews for the German vessels a 
force of 1400 men, nearly equal to the total number of Dewey's 
own crews. While the "Darmstadt" received Dewey's permission 
for this transfer, it did not add to the American commander's 
peace of mind that the transport remained at anchor in the harbor 
for four weeks. It was in reference to Admiral Dewey's question 
concerning the presence of the large German force at IVIanila 
that Admiral von Diederichs was said to have replied, " I am here 
by order of the Kaiser, sir." 

The subject of actual controversy between the two commanders 
was the right of the blockading force to send an officer on board 
each neutral war vessel to establish its identity before permitting 
it to enter the blockaded zone. This right Admiral Dewey claimed 
under international law, though he disclaimed any intention of 
exercising the technical "droit de visite" which involved rights of 
search. Admiral von Diederichs denied^- this right of boarding 
neutral war vessels, holding that if a neutral warship was admitted 
within the zone, then the belligerent had no more authority over 
the ship than during peace; that there was no requirement to 
report the arrival of neutrals to the blockading party; that the 
only requirement was that of an official visit by the officer in 
command as in time of peace — a duty with which he had complied. 
Correspondence on the subject was exchanged, in which Dewey 
quoted several authorities on international law who supported 
his position. Admiral Dewey then relates that Admiral von 
Diederichs notified him that he would submit the point to a con- 
ference of all senior officers of men-of-war in the harbor, but that 

12 Von Diederichs: "Statement of Events in Manila Bay;" in Journal of the 
Royal United Ser\ace Institution, Vol. LIX, No. 437, p. 430. 



CONTROVERSY ON RIGHTS OF BLOCKADING SQUADRON 223 

only one officer appeared, Captain Chichester, the British senior 
officer. According to Dewey, Captain Chichester held that the 
American commander was acting entirely within his rights and 
that he had received instructions from his government to comply 
with even more rigorous restrictions than Admiral Dewey had laid 
down. Admiral von Diederichs gave a radically different account 
of the proceedings, stating that he communicated individually 
with the P^rench, Austro-Hungarian and Japanese officei-s, that 
they agreed with him that the boarding of a neutral war vessel 
was not permissible and they gave orders to refuse visits to establish 
identity. In the case of Captain Chichester, the German Admiral's 
account states that though first agreeing with Dewey, he was 
later convinced of the correctness of von Diederich's stand. ^^ 
This does not seem in keeping with the subsequent actions of the 
British Admiral. The controversy was finally settled by a ruling 
forwarded to the German commander from his home government 
(upon agreement with the government of the United States) 
instructing that "for the future, and, as a rule, prior to the arrival 
of German ships of war before blockaded ports, the names of such 
ships should be communicated to the commander of the block- 
ading squadron, when all that will be required will be for these 
to exchange signals with the commander of the blockading squad- 
ron or his representative," This ruling thus steered a middle 
course between the views of the German and American com- 
manders. Admiral Dewey had in the meantime expressed, in an 

" Ibid., p. 440. 

Describing the interview with Captain Chichester, Admiral von Diederichs 
wrote: 

" He brought with him a . . . work d'ealing with blockade, and endeav- 
ored to prove, by showing me several paragraphs, that Dewey's assertions were 
justified. In every instance I was able to prove that his book referred only 
to merchant ships. On being asked, he admitted the phrase 'inquiries neces- 
sary to estabhsh identity' as implj'ing 'search for evidence.' I then asked 
him the question what he would do were an officer of another nation to 
endeavor thus to act against him, and received the reply, 'I would fire on him.' 
He then admitted that a search was unpermissible, that only a polite question- 
ing could be allowed, and that this could go no further than the officer ques- 
tioned chose to allow, and he added: 'If the officer does not take my word for 
it the worse for him,' " 



15 



224 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

interview with a young German officer," his rights and intentions 
in regard to the blockade in vigorous and unmistakable terms and 
instructed the officer to convey these to Admiral von Diederichs. 
After this incident, as Dewey himself records, "there was no 
further interference with the blockade nor breach of the etiquette 
which had been established by the common consent of the other 
foreign commanders." 

The account of Admiral von Diederichs was written as an 
answer^^ to that of Admiral Dewey, as a defense of the German 

'^ Ibid., p. 438. The young officer referred to was a Lieutenant Hinze. 
Admiral von Diederichs gives this officer's account of the interview in which, 
as Hinze describes it, he Kstened and Dewey talked. 

"Then suddenly Admiral Dewey exclaimed angrily, 'Why, I shall stop 
each vessel, whatever may be her colors; And if she does not stop I shall 
fire at her, and that means war, do you know. Sir? etc., etc' When the 
words 'if Germany wants war' and so on were repeated, I took my departure. 

I received the impression from this trivial matter that the explosion material 
engendered for some time past in Admiral Dewey through mistrust rumors and 
press reports, was on the point of going off!" 

Admiral von Diederichs then comments on this interview as follows: 

"Admiral Dewey knew well enough that a declaration of war could not 
emanate either from him or from me. I put down this behavior toward a 
young officer, who was interviewing him as the representative of a foreign 
commander, as due to the burden of his responsibility as commander of the 
blockading squadron and the nervous strain." 

This attitude of excusing Dewey's behavior on the ground of his difficult 
and unenviable situation at Manila is characteristic of the general tone of 
the von Diederichs account. Dewey's own account of the interview reads as 
follows: (Autobiography, p. 267): 

"On the following day Vice-Admiral von Diederichs sent a capable, tactful 
young officer of his staff to me with a memorandum of grievances. When 
I had heard them through, I made the most of the occasion by using him as 
a third person to state candidly and firmly my attitude in a verlial message 
which he conveyed to his superior so successfuly that Vice-Admiral von 
Diederichs was able to understand my point of view. There was no further 
interference with the blockade or breach of the etiquette which had been 
estabhshed by the common consent of the other foreign commanders. Thus, 
as I explained to the President, after the war was over, a difference of opinion 
about international law had been adjusted amicablj', without adding to the 
sum of his worries." 

15 V. R., 1914, Bd. 293, S. 7505, 19. Februar, 1914. After the publication 
of Dewey's Autobiography, the subject of the Manila controversy was brought 
by Mr. Erzberger (Center Party) before the Reichstag. In the course of a 
discussion of the naval V)udget, Mr. Erzberger spoke as foUows (translation 
by author): 

"If I am rightly informed the American Commander proceeds from quite 
false premises. He speaks of a blockade. I know nothing of the fact that 



ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICHs' ACCOUNT 225 

Admiral's actions at Manila and as an explanation of the presence 
of the German forces there. Admiral von Diederichs takes up 
point for point the incidents related by Dewey, and in some cases 
offers his explanation and in others gives direct contradiction. In 
the main he stresses the following points : First, that there was no 
official announcement to him of the establishment of a blockade. 
The blockade of Manila had been announced to the Spanish 
Governor-General on May 1, but its contents were first commu- 
nicated to the German consul, at his request, by the Governor- 
General on May 10. But that neither to the German commander 
nor to the German consul was there made directly or indirectly 
any declaration of blockade from the American side announcing the 
time of commencement, the limits of the blockaded territory, etc., 
as required by international law and as carried out by the United 
States on the coast of Cuba. Secondly, that the intercourse with 
the Spaniards in Manila was merely that due to Germany's posi- 
tion as a neutraP" and to the customarv official observation of con- 



a blockade was established at Manila, at least nothing of the kind has been 
published. On the occasion, however, he made against the German officer, the 
well-known Admiral von Diederichs, quite serious reproaches. Now that is 
in itself not to be taken so seriously; for when a man has been victor in so 
great a sea-fight as took place fifteen j^ears ago at Manila (amusement) then he 
is conscious of himself (dann fuehlt er sich) ; he looks at everytliing through 
a magnifying glass. Such things often occur in memoirs. I only wish that 
these very colored (tendenzioesen) representations, which allow our German 
officers to appear as quite inferior officials who haven't a glimmer or a notion 
of international law, or of marine law, or of deconmi . . . should be 
confronted with the necessary evidence from official German sources, and 
that we do not permit this unpleasant impression to be in any way strength- 
ened by our silence. . . . Personally I can still give expression to the 
conviction that the officer in command of our squadron during the war in the 
Philippines cannot deserve the slightest reproach. That is my firm convic- 
tion and I have reason to express it. But if this is so, then those in official 
positions should lay aside all timidity and speak the truth." 

In reply Admiral von Tirpitz informed the Reichstag that Admiral von 
Diederichs intended to issue a complete pubUcation of the events of that 
time. (This was published in the Marine Rundschau.) 

i« Ibid., p. 431. 

Von Diederichs records that he had two official interviews with the Governor- 
General : 

"I paid an official visit to the Governor-General of IVIanila just as I did to 
Admiral Dewey. The Spanish flag waved over Manila and under its folds 
lived very many Germans and others under the protection of Germany. 
The Governor-General behaved towards these in an indulgent and friendly 
manner; but even had this not been the case, I should have regarded it as a 



226 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

ditions of warfare. Thirdly, that the movement of German ships 
in and around the harbor was in no way different from that of the 
vessels of other neutrals. Fourthly, the controversy between 
himself and Admiral Dewey was soon smoothed over and cordial 
relations restored.'^ Finally, the presence of the first German 
war vessels in the harbor of Manila was due to the necessity for 
the protection of German nationals during hostilities. The pres- 
ence of the increased force was due to exceptional circumstances 

breach of international etiquette had I, for any trifling reason, omitted to 
greet the leading representative in the place — of one of the great European 
nations living in peace with the German Empire. That would have t)een to 
behave, not in a neutral, but in a ))rutal manner. According to agreement. 
General Augustin returned my visit the same day at the German Consulate." 

Von Diederichs was told that the French Admiral did the same but he did 
not know about the other neutral commanding officers. Concerning the visits 
of German officers to the Spanish, von Diederichs states (p. 432) : 

"The officers took a professional interest, as did other neutral officers, 
in following the course of the operations between the Spaniards and the 
rebels. I was inclined to sanction the gratification of this wish so long as 
no breach of neutrality was occasioned. No comjjlaints on this matter reached 
me. A certain acquaintance with the terrain in which the operations were 
carried on was acquired by the officers, but in this case there was nothing 
improper, and no possible injury could be done to anybody but the Spaniards." 

1" Ibid., p. 444. Admiral von Diederichs relates: 

"The relations with Admiral Dewey sopn took on a more friendly complexion 
The Admiral sent me a present of some mutton from a transjjort l)ringing 
frozen meat for the American forces, and owing to the want of fresh meat 
experienced during the blockade, the change was very welcome. I made a 
return with a live calf which I had received from Hong Kong. Thus a dead 
sheep and a live calf formed something of the nature of a sacrifice on the altar 
of friendship." 

The German Admiral then quotes a letter received from Admiral Dewey 
the following year in reply to von Diederichs' congratulations on Dewey's 

promotion. 

U. S. Naval Forces on Asiatic 
Station Flagship Olympia, 
Manila, P. I., 16 April, '99. 
"Dear Admiral von Diederichs: 

I wish to thank you most heartily for your cordial letter of congratula- 
tions upon my promotion. It is a great pleasure to me to feel that my advance- 
ment is a source of satisfaction to 3'ou, and I rejoice that our differences have 
been of newspaper manufacture. 

Hoping to have the pleasure of meeting you again liefore leaving the station, 
I am 

Very sincerely, 
(Sd.) George Dewey, 

Admiral U. S. Navy, 

Ccm'ding U. S. Naval Force on 
Asiatic Station." 



ADMIRAL VON DIEDERICHs' ACCOUNT 227 

which von Diederichs then proceeds to explain, chiefly on the 
ground that, it being necessary to maintain one or two vessels 
there for the protection of German citizens, it seemed advisable 
to bring the transport and supply ship " Darmstadt "^^ to that port 
and have the other vessels come from Tsing Tao to the "Darm- 
stadt" for their relief crews and supplies. Realizing that this 
might awaken unfortunate suspicions, he had taken care to 
explain to Admiral Dewey the reasons for the presence of the 
extra ships.^^ In general, von Diederich's account of events seeks 
to minimize the significance of German activities in the Philippines 
at that time and to account for the hostile and suspicious feelings 
engendered by attributing them to Dewey's natural anxiety over 
his isolated position and to the unfortunate rumors circulated in 
the town of Manila that Germany intended to come to the rescue 
of the Spaniards there. -'^ 

It is difficult to understand Admiral von Diederichs' attitude 
toward the validity of the blockade in any other light than that of 

1* Ibid., p. 427. Admiral von Diederichs states that the "Darmstadt" had 
been ordered to Manila before any intention of the Americap attack on the 
Philippines had been issued, and that, being unarmed and filled with recruits 
and stores, it could only be regarded as a source of weakness because of the 
protection it required. 

1^ Ibid., p. 427. Admiral Dewey asked Admiral von Diederichs if Prince 
Henry, then about to visit China, were coming to Manila and the Admiral 
von Diederichs repUed in the negative. The German Admiral then continued : 

' 'I then joined in and explained thg reason of my arrival and of the coming of 
two more German ships. The expression, 'I have come here by orders of the 
Emperor' may then have been used, but only in the sense that only a direct 
order had brought me there, not a wish to add to the forces before Manila 
and with the addition of the conjecture that the alarm created among the 
Germans threatened by the insurgents may possibly have aroused a wish in 
the highest quarters to obtain from me personally an impartial verdict as to 
the actual danger of the situation. The expression is used and is, indeed, 
• customary among German officers, since the orders for the movement of the 
ships on foreign stations are authorized after being reported to His Majesty, 
and are accepted as Royal Commands. I certainly did not use in their almost 
threatening sense the words, 'I am here by order of the Kaiser, Sir.' " 

20 Ibid., p. 445. 

"A misdirected public opinion in IVIanila had expressed a wholly unjustified 
hope of German assistance, and thus a mistrust of Germany's intentions was 
aroused. Many newspapers, especially those pubhshed in Enghsh on the 
East Asiatic Coast, spread abroad all rumors having a mistrustful reference 
to Germany." 



228 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

the desire to oppose it so far as technical interpretations would 
permit. The German admiral even goes so far as to declare that 
"there was never any 'effective' blockade at Manila." This does 
not harmonize with Dewey's statement, not contradicted by von 
Diederichs', that all merchant vessels were stopped at the harbor 
entrance, informed of the blockade and warned off, unless laden 
with coal, in which case they were allowed entrance and their 
cargo purchased for the American squadron. The war vessels of 
neutral nations were admitted as an act of courtesy. That they so 
recognized this was evident from their acquiescence in Dewey's 
measures and their policy of reporting to him on entering the bay 
and asking him to assign them anchorage. Then, too, the very 
grounds of the complaint which Admiral von Diederichs addressed 
to Dewey, namely, that of stopping German vessels with a shot 
across the bow in order to force them to report is evidence in itself 
of the effectiveness of the American admiral's blockade. That 
the German Government did not question its effectiveness'^ is 
shown in the instructions sent to Admiral von Diederichs directing 
that German ships before arriving at blockaded ports should report 
to the commander of the blockading squadron. The German 
admiral and the officers of the other German vessels seemed 
determined to ignore Dewey's authority in the bay and the 
existence of the blockade so far as it was possible to do so. 

Three months after the naval battle, Dewey proceeded up the 
bay for the taking of the town of INIanila. The foreign men-of-war 
were notified to move out of the probable line of fire. The German 
and French vessels took positions to the north of the city, but the 
British Captain (Chichester) followed Dewey's fleet near to the 
town and placed his two warships between the American and the 
foreign fleet. This act was not only deeply appreciated by Admiral 
Dewey but was featured and cheered in the American press as 
evidence of the British sympathies for the United States in the 

^' Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 31. Mr. Witte states that 
Dr. A. von Mumm, German minister at Washington during the absence of 
Ambassador von Holleben, confessed to him privately that in the von Dieder- 
ichs controversy the fault lay on the German side. 



EFFECT OF GERMAN ACTIONS AT MANILA 229 

war." This sentiment was supported by Ambassador Hay, who 
wrote from London^^ to Senator Lodge that if the United States 
wished it could have the practical assistance of the British navy. 
The controversy between the two commanders was of short 
duration, and would have excited little comment in the United 
States had it not been interpreted by the American press and 
public to be indicative not only of anti-American sympathies on 
the part of Germany but also of that country's intention to annex 
the Philippines. \\Tiile there was much opposition in the United 
States to the retention of those islands by the American Govern- 
ment,-^ still there was greater opposition to having them taken 
by a strong power which had definitely embarked on a colonial 
policy in the western Pacific. In the preceding decade Germany 
had acquired her large colonial possessions in Africa, and in agree- 
ment with Great Britain had divided the remaining unclaimed 
islands of the West Pacific into British and German spheres of 
interest for purposes of colonization.'^ During the same period 
she had annexed the north coast of New Guinea and the adjacent 

2= Dewey: Autobiography, p. 280. Admiral Dewey also records the fact 
that upon this formal notification to the foreign commanders of the American 
occupation of the city, Captain Chichester was the only commander who 
acknowledged the notification with a national salute of twenty-one guns. 

23 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 165 (see footnote 9). 

24 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, pp. 198 and 199. Among the opponents 
of annexation, which was termed "imperialism," were Senator G. F. Hoar, 
Senator Carl Schurz, Charles Francis Adams, Charles EHot Norton and 
Edward Atkinson. Mr. Hay, then Secretary of State, wrote to Mr. Whitelaw 
Reid November 29, 1898: 

"There is a wild and frantic attack now going on in the press against the 
whole PhiUppine transactions. Andrew Carnegie really seems to be off his 
head. He writes me frantic letters signing them 'Your Bitterest Opponent.' 
He threatens the President, not only with the vengeance of the voters, but 
with, practical punishment at the hands of the mob. He says henceforth the 
entire labor vote of America will be cast against us and that he will see that 
it is done. He says the Administration will fall in irretrievable ruin the 
moment it shoots dowii one insurgent Filipino." 

For the Senate opposition to Annexation see Congressional Record, 55th 
Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 733, 921, 1211, 1239, 1241, 1299, 1348, 1349, 1479, 1480, 
1485, 1486, 1529, 1678, 1740, 1741, 1830. Senator Schurz believed the 
PhiUppines should be placed under a guarantee of neutraUty by the powers 
having interests in the Islands. (See Schurz, Speeches, etc., Vol. VI, p. 37.) 

25 See Chapter V, Samoa. 



^ 



230 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

islands. In Samoa the German interests had come into direct 
contact with those of the United States. Just the year before the 
JNIanila episode Germany had taken the port of Kiao-chao in China, 
extending her influence through the province of Shantung, and the 
Kaiser's brother, Prince Henry, was at that time paying an official 
visit to the Orient with his squadron and being feted at Hong 
Kong.-*^ The German Government was openly asserting its power 
in the Pacific. Moreover, Germany had in the previous decade 
negotiated ^^ith Spain over the Caroline Islands, and, while this' 
controversy resulted in the retention of the islands by Spain, new 
negotiations were being conducted between Germany and Spain 
at this time.'-^ There would therefore have been nothing contra- 
dictory to the policy pursued by Germany up to that time in the 
inclusion of the Philippines in the colonial program. It was evident 
that Spain was about to lose the islands. The United States had 
always shown itself averse to foreign colonies. The Philippines 
would therefore be unattached. Consecpiently the American 
feeling that Germany's aims extended to this island group had 
natural foundation. Though it seems, therefore, most probable 
that Germany's colonial ambitions in this region included the Philip- 
pines, they were not considered by the Imperial Government-* 

-^ Dewey: Autobiography, p. 185. Admiral Dewey met Prince Henry 
frequently during this visit and relates the following: 

"Upon one occasion, in discussing the possible outcome of our complications 
with Spain, Prince Henry remarked that he did not beUeve that the powers 
would ever allow the United States to annex Cuba. 

'We do not wsh to annex Cuba, your Highness,' I answered, 'but we cannot 
suffer the terrible conchtion of affairs which exists at present in that island 
at our very doors to continue, and we are bound to put a stop to it.' 

'And what are you after? What does your country want?' the prince 
asked jokingly on another occasion, in referring to the general scramble for 
a foothold in the Far East. 

'Oh, we need only a bay,' I said jokingly in return, having in mind that 
this was all the Germans said that they wanted at Kiau Chau. It did not 
then occur to me that we should be taking Manila Bay permanently." 

27 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. II, 54 Sitz., 11. Maerz, 1899. 

28 Von Diederichs: Events in Manila, Journal of Royal United Service 
Institution, Vol. LIX, No. 437, August, 1914, p. 424. Admiral von Diederichs 
declares in his account that on being ordered to Manila he had no political 
instructions, that only one utterance from the Foreign Office in regard to the 
question of the Philippines came to his knowledge. This stated that the 



GERMANY AND THE PHILIPPINES 231 

sufficient to warrant direct, open-^ opposition to the policy of 
the United States in the islands. As a demonstration of her 
acquiescence in the American authority in the Philippines, Ger- 
many shortly after the taking of the town of jVIanila withdrew her 
ships, except for one cruiser, from the islands and placed the 
Gennan nationals and their interests there under the protection 
of the United States.^o 

That Germany was seeking more islands in this region, however, 
the Imperial Government made no attempt to deny. The policy 
became ciuite clear in the purchase of the Carohnes.^^ In ]March, 

Kaiser had altogether disclaimed any idea of the establishment of a German 
protectorate over the PhiUppines. The German Admiral holds that this 
declaration was jarobably called forth by the "irresponsible allusions" cm'rent 
against German intentions in the islands. 

^^Witte, Emil: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 61. Mr. Witte 
then employed by the German Embassy at Washington under the title of 
"Councillor of Legation," testifies to Germany's indirect opposition to the 
acquisition of the Philippines by the United States. He states: 

"I can testify, however, to thg fact that betwesn the Filipinos and the 
Foreign Office in Berlin there was a secret alliance which was brought about 
by Professor Blumentritt, pubhcity agent in Prague for the insurgent natives 
fighting for their freedom. 

Only a few days before the German interests in the PhiHppines were placed 
under American protection, I received, to translate, or perfect for the press, 
an official order which Professor Blumentritt had prepared for Count von 
Buelow about the Fihpino uprising. This account contains the most intimate 
details of the means of defence and reserves of the Filipinos, the ways and 
means of their arming and equipment, their possessions in munitions and 
means of sustenance, the personnel of their leaders, etc., etc., and ends with 
the prophecy that the Americans would never subjugate the FiUpinos, who, 
besides, would be glad to put themselves under a German protectorate. 
This last remark of the professor explains in part the polite attention which 
George Dewey and the American fleet received from Admiral von Diederichs. 

When I expressed my surprise that the Ambassador should publish such 
an article at a time when Germany was seeking the protection of America 
for its interests in the Philippine Islands, I received the following very sig- 
nificant answer: 

'We must not allow America to become too large."' 

All support, of the Filipinos as against the United States was emphatically 
denied by Secretary von Buelow before the Reichstag. (See V. R., 1898- 
1900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 794 D. 

30 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 79.5. F. R., '99, p. 302. 

31 Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 60. Mr. Witte declares 
that Germany had Herr Speck von Sternburg to thank for the acquisition of 
the Carolines. Baron von Sternburg was temporarily in charge of the German 
Embassy during the war and was on friendly terms with Mr. Roosevelt. 
The German attache states that it was through the personal influence of 



232 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

1899, Dr. Richter (member of the Freisinnige Volkspartei) ques- 
tioned the GoA'emmeiit in the Reichstag^^ as to whether it was 
true, as stated in the foreign press, that the German Government 
was conducting negotiations with the Spanish Government con- 
cerning the sale of the Caroline Islands. Von Buelow, Secretary 
of the Foreign Office, replied that he was not prepared to report 
anything definite. He considered, moreover, that there would be 
little profit in an academic discussion of the question whether the 
acquisition of these or those South Sea Islands would make for 
German interests. The situation could first be taken up for con- 
sideration after the peace treaty between the United States and 
Spain should have been ratified. 

Later, when the treaty with Spain ceding the Caroline, Pelew 
and Marianne Islands was brought before the Reichstag, ^^ Secre- 
tary von Buelow set forth the government's reasons for their 
acquisition and the relation of these islands to the German policy 
in the ^Yest Pacific. Through the acquisition of the Carolines, he 
explained, the German possessions in the South Sea were made 
complete. Up to this time, the Secretary stated, they had formed 
an extended, disconnected semicircle; now that circle was closed 
and formed a connected whole. If these islands had gone out of 
the possession of Spain into the possession of another power than 
Germany, he pointed out that the German colonial territory 
(Schutzgebiet) in the South Seas would have been split up and its 

von Sternburg with Roosevelt that the United States withdrew the CaroUne 
and Pelew Islands (except Guam) from its territorial claims. Mr. Witte is 
probably mistaken in this, since at the time of Germany's acquisition of the 
Carohnes (by treaty concluded with Spain, February 12, 1899) Mr. Roosevelt 
was Governor of New York and could hardly have influenced President 
McKinley's foreign policy to such an extent. 

32 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. II, 54 Sitz., 11. Maerz, 1899, S. 1490. At the time 
of Dr. Richter's question the German agreement with Spain concerning the 
Carohnes had been in existence for a month. It was signed on Februarj^ 12, 
1899. (See V. R., 1898-1900, Vol. Ill, Anlagen, p. 2503.) Dr. Richter in 
opposing the purchase of more colonies declared that he considered it self- 
evident that such a treaty of purchase could not be concluded without the 
consent of the Reichstag. It is interesting to note that the agreement deter- 
mining the price and all other considerations was signed the previous month. 

'3 V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. Ill, pp. 2695 ff. 



GERMAN POLICY IN THE PACIFIC 233 

development checked. From the standpoint of German general 
poHtical interests in the South Seas, therefore, Secretary von 
Buelow declared that this new extension of the German sphere 
of power there was useful and necessary and the situation of the 
newly acquired islands was particularly favorable. Finally he 
advised that those members of the Reichstag who considered 
the price too high should remember that in questions of large 
policy other considerations must be weighed besides the exact 
value of the territory and number of the inhabitants. 

Secretary von Buelow then declared that this present treaty 
with Spain acquiring the Carolines resembled the treaty with 
China concerning Kiao-chao and Shantung, in that both treaties 
were milesiones on the same road and links of a chain. In both cases 
Germany had proceeded calmly (ruhig), soberly (nuechtern) and 
deliberately (besonnen). He said that it had been necessary, 
however, for the government to see to it that this new acquisition 
disturbed in no way Germany's relation to other powers. Through 
timely and cautious procedure (rechtzeitiges und vorsichtiges 
^^orgehen) it had accomplished this, without (as he especially 
emphasized) obliging Germany to grant any return concessions to 
anyone. Secretary von Buelow asserted, however, that Germany 
had had no intention of setting up in the South Sea any opposition 
to the Americans. In that great region there was room for more 
than one people and he hoped through the new possessions the 
Germans would enter into still closer relations with their nearest 
neighbors there, the Americans and the Japanese. This official 
utterance a very frank expression of the German national expan- 
sion policy in which the recent acquisitions constituted merely 
milestones of progress. The secretary's speech also gives first 
indications of the new policy adopted, that of taking into acx-ount 
the factor of the United States. 

The relations created with the United States by these events of 
1898 to 1900 were made the subject of discussion in the Reichstag.^* 

3* V. R., 1898-1900, Bd. I, 3 Sitz., 12. Dez., '98, S. 25 ff. 
Fritzen (Center Party) (translation by author). 

"In the Spanish-American war the Imperial policy maintained a strict 
neutrality, and indeed in harmony with the great majority of the German 



234 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

Most of the speakers admitted the sjinpathy for Spain which had 
prevailed throughout Germany, but declared that the Government 
had observed a careful neutrality throughout the conflict. Secretary 
von Buelow explained that the government had had during the 
conflict the double duty of seeing to it that the relations of Ger- 
many with both Spain and the United States should remain undis- 

people, and even though in this war the sympathies of our nation — I say it 
quite openly^stood on the side of the weaker and unjustly provoked 
belHgerent (Bravo! in the center and on the right, laughter on the left), 
nevertheless all the reports of the English and American papers which talk of 
a violation of the principle of neutrahty, especially by our navy, may be 
rejected as evil inventions." 

Dr. Richter (Liberal People's Party) (Freisinnige Volkspartei), S. 27 D. 

"I too consider the conduct of the German Government in the Spanish- 
American war entirely correct, but I am not of the opinion of my colleague 
Mr. Fritzen that the sympathies in Germany stood everywhere predominantly 
on the side of Spain. (Very true! on the left)" 

Dr. Richter then urged a liberal commercial treaty and poHcy with the 
United States. 

Von Kardorff (Empire party) (Reichspartei), p. 70 C.: 

"In connection with America I should like to refer to a statement which the 
representative, Mr. Fritzen, made. The representative, Mr. Fritzen, said 
that in the Spanish-American war the sympathies of the German people were 
with Spain. To a certain extent Mr. Fritzen is right. It lies in the peculiarity 
of our national character that, when a weaker (nation) is attacked by a 
stronger, we are always inclined to take the side of the weaker and in the 
German nation there existed to a certain extent the feeling that the conflict 
of poor Spain with powerful America was an unequal conflict. Gentlemen, I 
admit that I, too, was not entirely free from this conception, but I must say 
that is a sentimental conception which politically cannot be turned to account, 
(nicht verwertbar) (very true! on the right). 

We must remind ourselves that it is more useful to us that a great aspiring 
people like the Americans should win the upper hand, especially since the 
conditions in Spain have shown themselves to be so decadent as has come 
to light during this war. I hope that we preserve through the future the good 
relations with the United States which the Prussian government has main- 
tained since the time of Frederick the Great. At first it may have seemed 
rather startling that the Americans should all at once begin to pursue a quite 
different policy from that which they were formerly accustomed to pursue; 
an expansion policy which formerly all American statesmen had opposed. 
But, gentlemen, I believe that actually it is more to our interests here in Ger- 
many that a country like America should enter into competition with all the 
great powers which compete in the world, and which possess fleets and armies 
ready for conflict. We have no cause to regret this fact in any way, just as 
little (cause) as towards Japan. But in the case of America I have, liesides, 
the feeling that it gives me a certain satisfaction to see the Anglo-Saxon, the 
Germanic stock — for the Americans are in great part Germanic — conie for- 
ward so powerfully as the Americans have done in the last war. When I 
hope for a good understanding with America for the future, then I am count- 
ing on it that the old Bismarck principle shall be revived, namely, not to mix 
commercial-political questions with other poHtical questions." 



ATTITLDE OF THE KAISER 235 

turbed. In the interest of humanity and from the standpoint of 
international commerce, he stated, Germany would rather have seen 
prevented a war which inflicted grie^'ous wounds on both sides. 
Nevertheless, he said, after the efforts toward this end had proved 
unsuccessful, there remained nothing for Germany to do but to 
allow things to take their course. The Cuban affair, the secretary 
stated, did not constitute an actual interest of Germany, nor was 
Germany called upon to judge who was right and who was wrong 
in the conflict. Germany, he said, had merely the task of observ- 
ing a loyal neutrality. That duty, he declared, Germany had ful- 
filled most conscientiously and never at any stage of the war had 
the German Government contemplated unauthorized interference 
in any form. The American ambassador. Dr. White, endorses^^ 
the statement that the official neutrality stand was correctly 
maintained by Germany and that the course, especially of the 
Foreign Office under Count von Buelow and Baron von Richthofen, 
was all that could be desired. In regard to the Kaiser himself. 
Dr. White states that never to his knowledge did the monarch 
show the slightest leaning toward the Spanish, and that, when 
certain publicists and statesmen suggested measures against the 
American Republic, the Kaiser quietly but effectiveh' put his foot 
upon them. 

The American Ambassador relates that at the time of the visit 
of Prince Henry to America the Emperor said to him : 

35 White: Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 168 and 169. 

3^ Ibid., p. 204. For accounts of the British-German controversy as to the 
actions of both governments in 1898, see Latane "America as a World Power," 
pp. 63 and 64; also Review of Reviews, Vol. XXV, pp. 267 ff.; also the Nation, 
1902, Vol. LXXIV, p. 141. The following are the references made to this 
subject in the British Parliament: 

Parliamentary Debates, Vol. II of Session 11 Feb., 1902, p. 992. 

Mr. Norman (Wolverhampton, S.). "I beg to ask the Undersecretary of 
State for Foreign Affairs, whether Great Britain, through her Ambassadors 
ever proposed a Joint Note in which the Powers should declare that Europe 
did not regard the armed intervention of the United States in Cuba as justi- 
fiable, and whether in consequence of the refusal of Germany this step was 
abandoned; and whether he can make any further statement upon the subject." 

The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranborne, 
Rochester). "No! Great Britain never proposed through Her Majesty's 
Ambassadors or otherwise any declaration adverse to the United States in 
regard to their intervention in Cuba. On the contrary Her Majesty's Gov- . 
ernment dechned to assent to any such proposal." 



236 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

"My brother's mission has no poHtical character whatever, 
save in one contingency. If the efforts made in certain parts of 
Europe to show that the German Government sought to bring 
about a European combination against the United States during 
your Spanish War are persisted in, I have authorized him to lay 
before the President certain papers which will put that slander to 
rest forever," Dr. White adds that "As it turned out there was 
little need of this, since the course both of the Emperor and his 
government was otherwise amply vindicated." 

The evidence^'' referred to by the Emperor and later published 
consisted of despatches from the German ambassador at Washing- 
ton transmitting the joint proposal of the diplomatic corps that 
a collective note be sent to the United States remonstrating against 
its intervention in Cuba. The Emperor had written on the margin 
of the despatches his express disapproval. 

There were, however, many contradictory statements issued 
by the German and British Governments and their representatives 
in regard to this movement at the opening of the Spanish war. 
The German ambassador had accused Lord Pauncefote of being 
the leader of the movement. Lord Cranborne, British Under- 
secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, denied categorically before 

Parliamentary Debates, Vol. Ill of 8ess. 14 Feb., 1902, pp. 38 and 39. 

Mr. Charles Hobhouse: "On behalf of the honorable member for South 
Wolverhampton, I beg to ask the Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
whether he is able to recall any statement concerning a meeting of Ambassa- 
dors at the British Ambassy in Washington in April, 1898." 

The Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Lord Cranborne Roches- 
ter). "The meeting which took place on the 14th April, 1898, was convened 
by Lord Pauncefote as Doyen of the Ambassadors at the verbal suggestion of 
some of his colleagues. Whatever opinions were expressed by Loi'd Paunce- 
fote during the discussion, which was of an informal character, were personal 
to himself and not in pursuance of any instructions from Her Alajesty's 
Government. The discussion resulted in an agreement by the Ambassadors 
to forward an identical telegram to their respective governments suggesting 
a further communication to the United States. On the receipt of this message, 
Her Majesty's Government at once replied objecting to the terms of the 
proposed communication as injudicious. Two days later Lord Pauncefote was 
informed that Her Majesty's Government had resolved to take no action. 
We had at that time no information of the attitude of the German Govern- 
ment." 

Mr. Dillon. "Is the noble Lord prepared to state whether the official 
German statement as to what has taken place is correct or incorrect?" 

Lord Cranborne. "I have nothing to add to the answer I have just given 
to the House." 

^' Latane: America as a World Power, pp. 63 and 64; also Review of Re\'iews, 
"Vol. XXV, pp. 269 ff. 



INTERVENTION MOVEMENTS 237 

the House of Commons that Great Britain had ever proposed any 
declaration adverse to the United States in regard to their inter- 
vention in Cuba, and had, on the contrary, refused to agree to 
such a suggestion. A few days later Lord Cranborne, on being 
interrogated in regard to the German Ambassador's accusations, 
repHed that the meeting of diplomats in Washington was con- 
vened by Lord Pauncefote at the suggestion of some of his colleagues 
because he was Doyen of the diplomatic corps and that any 
opinions that may have been expressed by the British ambassador 
at that time were personal ones and not based on instructions from 
his government. Whatever the facts at that period, it is evident 
that both governments did reject the proposal and that both were 
most eager at this period after the war to show that they had 
done so. 

Again, apropos of Germany's official neutrality in the war. Dr. 
White records^^ that on one occasion the German authorities over- 
hauled and searched at the mouth of the Elbe a Spanish vessel 
suspected to be carrying arms for use against American forces in 
Cuba. This action Dr. White took pains to make known in a 
speech at an American Fourth of July celebration in Leipsic. On 
the same occasion he reminded his audience, as he was in the habit 
of doing, that during the Civil War, when America's foreign friends 
were few, the German press and people had been steadily on the 
side of the Union. 

It is evident that the American ambassador and the German 
Secretary of the Foreign Office were both bending their efforts^^ 
toward counteracting and dissipating the hostile sentiments 
engendered between the two countries during the war. Baron 

38 White: Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 168 and 169. 

33 White: Autobiography, Vol. II, p. 139. Dr. White writes of the German 
Secretary of the Foreign Office : 

"With the multitude of trying questions which pressed upon me as ambas- 
sador during nearly six years, it hardly seems possible that I should be still 
alive were it not for the genial hearty intercourse, at the Foreign Office and 
elsewhere, with Count von Buelow. Sundry German papers, indeed, attacked 
him as yielding too much to me, and sundry American papers attacked me for 
yielding too much to him; but both of us exerted ourselves to do the best 
possible, each for his own country, and at the same time to preserve peace and 
increase good feeling." 



J 



238 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

voii Buelow made a long speech in the Reichstag*" on the special 
subject of the relations between Germany and the United States. 
After reiterating the strictly neutral course followed by the 
empire, he declared emphatically that the presence of German ships 
at Manila was actuated by no other motive than the obligation to 
protect German life and property and that of the subjects of other 
natibns who had been placed under German protection. The 
accusation of the foreign press that Germany was supporting 
the resistance of the Filipinos against the American occujjation*^ 
he declared to be absolutely false. The reports of tension between 
the German and American officers at INIanila the Baron termed 
myths, and he asserted that their intercourse was conducted in the 
spirit of mutual courtesy. He pointed out that after the close of 
hostilities Germany had withdrawn all her ships except one cruiser 
from the Philippines because she was convinced that the Germans 
would be safe under the protection of the United States. The 
Secretary then declared that the relations between the German 
Government and the American Government were good and 
friendly and had never ceased to be such. The distinguished repre- 
sentative of the United States at Berlin, ]\Ir. White, had testified 
to this in his speech on the Fourth of July. From the standpoint 
of rational policy the Secretary declared there was no reason why 
Germany and America should not stand toward each other in the 

^» V. R.. 1S98-1900, Bd. I, 30 Sitz., 11. Feb., '99, S. 794 D ff. 
^'Schiirz: Speeches, etc., Vol. VI, p. 37. 

New York, January 16, 1899. 
To Charles Francis Adams, Jr. 



"As to the intention of Germany to pounce upon the Phihppine Islands 
as soon as our forces are withdrawn, nothing could lie more absurd. I became 
firmly convinced of this by a conversation I had, immediately after his return 
from Europe, with the German ambassador Mr. von HoUeben. He gave me 
the most ample proof that the German Government did not only not intend 
to cross our jnu-poses in any way, but that it was on the contrary bent upon 
doing its utmost to remain on friendly terms with the United States. It seems 
to me the true policy is for the United States to secure an agreement of the 
powers most interested in that region to put the Philippine Islands under the 
cover of a guarantee of neutrality, as Belgium and Switzerland are covered 
in Europe. 

The only Power that might feel inclined to frustrate such a scheme might 
be Great Britain who would like to force us to take the Philippines for good 
and thus become dependent in a sense, upon her protection." 



VON BUELOW ON RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES 239 

best relations. He saw no point at which German and American 
interests met in hostile manner, and also, in the future, no point 
where their lines of development need cross in hostility. Germany, 
he said, in no way begrudged the Americans the fruits of their 
victory. But German public opinion, the Secretary explained, had 
not withheld from the brave and sorely tried Spanish people the 
expression of its sympathy, and this expression would not have been 
misconstrued in the United States if certain foreign press organs 
had not perfidiously distorted it in order to create in America 
distrust of Gennany. The Baron then concluded with references 
to the volume of commercial and social intercourse between the 
two countries, and to their friendly political relations throughout 
their history. 

It had become e^'ident to German leaders that the danger of a 
strong anti-German sentiment in the United States was a real one, 
and that it would be harmful to allow it to make further headway. 
They realized that the friendliness of the German public opinion 
toward the Spaniards had been a political mistake^'- and that in 
the meantime the great rival England, had made progress in 
\\inning American favor. The American Secretary of State John 
Hay was known to fa^'or close relations with England*^ and to 

*- Von Halle: "Duetschland und die.oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten 
Staaten," Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 205. 

"Like the friendly attitude towards 'the Transvaal in 1S9G, so was the 
unfriendly attitude of German public opinion towards America at the outbreak 
of the Spanish war, undoubtedly a political mistake. The latter is the more 
inexplicable since it concerned a war with Spain, that country which from 
the thirty years' war on to the refusal of the German-Spanish commercial 
treaty a few years ago, has mostly confronted Germany as an opponent. It 
stands immeasurably further from the German realm of custom, culture and 
interests than does the United States, and its wretched colonial administration 
gave really no cause for any sympathy." 

« Ibid., p. 207. Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 221. 
Mr. Hay wrote to Henry Wliite September 24, 1899: 

"As long as I stay here no action shall be taken contrary to my convaction 
that the one indispensable feature of our foreign policy should be a friendly 
understanding with England. But an alliance must remain, in the present 
state of things, an unattainable dream." 

Ibid., p. 248. Secretary Hay wrote to Henry White, November 21, 1900, 
apropos of the German-British agreement over China: 
16 



240 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

oppose Germany. In the most recent events in Samoa the British 
and American forces had combined against the German.^'* The 
British had shown sympathy with the United States in the recent 
war and had encouraged the Americans to retain the PhiUppines.^^ 
It was therefore very clear that Germany must take steps to undo 
as far as possible what harm had been done and to endeavor to 
build up in the United States a sentiment in favor of Germany.^*' 
The speeches of Baron von Buelow, referred to above, might 
be considered to mark the opening of this policy which was con- 
ducted along many lines during the next decade. One of the lines 
of procedure was hostility to England and the effort to make it 
appear that not Germany but Great Britain was the real enemy of 
the United States.^^ Another method was the cultivation of the 

"At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would 
rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the chum of the Kaiser." 

See also von Halle: "Deutschland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den 
Vereinigten Staaten," in Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 207. 
Von Halle refers to Hay as an undoubted Anti-German and an Anglophile 
"ein zweifelloser Deutschengegner und Anglomane." 

** See Chapter V, Samoa. 

^5 Congressional Record, 55th Congress, 3rd Session, Vol. XXXII, Part I, 
p. 737. Senator Bacon, of Georgia, declared that the reason Great Britain 
was anxious to have the United States retain the Phihppines was that, in case 
of a war of the powers over China the United States could lend her effective 
aid from this important base of operations. Senator Schurz held the reason 
to be so that the United States would become dependent on British sea-power. 

^^ Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 220. Secretary Hay wrote to Henry 
White Sept. 9, 1899: 

"The Emperor is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us — on his 
own terms, bien entendu." 

Von Buelow: "Imperial Germany, p. 50. Prince von Buelow gives 
frank acknowledgment of this new policy adopted by Germany. 

"During the Spanish-American War a section of German public opinion 
manifested strong sympathy with Spain, which was resented in the States. 
German relations with America had also been clouded by the way in which 
part of the Enghsh and American Press had interpreted certain incidents 
which had occurred between our squadrons and the American fleet off Manila. 
This difference reached its height in February, 1899, so that it seemed desir- 
able strongly to advocate preparations for a better understanding between 
the two nations of kindred race." 

^' Witte: Revelations of a German Attache, p. 39. Mr. Witte, appointed 
as Press Attache of the German Emb'assy in Washington, writes : 



EFFORTS TO lAIPROVE RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES 241 

German-American element as a nucleus for the creation of public 
sentiment favorable to the Fatherland .^^ Americans in Germany 
were given cordial reception, A direct cable to Germany was 
landed in the United States. A special collection of casts of 
medieval German architecture and sculpture was presented by 
the Emperor to Harvard University. The daughter of the 
x\merican President was recinested to christen the Kaiser's yacht. 
The brother of the Kaiser was sent to visit the United States.*^ 
The following year the American squadron was very cordially 
entertained at Kiel.^" The German Ambassador von Holleben, 

"In entering upon my duties I received general instructions to make every 
effort to make the papers keep silence, which were antagonistic to Germanv, 
and to perform the miracle of turning them from bitter opponents to friends 
and admirers of the Emperor, as well as to make it appear that the real enemy 
of the United States in America was not Germany but England." 

^» Ibid., Chap. XXII. Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 378. 

*^ F. R., 1902, pp. 422 to 425. Mr. Jackson, Secretary of the American 
Embassy at Berlin, wrote to Secretary Hay after the visit of Prince Henry 
as follows: 

Berlin, March 19, 1902. 



"As already stated, in no responsible quarter is it anticipated that Prince 
Henry's visit will have any definite political or commercial result, but confi- 
dence is felt that 'it will bear beautiful flowers, if not fruit,' that the efforts 
of those opposed to our hfiving closer relations with Germany will be less 
liable to do harm; that the transmission of news will be more direct, and the 
efforts to exaggerate the importance of every irresponsible, unfriendly state- 
ment may be discontinued; and that the consideration of international ques- 
tions — political and economic — will be approached with mutual feelings of 
friendliness. Prince Henry's visit has been described as the 'rediscovery of 
America' and one of its results has been to open the eyes of Germany generally 
to the growth and importance of the United States. Increased acquaintance 
with the United States is warmly advocated in important educational and 
industrial circles as being of reciprocal advantage and it is probable that in 
the future many more Germans of 'the better classes' will visit America as 
tourists than heretofore. A more intimate acquaintance with the United 
States and a better knowledge of our people, our institutions, and resources 
cannot fail to be of advantage to Germany and the rest of Europe, and it 
is hard to see wherein it can be otherwise than beneficial to us as well." 

Mr. Witte presents a different account and writes (see preface) that the 
visit of Prince Henry actually terminated in a diplomatic incident — by which 
he refers to the dismissal of Ambassador von Holleben immediately after the 
departure of the Prince. 

^" F. R., 1903, pp. 449 and 450. On this occasion Ambassador Tower said 
in the course of his speech: 

"Mutual understanding between nations, as between individuals, is best 
attained by personal intercourse which leads to better acquaintance; and it 
is the happy outcome of an occasion like this that strengthens the bond of 



242 THE SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR 

wlio liad been unsuccessful in his diplomatic dealings with the 
Government of the United States, was recalled^^ and Baron von 

friendship, which, in the case of the two great powers hke Germany and the 
United States, is a benefit to the whole civilized world. The efforts of Ger- 
many and the United States are constantly tending toward the same purposes 
in the development of civilization, the extension of commerce, and the peace 
of the world. The closer our personal acquaintance becomes, the more we 
are sure to discover how near our paths lie to each other, how readily we may 
follow them together, and how much we have each to gain by the mainte- 
nance of harmony in the future, as in the present and the past. America 
wishes this, sir, with all sincerity. 

There are hundreds of thousands of people of German birth and German 
extraction living in the United States who look back from their new home with 
feelings of tender affection toward the Fatherland. They are among the 
best of our citizens. They luring with them to us the habits of thrift and 
industry and the high ideals of domestic life which they have inherited from 
their ancestors, and which have contributed so much to make America what 
it is." 

The Emperor replied as follows : 

"In responding to j'our excellency's warm and sympathetic toast, I offer 
a cordial welcome to the American squadron, Admiral Cotton, and his officers, 
in the name of the German people. We look upon them as the bearers of 
friendly sentiments of the citizens of the United States, to which I can assure 
your excellency, the whole of Germany heartily responds. I am happy that 
my hopes for a better mutual understanding between our two countries, 
through the personal intercourse which my brother. Prince Henry, was able 
to hold with your excellency's countrymen, have been fully reaUzed and have 
strengthened the bonds of friendship l^etween Germany and America. That 
my gift of the casts of medieval German architecture has been received in so 
gracious a manner by the Harvard University gives me the greatest satisfaction. 
I hope that the samples relating to our old history will induce many of the 
young students to come over to Germany to study the originals and the people 
who hved around them. My sincerest -n-ish is that our two peoples may 
become closer acquainted. No serious citizen in America or Germany, I 
trust, believes that the harmony and continuance of our mutual interest 
could be disturbed by permanent factors in our relationship. We are knit 
too closely together in our material interests. Rivalries of trade and com- 
merce will always exist, but the power which draws us together is too strong 
to allow the development of any antagonism. It is my firmest conviction 
that the fact of so many himdreds of thousands of Germans living and thriv- 
ing in the United States, with their hearts still warm with their love of their 
Fatherland, will render the task more easy for smoothing the path of undis- 
turbed and progressive relations which are of vital importance to our countries. 
It is now my duty to beg your excellency to thank His Excellency the Presi- 
dent of the United States for the joyous occasion for which we are indebted 
to his kindness. We all over here admire his firmness of character, his iron 
will, his devotion to his country, and his indomitable energy, and we readily 
grasp the hand proffered to us across the sea in cordial friendship, feehng at 
the same time that blood is thicker than water. 

Gentlemen, I propose the toast of His Excellency the President of the 
United States. God bless him and the United States. " 

^^ Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 293. ]\Ir. Thayer assigns von HoUeljen's 
recall to his activities against England in the United States and his insinuations 
against the British Ambassador, Lord Pauncefote. According to Mr. Witte, 
von Holleben was dismissed because of intrigue. See Chap. XVIII. 



THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION 243 

Sternbura;, who was personally on very friendly terms with 
President Roosevelt, was appointed in his place. Connections 
with the universities were encouraged and the system of exchange 
professors established. The Emperor presented to the United 
States a statue of the father of German-American good-relations, 
Frederick the Great. In recognition of this, a few years later, 
Congress presented^- to the German Emperor and the German 
nation a statue of General von Steuben. 

In addition to these forces set in motion the solution of several 
diplomatic controversies helped t<^ create an era of better feeling. 
The Samoan situation had been terminated in a way satisfactory 
to both countries. Secretary Hay had secured ffom Germany at 
least a provisional acquiescence in the policy of the "open door" 
in China, which was followed through agreement between Germany 
and England by a more positive declaration of adherence to that 
principle. Temporarily commercial relations had been regulated 
by diplomatic agreements. Such efforts as these were not without 
results and produced, especially during the Roosevelt adminis- 
tration^^ favorable sentiment toward Germany in the United States, 
which to a certain extent overcame the hostility aroused during 
the Spanish-American war. 

52 F. R., 1911, p. 243. 

*' Von Halle : Deutschland unci die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereingten 
Staaten, Preussische Jahrbuecher, Vol. 107, 1902, p. 210 (transl. by author). 

"•From this viewpoint the jjresidency of Roosevelt — disturbed as were the 
circumstances which attended his entrance into office — is to be considered in 
Germany as thoroughly satisfactory. For thereby there came to the head 
of the government a wise, farsighted man, who through his own observation 
and knowledge is well acquainted with Germany, and, being a stronger 
character than McKinley, will hardly offer his hand to have the American 
poUcy work for the interests of one foreign country against those of another." 



CHAFER VII 
GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

After the Monroe Doctrine perhaps the most conspicuous 
feature of the foreign pohcy of the United States is that of the 
principle of the "open door" to commerce in the Chinese Empire. 
It is important, therefore, in studying the relations between 
Germany and the United States to consider the policy of the 
German Government toward this principle so repeatedly enun- 
ciated and acted upon by the American Government. 

Though no new idea, the principle received its first specific 
and expressed application as an American policy in China during 
the year 1899, and because of his earnest efforts in its behalf, has 
been associated with the name of the American Secretary of State 
John Hay. The immediate e^Thts giving rise to Secretary Hay's 
first approach to the European powers on this question were the 
acquisition by Germany, Russia, England and France of Chinese 
harbors^ and the division of China by those powers into "spheres 
of interest" for their commercial enterprises. - 

German acquisitions in China began with the seizure in 1897 
of the harbor of Kiao-Chao on the ground of the murder by Chinese 
of two German missionaries. The diplomacy' connected with the 
e^■ent, however, extended back to the close of the Chino-Japanese 
war in 1895, when Germany, France and Russia had intervened 
in favor of China and had forced the victorious Japanese to give 

1 F. R. 1898, pp. 182 to 191. During the year 1897 to 1898, Germany 
acquired the harbor of Kiao-Chao, Russia acquired Port Arthur and TaUen- 
wan. Great Britain acquired Wei-hai-wei and extensions to her possessions 
in Hong-Kong, and France acquired Kwangchau Baj^ in the Province of 
Kwangtung. See also, A. & P. '98, CV (C-8S14), Nos. 95, 133 and 1-41, 144 
and A. & P. '99, CIX (91317), No. 17. Japan also obtained a small con- 
cession at Amoy. F. R. 1899, pp. 150 to 153. 

2 F. R. 1899, pp. 129 ff. 



SEIZURE OF KIAO-CHAO 245 

up possession of the Liao-tiing Peninsula. For this act it was tacitly 
understood by these powers — and realized by China — that some 
tangible compensation was expected.'' The German Secretary of 
the Foreign Office had declared that there was no connection 
between the intervention in 1895 and the acquisition of Kiao- 
Chao.* This was contradicted, however, in the Reichstag by Dr. 
Richter (Liberal People's Party) and by Dr. Hasse (National 
Liberal), who, as spokesmen of their parties, declared the cession 
of Kiao-Chao to be a reward for the former intervention against 
Japan. Conclusive evidence of this is seen in the report of the 
Chinese officials (Tsungli Yamen) concerning their negotiations 
with German minister. Baron Heyking, Avho give as among the 
grounds set forth by Germany for her demands the fact of her 
assistance to China in securing the evacuation of the Liao-tung 
Peninsula by the Japanese.^ 

There was little attempt by the German Government to conceal 
the fact that the event of the murder of the two German mission- 
aries was merely chosen as a fitting occasion to secure that which 
it had become a part of deliberate German policy to secure, namely, 
a foothold in China, or, in the famous words of Secretary von 
Buelow, a "place in the sun."'' The secretary declared that the 

p- 3 A. & P. '98, CV (C-8814), No. 114. Count Moura\aeff said to Sir N. 
O'Conor that Russia considered that China owed her the ports of TaUenwan 
and Port Arthur in return for her services to China during the war wath Japan. 

* V. R. 1897-1898, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, '98, S. 893, B. and S. 909, A. 
Dr. Hasse stated that he and his friends had been waiting for years to see in 
what way Germany would be recompensed for her action at that time (1895). 
It was therefore no longer a secret (as it had to he for years) that Germany 
wanted to have a reward for placing herself on the side of Cliina. 

■> F. R., 1898, p. 189. 

e V. R., 1897-'98, Bd. \, 4 Sitz., 6. Dezember, 1897, S. 60 (translation by 
author), 

"The time when the German left to one of his neighbors the earth and to 
the other the sea and reserved for himself the sky where pure theory reigns 
(amusement! Bravo!) — that time is past. We consider it as one of our most 
distinguished tasks to advance (foerdern) and to take care of (pflegen) the 
interest of our navigation, our commerce and our industry in Eastern Asia. 

The sending of our squadron to the bay of Iviao-Chao and the occupation 
of this bay was done partly to secure full amends for the murder of German 
Catholic missionaries, partly to obtain greater security than heretofore 
against the repetition of such events. 

We must insist that the German missionary and German enterprise, German 



246 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

sending of the squadron to Kiao-Chao was not an improvisation;^ 
on the contrary, that it was the product of the full weighing of all 
contingencies and was the expression of a calm policy conscious 
of its goal. For the future, von Buelow declared Germany would 
proceed without undue haste, but also without petty narrowness, 
steadily, deliberately, step by step, not as conquest seekers, also 
not as calculators, but rather as efficient and wise merchants who, 
like the Maccabees of old, hold in one hand a weapon but in the 
other a trowel and a spade. 

This deliberate expansion policy of the German Government, 
with its complete ignoring of the rights of China in the case, did 
not escape unchallenged in Germany. The radical elements of 
the Reichstag attacked it with vigor and courage. ]\Ir. Bebel,^ 

goods, the German flag and the German ship in China be respected just like 
those of other powers. (Hearty bravo!) Finally we are gladly ready to take 
into account the interests of other great powers in East Asia, in the secure 
foresight that our own interests will also find their due appreciation. (Bravo!) 
In a word: we wish to place no one in the shade, but we too demand our place 
in the sun." 

' V. R., 1897-'98, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, 1898, S. 895 A. Also A. & P. 
CV (C. 8814), No. 74. 

« V. R., 1897-98, Bd. II, 35 Sitz., 8. Februar, 1898, S. 899. See also vehe- 
ment speech against the Government expansion policy by Liebknecht (Social 
Democrat), V. R., '97-'9S, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '98, S. 1981. 
Liebknecht — (translation by author). 

"I have noticed that there is no inclination to discuss in 

detail the supplementary budget nor to examine closely the general pohcy. 
But I cannot comply with this desire. I perceive in the part of the supple- 
mentary budget, so far as it pertains to Kiao-Chao, the beginning of a policy 
which can only become fatal to Germany. Kiao-Chiao itself is an extraordi- 
narily unimportant thing of little intrin.sic value. By means of remarkable 
advertising the imagination of the German people has been kindled for this 
corner of the earth and there are actually many people in Germany who imagine 
that we have in Kiao-Chao something wonderful. 

Let us recall how we came to Kiao-Chao at all; and here we must touch 
on a point which must make every German lilush before the foreign world 
(den Ausland). Who had thought of Kiao-Chao a half year ago? Who, a 
year and a half or two years ago, had thought that Germany must have a 
fleet large enough to rival France, Russia, if not even England, as a sea-power? 
No one among the people had thought of it and here in the Reichstag itself 
only a few had thought of it; those who timidly came forward with the thought 
were in a disappearing minority. Suddenly a complete reversal! Was it, as 
has just been stated here, a reversal within the German people? Truly not. 
The German people whom we know does not bother itself about Kiao-Chao 
and this colonial policy and fleet policy in the least. It rejects them. 

W^hat is to be made out of this piece of territory? Without the hinterland 
it is absolutely worthless. And what was the role which Germany played 



OPPOSITION OF RADICALS 247 

Social Democrat, compared the descent of the German squadron 
on Kiao-Chao to the Jameson raid on the Transvaal which Ger- 
many had so condemned and which had called forth the Kaiser's 
telegram of sympathy to the Boer President. He then stated 
that there would have been nothing to be wondered at if some 
third nation had at this time sent a similar telegram of sympathy 
to the government of China. The German troops had no right on 
Chinese soil, and if the Chinese had forcibly ejecterl them they 
w^ould have had good right to do so. That the murder of the mis- 
sionaries was only a mere excuse in order to be able to break into 
China, no one doubted any longer. Such protests as this, however, 
were confined chiefly to the radical groups, among whom opposi- 
tion to colonization had become practically a part of the party 
program and had little effect on the government policy. 

The treaty-' governing the transfer of Kiao-Chao to Germany 
leased to that country for ninety-nine years the bay and islands 
of Kiao-Chao and the land projections on each side of the harbor 
entrance. Over all this Germany should have not only adminis- 
trative but also sovereign rights for the period of the lease. In 
addition, it was agreed that within a zone of fifty kilometers around 
the bay, China was to permit German troops to march through the 
territory at any time and was not to take any measures or issue 
anv ordinances without the consent of the German Government. 



there? First it was said: it is a lease; then it was said in all German newspapers, 
it is a lease only in form but a lease in perpetuity, we will never give up the 
land. Therefore it was a conquest in the midst of peace. 

This robbery or colonial policy does not help the people in the least; on the 
contrary it injures them. Price Bismarck, as obedient servant of the capi- 
talist class, which granted him in return important and substantial rewards, 
tried it first with Samoa, then in Africa. And what happened then, and is 
still going on, does not redound to the honor of the German name and has 
brought only harm to the German people. Now we are trying it with China. 
And here the fiasco will be still greater. 

In China we had the choice between the EngUsh policy, of cultivating China 
and furthering its development by economic methods, by establishing com- 
mercial connections, etc., and the Russian policy which leads to the splitting 
up of China. We have decided on the Russian pohcy and our government 
has preeminently militaristic and naval purposes in view. 

Against the whole present policy, especially against the whole colonial 
policy, against the whole fleet craze (Flottenschwindel) — I can use no other 
expression — (great disturbance, lively interruptions) we protest: during the 
election-battle and after it we will speak!" 

s V. R., lS97-'98, Anlagen Vol. Ill, No. 262. 



248 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

Nevertheless, it was stated that China retained all her sovereign 
rights in this zone. It is further illustrative of the aggressive 
character of the treaty that provision was made that in case Ger- 
many, before the expiration of the lease, should desire to withdraw 
from Kiao-Chao, China would grant her some other place better 
suited to her purposes and in addition would recompense Germany 
for the expenditures made up to that time in developing the port. 
Though shedding much light on the expansion system of Ger- 
many, ^^ the treaty bears on the policy of the "open door" only 
in this respect — that it guarantees to China in the leased territory 
equal rights of commerce and navigation with the merchants 
and vessels of other nations. Germany retains, however, the right 
to decide at any time what those privileges of other nations shall 
be. That is, as far as the treaty stipulated, Germany was free to 
make Kiao-Chao an open or a closed port. She declared it a free 
port, aided the Chinese Government in the establishment of a 
customs house there, and gave assurances to the American Ambas- 

1° A. & P. '99, CIX (C-9131), No. 62 (Inclosure). Following the taking 
of Kiao-Chao, Germany reasserted her power and interest in the Orient by 
sending Prince Henry with a squadron on a tour of the Orient which should 
include a personal visit to the Emperor of China. The visit was of such 
importance that the details of it were arranged by formal agreement. 
Lascelles to Salisburj-, Extract from 'Reichsanzeiger' of Apr. 25, 1898 (trans- 
lation). 

Berlin, April 27, 1898. 

"His Royal Highness Prince Henry will, in the course of his travels in 
Eastern Asia, pay a visit to His Majesty the Emperor of China at Peking. 
^Yith regard to the ceremonial to be observed on this occasion, a detailed 
agreement has been arrived at between the Imperial German Minister at 
Peking and the Imperial Chinese Government ; which, according to telegraphic 
information, has received the assent of His Majesty the Emperor of China. 
According to the terms of this agreement, His Roj'al Highness Prince Henry 
will be received on his arrival at the Peking railway station by the Tsung-li- 
Yamen and the Imperial Princes and will be conducted to the Imperial German 
Legation. On the following day His Royal Highness will paj' a ^^sit to the 
Emperor in His Majesty's summer residence of Wan-show-shan. His Majesty 
will rise to receive him, and His Royal Highness will sit do^Ti in the seat of 
honor by His Majest3''s side. Immediately after this visit the Emperor will 
pay His Royal Highness his return visit, which His Royal Highness will await 
in a building within the gardens of Wan-show-shan. which is to be placed at 
the Prince's disposal as a temporary residence. Her Imperial Majesty, the 
ex-Regent, has also spontaneously expressed the wish to receive His Royal 
Highness and has commanded that the Prince be shown all those portions of 
the Palace which Europeans have hitherto been forbidden to enter." 



TREATY OF KIAO-CHAO 249 

sador at Berlin^^ that the rights and privileges ensured by treaties 
with China to citizens of the United States would not be anywise 
impaired within the acquired area. 

This treaty, governing the transfer of Kiao-Chao, embodied by 
no means all of the German claims on China at this time. Aside 
from those demands^- which referred directly to the reparation 
for the murder of the missionaries/^ there was included a demand 
that German engineers should have preference in the building of 

- 11 F. R., 1899, p. 129 f. Russia followed by declaring Dalny (Talienwan) 
a free and open port, but closed Port Arthur to all but Russian and Chinese 
vessels. (See F. R., 1898, p. 184.) 

12 A. P., '98, CV (C-8814), No. 5 and No. 73. Also F. R., 1898, pp. 187 ff. 
The demands presented by Germany to China upon the murder of the two 
missionaries were briefly the following : 

"1. The building of an Imperial tablet to the memory of the missionaries 
who were murdered. 

2. The families of the murdered missionaries to be indemnified. 

3. The Governor of Shantung to be degraded permanently. 

4. The Chinese Government to defray the cost of the German occupation 
of Iviao-Chao. 

5. German engineers to have preference in the building of any railway 
which China may construct in the province of Shantung, and also in the 
working of any mine which may e.xist along the track of such railway." 

These were the demands officially presented to the Chinese Government by 
Germany. It was soon discovered from the Chinese officials that there was 
a si.xth demand, namely, for a guarantee that no murders of German subjects 
should ever again occur. It was this gurantee which assumed concrete form 
in the retention by Germany of Kiao-Chao. 

" A. & P., '98, CV (C-8814), No. 73. The attitude of the German Gov- 
ernment was well brought out in a speech by Secretary von Buelow before the 
Budget Commission of the Reichstag. After summarizing Germany's demands 
on China he concluded (translation by source). 

"The Chinese Government has thus agreed to all the demands which we 
have made in this respect. In accordance with my instructions, the negotia- 
tions have been conducted by the German Minister at Peking in understanding 
with the representative of Bishop Auger. In the Bishop's opinion the grant 
of the three Imperial tablets — a rare distinction will greatly enhance the 
prestige of the missionaries in China. The Imperial Government has thus 
taken every step without employing un-Christian severity to secure satisfaction 
for the outrages perpetrated on Christian missionaries, and, as regards the 
future, to prevent the recurrence of such acts of violence. The Imperial 
German Representative will do all in his power to provide for the carrjang 
out of the stipulations made so far as that had not already been done. The 
best security, however, is the permanent jjresence of a German force at Kiao- 
Chao Bay, "which now rests on the firm ground of Treaty right. By this the 
Chinese authorities will have continually before their eyes the evidence of 
German power, and vnll realize that wrongs committed against German 
nationals will not remain unavenged." 



250 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

any railway which China might construct in the province of Shan- 
tung and also in the working of any mines along that railway. 
Xegotiations over this demand were conducted for several months 
after the signing of the treaty transferring Kiao-Chao to Germany 
and finally resulted in further concessions more extensive and 
advantageous to Germany than could be inferred from the claim 
as first reported by Secretary von Buelow to the Budget Com- 
mission of the Reichstag. These new concessions^'* discriminated 
markedly in favor of German commerce and capital as compared 
with that of other nations. The Chinese Government sanctioned 
the construction of two lines of railway in Shantung, to carry out 
which a joint German and Chinese company was to be formed. 
The Chinese Government was to afl'ord effectual protection to the 
delegates of the German company in their work. The object 
of the railway was declared to be merely for the development of 
trade, and in demanding it, Germany testified against any aims 
at illegal extension of territory in the province. The Chinese 
Government conceded to German subjects the right of acquiring 
property in mines along the whole length of the railway line and 
within a distance of 30 li (about 65 miles) on either side of it. 
Chiliese capital might take part in the working of the mines. 
Finally there came the provision which guaranteed unequivocally 
the preferential treatment of Germany in the province. It was 
stipulated that — 

"If the Chinese Government or individual Chinese subjects 
should at any time have plans for the development of Shantung, 
for the execution of which foreign capital is required, they shall in 
the first place, apply to German capitalists for it. Similarly in the 
event of machines or other materials being required, German 
manufacturers shall in the first instance be applied to. Only when 
German capitalists or manufacturers have refused their assistance 
shall the Chinese be entitled to apply to other nations." 

Here was at the outset an arrangement radically contradictory 
to the principle of the "open door." Germany put forth in defense 
of the claim the fact that similar privileges had been granted to 

1^ A. & P., 1S99, CIX (C-9131), No. 235, Inclosiire. 



SHANTUNG CONCESSIONS 251 

France in 1895.^^ Great Britain made protest to the Chinese 
Government stating that she had dechned in 1895 to recognize 
the vahdity of the Chinese concessions to the French, had reserved 
all her rights at that time, and n,ow claimed most-favored-nation 
privileges on the ground of the new concessions to Germany. 
These she secured. ^*^ Russia in turn secured concessions concern- 
ing railway hnes near the Russian frontier^^ and trade concessions 
immediately north of Port Arthur, and France secured further 
privileges in Tonquin.^^ The situation had in short become a 

'5 Ibid., No. 21. Also A. & P. 1898, CV (C-8814), No. 70. 

The Chinese officials in an interview with the British representative declared 
that the German demand for railroad privileges in Shantung was similar in 
character to the stipulations of the French Convention of 1895. 

i« A. & P. 1898,. CV (C-8814), No. 85. The concessions were as follows: 

1. Opening of interior waterways to British and other foreign steamers. 

2. Assurance that China would never alienate any territory of ihe pro- 
vinces adjoining the Yang-tsze to any other power. 

3. The Inspector-General of Customs for the Chinese Government shall 
be in the future as in the past an Englishman — (for as long as the British 
trade with China shall continue to surpass that of any other nation.) 

Great Britain also secured extensions of her possessions at Hong Kong and 
the right to extend the Burmah Railway into Yunnan Province. (See A. & 
P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 17. 

'■ A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9329), No. 2. A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 

273 inclosure. 

Mac Donald to Salisl:)urv 

June, 24, 1898. 
Russian Foreign Office Special Agreement (St. Petersburg, May 7, 1898). 
(Supplement to Russo-Chinese Agreement of March 15, 1898, Russian 
calendar.) 

(neutral ground established north of Port Arthur). 

"Art. V. The Chinese Government agrees 

1. That without Russia's consent no concession will be made in the neutral 
ground for the use of subjects of other Powers. 

2. That the ports on the sea-coast east and west of the neutral ground shall 
not be opened to the trade of other Powers. 

3. And that without Russia's consent no road and mining concessions, 
industrial and mercantile privileges shall be granted in the neutral territory. 

's A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 17. The.se concessions to France 
included: , 

1. The lease of Kwangchow Wan as a coaling station (for 99 years). 

2. The right to construct a railway to Yunnan-fu from the Tonquin frontier. 

3. The promise not to alienate any territory in the three provinces of 
Kwangtung, Kwangsi and Yunnan, which border on the French frontier. 

4. The agreement that if the Chinese Government should ever create a 
Postal Department independent of the maritime customs and if a European 
is to be 'appointed Director, France will have equal right with others to appoint 
a candidate. 



252 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

battle for concessions.^^ It was soon realized, however, by the 
nations themselves that they were defeating their own ends in this 
unrestrained competition and that it would promote the interests 
of all if each defined its zone of intended future activities. Accord- 
ingly agreements were concluded-" between Great Britain and 
Germany and between Great Britain and Russia-^ defining their 
respective spheres of interest in China. In the sphere agreed 
upon as belonging to one nation the other nation promised not 

19 A. & P. 1899, CIX (C-9131), No. 245. Sir Claude MacDonald, British 
Minister to China, telegraphed to SaUsbury July 23, 1898, as follows: 

"The battle of concessions is not in my opinion going against us, as your 
Lordship suggests in your telegrams of 13th July. . . . Up to the present 
any concessions granted to other nationahties are far outbalanced in financial 
value by the Shansi and Honan mining and railway concessions and by the 
Shanghai-Nanking Railway concession with its possible extensions." 

20 F. R., 1899, pp. 129 to 135. The British sphere was the valley of the 
Yang-tsze, the Russian sphere was all China north of the Great Wall, the 
German sphere was the province of Shantung and the Valley of the Hoang Ho. 
France, also, by treaty with China, had given notice that her sphere of interest 
lay in the southern provinces bordering on her possessions in Tonquin. (See 
footnote 17). The British and German spheres were defined by agreement 
between British and German banking s>Tidicates in September, 1898, and this 
agreement was approved by the two governments. (See A. «fe P. 1899, CIX 
(C-9131), No. 3121. 

21 A. & P. 1899, CX (C-9241), Treaty Series No. 11. Exchange of Notes 
between the United Kingdom and Russia with regard to their Respective 
Railway Interests in China. 

No. 1 Sir C. Scott to Count Mouravieff 



"Great Britain and Russia animated by a sincere desire to avoid in China 
all cause of conflict on questions where their interests meet, and taking into 
consideration the economic and geographical gravitation of certain parts of 
that Empire, have agreed as follows: 

1. Great Britain engages not to seek for her own account or on behalf of 
British subjects or of others, any railway concessions to the north of the Great 
Wall of China, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for 
railway concessions in that region supported by the Russian Government. 

2. Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for her own account, or on behalf 
of Russian subjects or of others, any railway concessions in the basin of the 
Yang-tsze, and not to obstruct, directly or indirectly, applications for railway 
concessions in that region supported by the British Government. 

The two Contracting Parties, having nowise in view to infringe in any way 
the sovereign rights of China or existing Treaties, will not fail to communicate 
to the Chinese Government the present arrangement, which, by averting all 
cause of complications between them, is of a nature to consoHdate peace in 
the Far East, and to serve primordial interests of China herself. 

(Signed) 

Charles S. Scott. 
St. Petersburg, April 28, 1899." 



hay's first notes to the powers 253 

to seek for itself any railway or mining concessions, and not to 
obstruct the efforts of the first nation to acquire from China 
railway or mining concessions within the stipulated territory. 

It was these agreements acknowledging the special interests 
of certain European nations in certain sections of China which 
called forth Secretary Hay's first notes to the powers in 1899." 
In the note to Germany the secretary wrote that although at the 
time of the lease of Kiao-Chao the German Government had 
given assurances that the rights and privileges of United States 
citizens would be in nowise impaired in the acquired territory, 
nevertheless the formal agreement since made by Germany with 
Great Britain, recognizing Germany's exclusive right to certain 
privileges in the sphere of influence contiguous to the leased area, 
had created a different situation. As the exact nature and extent 
of the rights thus recognized had not been clearly defined, conflicts 
might arise at any time between British and German subjects 
and the interests of American citizens might be jeopardized. 
Being anxious to remove any cause for such conflict and to ensure 
for the commerce of all nations equality of treatment for their 
commerce and navigation throughout China, the Government 
of the United States would be pleased to receive from the Govern- 
ment of Germany formal assurances that it 

"First, win in no way interfere with any treaty port or any 
vested interest within any so-called 'sphere of interest' or leased 
territory it may have in China. 

Second, that the Chinese treaty tarifl' of the time being shall 
apply to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports as 
are within said 'sphere of interest' (unless they should be free 
ports), no matter to what nationality it may belong, and that 
duties so leviable shall be collected by the Chinese Government. 

Third, that it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of 
another nationality frequenting any port in such 'sphere' than 
shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher rail- 

-- F. R., 1899, pp. 128 to 143. In the note to Great Britain Secretary Hay 
stated that the United States would in no way commit itself to a recognition 
of the exclusive rights of any power within or control over any portion of the 
Chinese Empire under such agreements as had been concluded during the past 
year. 



254 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

road charges over lines built, controlled, or operated within its 
' sphere' on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects of other 
nationalities transported through such 'sphere' than shall be 
levied on similar merchandise belonging to its own nationals 
transported over equal distances." 

In forwarding this request Secretary Hay stated that he felt 
confident of the support of the German Government because of its 
Hberal policy already shown in declaring Kiao-Chao a free port 
and in aiding the Chinese Government in the establishment of a 
customs house there. These two actions, he declared, were directly 
in line with the policy which the United States wished to see estab- 
lished in China. 

The German Government replied first informally by interview 
with ]Mr. Jackson, American Charge d'Aft'aires at Berlin, declaring 
that the politics of Germany in the Far East were de facto the 
politics of the "open door" and that Germany proposed to main- 
tain this principle in the future. In regard to the United States' 
proposal, Secretary von Buelow advised that the other European 
cabinets be consulted in the matter, and if they agreed to adhere 
to it, Germany would raise no objection. He was also willing that 
the other cabinets be informed of this fact. This provisional 
acceptance Germany embodied later in written form, which stated 
that Germany had already carried out to the fullest extent equality 
of treatment of all nations in its Chinese possessions and that it 
entertained no thought of departing from this principle "so long as 
it was not forced to do so, on account of conditions of reciprocity, 
by a divergence from it by other governments." Similar rephes^^ 
accepting with the same reservation the American proposal were 
received by the United States from Great Britain, Russia, France 
and Japan. Secretary Hay then issued a circular note to all the gov- 
ernments concerned, stating that since the condition attached to 
their acceptance had been complied with the United States would, 
therefore, consider the assent given to it as final and definitive. 

" Ibid., p. 138. Italy having learned of t'he adherence of the other powers 
to the American proposals accepted them without reservation. 



THE BOXER REBELLION 255 

The United States had thus made its first progress toward the 
recognition of the "open door" as the principle to govern inter- 
national relations in China. That recognition had been hesitating, 
however, and far from complete, and had still the reservation 
attached to it which meant that if any nation were to depart from 
the policy all the rest kept themselves free to do the same. In 
Germany's declaration that Kiao-Chao should be a free port, she 
was carrying out the "open door" principle, and to this Secretary 
Hay gave due recognition. The privileges secured from China 
in the province of Shantung, however, discriminated in favor of 
German trade, capital and industry, and were therefore in contra- 
diction to any policy of equal opportunity. Germany's claim was 
that because it had made no distinction of treatment between other 
nations in the leased territory, it was therefore carrying out to 
the fullest extent the principle of the "open door." This was 
true only so far as it went and only for Kiao-Chao. The fact still 
remained that it had secured important concessions for its own 
commerce and the very fact and character of a sphere of interest 
contradicted the principle of the " open door." 

The following year came the Boxer rebellion and the murder by 
the Chinese of Baron von Ketteler, the German minister to China. 
The great A'iceroy of China, Li Hung Chang, records in his 
Memoirs-^ his consternation at the news. "If she" (Germany), 

24 Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 232 ff. 

June 22 

"A telegrapliic message tells me of the outrageous killing of the German 
minister. In the name of hell and purgatory and all the black valleys, what 
are the national miscreants tliinking about? . . . Now it will not only 
be war with Japan but with the German Empire. . . . 

And Germany will take no apology for the murder of her minister! If she 
took Kiao-Chao from us for the lives of two missionaries, what mil she demand 
for the life of Baron von Ketteler? I tremble for the consequences of all this 
folly! 

I did not know the Japanese official, but Baron von Ketteler was one of the 
last to say good-bye to me in Peking, and upon that occasion he spoke happily 
of our meeting in Germany four years before, when I was the guest of his own 
great nation. And now my fellow countrymen kill him in the streets of our 
capital! What will the Germans think now of the fine China I spoke so proudly 
of and which I endeavored to represent so worthily. And all the Christian 
world will more than ever look upon us as a vast swarm of barbarians, who are 
not possessed of the first principles of international fair dealing, nor deserving 
of the first advances of international comity. 

I am iU." 
17 



256 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

he writes, " took Kiao-Chao from us for the Hves of two mission- 
aries, what will she demand for the life of Baron von Ketteler? 
I tremble for the consequences of all this folly I" It was Germany's 
determination that China should tremble for this act and the prep- 
arations for the avenging expedition under Count von Waldersee 
were made with vigor.-^ Li Hung Chang viewed with alarm the 
increasing German regiments being despatched to China under the 
German Field Marshal. If they should establish a big army in 
the Chinese capital, he reasoned, and demand an indemnity such 
as they did of the French and stay until it should be paid, there 
seemed little chance of their leaving China at all. However, the 
results of the German expedition were not so dire as China had 
feared. The main object of the allied intervention, the freeing 
and protection of the foreign Legations at Peking, had been accom- 
plished by the time Count von Waldersee arrived, and the Chinese 
soldiers ha<l been ordered not to fire on or oppose in any way the 
movements of the foreign armies.-*^ There was, therefore, no imme- 
diate occasion for military operations on a large scale, and, while 
the German forces made a number of expeditions throughout 
the province, these did not have the harmful effect on the peace 
negotiations which was feared by the American minister, and by 

Secretary Hay." 

• 

25 It was on this occasion that the German Emperor uttered his notorious 
speech to the German troops as they were about to sail for China. As pub- 
hshed in the collection of Utterances of German Rulers, etc., entitled "Out 
of their own Mouths," the Kaiser's instructions were: 

"'You know very well that you are to fight against a cunning, V:)rave, well- 
armed and terrible enemy. If you come to grips with him, be assured quarter 
will not be given, no prisoners will be taken. Use your weapons in such a way 
that for a thousand years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German ask- 
ance. Be terrible as Attila's Huns.' 

William II, Speech to the Chinese Expeditionary force July 27, 1900. The 
last sentence appeared in contemporary reports but not in the official version." 

A. & P. 1900, CV (C-257), No. 237. The Emperor also declared: 

" I will not rest until the German flags united \\-ith those of the other powers 
float victoriously over those of China, and planted on the walls of Peking, 
dictate the terms of peace." 

2« F. R., 1901, Appendix, p. 40. 

" Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 245. Hay wrote on October 16, 1900: 

"Everything appeared to be going well until this promenade of Waldersee's 
to Tao Ping, which I fear will have very unfavorable results upon the rest of 



AMERICAN POLICY IN CHINA 257 

The whole weight of the United States' miHtary and diplomatic 
force was thrown on the side of the preservation of the territorial 
integrity and sovereignty of the Chinese Empire. At the most 
critical period of the Boxer uprising Secretary Hay issued a cir- 
cular telegram^* which set forth the immediate purpose and the 

China. The great Viceroys, to secure whose assistance was our first effort 
and our success, have been standing by us splendidly for the last four months. 
How much longer they can hold their turbulent populations quiet in the face 
of constant incitements to disturbance which Germany and Russia are giving 
is hard to conjecture." 

See also F. R. 1901, Appendix, pp. 91 and 92. Mr. Conger, American 
Minister at Peking, wrote to Secretary Hay Feb. 21, 1901, concerning an order 
of Coimt Waldersee's which threatened to resume military operations on a 
large scale: 

"There has been a constant disposition upon the part of most of the military 
commanders to do something or go somewhere with their troops upon the 
flimsiest of excuses, so that during the winter a great part of this province has 
been gone over. 

The probability was that under this order some kind of a movement would 
be made which might seriously disturb our present efforts at negotiation, 
frighten the court, make its return to Peking less probable, and jeopardize 
the final settlement." 

See also A. & P. 1901, XCI (C-675), Nos. 112 and 118. 
2^ F. R., 1901, Appendix, p. 12. Circular note of July 3, 1900, to the powers 
cooperating in China, defining the purposes and policy of the United States. 

Department of State, 
Washington, 

July 3, 1900. 
" In this critical posture of affairs in China it is deemed appropriate to define 
the attitude of the United States as far as present circumstances permit this 
to be done. We adhere to the policy initiated by us in 1857 of peace with the 
Chinese nation, of furtherance of lawful commerce, and of protection of lives 
and property of our citizens by all means guaranteed under e.xtraterritorial 
treaty rights and by the law of nations. If wrong be done to our citizens we 
propose to hold the responsible authors to the uttermost accountabihty. We 
regard the condition at Pekin as one of virtual anarchy, whereby power and 
responsibility are practically devolved upon the local provincial authorities. 
So long as they are not in overt collusion with rebellion and use their power 
to protect foreign life and property, we regard them as representing the Chinese 
people, with whom we seek to remain in peace and friendship. The purpose 
of the President is, as it has l)een heretofore, to act concurrently with the other 
powers; first, in opening up communication with Pekin and rescuing the Ameri- 
can officials, missionaries, and other Americans who are in danger; secondly, 
in affording all possible protection everywhere in China to American life and 
property; thirdly, in guarding and protecting all legitimate American interests; 
and fourthly, in aiding to prevent a spread of the disorders to the other pro- 
vinces of the Empire and a recurrence of such disasters. It is of course too 
early to forecast the means of attaining this last result; but the pohcy of the 
Government of the United States is to seek a solution which may bring about 
permanent safety and peace to China, preserve Chinese territorial and admin- 
istrative entity, protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty 



258 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

general policy of the United States in China. This note sent to the 
American embassies throughout Europe declared that while the 
American Government would hold to the "uttermost accounta- 
bility" the authors of any wrongs done to American citizens, it 
was the policy of the United States to seek a solution which would 
"preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity, protect 
all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international 
law and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial 
trade with all parts of the Chinese Empirie." It was, in a word, 
a reassertion of the doctrine of the "open door." The Chinese 
Viceroy-^ saw in the stand taken by the United States the one 
hope of the integrity of China — when he was convinced that all 
the other powers were aiming at the partition of the empire. 
The American influence was brought to bear wherever possible,^'' 

and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and 
impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire. 

You will communicate the purport of this instruction to the minister for 
foreign affairs. Hay." 

-^ Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 232. 

"All the foreign nations are against us it would seem. No, there is an 
exception, and the exception may prove our salvation from being sliced up 
like a watermelon. The Americans are, of course, acting with France, Russia, 
England, Germany, and Japan, but at the same time 1 have received assur- 
ances from the Ahierican commander and from the Washington Government 
that the United States ^\^ll oppose morally and physically, if necessarj', the 
partition of China. 

]My greatest fear now is from the Germans and Russians. The Germans 
Ijecause of the death of their minister, aTe despatching regiments ever\^ day 
for China, and are sending one of their greatest field-marshals to command 
their troops. If they establish a big army in the capital, and demand an 
indemnity such as they did cf the French, and stay until it is paid, I fear thej' 
will never leave us. The Russians, too, have a tremendous force, in Man- 
churia, and along the Siberian Railway-; and if there is an agreement between 
them it may take more than a ccmbinaticn of the other Powers to make them 
relent. My hope, however, is centred in the attitude of the United States." 

3° F. R., 1901, pp. 19 and 20. Russia having declared that she had no 
designs of territorial acquisition in China and had occupied Niuchwang purely 
temporarily for mihtary purposes, the United States took the opportunity to 
assert once more her general pohcy toward China and her immediate purpose 
in the joint operations. This purpose was to join with the other powers in the 
occupation of Peking vmtil the Chinese Government should be reestabhshed 
there, whereupon the United States would immediately withdraw her troops. 
Meanwhile, if any other power should withdraw its troops and proceed to look 
after its interests in Cliina by its own methods this would make a general 
withdrawal of all expedient. In short, the United States would stay in Peking 
under a definite understanding and not otherwise. (See Thayer: Life of Hay, 
Vol. II, p. 245, also p. 369.) 



BRITISH-GERMAN AGREEMENT, 1900 259 

but, standing alone, the strength of the United States' position 
was entirely moral. Secretary Hay testifies that it was successful 
in moderating the German policy in China at this time.^^ 

x\nother factor, however, had important influence for the benefit 
of China and assisted the policy of the United States, and that 
was the rivalry between the competing powers. As Li Hung 
Chang aptly described the situation, " Perhaps between the quarrel- 
ing of the foxes the sheep will get away."''^ It is quite probable that 
this rivalry rather than the influence of the United States accounted 
for the next development in the "open door" diplomacy. This 
was the publication of an agreement between Great Britain and 
Germany declaring the principles of their neutral policy in China.^^ 

31 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 246: 

'"The success we had in stopping that first preposterous German movement 
when the whole world seemed likely to join in it, when the entire press of the 
Continent and a great many on this side were in favor of it, will always be a 
source of gratification, ' he confides in the same letter to an intimate friend. 
'The moment we acted, the rest of the world paused, and finally came over 
to our ground; and the German Government, which is generally brutal but 
seldom silly, recovered its senses, climbed down off its perch, and presented 
another proposition which was exactly in line with our position. ' (October 
16, 1900.)" 

32 Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 233: 

"October 12, Peking. I have learned from a source that is beyond question- 
ing that the Powers had determined immediately after the capture of the city 
to make a division of China between them. Yet it seems that like so many 
dogs after the carcass of a beast, they could not agree upon their respective 
shares. It was determined that the European nations and Japan should act 
in concert, ignoring the United States. Tliis, however, was not found to be 
feasible, for, first, England, and then Japan, weakened. The trouble is that 
Japan wanted that part of China as her sphere of influence which Russia 
claimed as her own. Perhaps between the quarrelhng of the foxes the sheep 
will get away." 

33 F. R., 1901, Appendix, p. 31: 

"Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Govern- 
ment, being desirous to maintain their interests in China and their rights under 
existing treaties, have agreed to observe the following principles in regard to 
their mutual poHcy in China: 

I. It is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports 
on the rivers and littoral of China should remain free and open to trade and to 
every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all coun- 
tries, without distinction, and the two Governments agree on their part to 
uphold the same for all Chinese territory so far as they can exercise influence. 

II. Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Imperial German Govern- 
ment will not on their part make use of the present complication to obtain for 
themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions and wall direct 



260 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

They agreed that the ports on the rivers and coast of China should 
remain free and open to the trade of all countries without distinc- 
tion and the* two governments agreed to exercise their influence 
to this end. The British and German Governments secondly 
declared that they Avould not make use of the complications then 
prevailing to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in 
Chinese dominions, but would seek to preserve undiminished 
the territory of the Chinese Empire. And, thirdly, it was agreed 
that in case another power made use of the existing complications 
to obtain any territorial advantages, the two contracting parties 
would come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual 
steps to be taken for the protection of their interests in China. 
The other powers interested were then invited to accept these 
principles. 

This agreement came as a great surprise to the United States. 
Secretary Hay termed it a bomb-shell among the diplomats at 
Washington.'*^ It was a triumph of his policy, something which 
because of the American policy against alliances he had been 

their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the 
Chinese Empire. 

III. In case of another power making use of the complications in China in 
order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages, the two 
contracting parties reserve to themselves to come to a preUminary under- 
standing as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own 
interests in China 

IV. The two Governments will communicate this agreement to the other 
powers interested, and especially to Austria-Hungary, France, Italy, Japan, 
Russia, and the United States of America, and will invite them to accept the 
principles recorded in the agreement." 

3* Letters of John Hay, Vol. Ill, p. 201. 

Hay to Adams 

» Department of State, 

Washington, 

October 31, 1900. 
"The A(nglo)-G(erman) pact was a bomb-shell here. None of the diplomats 
know anything about it. My B(ritish?) people say it is a victory for G(ermanjO 
and Russia. C(hoate) can't get a word out of S(alisbury). P(auncefote) 
thinks it all right and apologizes for infringing my copy-right. . . . All 
of the powers seem to be shy, except J(apan), who plunged in boldh' and said 
they were into the game third clause and all, — I imagine a little to the con- 
sternation of the two signatories. 

Our position was a matter of course. We can't make alliances, but we can't 
object to other powers making alliances to do our chores for us. If — of course." 



hay's view of BRITISH-GERMAN AGREEMENT 261 

laboring alone to accomplish. ^^ And yet the Secretary, who held 
marked British sympathies, felt grieved over the situation because, 
although on the face of the compact it seemed to be an alliance 
to prevent further aggressions of Russia in China, he soon per- 
ceived that it was in reality a check on British control in her 
sphere of interest, the valley of the Yangtsze, and that Great 
Britain had been led into the agreement without realizing its full 
import.^*^ Secretary Hay, however, rejoiced over the fact that 
through the Anglo-German compact in maintenance of the " open 
door" the United States was spared an alliance with Germany. 

Secretary Hay's analysis of the underlying motive for the 
British-German agreement, namely, the prevention of increase of 



^5 Letters of John Hay, Vol. Ill, p. 199: 

Hay to C(lara) S. H(ay) 



Department of State, 
Washington, D. C, 
Oct. 29, 1900. 



"When I got in the train I saw in the evening papers the news of the 
Anglo-German agreement to defend the integrity of China and the Open Door. 
This was the greatest triumph of all. Lord S(alisbury) proposed this to me, 
before I left England. I could not accept it, Ijecause I knew that unspeakable 
Senate of ours would not ratify it, and ever since I have been laboring to bring 
it about without any help, and succeeded as far as was possible for one power 
to do it. Now then, two great powers, who are not dependent upon the Senate, 
come together and form a compact to confirm and fortify my work, which 
makes the 20th of October a great day in my little hfe." 

=*« Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 248: 

To Henry Adams 

November 21, 1900. 

What a business this has been in China! So far we have got 

on by being honest and naif — I do not clearly see where we are to come the 
delayed cropper? But it will come. At least we are spared the infamy of an 
alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think, be the dupe of China, than the 
chum of the Kaiser. Have you noticed how the world will take anything 
nowadays from a German? Buelow said A^esterday in substance — "We have 
demanded of China everything we can think of. If we think of an^-thing else 

we will demand that, and be d d to you" — and not a man in the world 

kicks. 

My heart is heavy about John Bull. Do you twig his attitude to Germany? 
When the Anglo-German pact came out, I took a day or two to find out what 
it meant. I soon learned from Berlin that it meant a horrible practical joke 
on England. From London I found out what I had suspected, but what it 
astounded me, after all, to be assured of— THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW! 
Germany proposed it, they saw no harm in it, and signed. When Japan 
joined the pact, I asked them why. They said, 'We don't know, only if there 
is any fun going on, we want to be in.' Cassini is furious — which may be 
because he has not been let into the joke." 



262 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

British control in China, seems to be confirmed to a degree by 
Secretary von Biielow in his pubKc comment^^ on the position of 
Germany in China after the acquisition of Kiao-Chao. Germany 
]iad won, he declared, in Kiao-Chao a strategic and political posi- 
tion which assured to it a determining influence on the future fate 
of Eastern Asia. From this firm position Germany could look 
upon the further development of affairs there with equanimity. 
The Germans had so great a sphere of action before them and such 
important tasks ahead that they had no need to be envious of 
the concessions made to other powers. The gist of the Secretary's 
words was that Germany was well satisfied with her acquisition 
in China and had secured enough room for future development. 
The conclusion seems justifiable, therefore, that the next move 
in her interest was not to seek further concessions for herself but 
to check the further acquisitions of the other powers. The par- 
ticular determination to prevent Great Britain from advancing 
her hold on the Yangtsze valley came out two years later during 
the negotiations concerning the withdrawal of the foreign troops 
from Shanghai. At that time Germany sought to obtain from 
China the formal pledge not to grant to any power special advan- 
tages of a political, military, maritime or economic nature on either 
the upper or lower Yangtsze.^'^ The policy, therefore, directly 
suited to Germany's need was the United States policy of the "open 
door." This principle the new agreement with Great Britain 
reasserted without at the same time upsetting the siaivs quo or in 
any way disturbing the advantages obtained at Kiao-Chao or 
throughout the province of Shantung. 

The replies^^ to the Anglo-German note were in principle similar 
to the replies received by Secretary Hay in his first note to the 
powers the previous year. Russia and France each declared that 
they had already demonstrated their intention to preserve the 

" V. R. '97-'98, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '98, S. 1987. 

38 A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1369), No. 2. 

3^ For the replies of the powers see "Correspondence respecting the Anglo- 
German Agreement of October IG, 1900, relating to China." A. P. 1900 
CV (C-365). For Hay's description of the attitude of the other powers, 
especially Japan, see footnote 34. 



JOINT NOTES OF THE POWERS, 1900 263 

integrity of China and to maintain the "open door" to commerce 
in that Empire — but that, in the' case of the infringement of these 
principles by any power, they reserved the right to act according 
to circumstances for the guarding of their interests. Secretary 
Hay's reply summed up the previous efforts of the United States 
to secure recognition of the same principles set forth in the Anglo- 
German agreement and recorded the full sympathy of the American 
Government with those principles. As to the third article, however, 
referring to the proposed action of Great Britain and Germany 
in case of infringement of the principles by a third party, Secretary 
Hay deemed this to be merely an arrangement between the two 
contracting powers and did not consider that the United States 
was called upon to express an opinion in regard to it. Japan 
took a different stand from the rest, and upon being assured that 
acceptance of the agreement would place it in the same position 
as if it had concluded with Great Britain a like agreement, it 
endorsed unqualifiedly the whole compact and was recognized as 
a signatory rather than an adhering state. 

Having thus definitely agreed not to use the Boxer uprising as 
an occasion for further territorial demands on China, the powers 
framed the joint note*° to the Chinese Government upon principles 
of the punishment of the responsible authorities of the massacres 
and upon equitable money indemnities to the governments and 
individuals injured in proportion to. the losses suffered. No dis- 
tinction was made in the note in the treatment to be accorded to 
the several nations by China, except that in the case of Germany 
and Japan, each of which had lost an official representative at the 
hands of the Boxers, China was to despatch an extraordinary 
mission, headed (in the case of Germany) by an Imperial Prince, 
to express the regrets of the Emperor of China for the murders 
committed. During the long negotiations of the commissioners 
oh the subject of the amount of indemnity*^ the influence of the 

" F. R. 1901, Appendix, p. 59. 
" Ibid., pp. 141 and 142. 

Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Commissioner of the United States to China 

Peking, April 23, 1901. 



. . . "The terms of the Joint Note of December 24 last stated that the 
indemnity should be 'equitable,' in other words just and reasonable, by which 



264 GERxMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

United States was constantly on the side of moderating the 
demands and reducing them to amounts which China could pay 
' without grave financial embarrassment prejudicial to the admin- 
istration of the country." The influence of the German representa- 
tive, on the other hand, was in favor of a heavy indemnity, reim- 
bursing the powers for their expenses as far as the revenues of 
China made this possible."*- In view of the necessity of main- 
taining the entente with Germany, the American Commissioner, 
Mr. RockJiill, records^^ that Great Britain made frequent conces- 

we understood that it should not exceed tlie power of China to pay without 
creating for it grave financial embarrassments, prejudicial to the administra- 
tion of the country, administrative reform, and to all foreign interests, and 
which might compel it to have recourse to financial expedients, which all the 
powers must condemn, imperilUng the independence and integrity of the 
Empire. 

Since the indemnity to be asked of China must therefore be reasonable, 
it mattered little to us whether its annual revenues were eighty or a hundred or 
more millions of taels. We were bound to only ask that which China was in a 
position to pay us of our losses and expenses and it was not for us to seek to 
ascertain what was the full extent of China's resources so as to exact the last 
cent of it of her." 



"The German minister stated that he had no instructions from his Gov- 
ernment on our proposition, but he thought that if the commission charged 
with studying the revenue ascertained that China could pay the full amount 
of the expenses of the powers she should be made to do so, and that he saw no 
reason why the latter should show excessive generosity in the matter." 

Ibid., p. 171. 

Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay 

Commissioner of the United States to China, 
Peking, May 22, 1901. 



"The Austrian, German, and Russian ministers were opposed to this 
proposition, the German minister expressing himself most strongly on the 
subject, saying that his instructions directed him to insist on the integral 
payment of every cent spent, or to be spent, by his Government on the expedi- 
tion to north China. I fancy, however, his Government has before this prac- 
tically accepted the British proposal." 

« Ibid., p. 312 ff. 450,000,000 Haekwan taels equal about $340,000,000. 
« Ibid., p. 175. 

Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay 

Commissioner of the United States to China 

Peking, China, May 25, 1901. 



"The position of Germany on the question of the indemnity, has, as I 
have advised you repeatedly, been most uncompromising. The urgent 
necessity for Great Britain to maintain her entente with Germam* in China 
is, of course, responsible for the numerous concessions she has recently made 



WITHDRAWAL OF POWERS FROM SHANGHAI 265 

sions to this German viewpoint. The total indemnity as finally 
agreed upon was 450,000,000 Haikwan taels, an amount greater 
than that suggested as fitting by the United States. 

The next event involving the assertion of the "open door" 
policy by Germany occurred in 1902 at the occasion of the with- 
drawal of the foreign troops from Shanghai.*^ During the dis- 
turbances the city had been occupied by British, French, German 
and Japanese troops, but with the restoration of order, negotia- 
tions were initiated for a simultaneous withdrawal. The condi- 
tions^^ laid down by Germany for the withdrawal of her troops 
were, first, that a previous arrangement should be made for the 
simultaneous and uniform evacuation; secondly, that in case any 
power should proceed to a fresh occupation of Shanghai, Germany 
should reserve the right to take similar action; and, thirdly, that 
the Peking Government and the Yangtsze Viceroys should engage 
"not to grant to any power special advantages of a poUtical, 
military, maritime or economic nature, nor to allow the occupa- 
tion of any other points commanding the river either below or 
above Shanghai." The German Government explained that this 
did not refer to individual concessions — such as railway conces- 
sions, but that its purpose was merely to prevent " such grants as 
would entail the exclusion of free competition on the part of the 
other states in a manner contrary to the principle of the 'open 
door.' " These conditions were accepted by China. Great Britain 
whose sphere of interest was the Yangtsze Valley, protested at 
once both to Germany and to China on the ground that the " open 
door" principle was already suflSciently safeguarded by existing 
agreements; and that such an arrangement would be binding only 
on a limited number of powers and restricted to onh' a portion of 

to German insistence on being paid the last cent of her expenses. The most 
remarkable of these concessions is found, however, in the British Government's 
willingness to have the tariff on imports raised to an effective 5 per cent, ad 
valorem, without compensating commercial advantages." 

See also A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1005), Nos. 37, 56, 62, 65, 79, 90, 96, 
and 100. 

« A. & P. 1902, CXXX (C-1369). 

45 A. & P. 1902, CXXX, No. 22 (C-1369). The first two conditions were 
also laid down bv France. 



2G(3 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

Chinese dominions. To the Chinese Government the ^Marquess 
of Lansdowne sent word*^ that the British Government ^^•ould 
not pay any regard to any pledges given by the Chinese Govern- 
ment or Viceroys by which the British freedom of action in the 
future for the maintenance of order and the protection of British 
interests in the Yangtsze region would be limited. To the German 
Government Lord Lansdowne declared, further, that the British 
Government objected to the German condition, not because it 
had any intention of receding from the "open door" policy but 
because the condition seemed specially directed against Great 
Britain. ^^ The German Government therefore modified its con- 

^«Ibid., No. 32. 

The ]\Iarquess of Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow 

Foreign Office, October 16, 1902. 
"(Telegraphic) 

EVACUATION of Shanghai. 

Tell Prince Ching that His ^Majesty's Government deeply resent his treat- 
ment of them. Remind him that Chinese interests have constantly been 
upheld by them, and that the consent of Germany and France was due to our 
initiative. 

His jVIaje&ty's Government are compelled by Prince Ching's duplicity to 
reconsider their attitude, and he will be responsible should withdrawal of 
troops consequently not take place. 

You may communicate to him the substance of reply of His Majesty's 
Government to the German Government, and inform him that we shall not 
pay regard to any pledges given by the Chine&e Government or Viceroys by 
which their and our freedom of action in the future as regards the maintenance 
of order and protection of our interests in the Yang-tsze region would be 
limited. 

This telegram should be repeated to Sir C. MacDonald." 

4" Ibid., No. 47. 

The Marquess of Lansdowne to Count IVIetternich 

Foreign Office, November 6, 1902. 



"To that condition His Majesty's Government took exception, not, as 
you are aware, because they desired to recede from their adherence to the 
principle of the "open door," or because they are not most anxious to preserve 
the sovereign rights of China, but because they can see no reason why the 
withdrawal of their troops from Shangha* should be made the occasion for a 
fresh affirmation of those accepted principles, or for a renunciation which, if it 
had any new meaning at all, seemed specially directed against Great Britain. 

I understood from your Excellency that the actual terms of the General 
declaration which has now been made by the Chinese Government are not 
3^et in your possession, but I gather from the description given of it in your 
note that it has reference not only to the Yang-tsze region, but to the whole 
of the Chinese Empire, with this limitation, that it would not extend to any 
alienation of sovereign or territorial rights by China which might alreadj- have 
taken place. 

His Majesty's Government are not a party to this arrangement, and do not 
therefore consider themselves afTected by it, and of this they have informed 
the Chinese Government." 



GERMAN-CHINESE AGREEMENT, 1902 267 

dition to apply to the whole of the Chinese Empire and secured 
from China a formal declaration that the empire would not part 
with any of its sovereign rights nor would it agree to any preferen- 
tial right which was opposed to the principle of the "open door.""*^ 
The German ambassador explained"*^ to the jNIarquess of Lansdowne 
that none of the powers should take offense at the agreement 
since they had all repeatedly declared that they would respect the 
sovereignty of China and the principle of the open door; that the 
present agreement was binding on China alone, interfered with the 
rights of no one and aimed only at maintaining the status quo. 
Moreover, he declared, this declaration of China in no way preju- 
diced the Anglo-German treaty of October, 1900, nor the adher- 
ence of the powers to the principle of the "open door," agreed to 
at the suggestion of the United States, but, on the contrary, 
completed and confirmed such declarations. The INIarquess of 
Lansdowne, however, reasserted that, as Her ^Majesty's Govern- 
ment was not a party to the arrangement, it would not consider 
Great Britain to be affected by it, and he so informed the Chinese 
Government. 



« Ibid., No. 43. « Ibid., No. 48. 

Count jNIetternich to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (Received Nov. 7) 
(Translation) 
My Lord, German Embassy, London, Nov. 7, 19 02. 

"I had the honor to-day to receive your Excellency's note of the 6th 
instant, and shall not fail to make known its contents to my Government. 

I would, however, at once venture to observe that the condition which was 
referred to in the note from this Embassy of the 7th ultimo, and to which 
objection is taken bj^ the British Government, cannot be considered as specially 
directed against Great Britain. By a declaration that the Chinese Govern- 
ment will not cede any of the rights of sovereignty of China and will not sanc- 
tion any monopoly in contradiction to the principle of the open door none of 
the participating Powers should be offended, as the latter have repeatedly 
positively declared that they would respect the sovereignty of China as well as 
the principle of the open door. That engagements which are given to us alone 
by China, and which, with the exception of China, are binding on no one 
which interfere with the rights of no one, and only aim at maintaining the 
status quo should be taken as containing a provision directed against Great 
Britain must be the result of a misapprehension. 

As the Imperial Government merely took part in the occupation of Shanghse 
because the serious crisis which prevailed in the interior of China two years 
ago might have brought about a change in the status quo in the Yang-tsze 
territory, it appeared only logical to require guarantees from China as a pre- 
liminary to the evacuation of Shanghse, which guarantees, on the reestablish- 
ment of peace, would take the place of the actual guarantees given by the 
occupation of Shanghse. 

I have etc. 
(signed) P. Metternich. 



268 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

As is evident, these negotiations represented a diplomatic 
game of the two powers. Germany had in the agreement of 1900 
secured Great Britain's promise not to infringe upon the principle 
of the " open door " in her sphere of interest. The German Govern- 
ment now made this more 'secure by obtaining a promise from 
China that no further cessions of her sovereignty would be made 
and no monopolies granted throughout the empire. Although it 
is self-evident that China had no desire to make further conces- 
sions and would avoid it if possible, still it was valuable to Ger- 
many to have this stated in formal contract, so that any breach of 
that contract in the future might furnish groimd for corresponding 
new claims by Germany. In the 1900 agreement Germany had 
bound herself to maintain the " open door." In the 1902 agreement 
she had bound China as well. 

Two years later, during the Russo-Japanese war, Germany took 
the initiative still more definitely in defense of the "open door." 
This was done through the medium of the United States.^" The 
German Emperor suggested that the American Government call 
upon the powers to use their good offices to influence Russia and 
Japan to respect the neutrality of China outside the sphere of 
inihtary operations. Secretary Hay, in agreement with President 
Roosevelt, acquiesced in the suggestion, modifying it by eliminat- 
ing the clause "outside the sphere of military operations" and 
adding to the "neutrality" the "administrative entity" of China. 

The following year Germany again called upon the United States 
to take action in behalf of the open door.^^ The Emperor sent word 
to President Roosevelt that he believed the integrity of China to 
be gravely menaced. He was convinced that a coalition was 
being formed under the leadership of France for the spoliation of 
China, the combination consisting of France, England and Russia. 
He therefore requested the United States to frustrate this coalition 
by asking all the powers having interests in the Far East whether 
they would pledge themselves not to claim any compensation in 
China or elsewhere for any services they might render to the 



Thayer: Life of Hay, p. 372. Also F. R. 1904, p. 309 ff, 327 ff. 
Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. H, pp. 385 ff. 



OPEN-DOOR DIPLOMACY DURING RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR 269 

belligerents. This would force the powers to reveal any designs 
against the "open door." If the United States should accede to 
this request, Germany would, of course, at once declare her own 
policy of disinterestedness. 

President Roosevelt and Secretary Hay agreed that it would be 
well to accept the Kaiser's suggestion. Accordingly the Secre- 
tary framed a circular letter" and despatched it to the American 
embassies throughout Europe. It stated that it had come to the 
knowledge of the United States that apprehension existed on the 
part of some of the powers lest claims be made after the close of the 
Russo-Japanese war for concession of Chinese territory to neutral 
powers. While the President was loath to share this apprehension, 
the United States considered it fitting to reassert the position it had 
maintained and which it had repeatedly made known, namely, the 
maintenance of the integrity of China and the open door to com- 
merce in the Orient. The United States, therefore, in the existing 
situation disclaimed any thouglitof acquiring territorial rights or 
control in the Chinese Empire and invited the other governments 

5-' F. R. 1905, p. 1. 

(Circular Telegram) 

Department of State, 
Washington, 

Jan. 13, 1905. 
To the American Ambassadors to Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Great 
Britain, Italy and Portugal. 
"It has come to our knowledge that apprehension exists on the part of 
some of the powers that in the eventual negotiations for peace between Russia 
and Japan claim may be made for the concession of Chinese territory to neutral 
powers. The President would be loath to share this apprehension, believing 
that the introduction of extraneous interests would seriously embarrass and 
postpone the settlement of the issues^ involved in the present contest in the 
Far East, thus making more remote the attainment of that peace which is so 
earnestly to be desired. For its part, the United States has repeatedly made 
its position well known, and has been gratified at the cordial welcome accorded 
to its efforts to strengthen and perpetuate the broad policy of maintaining 
the integrity of China and the "open door" in the Orient, whereby equality 
of commercial opportunity and access shall be enjoyed by all nations. Holding 
these views the United States disclaims any thought of reserved territorial 
rights or control in the Chinese Empire, and it is deemed fitting to make this 
purpose frankly known and to remove all apprehension on this score so far as 
concerns the policy of this nation, which maintains so considerable a share of 
the Pacific commerce of China and which holds such important possessions in 
the western Pacific, almost at the gateway of China. 

You will bring this matter to the notice of the government to which you are 
accredited, and you will invite the expre.ssion of its views thereon. 

John Hay." 



270 GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 

to express their ^'ie\vs on the subject. The rephes from all the 
powers declared them to be in full accord with the principle set 
forth by the United States. Germany's acceptances^ of her own 
invitation was of course especially emphatic and gratification was 
expressed that the American Government intended to continue to 
assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the policy of the 
integrity of China and the "open door" in the Far East. 

It is thus clear that after the taking of Kiao-Chao, and beginning 
with the xA.nglo-German agreement of 1900, the United States' 
doctrine of the "open door" received the active support of Ger- 
many. The German Government claimed that it had always 
acted upon that doctrine and that it had demonstrated this in 
declaring Kiao-Chao a free port. This explanation ignored, 
however, the special privileges secured to Germany in the province 
of Shantung. These, while they left all other nations on a par 
with one another in relation to the trade of that province, dis- 
criminated in favor of German industry, products and capital 
in a manner directly contrary to the doctrine. The general atti- 
tude of the two countries toward China itself was radically different 
The United States, although possessing a most-favored-nation 
treaty with China, '^'^ did not assert its rights under that treaty as 

" r. R. 1905, p. 3 (Inclosure — translation by source). 

The German Chancellor to Ambassador Tower 

Berlin, Jan. 18, 1905. 

"Mr. Ambassador: I have had the honor of receiving your commmiication 
of the 14th of January, 1905, in which you were good enough to set forth the 
position of your Government in regard to certain questions raised by the 
present war between Russia and Japan. I am extremely gratified to learn 
by it that the President and the Government of the United States of America 
intend to continue to assist in the maintenance and strengthening of the policj^ 
of the integrity of China and the open door in the Far East for the benefit of 
the free commercial iiitercourse of all nations and that they have no thought 
of acciuiring territorial rights in the Chinese Empire. 

This view corresponds entirely with that of the German Government which 
has repeatedly declared its adherence to the principles of the integrity of China 
and the open door in the Far East. Its purpose is absolutely to stand by its 
former declarations. Germany's position is defined in the Anglo-German 
agreement of the 16th of October, 1900, which was communicated at that time 
to all the powers interested and accepted by them. In this agreement the 
Imperial Government has bound itself to support the principle of the open door 
in China wherever its influence may be felt. It is therefore scarcely necessary 
to add that the Imperial Government does not seek for itself any further 
accjuisition of territory in China. 
I avail etc. 

BUELOW." 

5^ Malloy: Vol. I, p. 221. 



. GERMAN AND AMERICAN POLICIES IN CHINA 271 

a basis for claim to Chinese territory, when other nations were 
acquiring ports and other concessions on the ground of their most- 
fa vored-nation treaties with China. The United States announced 
at the outset and consistently acted upon its purpose of maintain- 
ing the integrity of China^^ even though it had as much basis 
as the others for claims to similar concessions. In the case of 
Germany the policy was governed by a deliberate expansion 
system, which ignored the rights of China and sought to justify 
itself by the actions of the other European powers. Great Britain, 
France and Russia had each secured a foothold in the Empire, 
therefore Germany had determined to secure one also and merely 
waited for the suitable occasion, which came in 1897. The atti- 
tude of the government was described openly by von Buelow 
before the Reichstag at the time of the seizure of Kiao-Chao.^'^ The 
Secretary stated that while the partition of China would not 
have been initiated by Germany, that the Government had merely 
seen to it that whatever happened Germany should not come out 

55 Memoirs of Li Hung Chang, p. 234: 

"Peking, at U. S. Legation, October 19. — Today I received an American 
newspaperman, and gave him a lengthy interview. I would not have talked 
at all with him, but for two things: his paper, which is one of great influence 
at Washington, has been China's advocate in all this miserable affair; and 
secondly, he told me that he tried to get an interview with me at the Phila- 
delpMa junction (Germantown) but failed. So I made it up with him, and sent 
the thanks of China and myself to those fair-dealing people who live in the 
land of Lincoln and Grant and McKinley." 

56 V. R. '97-'98, Bd. IH, 76 Sitz., 27. April, '99, S. 1987. (transl. by author) : 

' ' Reference has been made to the partition of China. Such a partition would 
at any rate not have proceeded from us; we have only seen to it in season that 
whatever may happen, we shall not come out entirely empty handed. When 
a railroad train shall start does not always depend on the inclination of the 
traveller, but (it is his business to see) that he does not miss connections. The 
devil takes the hindmost! (Den Letzen beissen die Hunde) (Amusement) 
But we do not desire — and this I wish to mark with especial emphasis — that it 
should come to a partition of the Chinese Empire. And I do not believe today 
that such a partition will occur within the visible future (in absehbarer Zeit). 
At any rate we have won and herewith I think are best summed up the reasons, 
which led us to Kiao-Chao and also the significance of Kiao-Chao for us — in 
Kiao-Chao a strategic and political position, which assures us a determining 
influence on the future fate of East Asia. From this firm position, we can 
await the further development of affairs with calmness and equanimity. We 
have before us so great a sphere of action and such important tasks that we 
need not begrudge other nations the concessions granted to them. (Very 
good!) German foreign policy will, as everywhere, so also in East Asia, under- 
stand how to go its way calmly, firmly and peacefully. We will nowhere play 
the role of disturber of the peace, but also not that of Cinderella. (Animated 
bravo!)" 
IS 



27>2 



GERMANY AND THE OPEN DOOR IN CHINA 



empty-handed. It was not the privilege of the traveller to deter- 
mine when the train should start, but it was his business to see 
that he did not miss it. In other words, as the secretary expressed 
it, it was a case of "the devil takes the hindmost" ("den Letzten 
beissen die Hunde"). However, having secured in China that 
which suited well Germany's putrposes, both from the viewpoints 
of strategic position and commercial opportunity, the Imperial 
Government considered that the interests of the empire dictated 
a maintenance of the stahis quo. For this the best instrument was 
the American doctrine of the "open door." The utterance of that 
doctrine, however, came with better grace from its first champion, 
the United States. For this reason" the Emperor called upon 
President Roosevelt for a reassertion of this doctrine at the time 
when the status quo in China seemed to him again threatened. 
The United States was glad to take advantage of another oppor- 
tunity to secure from the powers reinforcement of its well-known 
principle. Therefore, it resulted that from the time of the Anglo- 
German compact to the end of the period under consideration 
both the United States and Germany were acting as champions 
of the "open door." 

" Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 388. Mr. Thayer holds that the Kaiser 
felt isolated from the other great powers at this time and feared that they 
aimed at the partition of China without giving Germany a share of the spoils. 
Mr. Thaj^er also holds that a desire to humiliate France for intrigues in Morocco 
was an additional reason for the Kaiser's approach to the United States on 
this question. Secretary Hay himself records in his diary: 

"What the whole performance meant to the Kaiser it is difficult to see. 
But there is no possible doubt that we have scored for China." 

Mr. Elihu Root spoke of this subject in his address as Temporary Chairman 
of the Republican National Convention at Chicago in 1904. (See "The 
Military and Colonial Policy of the United States: Address and Reports," by 
Elihu Root, pp. 105 and 106). Mr. Root stated: 

"None other had won confidence in the sincerity of its purpose, and none 
other but America could render the service which we have rendered to 
humanity in China during the past four years. High evidence of that enviable 
position of our country is furnished by the fact that when all Europe was in 
apprehension lest the field of war between Russia and Japan should so spread 
as to involve China's ruin and a universal conflict, it was to the American gov- 
ernment that the able and far-sighted German Emperor appealed, to take the 
lead again in bringing about an agreement for the limitation of the field of 
action, and the preservation of the administrative entity of China outside of 
Manchuria; and that was accomplished. ..." 



CHAPTER VIII 
GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

For a complete and adequate study of the German policy toward 
the fundamental American policy of the Monroe Doctrine, many 
factors besides the events leading to diplomatic negotiations 
should be taken into account. Such a study should give full 
weight to the general expansion policy of the German Govern- 
ment as expressed openly by its representatives and demonstrated 
by its colonial acquisitions. Account should be taken of the 
programs framed and voiced by the Pan-Germanists, opposed by 
the Radicals and Moderates, but followed — at some distance — by 
the Imperial Government. There should also be considered the 
avenues through which this policy was conducted — the effective 
support given by the government to German enterprise in foreign 
countries and the efforts of the government to use the stream of 
German emigration to further the commerce and national prestige 
of the empire. It was the consciousness of these facts, rather than 
the factors of actual controversy betw^een the two countries, which 
caused the American public to look upon Germany as the new foe 
of the Monroe Doctrine. In this chapter, however, the attempt 
only is made to view the German Government's attitude from 
those diplomatic negotiations in which the Monroe Doctrine w^as 
the main principle involved. 

During the forty-year period under consideration there were 
comparatively few diplomatic controversies between Germany and 
the United States relating to a possible violation of the Monroe 
Doctrine, and with the exception of the Venezuela episode of 1902 
to 1904, none which — so far as published documents reveal — 
threatened to become serious. The first episode occurred shortly 
after the unification of the empire in 1871 and related to the country 
so frequently the center of complications with European powers — 



274 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Venezuela. Germany planned^ to present to the various powers 
having claims against that country the proposal that they unite 
to secure satisfaction of their claims. Before taking the step, 
however, Baron Gerolt, the German Minister at Washington, 
consulted Secretary Fish as to how the United States would receive 
such a proposal. He had been instructed not to make the proposal 
formally to the American Government unless sure that it would 
be favorably received. Secretary Fish informed the baron that 
the United States had a vivid recollection of a combined European 
movement against Mexico a few years previous, and would wish 
now to know more definitely Germany's intentions and the causes 
of her complaints against Venezuela. If the object was merely 
a united remonstrance against the chronic revolutionary conditions 
of Venezuela and her non-observance of obligations, the American 
Government would not object and w^ould itself make a similar 
protest. But if, however, the purpose were the forcible coercion 
of \'enezuela by a combination of European powers, then the 
United States would view such action with the greatest concern. 
No forcible action was taken, the countries leaving their claims 
to mixed commissions for settlement.^ Mr. Bancroft, American 
Minister to Germany, wrote to Secretary Fish'^ that Germany 
intended nothing further than the protection of her subjects in 
^ enezuela and would do nothing against the wishes of the United 
States. The British minister at Washington showed that the 
British Charge d 'Affaires at Caracas had been instructed to join 

1 Moore: Vol. VI, p. 531. 

2 House Reports No. 29, 42nd Cong., 2nd Sess. Also A. & P., 1871. 
LXXII (C-308), 571. 

3 J. C.'B. Davis Corresp. 
Fish to Davis. 

July 7, 1871. 



"Bancroft writes me that Germany means nothing in the Venezuela 
business, except to show a watchfulness over the rights of some of her subjects 
in business there, and that she will do nothing without advising us or against 
our wishes. He expresses a desire to be allowed to say that in the Joint 
Gommission the U. S. Commissioners wished that Germany (name) one of the 
Arbitrators and that we proposed to refer the question to Germany — the 
latter I am not sure that we did in terms — we sounded them. I do not know 
that there will be any harm in letting Bancroft state the facts — not officially 
or by authority but he may 'blab.' Do you see any objection? If not you 
may say so to him." 



PROPOSAL FOR JOINT ACTION AGAINST VENEZUELA, 1871 275 

in a diplomatic representation to Venezuela, but to go no further 
should the representation be unsuccessful.'' The episode did not 
develop into any real controversy^ but served to place again on 
record the opposition of the United States to combined action 
by European powers against an American State. 

In 1874 the rumor became current that Germany was negotiating 
with Denmark for the acquisition of the Danish West Indies." 
Mr. Bancroft was instructed to inquire discreetly into the subject 
and to ascertain the truth of the report, as the transfer of those 
islands to another European power could not be regarded with 
favor by the United States. Mr. Bancroft w^as emphatic in his 
denial of the report that Germany was planning to acquire the 

^J. C. B. Davis: Journal. 

July 6, 1871. 

"He (Sir Edward Thornton (British minister to United States)) then said 
that Mr. Fish had spoken to him about a communication from Baron Gerolt 
to this Government about Venezuela, proposing a joint note of the several 
creditor governments to be followed by joint hostile action if the note should 
prove to be ineffectual, and that Mr. Fish had informed him that he had 
replied to the Baron that should such a note be followed by combined hostile 
action from the European governments the United States would look with 
disfavor upon such a course. Sir Edward then said that he would, although 
not instructed to do so (show? a dispatch which he had received from his 
government, and proceeded to read a dispatch inclosing a copy of instructions 
to the British Charge d' Affaires at Caracas. It appeared from this that the 
Charge was instructed to advise with his colleagues and to join in a diplomatic 
representation but to make it clear that Great Britain would not undertake 
to go further should the representation be unsuccessful." 

^ F. R., 187.3, p. 1171. The American representative at Caracas recorded 
the following year (December 10, 1872) the visit of a fleet of five German 
war vessels at La Guayra, but could not report as to its object. 
« F. R., 1874, p. 439 v., No. 253. 
Mr. Bancroft to Mr. Fish. 

American Legation, 

Berlin, January 9, 1874. 



"As to Saint Thomas, Germany does not want it, would not accept it as 
a gift; has no hankering after that or any other West India colony; from 
principle avoids them; wishes at most a coaling station in Asiatic seas, and 
that only in case it can he enjoyed in security without being made a military 
post. This statement I have had often from every member of the govern- 
ment that could by any possibility have charge of any negotiation made for 
the acquisition of territory. They have said it to me over and over again. 
This much in answer to a telegram received night before last through General 
Schenck. 

Geo. Bancroft." 

Mr. Bancroft was therefore instructed by Secretary Fish to be watchful 
should any negotiations of this character occur. 



276 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Danish islands, and a similar denial was made^ by Mr. Cramer, 
the American representative at Copenhagen.^ From this date 
throughout the period under consideration no evidence was 
published connecting German diplomacy with the Danish posses- 
sions in the West Indies.^ 

For over twenty years after this report the published corre- 
spondence reveals no negotiations between Germany and the 
United States involving the principle of the IMonroe Doctrine. 
In 1897, however, Germany made a demonstration of national 
power in the West Indies. A German citizen, Emil Lueders,'" 
living in Haiti, came into conflict with the local authorities, and 
on the charge of assaulting a policeman, v/ho had entered his place 
of business without a warrant, was sentenced to prison for a year. 
The sentence was made under an act which denied the defendant 
the right of appeal. The personal efforts of the German representa- 
tive to secure his release were fruitless. Therefore the German 
Government took up the matter and instructed its representative 
to demand the release of Lueders, the punishment of the officials, 
an apology and indemnity. The demands Mere presented by the 
German representative to the President of Haiti in person at a 
public reception instead of through the Foreign Office. The 
Haitian President resented what he considered to be an indignity 

' F. R., 1874, p. 368. 

^ F. R., 1879, p. 208 ff. In 1879 another rumor was spread that Denmark 
was negotiating for the sale of the islands^to an unnamed government, pre- 
sumed to be that of Great Britain. On inquiries being made by Mr. Cramer, 
American minister at Copenhagen, the Danish minister of foreign affairs at 
first denied the report categorically but at a later date stated that, although 
he had had no information on the subject, he did not know what England 
might do. The Danish islands had suffered much from crop failures and 
riots and England would be strong enough to help and protect them. 

9 Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 294. Mr. Thayer holds that Secretary 
Hay suspected that the United States' treaty with Denmark for the purchase 
of the Danish West Indies was defeated in the Danish Parliament by German 
influence. 

" Moore: Vol. VI, pp. 474 ff. Lueders had at first been sentenced for 
just a month, had appealed and was tried again under another act by which 
he was fined $500 and sentenced for a year. The indemnity demands of the 
(ierman Government stipulated the payment of $1000 for each day's imprison- 
ment before the second judgment and $5000 for every day thereafter. 



LUEDERS EPISODE IN HAITI, 1897 277 

and refused to receive the German demands. At this juncture 
the American minister intervened in behalf of ]\Ir. Lueders and 
secured his release from prison and his safe departure from Haiti. 
The release was granted as an act of pardon b}' the president in 
recognition of the intercession of the American representative. 
The Haitian Government then suggested that the matter be 
referred to arbitration. Germany declined to arbitrate and insisted 
on an immediate apology and the pa\Tnent of an indemnity. The 
Government of Haiti refused both at first, though it later agreed 
to the indemnity. The German Government, however, despatched 
two na^■al vessels to Port au Prince and presented its ultimatum. 
The Haitian Government was informed that the forts and public 
buildings of Port au Prince would be bombarded within eight 
hours unless the Haitian Government should grant at once the 
following demands: (1) an indemnity of ,S30,000, (2) the return 
of Lueders and the responsibility for his safety, (3) an apology for 
the treatment of the German Emperor's representative, (4) the 
renewal of relations and the prompt acceptance of a German repre- 
sentative. With the German guns trained on the city the Haitian 
Government offered no further resistance and complied with all 
of the demands. 

The episode represented a demonstration of force on the part 
of Germany to assert its power and intention to exact severe penal- 
ties for injuries to its citizens in distant lands. Occurring simul- 
taneously with the German descent upon Kiao-Chao, it resembled 
that expedition in the aggressive character of the demands, the 
imperious methods of exaction and in the general motive of dis- 
play of power. The German Social Democrats ridiculed^^ the 
exj)edition as a crusade by sea, which should act as an advertise- 
ment of German interests overseas and help to manufacture in 
Germany enthusiasm for the government's fleet policy. Admiral 
von Tirpitz'' then demonstrated the correctness of their assertions 
b>' declaring that the Haitian episode, in which Germany was able 
at that time to despatch only two school ships to the scene, gave 

>i V. R., 1897-1898, Bd. Ill, 76 Sitz., 27. April, 1898, S. 1982. 
'2 V. R., 1897-1898, Bd. I, 5 Sitz., 7. Dezember, 1897, S. 80. 



278 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

clear evidence of the inadequacy of the German navy. The Navy 
bill was introduced that year'^ and the empire entered definitely 
upon its program for development as a naval power. 

The United States did not treat the German action at Haiti as 
having any great significance. Secretary Sherman wrote" to the 
American minister to Haiti that the Monroe Doctrine was wholly 
inapplicable to the case and that the Government of the I'nited 

^^ Von Buelow: Imperial Germany, p. 42. 

"Moore: Vol. VI, p. 475. 

Mr. Sherman, Sec. of State, to Mr. Powell, minister to Hayti. 

January 11, 1898. 

"I have received your No. 134, of the 24th ultimo, in which you report that, 
in view of the 'severe lesson' of the recent German event, you have been 
approached by friends of the present Haytian administration 'to get the 
views of the Government of the United States, to arrange for a new treaty, 
in which they desire a closer aUiance with us, virtually placing themselves 
under our protection.' You accordingly ask instructions in this regard . 

It would 1)6 unfortunate if, by your reception of the overtures you now 
report, or in your intercourse with the Haytian administration or its friends, 
you have encouraged any impression that this Government entertains a 
policy in this relation other than that to which it has scrupulously adhered 
from the beginning of our national life. 

You can not be unaware that the proposal for a congress of the American 
States to be held at Panama in 1825-6, rested on the theory that all of them, 
with the United States at their head, should stand pledged to mutual pro- 
tection against foreign aggression looking to interference with their political 
organization, yet, even as to this important aspect of the question, this country 
held aloof, in the conviction that in any such system 'the United States would 
necessarily be its protector, and the party responsible to the world, while the 
Spanish-American States would get the benefits of a system of mutual pro- 
tection which the United States did not need.' (See Dana's Wheaton, page 
101, footnote.) 

Moreover, protectorates over our neighbors have never been advocated 
in our foreign pohcy, being contrary to the principles upon which this Govern- 
ment is founded. A protectorate, however, qualified, assumes a greater 
or less degree of responsibility on the part of the protector for the acts of the 
protected state, without the ability to shape or control these acts, unless the 
relation created be virtually that of colonial dependency, with paramount 
intervention of the protector in the domestic concerns of the protected com- 
munity. Any such relation is obviously out of the question in an arrangement 
between sovereign states and would assuredly never be proposed by a state 
so jealous of its independence as Hayti. 

These observations are made for your personal guidance in dealing with 
the embarrassing suggestions which, it would see, are made to you \}\ well- 
meaning persons, who have not considered the subject in its true lights. 
They are not intended for communication to such persons. You certainly 
should not proceed on the hypothesis that it is the duty of the United States 
to protect its American neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the 
exercise of independent sovereignty. 

It behooves me to enjoin upon you the utmost circumspection and reti- 
cence as to matters of this character in your intercourse with the Haytians, 
in order that your representative utility be not impaired, nor the true policies 
of your Government be misunderstood." 



THE ISLAND OF MARGARITA, 1901 279 

States was under no obligation to "become involved in the con- 
stantly recurring quarrels of the republics of this hemisphere with 
other states." The Government of Haiti, however, had become 
alarmed at the aggressive German demonstration and sought to 
arrange with the United States a new treaty which should virtually 
place the island under American protection. Secretary Sherman 
instructed the American minister to refuse emphatically any 
suggestion of a protectorate and not to proceed " on the hypothesis 
that it was the duty of the United States to protect its x\merican 
neighbors from the responsibilities which attend the exercise of 
independent sovereignty." 

With the development of plans for the Panama Canal under 
American construction and ownership, increased importance was 
given to the region of the Caribbean and the Monroe Doctrine 
became more frequently involved. In 1901 Secretary Hay was 
informed that Germany was negotiating to secure the island of 
Margarita off the coast of Venezuela. The details of this attempt 
have never been published, but that it was looked upon with 
concern by the United States Government is evident from the 
instructions sent by Secretary Hay to Mr. Jackson, ^^ Charge 
d 'Affaires at Berlin. Mr Hay wrote that, "Having in view the 
long declared and widely known policy of the United States, any 
attempt on the part of a European power to acquire the Venezuelan 
coast-island of INIargarita would be a source of concern to this 
Government, if not tending to the embarrassment of the cordial 
and frank relations between the United States and such power." 
It has also been stated^*^ that the German Emperor was negotiating 
for the purchase ' for his own personal use ' of two harbors in Lower 

1' Moore: Vol. VI, p. 583. Mr. Moore cites this event from State Depart- 
ment manuscript. "Mr. Hay, Sec. of State, to Mr. Jackson, Charge at 
Berlin, No. 1186, April 10, 1901. Ms. Inst. Germany, XXI, 28.3." This 
source is referred to by Kraus (Die Monroedoktrin, p. 243) in his account 
of the incident. 

i« Thayer: Life of Hay, Vol. II, p. 284. Mr. Thayer states: 

"In May, 1901, Hay received information that German warships had been 
inspecting the Santa Margarita Islands, off the coast of Venezuela, with a 
view to occupying them as a naval base. Later he learned that tlie Kaiser 
was secretly negotiating for the purchase of two harbors, ' for his own personal 
use,' whatever that meant — on the desolate coast of Lower Cahfornia." 



280 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

California. Such reports, if borne out by the facts not yet made 
pubHc, would demonstrate the intention of the Imperial Govern- 
ment to ignore the well-known policy of the United States. That 
the>' did not materialize is evidence of the acquiescence of Germany 
though under what pressure cannot be determined. 

In the year 1902 several events took place involving Ger- 
man\-, the United States and the Monroe Doctrine. One of these 
concerned the foreign debt of Guatemala. Ambassador von 
Holleben'^ left at the Department of State a " pro-memoria " 
stating that the council of foreign bondholders in London was 
seeking a new arrangement with the government of that country 
and desired to have that arrangement endorsed by the most 
interested powers, Germany, the United States and England, in 
order to secure from Guatemala the fulfilment of her pledges. 
The Imperial German embassy therefore requested to be informed 
whether the United States Government would join in such a pro- 
ceeding if it should be entered upon by the German and British 
Governments. The United States declined this proposition, 
stating that it was "indisposed to join in any collective act which 
might l)ear the aspect of coercive pressure upon Guatemala." 
The Government of the United States reserved, however, for its 
citizens "equal benefits with those which might be obtained for 
creditors of any other nationality in the adjustment of the Guate- 
malan foreign debt." The American INIinister to Guatemala 
informed Secretary Hay^^ that the Go\ernments of Belgium, 
England, Erance, Germany and Italy had during the previous year 
presented to Guatemala identic notes regarding the external debt 
of that country. Since the reply of Guatemala had been considered 
unsatisfactory the powers had addressed a joint note of protest. 
Secretary Hay replied to Mr. Hunter, the American representative 
at Guatemala, that this joint note of the powers called for no action 
or comment on the part of the United States, ' inasmuch as it was 
within the right of the creditor nations to require payment of debts 
due to their nationals."' Xo action appears, therefore, to have 
been taken by the United States by way of protest to the powers, 

1' F. R., 1902, p. 426. >» Ibid., p. 569 ff. 



FOREIGN DEBT OF GUATEMALA, 1902 281 

although it was later learned by the American representative that 
they had threatened to blockade the ports of Guatemala^^ if 
arrangements to satisfy their respective creditors were not made by 
a specific date. The controversy represented a familiar problem 
to the United States — the demands of European powers upon a 
Latin-American nation for the payment of its debts — and the 
American Government acted consistently with its established 
interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. Although refusing to join 
in collective action of such a character, it nevertheless did not 
interfere with the enforcement of just claims, provided that enforce- 
ment did not take the form of acquisition of territory or interfer- 
ence with the system of government of any American nation. 

During the same year a revolution in Haiti-" resulted in a second 
demonstration of German naval power at that island. Following 
the forced resignation of the President of the Republic by anti- 
government parties, a number of rival candidates entered upon 
campaigns for election. Of these, two were considered to have 
the support of foreign interests.-^ Mr. Firmin, Haitian minister 
to France and former secretary of Foreign Relations in the Haitian 
cabinet, was said to have the faA'or of the French minister and the 
strong opposition of the German Charge dWff aires. Another 
candidate, General Leconte, Secretary of Agiiculture, was said to 
be supported by the leading German commercial and banking 
interests in the capital. In return for this support, Leconte, if 
elected, was to grant certain commercial favors. It was rumored 
that he was to grant to the German Government a coaling station 
near the Mole St. Nicholas. This report the American minister 
declared was untrue, but that it was supposed that General Leconte 
had made arrangements with the Hamburg-American Steamship 
Company by which if elected he would faAor granting the company 
a place near the mole for storing coal and also that he would grant 
the company concessions giving it almost exclusive control over 
certain mineral lands on the island. On the discovery and publica- 
tion of Leconte's proposed agreement by his opponents, great 

1^ F. R., 1902, p. 579. 20 ibi^., pp. 5S7 ff. 

21 Ibid., pp. 590 and 591. 



I 



282 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

opposition to him was aroused and, although both he and the 
German Company's agents at once pubhshed denials of the arrange- 
ment, the denials were not generally credited. The feelings of 
most Haitians had been hostile to Germany since the time of the 
Liieders incident, and the result was that the populace forcibly 
broke up the election proceedings, prevented the election of General 
Leconte and caused him soon afterward to leave the island. 

^Meanwhile a committee of public safety had taken charge of 
affairs, and, although not formally recognized by the foreign 
diplomatic corps, was in general treated as a provisional govern- 
ment. The main issue of the revolution then continued to be the 
attempt of the former candidate ^Ir. Firmin, to secure the presi- 
dency by force. He received support by sea from the Haitian 
Vice-Admiral Killick, who in his gunboat, the "Crete-a Pierrot," 
cruised the Haitian waters carrying ammunition to the Firminist 
forces and holding up Haitian merchant vessels loaded with 
supplies for the provisional government. The admiral had been 
declared an outlaw by the provisional government, which requested 
the members of the foreign diplomatic corps to consider him as 
such and to capture his vessel. This the foreign representatives 
felt that they could not do, since the admiral had committed no 
depredations on neutral vessels on the high seas and no other acts 
fulfilling the conditions of outlawry as determined by international 
law. Later, however. Admiral Killick held up a German merchant 
vessel, the "]\Iarkomannia," sent an armed crew on board and took 
from the vessel arms and ammunition intended for provisional 
government forces.^- This action met with prompt response from 
the German Government. It despatched at once the corvette 
" Panther " in pursuit of Admiral Kilhck. On finding the " Crete " 
anchored in the harbor of Gonaives the German commander 
ordered the surrender of the vessel. This was refused. Thereupon 
the "Panther" fired upon and sank the "Crete."-^ Although the 

^ F. R., 1902, p. 645. 

-3 Ibid., pp. 656 ff. Admiral Ivillick, seeing that his vessel was helpless, sent 
his crew ashore and then arranged powder about the Crete and blew up 
himself and his ship. This dramatic act won the admiration of the Haitians, 
strengthened the Firminist power and increased the hostility to the Germans. 



ACTION OF THE " PANTHER," HAITI, 1902 283 

act was one of assistance to the provisional government, which 
had again called upon the powers to capture the vessel as a pirate 
ship, the effect was nevertheless in general to increase the hos- 
tility of the Haitian people toward Germany. As was the case 
after the Lueders episode, reports immediately were circulated 
that the American Government would take over the island. The 
Haitian minister at Washington warned'^ his government that the 
American press was calhng for intervention and annexation. This 
excitement aroused by the German demonstration was allayed 
by Mr. Adee's statement contradicting all reports of the intention 
of the United States to annex Haiti. The American Government 
made no public protest to Germany for the action of the " Panther," 
and that fact was received with satisfaction by the Gennan press, 
which considered it CAidence that the "Monroe Doctrine did not 
mean that the United States would object to the proper protection 
of its commercial interests by a European power."25 

The contro\'ersy, howcA'cr, which assumed the greatest propor- 
tions of those episodes invohing Germany's attitude toward the 
INIonroe Doctrine was that of the claims against Venezuela dviring 
the years 1901 to 1904. The German case as presented by the 
Imperial Government to the United States in December of 190P'^ 

■'' F. R., 1902, p. 665 ^s ibid., p. 443. 

'^^ F. R., 1901, pp. 192 ff. For correspondence between Germany and 
Venezuela on which this statement of Germany's is based, see Sen. Doc. No. 
119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., Fart III, Appendix to the Case of Venezuela. 
This correspondence shows (p. 261) that Germany did at this time propose 
to Venezuela that the claims of German subjects be submitted to arbitration. 
Translation by source. 

Imperial Leg.\tion of Germany in Venezuela, 
Caracas, July 16, 1901. 



"The proposal which I already had the honor to make orally to your 
excellency is as follows: 

The Venezuelan Government on the one part, and the Imperial Legation on 
the other, would each name an arbitrator, so that both would jointly examine 
the claims of German subjects growing out of the civil wars. 

Whenever the arbitrators should agree the payment of the indemnity would 
be effected without anj' delay whatever, and all cases in wliich the arlaitrators 
could not come to an agreement would be made the subject of special con- 
ferences between the "\'enezuelan Government and the Imperial Legation. 
If these were hkewise barren of result, then the matter would in advance he 
deferred to the arbitral tribunal of The Hague for a decision. 

WTiile believing that this, my proi^osal, meets all the demands of equity, 
I would nevertheless lay special stress on the point that, should the Venezuelan 



284 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

was as follows: In biiikling the great Venezuelan Railway the 
Venezuelan Government had borrowed large sums from the Berlin 
Company of Discount (Berliner Discontogesellschaft) and had 
failed to meet its obligations, which were steadily increasing. 
In addition the German citizens residing in Venesuela had sus- 
tained heavy losses during the civil wars of 1898 to 1900. The 
German Government became convinced that the Government of 
Venezuela did not intend to try to meet these obligations, since 
it had enacted on the subject of foreign claims several decrees, 
one of which dismissed from consideration all claims for damages 
received before the administration of President Castro. The 
efforts of the German Government to induce the Castro Govern- 
ment to alter these decrees had been fruitless. It had therefore 
declared its refusal to abide by the decrees and similar action had 
been taken by other interested po>vers, including the United States. 
Under these circumstances the Imperial Government held that 
further negotiations with Venezuela were hopeless, and announced 
its intention of presenting an ultimatum to President Castro. 
If this should be disregarded measures of coercion were to be 
applied. First, however, the German Government considered it 
important to inform the United States of its purposes. These, it 
declared, had nothing else in view than to help German citizens 
who had suffered damages, and aimed under no circumstances at 
the accjuisition or permanent occupation of Venezuelan territory. 
The measures of coercion contemplated in the event of the refusal 
of Venezuela to accept the ultimatum were "first of all the blockade 
of the more important Venezuelan harbors," and later, if this did 
not seem efficient, Germany would have to consider the temporary 
occupation of different ^'enezuelan harbors and the levying of 
duties in those places. 

Such was the situation and program as formally presented by 
Ambassador von Holleben to Secretary Hay. The United States 

Government have any reason whatever for not being suited with it, I stand 
ready to accede to any other sohition of the question l^y which the coopera- 
tion of the authorities of the Empire in the examination of the claims of 
German subjects and in the determination of the indemnities appertaining 
thereto will be assured. Such a cooperation is the only foundation on which 
a solution of the question can be established." 



OPENING OF THE VENEZUELAN CONTROVERSY, 1901 285 

in reply accepted the assurances of the German Government.-^ 
Secretary Hay at the same time quoted in his memorandum the 
principles of the Monroe Doctrine as expressed by President 
Roosevelt only two weeks pre\ious in his message to Congress. 
The Monroe Doctrine President Roosevelt had declared to be 
" a declaration that there must be no territorial aggrandizement by 
any non-American power at the expense of any American power 
on American soil," but that it was "in no wise intended as hostile 
to any nation in the Old World." Finally, the President asserted, 
"We do not guarantee any State against punishment if it miscon- 
ducts itself, provided that punishment do^s not take the form of 
the acquisition of territory by any non-American power." The 
German ambassador on his recent return from Berlin having 
"conveyed personally to the President the assurance of the German 
Emperor that His ^Majesty's Government had no purpose or inten- 
tion to make even the smallest acquisition of territory on the South 
American Continent or the islands adjacent," the President, 
according to Hay's memorandum, accepted these assurances and 
stated that he believed no measures would be taken by agents of 
the German Government contrary to the declared purpose of the 
emperor. 

The announcement of Germany's intention to enforce her claims 
against Venezuela was presented singly and with no reference to 
the action of other European powers. The subject w^as given a new 
phase, however, during the following year when the German 
temporary alliance with Great Britain became pubHc. The initia- 
tive seems to have been taken by Germany .^^ On July 2.3, 1902, 

"F. R., 1901, p. 195. 

"The President of the United States, appreciating the courtesy of the 
German Government in making him acquainted with the state of affairs 
referred to, and not regarding himself as called upon to enter into the con- 
sideration of the claims in question, believes that no measures will be taken 
in this matter lay the agents of the German Government which are not in 
accordance with the well-known purpose, above set forth, of His Majesty 
the German Emperor." 

28 A. & P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), No. 2. See also Thayer: Life of Hay. 
Vol. II, pp. 284 ff. 

Mr. Thayer states, "By offers which cannot yet be made pubUc, Germany 
persuaded the Tory Government to draw closer to her." ... In refer- 



286 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

the Marquess of Lansdowne records an interview with the German 
ambassador in which the latter spoke to him of affairs in Venezuela. 
Lord Lansdowne informed the Gennan representative that Great 
Britian had various causes of complaint against Venezuela, that 
it intended to obtain satisfaction for the claims of British subjects 
and that the British Government would be quite ready to confer 
with the German Government with a view to joint action. The 
British causes of complaint against Venezuela as put forward by 
the foreign office^^ were, in addition to the financial claims of British 
subjects, the interference of the Venezuelan Government in the 
liberty and property of British subjects and the refusal of the 
Government of Caracas to heed the British protests or to render 
satisfaction.^^ These complaints, together with the small amount 
of shipping claims involved in their settlement, became in the 
course of the controversy the British "first-line claims," and were 
placed beside those of the Germans incurred during the revolu- 
tions of 189S and 1899, as subjects which would not be submitted 
to arbitration. 

With the prospect of mutual aid both go\'ernments decided that 
further claims could be pressed.^^ Consequently they formulated 

ence to Great Britain's part in the proceedings, Mr. Thayer writes (p. 289): 
"England, we presume, had never intended that her half -alliance with Ger- 
many should luring her into open rupture with the United States. Although 
her pact was kept as secretly as possible at home, inklings of it leaked out, 
and it has since been esteemed, by those who know the details, one of the 
least creditable items in Lord Salisbury's foreign policy. Whether he or Mr. 
Balfour originated it, the friends of neither have cared to extol it, or indeed 
to let its details be generally known." 

28 A. <t P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), No. 1. The Venezuelan Government 
had refused to consider British claims until its own claims for reparation 
for damages inflicted by the insurgent gunboat the "Ban Righ," with 
the assistance of the authorities of Trinidad, should have received satisfac- 
tion from the British Government. These claims of the Venezuelan Govern- 
ment were steadily refused. There was also a dispute between the British 
and Venezuelan governments over the island of Patos, each claiming ownership. 

3° A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 122. On one occasion, when 
the British minister had presented with much emphasis the serious character 
of the British demands and intentions, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign 
Affairs replied that they were used to such communications. The British 
minister at once retorted that that might be the case, but not from England. 

^iSen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 224. 



ANGLO-GERMAN ALLIANCE 287 

a second class of demands, Germany placing in this class her claims 
arising out of the civil war still going on, and also the large amounts 
owed to the Discontogesellschaft for the building of the Venezuela 
railway. Great Britain decided to include as second-class claims 
the demands of the English railways in Venezuela for damages 
done to their lines and for the failure of the \>nezuelan govern- 
ment to meet Habilities. These further demands were to be 
enforced^- in case the two powers upon the refusal of Venezuela 
to yield should have recourse to coercive measures. At the sugges- 
tion of the German Go\-ernment^^ the two countries agreed further 
that should such coercive action be undertaken, each would support 
the other's demands and that (except by mutual agreement) 
neither would withdraw -from the undertaking until the demands 
of both should be satisfied. 

There remained, therefore, only the methods of procedure to 
be considered. The German ambassador suggested in general 
terms that the two powers concerned should take part in a joint 
naval demonstration.^^ xhe British Foreign Office thereupon 
consulted the admiralty for the views of the Lords Commissioners 

'■' A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 137. 
•'3 A. & P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), No. 13. 
The Marquess of Lansdowne to Mr. Buchanan. 

Foreign Office, November 11, 1902. 
(Extract) .... 

"As to the joint execution of measures of coercion, the German Govern- 
ment recognized that there was a sharp distinction tsetween the character of 
the British and German "first-hne" claims; nevertheless, the two claims 
ought to stand or fall together, and we ought to exclude the possibiHty of a 
settlement between Venezuela and one of the two powers without an equally 
satisfactory settlement in the case of the other. Each Government ought, 
therefore, to come to an understanding before it embarked upon a project of 
coercion that neither Government should be at Uberty to recede except by 
mutual agreement; and before common action was initiated, we ought to come 
to a distinct agreement to this effect. 

I told Count Metternich that it seemed to be only reasonable that if we 
agreed to act together in applying coercion, we should also agree that each 
should support the other's demands, and should not desist from doing so except 
by agreement." 

•'" A. & P., 1902, CXXX (Cd-1372), Nos. 5 and 6. The Admiralty advised, 
however, that such a blockade should be deferred till November when the 
unhealthy season would be over. Vice- Admiral Douglas (see Inclosure in No. 
9) also advised waiting till November when the Newfoundland fishery season 
should have concluded and released the ships employed on that division. 
19 



288 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

as to the most effectual and convenient manner of putting pressure 
on the Venezuelan Government. The admiralty replied that the 
best method would be a blockade of Venezuelan ports — which 
could be effectively accomplished by the British squadron already 
present at the North America and West Indies station. The Vice- 
Admiral at Hahfax, however, suggested as an alternative scheme 
to the blockade that all the Venezuelan gunboats should be 
seized until the demands should be complied with. This suggestion 
was approved by the Foreign Office as preferable,*^ a blockade 
appearing open to some objection. Lord Lansdowne therefore 
informed the German Government that the first measures of 
coercion would be the seizure of the gunboats, and that if this 
should not produce the desired effect it would, of course, be neces- 
sary to decide what should be the next step, and that this further 
action would be carefully considered. This plan was agreed to by 
Germany. 

Having settled upon the military measures to be taken following 
a refusal of Venezuela to accede to the demands the next matter 
to be decided was the diplomatic procedure. ^'^ Hereupon the Ger- 
man Government was seized with compunctions concerning the 
fact^'^ that its last notes with ^"enezuela had been exchanged six 
months before and had not been "couched in a tone which would 
justify an immediate resort to coercion." Therefore the Imperial 
Government considered it necessary to give Venezuela one more 
chance and suggested that each of the two powers should simul- 
taneously present an ultimatum, embodying its own collective 
demands and referring to the demands of the other power. This 

35 Ibid., Nos. 10 and 14. 

36 A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos 134 and 138. As the German 
Government had done in 1901, the British Government now informed the 
United States of its intention of using force against Venezuela. The British 
Government did not, however, refer to its intentions in regard to the occupa- 
tion or acquisition of Venezuelan territory. Secretary Hay replied that, 
although "the United States Government regretted that European Powers 
should use force against Central and South American countries," it "could 
not object to their taking steps to obtain redress for injuries suffered by their 
subjects, provided that no acquisition of territory was contemplated." 

" A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 153. 



ENTRANCE OF ITALY 289 

final effort, the German ambassador explained, need not delay 
the active measures arranged, since the ultimatums might be 
presented at once and a period of twenty-four hours granted for 
compliance. 

The agreement finally reached^^ was that the ultimatums should 
be presented simultaneously, though without announcing to 
Venezuela the twenty-four-hour time-limit. The communications 
should demand that the Venezuelan Government accept in principle 
all the German-British claims, accept without fresh investigation 
the so-called first-line claims and agree to refer to a mixed com- 
mission the claims of the second class. 

At this juncture, just a few days before the presentation of the 
British-German ultimatums, Italy appeared on the scene and 
announced her desire to take part in the coercive measures.^'-' The 
Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs informed the British represen- 
tative at Rome that Italy also had just cause for complaint against 
Venezuela, that the Italian Government had informed the United 
States of its intention to use coercive measures and had received 
a very satisfactory reply. Therefore the Italian Government, 
although not disposed to take the initiative in this undertaking, 

3»A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 153. The German Govern- 
ment classified its demands as follows: 

"(a) Payment of the German claims arising out of the civil wars of the 
years 1898-1900, amounting to about 1,700,000 boHvars. 

(b) Settlement of claims arising out of the present civil war in Venezuela. 

(c) Guarantee for the claims of German firms on account of the building of 
the slaughter-house in Caracas, amounting to a round sum of 800,000 boHvars. 

(d) Guarantee for the payment of the claims of the German Great Venezuela 
Railway Company for interest and sinking fund of the Venezuelan Loan of 
1896." 

The demands under class (a) the Imperial Government stated had already 
been thoroughly investigated and it refused to have them subjected to a fresh 
examination at the hands of the Commission. (The investigations, however, 
had been made by German authorities — alone — on the ground that Venezuela 
had refused a mixed commission.) The British claims to be "paid at once" 
(see Ibid., No. 161) were "the compensations in the shipping cases, and in 
cases where British subjects have been falsely imprisoned or maltreated," 
and in addition to these a sum sufficient to make the whole immediate pay- 
ment equal to that which might in the first instance be paid to the German 
Government. 

" A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 162 and 166. 



290 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Avoiild be glad to join in any action taken by Great Britain if this 
should be favorably viewed by the British Government. 

The reception given to this proposal was not enthusiastic. Lord 
Lansdowne told the Italian Ambassador that while in principle 
he saw no objection to Italian participation, there were many 
practical difficulties. The British Go^•ernment had for some time 
past been discussing with the German Government the scope and 
character of the measures to be taken anrl these measures had 
required most careful consideration, " not only on account of the 
manner in which they affected the two European powers concerned, 
but on account of the international questions to which they were 
calculated to give rise." Having reached an agreement and pro- 
posing to take action at once, there was no time available for 
settling the conditions upon which Italy might join Great Britain 
and Germany, "supposing that were desired." Lord Lansdowne 
therefore ventured to suggest that under the circumstances the 
Italian Government should not press its demands at that moment. 
The Italian ambassador seemed in no wise disheartened by this 
reception. He replied that while he realized that it would probably 
be impossible for Italy to take part in the initial action agreed 
upon by Germany and Great Britain, still he though it desirable 
to enter into discussion of the cooperation of Italy in the near 
future. In the meanwhile Italian ships might visit ^'enezuelan 
waters to show that "Italy was not indifferent to what was 
occurring." Lord Lansdowne promised to confer with Germany 
on the subject. 

Throughout these preparations for naval action against Venezuela 
the United States had made no formal protest and had informed 
both Great Britain and Germany that it would put forward no 
objections so long as there should be no attempt at the acquisition 
of ^^enezuelan territory."*^ Secretary Hay made it quite clear, 
however, that such application of force to a South American 
country was regretted by the Go\Trnment of the United States. 
Evidence of his effort diplomatically to divert the two countries 

4° F. R., 1901, p. 195, and A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), No. 138. 



BRITISH-GERMAN ULTIMATUMS 291 

from their contemplated action is revealed in the official approvaP^ 
given to the efforts of the banking firm of Seligman & Co. to effect 
a settlement of the Venezuelan debt. Secretary Hay telegraphed 
to the American representatives at Berlin and London, informing 
them of the efforts of Seligman & Co., and stating that at the 
request of that company it gave him pleasure to say that "the 
President would be glad if such an arrangement could be made 
as might obviate the necessity of any exhibition of force on the 
part of Germany and Great Britain." It was to be understood, 
however, that the United States Government assumed "no 
obligation whatever in the nature either of a material or moral 
guarantee of any liabilities created by the transaction." This 
attempt to assist the banking firm to settle an international 
difficulty was without result. 

Germany and Great Britain presented their ultimatums to 
Venezuela on December 7, 1902.^2 During the following da>' Presi- 
dent Castro published in the newspapers a statement^-^ declaring 
that foreign creditors must await the reestablishment of peace 
when all promises would be fulfilled, and that in the meantime he 
would not try to " placate with phrases " nor " accept humiliation." 
The ultimatums, therefore, were rejected,^ and on the 9th the two 

" F. R., 1903, pp. 418 ff. and p. 452. The correspondence with Great 
Britain shows no reply to the instructions sent to Mr. White. In the cor- 
respondence with Germany the American Ambassador records a declai-ation 
by Doctor von Muehlberg of the Foreign Office that aside from newspaper 
accounts he knew nothing of the efforts of Seligman & Company. 

«V. R., 1900-1903, VII, Anlageband, M. 786, S. 4957. (Contains official 
government account (Denkschrift) of Germany's case against Venezuela.) 
See also Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 272 ff. 

« F. R., 1903, p. 789. 

« Sen. Doc. No. 119, 5Sth Cong., 3rd Sess., p. 279. After setting forth at 
length his covmtry's side of the case, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign 
Relations concluded, in reply to the German ultimatum as follows: 

"Havihg thus returned in an essentially conciUatory and friendly manner 
a reply to your note, I pass by, under special orders of the Government, 
that part which relates to the joint action of the Empire and the United 
Ivingdom; for a power hke Venezuela, which need not be urged, much less 
constrained, to discharge as far as it is in its power, its lawful obUgations, will 
never, in its intercourse with the other civilized nations, look for anything that 
will not be in accordance with the principles of mutual respect and with the 
rules of reciprocal cordiality." 



292 GERMAN^' AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

powers entered upon their program. Both British and German 
interests were placed in charge of Mr. Bowen, American minister 
at Caracas and the ^^enezuelan gunboats in the harbor of La 
Guayra were seized by the combined forces, no resistance being 
ofTered.^^ The German commander sank the two vessels captured 
by him.'*'' These actions aroused great excitement in Caracas and 
resulted in attacks on the legations and the imprisonment of many 
German and British subjects. ]\Ir. Bowen's efforts to obtain 
their release were not immediately successful. 

The counter-effect of the Venezuelan demonstrations was that 
the attacking powers lost no time in advancing to the second 
measure on their program — the blockade. Just two days after 
the seizure of the gunboats the decision was reached that these 
measures already taken would not be sufficiently effective and that 
the blockade should commence as soon as possible.^" The blockade 
was formally announced on the 2()th and included the ports of 
La Guayra, Caranero, Guanta, Cumana, Carupano and the mouths 
of the Orinoco. In the meantime the overtures of Italy had been 
accepted, and it was agreed that if a blockade should be resorted 
to Italy might take part in it. Vessels of the three nations, there- 
fore, held the blockaded harbors. 

The establishment of the blockade gave rise to a discussion with 
the United States as to the status and character of such a measure 
when not accompanied by a declaration of war. In its first note on 
this subject to the United States in 190U* the German Government 

^ A. P., 1903, LXXXVII (C-1399), Nos. 173 and 174. 

^^ F. R., 1903, p. 422. The reason given for sinking the ships was that 
the two vessels were not sufficiently seaworthy to undertake the voyage to 
Trinidad imder their own steam, and to have towed them there would have 
impaired the movements of the German squadron in search of the rest of 
the Venezuelan fleet. 

" Ibid., Nos. 182 and 183. 

«F. R., 1901, p. 196. 

Promemoria. 

Imperial German Embassy, 

Washington, December 20, 1901. 
"In case the German Government should be obliged to use coercion against 
Venezuela in connection with the pending claims, it will have to be considered 
what kind of measures should be applied. The most important measure of 
coercion — that is, the blockade of \'enezuelan harbors — would have to be 
carried through without a declaration of war preceding it. The blockade 



LEGAL ASPECTS OF BLOCKADE 293 

had declared that the measures to be taken would not be preceded 
by a declaration of war, would constitute only a peace blockade, 
but would affect neutral ships which would have to be turned 
away from the harbor.^^ The United States refused to acquiesce 
in this extension of the doctrine of pacific blockade to include inter- 
ference with the commerce of neutral nations, and Secretary Hay 
referred to the fact that the American Government had taken 
this same stand in 1897 when the European powers had declared 
a similar blockade of Crete.^" The German Government later 
informed^^ Secretary Hay that although Germany was at first 
inclined to a peace blockade, Great Britain had insisted on estab- 
lishing a warlike one, to which Germany had yielded.^'- The stand 
taken by Great Britain coincided^^ with the viewpoint of the United 
States, which recognized no form of blockade affecting neutral 
commerce except the complete effective blockade of war as laid 
down by international law. INIr. Balfour, British Prime IMinister, 
declared before the House of Commons that personally he agreed 
with the United States that there could be no such thing as a peace 
blockade and that a blockade did involve a state of war. Never- 



would therefore be a peace blockade. 8uch a blockade would touch likewise 
the ships of neutral powers, inasmuch as such ships, although a confiscation of 
them would not have to be considered, would have to be turned away and 
prohibited until the blockade should be raised. In the same manner Euro- 
pean states have proceeded on such occasion, especially England and France." 

" F. R., 1903, pp. 420 and 42L 

^•^ F. R., 1897, p. 255. In reply to the announcement by the powers of the 
blockade of Crete, Secretary Sherman wrote (March 26, 1897): 

"As the United States is not a signatory of the treaty of BerUn, nor other- 
wise amenable to the engagements thereof, I confine myself to taking note of 
the communication, not conceding the right to make such a l^lockade as that 
referred to in your communication, and receiving the consideration of all 
international rights and of any questions winch may in any way affect the 
commerce or interests of the United States." 

51F. R., 1903, p. 421. 

^' F. R., 1903, p. 454. The British Minister of Foreign Affairs explained 
to Mr. White that Germany had used the word "war-like blockade" because 
a regular "jure gentium" blockade required a vote of the Bundesrath. This 
full, recognized form was insisted on by Great Britain and the vote of the 
Bundesrath endorsed it. 

53 Parliamentary Debates, Session 1902, Vol. 16, pp. 1490 f. 



294 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

theless both countries avoided"^ a direct declaration of war against 
Venezuela. The whole controversy over the doctrines involved 
in the blockade has been considered^'^ important as having estab- 
lished the American viewpoint and having definitely fixed the 
status of the "pacific blockade." 

But the theoretical aspects of the case were of less pressing 
significance to the United States than the facts of the situation 
and the immediate intentions of the blockading powers in A^ene- 
zuela. The German Government had announced in 1901 that it 
considered under no circumstances the acquisition or permanent 
occupation of Venezuelan territory, but it had suggested at that 
time that it might consider temporary occupation necessary. ]Mr. 
Balfour, on the other hand, declared before the House of Com- 
mons^*^ that the British Government harl no intention of landing 
troops^'' in Venezuela or even temporarily of occupying territory 
there. The United States Government was anxious to preveni, 
if possible, occupation in any form, even though declared to be 
temporary. As President Roosevelt stated"* to Ambassador von 

** F. R., 1903, p. 421. The German Secretary of State for foreign affairs 
declared to Ambassador Tower that Germany had ("at present") no inten- 
tions of declaring war or of going beyond the measures of a "war-like block- 
ade." In the House of Commons Mr. Balfour met the question as follows: 
Mr. A. J. Balfour: 

"The question of the honorable and learned Gentleman the member for 
Louth, does not arise when you are in a state of war with a third part}-." 
Mr. T. M. Healy: 

"A state of war! Has war been declared? 
Mr'. A. J. Balfour: 

"Does the honorable and learned gentleman suppose that without a state 
of war you can take the ships of another Power and blockade its ports?" 

55 North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVII, pp. 86 ff., article entitled 
"The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela," by W. L. Penfield, Solicitor 
of the Department of State, Agent and Counsel for Venezuela and the United 
States at the Venezuelan Arbitration before the Hague Tribunal. 

56 Parhamentary Debates, Session 1902, Vol. 16, pp. 1290 and 1-490. 

57 A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 192 and 2.30. After bom- 
barding the forts, a British force was landed at Puerto-Cabello, but withdrew 
after dismanthng the fort guns. The German warships took part in the 
bom])ardment (F. R., 1903, p. 796). 

5s Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, Appendix, p. 413. 



BRITISH AND GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ARBITRATION 295 

Holleben, Kiao-Chao was not a permanent possession of Germany's 
merely held by a ninety-nine year lease, and he did not intend to 
have another Kiao-Chao on the approach to the Panama Canal. 

For this reason the United States Government gave support 
at once to the prompt proposal of Venezuela that the differences • 
with Great Britain and Germany be submitted to arbitration.'* 
j\Ir. Bowen, the American minister, was permitted to accept the 
request of the Venezuelan Government that he act as arbitrator 
representing ^'enezuela should the other powers agree to arbitrate. 
The crux of the whole controversy thus became the endeavor to 
induce Great Britain and Germany to arbitrate. Here the pub- 
lished correspondence reveals no hint of the decisive action taken 
by President Roosevelt.'^*^ This correspondence*^^ shows only the 
following facts: First, that the United States forwarded without 
comment to Great Britain and Germany the Venezuelan proposal 
to arbitrate. Secondly, that the German minister gave to Lord 
Lansdowne as his personal view that "there seemed to him to be 
considerable objections to encouraging the idea of arbitration" 
and that this personal view had later been sustained by his instruc- 
tions from his government. Thirdly, that Great Britain also 
considered the Venezuelan proposal, as it stood, to be unacceptable, 
for the same reasons in the main as those advanced by the German 
Government, but that Great Britain, while refusing to arbitrate 
concerning cases of injury to the person and property of British 
subjects, suggested that the other claims be submitted to arbitra- 
tion and that the United States be invited to arbitrate upon them. 
It may be also significant of a divergence of policy between Great 
Britain and Germany that Lord Lansdowne told the German 
Ambassador that it seemed to him desirable that the countries 
send separate replies to the Venezuelan proposal — although he 
considered that in substance they should make them as similar 
as possible. Also the correspondence shows that the United States 

59 F. R., 1903, pp. 790 ff. 

«o Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II, pp. 286 ff. and Appendix. This action of 
President Roosevelt was first made public by Mr. Thayer in the above work. 

61A. &P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Nos. 185, 190, 191, 193, 195, 198, 
199. Also F. R., 1903, pp. 423 ff., 453 ff. and 790 ff. 



296 GERMANS' AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

repeated its inquiries concerning the intentions of the blockading 
powers, adding this time the recommendation of the American 
Government that the \"enezuelan proposals be accepted. And, 
fourthly, that shortly thereafter the principle of arbitration for 
certain classes of claims was accepted by both the British and 
German Governments. 

There has since been revealed,"^' however, the pressure exercised 
by President Roosevelt upon the German Go\ernment before it 
announced willingness to arbitrate. The President had become 
convinced that Germany was the leader in the transaction and 
intended to seize some Venezuelan harbor and fortify it with a 
view to exercising some degree of control over the prospective 
Isthmian Canal. Mr. Roosevelt also becarhe.convinced that Great 
Britain would not back Germany in the event of hostilities with 
the United States over the situation. The President therefore 
assembled for maneuvers in the West Indies under Admiral Dewey 
an American squadron superior to the German fleet assembled at 
^'enezuela. Admiral Dewey was given secret instructions to have 
his fleet "in fighting trim" and ready to sail at an hour's notice. 
^Yhen, therefore, the German Ambassador von Holleben repeated 
that his government would not arbitrate, President Roosevelt 
notified him that unless within a specified number of days the 
German Government should signify its willingness to arbitrate, 
Dewey would be ordered to Venezuela to "see that the German 
forces did not take possession of any territory." Though the Ger- 
man ambassador expressed grave concern over the consequences 
of such an act, he seems to have concluded''^ that President Roose- 
velt was bluffing, for the Imperial Government furnished no reply 
within the time set. Thereupon President Roosevelt notified him 
that there was no use waiting longer and that Admiral Dewey 
woidd be orderefl to sail a day earlier than the date specified. The 
German ambassador then awoke to the situation. He discovered 
that not only was the American President not bluffing, but that 

62 Thayer, Life of Hay, Vol. II. 

•"'' Ibid., p. 416. It is asserted in an inclosure in Roosevelt's letter to Mr. 
Thayer that it was this misjudgment of the Venezuelan situation which caused 
von HoUeben's recall. 



ACTION OF PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT 297 

the American fleet, outmatching in strength the German naval 
forces, was in readiness and could act to advantage in the Carib- 
bean. Within twenty-four hours President Roosevelt received 
from the German Emperor not only the consent to arbitrate but 
the invitation that the President himself act as arbitrator. There- 
upon Mr. Roosevelt publicly expressed his gratification at this 
endorsement by Germany of the principle of arbitration. 

By the decisive action the President thus, without letting the 
public become aware of it, removed what he evidently believed to 
be a real threat against the Monroe Doctrine in the region of his 
pet enterprise, the Isthmian Canal. The American Ambassador 
to Germany, Dr. White, seems not to have shared in any degree 
the President's suspicions of the purposes of Germany. The 
action of the German naval forces at Venezuela he describes"^ 
as "perfectly legitimate," and states that "the Monroe Doctrine 

"* White, Autobiography, Vol. II, pp. 247 and 248. After relating the acts 
of the Castro Government in Venezuela, Dr. White states: 

"At this the German Government, as every government in similar cir- 
cumstances is bound to do, demanded redress and sent ships to enforce the 
demand. This was perfectly legitimate; but immediately there arose in 
the United States an outcry against a 'violation of the Monroe Doctrine.' 
As a matter of fact, the Monroe Doctrine was no more concerned in the 
matter than was the doctrine of the Perseverance of the Saints; but there was 
enough to start an outcry against Germany, and so it began to spread. The 
Germans were careful to observe the best precedents in international law, yet 
every step they took was exhibited in sundry American papers as a menace to 
the United States. There was no more menace to the United States than to the 
planet Saturn. The conduct of the German Government was in the interest 
of the United States as well as of every other decent government. Finally, 
the soldiers in a Venezuelan fort wantonly fired upon a German war vessel — 
whereupon the commander of the ship, acting entirely in accordance, not only 
with international law, l)ut with natural right, defended himself, and knocked 
the fort about the ears of those who occupied it, thus giving the creatures who 
directed them a lesson which ought to rejoice every thinking American. At 
this the storm on paper against Germany, both in America and Great Britain, 
broke out with renewed violence, and there was more talk about dangers to 
the Monroe Doctrine. As one who, at The Hague Conference, was able to do 
something for recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by European powers, and 
who, as a member of the Venezuelan Commission, did what was possible to 
secure justice to Venezuela, I take this opportunity to express the oi)imon 
that the time has come for plain speaking in this matter. Even with those 
of us who Ijelieve in the Monroe Doctrine there begins to arise a question as 
to which are nearest the interests and the hearts of Americans — the sort of 
'dumb driven cattle' who allow themselves to be governed by such men as 
now control Venezuela, or the people of German}^ and other civilized parts of 
Europe, as well as those of the better South American republics, hke Chile, the 
Argentine RepubUc, Brazil, and others, whose interests, aspirations, ideals, 
and feelings are so much more closelv akin to our own." 



298 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

was no more concerned in the matter than was the doctrine of the 
Perseverance of the Saints." He also declared that "There was no 
more menace to the United States than to the planet Saturn" and 
that " the conduct of the German Government was in the interest 
of the United States as well as of every other decent government." 
Absolute proof of Germany's intention to overthrow its assurances 
and seek to acquire territory in Venezuela at this period has not 
been made public. But the reluctance to arbitrate, the increased 
assertion of power in regions of the Caribbean within the few years 
preceding the acciuisition of the canal rights by the United States, 
the programs of the Pan-Germanists, and the general expansion 
policy as frequently expressed by German Government officials, 
combine to create foundation for the fears of the President. 

The subsequent negotiations related rather to the measures of 
securing paATnent, to the principle of equal treatment of creditor 
nations and to the procedure of arbitration rather than to the 
]\Ionroe Doctrine, yet they are significant of the contrasting poUcies 
of the United States and the blockading powers toward a debtor 
state. The alhed'^^ powers demanded that Venezuela recognize 
in principle all their claims and offer provision for immediate 
payment of their "first-line" claims which they had declared to be 
not suited for settlement by arbitration.*^*^ ]Mr. Bowen, duly 
accepted as representative of the case of Venezuela, forwarded the 
reply of President Castro that, bowing to superior force, he recog- 
nized in principle the claims of the allied powers. This was not 
considered satisfactory, the allied governments demanding to know 
the means by which Venezuela would guarantee pajTnent of their 

•=5 F. R., 1903, pp. 602 and 606. Italy declared that, while well disposed to 
arbitration, she would be governed in her action by the attitude of Germany 
and Great Britain. Italy later proposed as her conditions of arbitration: 
First, that the arbitration should include all her claims against Venezuela 
so as to leave nothing for further dispute; second, that her claims should 
receive precisely the same treatment and guarantees as the claims of other 
countries. 

«« A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399), Xos. 199, 21.5, 228. See especially 
Lord Lansdowne's instructions to Sir M. Herbert, British Amlsassador at 
Washington in No. 234. 



PREFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR BLOCKADING POWERS 299 

claims. This guarantee was later declared to be the receipts from 
the customs houses.^^ 

Meanwhile the blockade of Venezuelan ports was maintained 
and the negotiations with INIr, Bowen at Washington were ham- 
pered by a new problem — that of the treatment of the claims 
against A'enezuela of the other nations who had taken no part in 
the blockade. The government of Venezuela was ready to accord 
equal treatment to all and Mr. Bowen had stated that 30 per cent, 
of the customs receipts of the ports of La Guayra and Puerto 
Cabello represented the maximum amount which Venezuela could 
afford. The British and German Governments, upon computing 
the average income from those ports, realized that should this 
amount be divided equally among all the creditor nations (a long 
list) the full pajiiient of their claims would take many years, aad 
that " the interest of the creditors would be far from assured con- 
sidering the insecurity of aft'airs in Venezuela." They therefore 
demanded preferential treatment for the three blockading powers.^^ 

'^' Ibid., No. 236. President Castro's declaration embodied in the form of 
a confidential postscript to Mr. Bowen, that the guarantee of the payment 
would be the customs houses, seems not to have been forwarded to the German 
Government, although it was forwarded to the British. The German ambas- 
sador at London stated to Lord Lansdowne that President Castro's answer 
had contained no statement as to when or how the payment was to be made. 
Lord Lansdowne, who had received the confidential postscript, appears to 
have made no mention of it to the German Ambassador but advised against 
pressing President Castro further on that point. 

es Ibid., 2.36 and 245. 

No. 236. 

The ]\Iarquess of Lansdowne to Sir F. Lascelles: 

Foreign Office, January 15, 1903. 
. . . . (Lord Lansdowne relates to Sir F. Lascelles his interview with 
the German Aml)assador) : 
"His Excellency called ray attention to the fact that President Castro's 
letter apparently contemplated that Mr. Bowen should confer not onlj^ mth 
the Representatives of Great Britain and Germany, but with those of all 
other nations having claims against Venezuela. His Excellency regarded 
this instruction with some alarm. 

I said that it seemed to me that the blockading powers stood on an entirely 
different footing from the rest, and that in my view, it would be impossible 
for us to allow our Representatives to take part in a general discussion at 
which a number of other Powers would also l)e represented. 

In my view the most convenient procedure would be that the British and 
German Representatives should negotiate separately with Mr. Bowen but 
should keep one another fully informed as to their proceedings. . . ." 



300 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

Mr. Bowen, who, as representative of Venezuela, had signed an 
agreement assigning the 30 per cent, of the customs receipts of 
the two ports to satisfy the claims of all the creditor nations, 
refused''^ to grant to the blockading powers a preferred status in 
relation to their claims. He considered it unjust to tie the hands 
of the other nations for the five or six years required to pay the 
claims and that to grant such a reward to those who had used force 
would encourage the other nations to vise the same method. He 
also contended that if the allied powers wanted preferential treat- 
ment, they should have asked for this in the beginning and not after 
he had understood that all their conditions had been presented. 
The British Government replied that it refused to be bound by 
any agreements Mr. Bowen might have made with other powers. 
The outcome of this controversy was that in the separate pro- 
tocols^" signed by Mr. Bowmen for Venezuela with Germany, Great 



" Ibid., No. 252. 

Sir M. Herbert to the Marquess of Lansdowne. (Received Jan. 29.) 

(Telegraphic) Wa.shington, January 29, 190-3. 

"Venezuela. The Italian Ambassador, the German Charge d' Affaires, 

and I called to-night on ]Mr. Bowen. I informed him that we were forced 

to reckon with public opinion in England, and that it might be necessary to 

fall back on the Tribunal of the Hague. 

We were unable to obtain a satisfactory answer from Mr. Bowen, who was 

very obdurate. 

He ultimately made a statement m reply in the following terms : 

'I object to paying first the claims of the alUed Powers and the claims of 

the other nations afterwards, because 

1. I think it is unjust, unfair, and illegal to tie the hands of the said other 
nations for the period of five or six years that it would take to pay the claims 
of the aUied Powers; 

2. If I recognize that brute force alone can be respected in the collection 
of claims I should encourage the said other nations to use force also; 

3. If the allied Powers wanted preferential treatment they should have 
asked for it in the beginning, and should not now propose it after I understood 
that all the conditions of the allied Powers had been stated. 

If, however, this demand for preferential treatment is raised simply as a 
point of honor, I am willing to agree that the entire 30 per cent, be paid to the 
allied Powers for the first month!' " 

'"Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess. : Venezuelan Protocol with 
Great Britain, pp. 769 ff. Venezuelan Protocol with Germany, pp. 831 ff. 
Venezuelan Protocol with Italy, pp. 849 ff. (also pp. 23 to 40). Each of the 
three powers received an immediate cash payment of 5500 pounds. All 
further claims of Great Britain were referred to a mixed commission. The 
German claims originating from the Venezuelan civil wars of 1898 to 1900 
(the "first rank claims") amounted to 1,718,815.67 boUvars, and were to be 
paid in monthly installments within that year (1903). The remaining Ger- 



HAGUE-TRIBUNAL ARBITRATION 301 

Britain and Italy the provision was made'^^ that the question of 
preferential treatment be referred to the Hague Tribunal. ''- 

When finally submitted to that Tribunal the main ground set 
forth by the American delegates''^ for opposing preferential treat- 
ment of the blockading powers was that such a recognition would 
place a premium en the use of mihtary force for the collection 
of claims, a principle which the Hague Tribunal founded in the 
interests of peace should not endorse. As precedent for the 
equality of treatment of the claims of all nations the American 
delegates cited that after the Boxer rebellion, in the awarding of 
the indemnities, no distinction was made between the nations who 
had used force and those who had not. The main contentions^ 
of the blockading powers was that it was the measures taken by 
them which alone obtained from Venezuela security for the pay- 
ment of claims, that therefore the nations which did the work 
should have at least first access to the benefits. Moreover, they 
asserted that the other powers had acquiesced in their action and 
should not therefore seek to deprive the blockading powers of 

man claims were referred to a mixed commission. The Italian claims derived 
from the revolutions of 1898-1900 amomited to 2,810,255 boUvars. It was 
agreed that these were to be paid without submission to a commission, but the 
time or method of payment was not stipulated. All further Italian claims 
were submitted to a mixed commission. Later, on May 7, 1903, further 
protocols were signed between Venezuela and the three blockading powers 
definitely referring to the Hague tribunal for arbitration the question as to 
whether the blockading powers should have preferential treatment. (See 
Ibid., pp. 31 ff.) 

'1 A. & P., 1903, LXXXVII (Cd-1399) : 

Article V 



•'Any question as to the distribution of the customs revenues so to be 
assigned, and as to the right of Great Britain, Germany and Italy to a separate 
settlement of their claims, shall be determined in default of arrangement, l)y 
the Tribunal at the Hague, by arbitration to which any other Power interested 
may make itself a Party." 

'- Ibid., No. 269. It had been agreed upon to submit to the Hague Tribunal 
the second class claims of the Powers, since President Roosevelt had dechned 
their invitation to serve as arbitrator. These second-class claims were now, 
by the protocols, referred to mixed commissions. 

"3 Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 239 to 244. 

"^ Ibid., pp. 1325 ff. 



302 GERMANY AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE 

advantages gained through activities to which they had given 
their tacit or expressed consent. The tribunal decided^^ in favor 
of the blockading powers and awarded to Great Britain, Germany 
and Italy preferential treatment of their claims. 

The presentation of the cases before the Hague Tribunal shows 
\'ery clearly the opposing policies of the United States and Germany 
(in unison with Great Britain and Italy) in regard to the applica- 
tion of force against small nations for the satisfaction of finailcial 
claims. The same is true throughout the whole Venezuela episode. 
While the United States offered no formal protest when Germany 
announced her proposal to use coercion, and stipulated only against 
the acquisition of territory, still it made clear its disapproval of 
such methods by its many attempts to bring about a settlement 
by arbitration, and by its own abstention from the use of similar 
methods for the satisfaction of its own claims. It is true that 
Germany, when acting alone (in 1901), had proposed'^^ to ^ enezuela 
the solution of their differences by arbitration and had suggested 
referring the claims of German subjects to the Hague Court. For 
this both the American representatives and the arbitrators gave 
her due credit before the tribunal. Nevertheless, after securing 
the support of Great Britain in the enterprise, Germany's influence 
had been exerted against the policy of arbitration when President 
Castro, under the military constraint, had offered it. Only 
under the effective pressure exerted by President Roosevelt did 
the Imperial Government yield. But that pressure was applied so 
quietly that it was not known to the public, and Mr. Penfield, 
the Solicitor of the Department of State and Counsel for Venezuela 
and the United States before the Hague Court, classes as one of 
the important features of the iVnglo-German intervention in 
Venezuela that it constituted a " solemn recognition of the Monroe 
Doctrine by non-American States."" 



-^ Sen. Doc. No. 119, 58th Cong., 3rd Sess., pp. 106 ff. 

™ See footnote 26 of this chapter. 

" North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVII, p. 86. Penfield, W: 

"The Anglo-German Intervention in Venezuela." 

"Measured by its consequences, the intervention of Germany and Great 
Britain in Venezuela in December, 1902, was a notable event in its relation 



INDICATIONS OF POLICY 303 

Summing up the incid<ents bearing on the American national 
policy, as they appear from pubHshed diplomatic sources, it is seen 
that within the forty-year period under consideration there were 
comparatively few controversies with Germany in which that prin- 
ciple was involved. It is also seen that whatever the views of Pan- 
German writers, official Germany, by its declarations of its pur- 
poses in Venezuela, gave official outward recognition to the Monroe 
Doctrine.^* On the other hand it seems significant that just about 
the time of the acquisition of the Panama Canal by the United 
States the German demonstrations of power in the region of the 
Caribbean became more frequent and more important. Having 
secured the support of Great Britain in the Venezuelan episode, 
Germany had asserted her claims with more vigor and had showed 
less willingness to defer to the policy of the United States. More 
significant still was the fact that President Roosevelt, who was 
never considered by the Germans to hold an anti-German policy 
and who was on very frieiJidly terms with both the Ambassador, 
von Sternburg, and the Emperor, should become convinced that 
Germany was seeking a foothold on the American Continent and 
should take prompt measures to prevent it. These facts are also 
given support by the openly expressed expansion policy of the 
German Government, although that colonial sphere was never 
officially admitted to include the American Continent. 

to the law of nations. It was notable, first, as an impressive assertion of the 
right of intervention for the protection of subjects of intervening states; 
second, as definitely fixing the status of the 'Pacific blockade;' third, as a 
solemn recognition of the Monroe Doctrine by non- American states; fourth, 
in finally strengthening the position of the Hague Court, and in advancing 
the cause of international arbitration." 

^8 Root, The MiUtary and Colonial Policy of the United States, p. 107. 
Secretary Root stated on this subject: 

"The armed demonstration by the European Powers against Venezuela 
was made the occasion for disclaimers to the United States of any intention 
to seize the territory of Venezuela, recognizing in the most unmistakable 
way the rights of the United States expressed in the declaration of that 
traditional pohcy." 



20 



BIBLIOGRAPHY, 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 



PRIMARY WORKS 

Manuscript Material 

Bancroft Manuscript. 
Manuscript Division, Public Library, New York City: 

A collection of letters written by George Bancroft to Hamilton Fish, Secre- 
tary of State, during the years 1868 to 1871 inclusive, when Mr. Bancroft was 
serving as American Minister to the North German Union and subsequently 
as Minister to the German Empire. Some of these letters appear in the pub- 
lished diplomatic correspondence of the United States, Foreign Relations 
Series, for the corresponding years. 

J. C. B. Davis Correspondence and Journal, 

Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. 

"A collection of the diplomatic papers of Mr. J. C. Bancroft Davis, com- 
prising his journal of the negotiations of the treaty of Washington, 1871, 
January-May (3 volumes) A record of the Geneva Arbitration being four 
volumes of Davis's diary, copies of correspondence, official and personal, 
newspaper clippings etc., 1871-1872. The letter-press copy books, A. B. and 
C, 1872, Januarv-September (3 volumes) and four volumes of Letters received, 
1871-1872. (U volumes in all)" 

The above is the official description of the whole collection as published in 
the Handbook of Manuscripts in the Library of Congress, for 1918. For this 
thesis the author found most valuable the Journal kept by Mr. Davis while 
Assistant Secretary of State and his correspondence with Mr. Fish, Secretary 
of State, and with Mr. George Bancroft, Minister to Germany during the same 
period. Mr. Davis was a nephew of Mr. Bancroft and this close kinship gave 
to their correspondence a freedom and informality which resulted in very 
frank comitients on international situations and policies — with the result that 
they throw much light on the relations between the United States and Ger- 
many at this period. 



GOVERNMENT PUBLICATIONS 

The United States 

Congressional Globe. 

Published by F. and J. Rives and George A. Bailey. 
Office of the Congressional Globe, Washington, D. C. 

A record of the debates and proceedings of the United States Congress 1835 
to 1872. 



308 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Commercial Relations of the United States. 

Published by the Bureau of Foreign Commerce, Department of 
State. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870 to 1914. 

A compilation of reports of consuls and consuls-general on economic con- 
ditions in the countries of their residence and on the trade relations of those 
countries with the United States. 

Congressional Documents. 

Published by the United States Congress. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870-1910, 

These include Journals, Reports, Executive and Miscellaneous Documents 
of both the Senate and House of Representatives during the forty year period 
treated. 

Congressional Record : 

Proceedings and Debates of the United States Congress. 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1873-1910. 

Malloy, W. M.: 

"Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and 
Agreements between the United States of America and 
other Powers, 1776-1909." 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1910. 

This collection was prepared under the direction of the Committee on 
Foreign Relations, United States Senate, pursuant to a resolution of the Senate, 
January 18, 1909, and appears also at Senate Document No. 357, 61st Congress 
2nd Session. The "Saratoga Agreement" between the United States and 
Germany in 1891 is omitted from this collection and appears in Senate Execu- 
tive Document No. 119, 52nd Congress, 1st Session, 1891-1892, p. 110. The 
Malloy collection was followed by a Supplement covering the treaties etc. 
from 1910 to 1913. 

"Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States." 
Published by the House of Representatives. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870-1910. 

The diplomatic correspondence of the United States with foreign powers, 
so far as made public by the Government. It omits, however, considerable 
published material and requires to be constantly supplemented by the Con- 
gressional Documents. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 309 

Richardson, James D.: 

"A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presi- 
dents, 1789-1897." 
Published by authority of Congress. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1898. 

This collection also appears as House Miscellaneous Document No. 210, 
53rd Congress, 2nd Session. 

Statutes of the United States of America. 

Washington: Government Printing Office, 1870-1910. 

United States Tariff Commission: 

"Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties." 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1919. 

A thorough study of the commercial agreements of the United States with 
foreign countries. The report sets forth the conditional and the unconditional 
forms of the most-favored-nation clause and the practice of the United States 
in regard to these principles. A clear account is given of the relations and 
dibcussion with Germany on the subject of the most-favored-nation clause as 
the basis of the commercial relations between the two countries. 

Germany 

"Anlagen zu den stenographischen Berichten der Verhandlungen 
des Reichstags." 
Berlin: Xorddeutsche Buchdruckerei, 1870-1910. 

The public documents of the Reichstag — corresponding approximately to 
the United States Congressional Documents. The Anlagen often contain 
official accounts (Denkschriften) of the Imperial Governments' actions, or 
negotiations. Occasionally they contain extracts from official correspondence 
(Aktenstuecke) 

^'Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des Reichstags." 
Berlin: Norddeutsche Buchdruckerei, 1870-1910. 

A stenographic record of the proceedings of the Reichstag. Well-indexed. 
This is a valuable source for official German Government utterances on 
national policy as well as for the views of the various parties of the Reichstag. 



310 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Reichs-Gesetzblatt. 

Berlin: Kaiserlicher Postzeitungsamt, 1870-1910. 

p^Collection of Imperial Government statutes and proclamations. 

-Weissbuecher. Vorgelegt dem Deutschen Reichstag. 
Berlin: Carl He^inann's Verlag. 

These contain the official correspondence of the German Government with 
foreign countries, instructions to German consuls, diplomatic officers etc. 
The "white-books" are not published continuously like the United States 
Foreign Relations Series, but only occasionally. There are several white 
books on Samoa in parts V, \T, and VIII of the white-book series. 



Great Britain 

Accounts and Papers. State Papers Presented to both Houses of 
Parliament by Command. 
London: 1870-1910. 

Contain the Official Correspondence of the British Foreign Office. As 
Great Britain was involved in several of the most important issues between 
the United States and Germany, the correspondence between Great Britain 
and Germany on these subjects is particularly valuable — especially since the 
German Government published comparatively little of its foreign correspond- 



Hertslet's Commercial Treaties. 

London: Harrison & Sons, 1870-1910. 

A collection of the treaties and conventions between Great Britain and 
Foreign Powers. Compiled by Richard W. Brant, Librarian of the Foreign 
Office and Godfrey E. P. Hertslet, Esq., clerk in the Librarian's Department. 



Parliamentary Debates. 
London: Wyman & Sons, 1870-1910. 

The fact that Great Britain was several times a party to the controversies 
between the United States and Germany causes the Parliamentary Debates 
to contain frequently discussions of these questions which contribute informa- 
tion as to the British government attitude. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 311 



AUTOBIOGRAPHY 



Dewey, Admiral George: 

"Autobiography of George Dewey." 
New York: Scribners, 1913. 

The first published report by the American Admiral of his difficulties with 
the German Admiral after the battle of Manila. Admiral Dewey gives a clear 
account of the size and activities of the German forces in the harbor — both 
of which were in contrast to those of the other nations represented there. 



Foster, John W. : 

"Diplomatic Memoirs." 
Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1900. 

Contributes an account of the negotiations with Mr. von Mumm concerning 
the "Saratoga Agreement" with Germany. 



Hay, John: 

"Letters of John Hay and Extracts from Diary." 
Washington, 1908. 

A collection of the Secretary's letters, printed by Mrs. Ha}\ Great care 
has been taken throughout to omit nearly all names of persons referred to in 
the letters, giving first initials only. The reader, therefore, while grateful to 
have the letters at all, feels greatly handicapped and is forced to do much 
guessing. 



Li Hung Chang: 

"Memoirs of the Viceroy Li Hung Chang." 
London: Constable & Co., 1913. 

In addition to its unique qualities as an autobiography this work gives 
valuable insight into the viewpoint of the great Chinese statesman towards 
the foreign powers in general and his contrasting opinions of the different 
western nations. The Viceroy's comments reflect most clearly the efi"ects of 
the contrasting policies of Germany and the United States towards China. 



312 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Schurz, Carl: ' 

"Speeches, Correspondence and Political Papers," selected and 

edited by Frederic Bancroft. 

New York: Putnam, 1913. 

Some of the letters contained in this collection throw valuable light on the 
relations between Germany and the United States. Mr. Schurz as a German 
by birth, and a United States Senator, was unusually equipped to understand 
the relations between the two countries. His sympathies were thoroughly 
American and as a fugitive from Prussian autocracy in 1849, he became a 
particularly staunch champion of American democracy. The Senator sought 
whenever possible to promote friendship between the United States and Ger- 
many. 

Seward, Frederick W. : 

"Reminiscences of a War-Time Statesman and Diplomat, 1830- 

1915." 

New York: Putnam, 1916. 

Mr. Seward was Assistant Secretary of State during the Administrations 
of Lincoln, Johnson and Hayes. He gives an interesting account of the nego- 
tions in 1877 over the first American Treaty with Samoa. 

Stevenson, Robert Louis: 

"A Footnote to History — Eight Years of Trouble in Samoa." 

Letters and Miscellanies of Robert Louis Stevenson, \o\. XIX 

New York: Scribners, 1897. 

Mr. Stevenson is a most valuable eye-witness of events in Samoa and of the 
workings of the representatives of the three nations there. Mr. Stevenson 
writes graphically and without national bias, taking in general the point of 
view of the native Samoans. 

Von Diederichs, Admiral: 

"A Statement of Events in Manila Bay." 

Translated from the Marine Rundschau ahd published in the 

Journal of the Royal United Service Institution. Vol. LIX, 

No. 437, August, 1914, pp. 421 to 446 inclus. 

Tills account was written by Admiral von Diederichs as a reply to Admiral 
Dewey's account of events at Manila which the latter published in his Auto- 
biography in 1913. Admiral von Diederichs takes up point for point the 
complaints made by Dewey and either seeks to explain away their significance 
or contradicts the facts presented. In general the German Admiral's account 
seeks to smooth over the differences with Dewey at that time and to minimize 
the significance of German naval operations in the harbor. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 313 

White, Andrew Dickson: 

"Autobiography of Andrew D. White." 

New York: Century Company, 1905. 

Dr. White's autobiography is one of the most valuable sources of information 
on the relations between the two countries. Serving as Minister to Germany 
from 1879 to 1881 and again, as Ambassador to that country from 1897 to 
1903, Dr. White was in close touch with the two governments in periods of 
cordial and of strained relations. Through all conditions he served efficiently 
the interests of the United States, retained the respect and admiration of the 
German Government and was an important factor in maintaining harmony 
in the period of the Spanish War. 

Witte, Emil: 

"Revelations of a German Attache." "Ten Years of German- 
American Diplomacy." 
Translated by Florence Clarkson Tajdor. 

New York: Doran, 1916. From the German edition 
entitled "Aus einer Deutschen Botschaft" — ^"Zehn Jahre 
Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diplomatic." Leipzig: Zeit- 
bilder-Verlag : 1907. 

The author of this work was employed as confidential press-agent of the 
German Legation at Washington, and was therefore a part of the German 
diplomatic system in the United States at this time. It is to be regretted that 
he has allowed his personal grievances against the German Ambassador and 
other officials to distort his narrative and that he has given his book a sensa- 
tional and exaggerated tone which undennines the reader's impressions of its 
rehability. In many instances he uses insinuations instead of direct state- 
ments and the particular "revelations" which he transmitted to American 
Government authorities are never given at all. Nevertheless, his work sheds 
much light on the general methods of German diplomacy in the United States, 
especially its activities among German- American societies. Mr. Witte's 
general attitude seems to be that of a genuine desire for good relations between 
the two countries and his book is a protest against the diplomatists of Germany 
who were undermining those good relations by national propaganda in the 
United States. 

SECONDARY WORKS 

Benton, E. J. : 

"International Law and Diplomacy of the Spanish-American 

War." 

Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1908. 

A thorough study of the diplomacy of the Spanish-American war both as a 
history of the negotiations preceding the conflict and an exposition of events 
and practices of the war in their relation to international law. There is ample 
reference to source materials. 



314 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Calwer, Richard : 

"Die Meistbeguenstigung der Vereinigten Staaten von Xord- 
america." 
Akademischer Verlag fuer sociale Wissenschaften. Berlin, 
1902. 

A liberal exposition of the commercial relations between the United States 
and Germany, and of the policies of the two nations in regard to the "most- 
"T^^f avored-nation " clause. Dr. Calwer was a member of the Reichstag, Social- 
democratic Party. 



Fisk, Dr. George M. : 

"Die handelspolitischen und sonstigen voelkerrechtlichen Bezie- 
hungen zwischen Deutschland und den Vereinigten Staaten 
von Amerika." 
Muenchener Volswirtschaftliche Studien. Stuttgart: ^'erlag 
der J. G. Cotta'schen Buchhandlung Nachfolger, 1897. 

An excellent study of the history of the pohtical and commercial relations 
between the United States and Germany from colonial daj's, when the chief 
relations were with Prussia — until 1894. Dr. Fisk was employed as secretary 
to the American Embassy in Berlin and had access to the material in the 
Embassy Archives. Dr. White speaks with praise of Dr. Fisk's record and 
services at the Embassy. (See A. D. White: Autobiography, Vol. II pp. KBl 
and 132) 



Fi.sk, Dr. George M. : 

"Continental Opinion Regarding a Proposed Middle European 
Tariff Union." 
Johns Hopkins University Studies, 1902, Vol. XX. 

Fisk, Dr. George M. : 

"Most-favored-nation Relations, German- American." 
Article in the Journal of Political Economy, March, 1903. 

A very good exposition based on the official correspondence pubhshed in the 
Foreign Relations Series and also upon certain archives of the American Lega- 
tion in Berlin where Dr. Fisk was employed as secretary. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 315 

Foster, John W. : 

''The Practice of Diplomacy." 
Boston: Houghton, Mifflin & Company, 1906. 

Mr. Foster illustrates his exposition of diplomatic practice with actual 
incidents in the careers of American diplomatic officers — anecdotes culled 
from his experience as Secretary of State. A few of these relate to American 
representatives in Germany. 

Hepner, Adolf: ^ 

"America's Aid to Germany in 1870-71." 
St. Louis, Mo., 1905. 

Extracts from the official correspondence of E. B. Washburne, U. S. 
Ambassador to France during the Franco-Prussian war. 

Howe, M. A. D.: 

"Life and Letters of George Bancroft." 
New York: Scribner, 1908. 

Contains several letters by Mr. Bancroft on the Franco-Prussian War which 
are not contained in the New York Library collection nor in the pubhshed 
government correspondence. 

Ide, Henry C: 

"The Imbroglio in Samoa." 
North American Review, 1899, Vol. 168, p. 679. 

Mr. Ide, as former Chief Justice of Samoa, gives an authoritative resume 
of the Samoan question as a whole, and a first-hand account of the events 
immediately preceding the partition of the islands. Mr. Ide urges more active 
support on the part of the United States Government of the Berlin treaty 
provisions and of the American interests in the islands. 

Kraus, Dr. jur. Herbert: 

"Die IVIonroedoktrin in ihren Beziehungen zur amerikanischen 
Diplomatic und zum Voelkerrecht." 
Berlin: Guttentag, 1913. 

An exhaustive and scholarly study of the American policy from a view- 
point non-American, but not anti-American. Dr. Kraus cites his sources 
throughout and contributes an extensive bibliography. 



31G BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Latane, J. H.: 

"America as a World Power, 1897-1907." 
The American Nation: A History. Edited by A. B. Hart, 
Vol. 25. New York: Harpers, 1907. 

McKinley, William : 

"A Review of the Tariff Legislation of the United States from 
1812 to 1896." 
New York: Putnam, 1904. 

Moore, John Bassett : 

"A Digest of International Law." 
Washington: Government Printing Office, 1906. 

Professor Moore's epochal work reveals occasionally in its citations from 
State Department correspondence events and situations which are not pub- 
lished elsewhere. So far as I have been able to discover, Professor Moore's 
work is the only pubHshed source of information on the attempt of Germany 
to acquire the island of Margarita from Venezuela in 1901. 

Paullin, C. O.: 

"Diplomatic Negotiations of American Naval Officers, 1778- 
188.3." 
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1912. 

Contains extracts from Commanders' Letters and is based on research in 
the Navy and State Departments. Contains account of the first American 
agreement with Samoa made by Commander Meade in 1872. 

Penfield, W. L.: 

"The Anglo-German Litervention in Venezuela." 

North American Review, 1903, Vol. CLXXVH, pp. 86 ff. 

Mr. Penfield, Solicitor of the Department of State, was agent and counsel 
for Venezuela and the United States at the Venezuelan Arbitration before the 
Hague Tribunal. 



BIBLIOGRAPHY 317 

Root, Elihu: 

"The Military and Colonial Policy of the United States. 

Addresses and Reports by Elihu Root." 

Cambridge:- Harvard University Press, 1916. 

A collection made and edited by Robert Bacon and James Brown Scott. 
Most of the addresses are on military subjects, but a few deal with th'e foreign 
policies of the United States and American principles in regard to colonization. 

Taussig, F. W. : 

"A Tariff History of the United States." 
New York: Putnam, 1914. 

Thayer, William Roscoe: 

"The Life and Letters of John Hay." 

Boston: Houghton, Mifflin Co., 1915. 

Mr. Thayer's work is an invaluable contribution to an understanding of 
American foreign poUcy. By publishing directly so many of Secretary Hay's 
letters the work retains the character of source material, yet that material is 
clarified by Mr. Thayer's own able delineations of the situations and episodes 
treated in the letters. Secretary Hay's letters deal so frankly and tellingly 
with the national and international problems of his time that there is at no 
point any doubt of what the American poKcy toward foreign nations, individ- 
ually and collectively, was to be, so far as the Secretary of State was able to 
direct it. The seventeenth impression, 1916, and subsequent impressions con- 
tain in the appendix Ex-President Roosevelt's own accovmt of the episode 
with von Holleben by wliich Germany was induced to arbitrate the Venezuelan 
question. 

Thayer, W. R. : 

"Out of their own Mouths." 

New York: Appleton, 1917. 

A collection made for the purpose of showing German national policy. 
Aggressive utterances are selected from the speeches and writings of German 
rulers, statesmen, servants, publicists, poets, business men and others — with 
introduction by Air. Thayer. 

Von Buelow, Prince Bernhard: 

"Imperial Germany." 

Translated by Marie A. Lewenz, M.A. New York: Dodd, 

Meade & Co., 1914. 

A clear exposition of German Imperiahsm. The work is a glorification by 
the Chancellor of the national strength achieved, of the successes of the Gov- 
ernment's world policy and of the consequent relations with other powers 
including the United States. 



318 BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Von Halle, Ernst: 

"Deutschland und die oeffentliche Meinung in den Vereinigten 
Staaten." 
Preussische Jahrbuecher, Band 107, 1902, 

An article outlining the general history of German-American relations. 
The author deprecates the anti-American sympathies shown in Germany 
during the Spanish- American war, declares as false, hostile propaganda the 
accusations spread in America against Germany and advocates the further- 
ance of good relations with the United States. The article is typical of the 
efforts of the German Government in the period following the Spanish-Ameri- 
can war to win favor in America. 



APPENDIX 



21 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX I 



GERMAN-AMERICAN TREATIES AND CONVENTIONS. 



Treaties Concluded between the United States and Separate German 
States Previous to 1870. 



Date. 


German State. 


Subject of Treaty. 


1785 


Prussia 


Amity and Commerce. 


1799 


Prussia 


Amity and Commerce. 


1827 


Hanseatic Republics 


Friendship, Commerce and Naviga- 
tion. 


1828 


Prussia 


Commerce and Navigation. 


1828 


Hanseatic Republics 


Additional Article to Convention of 

1827. 


1840 


Hannover 


Commerce and Navigation. 


1844 


Hesse 


Abolishing "Droit D'Aubaine" and 
Taxes on Emigration. 


1844 


Wiirttemberg 


(Same Subject). 


1845 


Bavaria 


(Same Subject). 


1845 


Saxony 


(Same Subject). 


1846 


Nassau 


(Same Subject). 


1846 


Hannover 


Commerce and Navigation. 


1847 


Mechlenburg-Schwerin 


Commerce and Navigation. 


1847 


Oldenburg 


Commerce and Navigation. 


1852 


Hanseatic Republics 


Consular Convention. 


1853 


Bavaria 


Extradition. 


1853 


Bremen 


Extradition. 


1853 


Mechlenburg-Schwerin 


Extradition. 


1853 


Mechlenburg-Strelitz 


Extradition. 


1853 


Oldenburg 


Extradition. 


1853 


Wiirttemberg 


Extradition. 


1854 


Schaumburg-Lippe 


ExtracUtion. 


1854 


Bmnswick and Luencburg 


Disposition of Property. 


1855 


Hannover 


Extradition. 


1857 


Baden 


Extradition. 


1861 


Hannover 


Abolishment of Stade dues (Naviga- 
tion tolls on Elbe River). 


1868 


Baden 


Naturahzation. 


1868 


Bavaria 


Naturalization. 


1868 


Hesse 


Naturalization. 


1868 


North German Union 


Naturalization. 


1868 


Wiirttemberg 


Naturalization and Extradition. 



322 



APPENDIX 



Treaties Concluded and Ratified between the United States and the 
German Empire between 1870 and 1910. 

Date. Character of Treaty. 

1871 Consular Convention. 
1909 Patent Convention. 



Agreements Concluded between the United States and the German 
Empire between 1870 and 1910. 



Date. Subject of Agreement. 

1891 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- 

ment. (The "Saratoga" 
Agreement) 

1892 Copyright Agreement 

1900 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- 

ment 

1901 Agreement for Protection of 

Trademarks in Morocco 

1905 Agreement for Protection of 
Trademarks in China 

1906 Reciprocal Commercial Arrange- 

ment 

1907 Commercial Agreement 

1910 Commercial Agreement 



Form. 

Exchange of notes. 



Signed but not proclaimed. 
Signed and proclaimed. 

Exchange of notes. 

Exchange of notes. 

Proclamation. 

Signed and accompanied by 

diplomatic notes. 
Proclamation by President of 

United States and in Germany 

by statute. 



Treaties and- Conventions Signed Jointly by the United 
States, Germany and a Third Power. 

Date. Subject of Treaty. Third Power. 

1889 General Act providing for neutraUty, etc., of Great Britain. 

Samoan Islands 
1899 Convention Relating to Settlement of Samoan Great Britain. 

Claims 
1899 Convention to Adjust the Question of the Great Britain. 

Samoan Islands 



INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND ACTS 



323 



Date of 
Conclusion 


Place of 
. Conclusion, 


1875 


Paris 


*1883 


Paris 


1884 


Paris 


1886 


Paris 


1890 


Brussels 


tl899 


Brussels 



11899 The Hague 
§1900 Brussels 
1901 Peking 



1903 
1904 
1904 



Paris 
Paris 
The Hague 



1905 Peking 



International Conventions and Acts to which the United States and 
THE German Empire Were Signatories from 1870 to 1910. 

Subject of Convention. 

International Bureau of Weights and Measures. 
International Protection of Industrial Property. 
Protection of Submarine Cables. 
Interpretation of certain articles of Convention of 

1884 for Protection of Submarine Cables. 
Repression of African Slave Trade. 
Regulation of Importation of Spirituous Liquors 

into Certain Regions of Africa. 
International Peace Conference. 
Additional Act for Protection of Industrial Property. 
Conclusion of "Boxer" troubles, Provisions for 

Indemnities. 
International Sanitary Convention. 
Suppression of White Slave Traffic. 
Exemption of Hospital Ships in War Time from 

Taxation. 
New agreement between China and Certain Powers 

concerning Whang-Pu Conservancy. 
Creation pf International Institute of Agriculture. 
Regulating Trade and Administration of Morocco. 
International Red Cross Convention. 
Revision of duties imposed by Brussels Convention of 

1899 on Spirituous Liquors Imported into Africa. 
Unification of Pharmacopocial Formulas for Potent 

Drugs. 
International Wireless Telegraph Convention. 
Arbitration, Rules of Warfare, etc. 
Represision of Obscene Publications. 
Regulation of Assistance and Salvage at Sea. 

* Not signed at conclusion but adhered to later by United States and German 
Empire. 

t Signed by German Empire at time of conclusion, later adhered to by 
United States. 

t Includes separate articles not all of which were signed by both nations. 

§ Signed by United States at time of conclusion, later adhered to by German 
Empire. 

II Signed by United States with reservation. 

Compiled from Senate Document No. 357, 61st Cong., 2nd Session. 

"Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols and Agreements 
between the United States of America and Other Powers," 1776-1909. 

Supplement to above Document, 1910 to 1913. 

Reichsgesetzblatt. U. S. Revised Statutes. 

Sen. Ex. Doc. No. 119, 52nd Cong., 1st Sess., '91-'92, p. 110. (For the 
Saratoga Agreement of 1891 — which is omitted in the Malloy Collection, 
Senate Doc. No. 357, 61st Congress, 2nd Session.) 



1905 


Rome 


1906 


Algeciras 


1906 


Geneva 


1906 


Brussels 



1906 



Brussels 



1906 


Bedin 


11907 


The Hague 


1910 


Paris 


1910 


Brussels 



324 APPENDIX 



APPENDIX II 

Pkussian-American Treaty of 1828 and Articles revived 
FROM Former Treaties 

(Malloy, Treaties, Conventions, etc., Vol. II, pp. 1477 fF.) 

1828 Treaty of Commerce and Navigation 

Concluded May 1, 1828; ratification advised by the Senate 
May 14, 1828; ratification again advised and time for exchange 
of ratification extended by the Senate March 9, 1829; ratifications 
exchanged March 14, 1829; proclaimed March 14, 1829. 

Articles 

I. Freedom of commerce and nav- VIII. No preference to importing 

igation. vessel. 

II. No discrimination of shipping IX. Most favored nation commer- 

charges. cial privileges. 

III. No discrimination in import X. Consular privileges and juris- 

duties on account of vessels. diction. 

IV. Application of two preceding XI. Deserters from sliips. 

sections. XII. Articles of former treaties 

V. No discrimination of import revived, 

duties. XIII. Blockades. 

VI. No discrimination of export XIV. Estates of deceased persons, 
duties. XV. Duration. 

VII. Coastwise trade. XVI. Ratification. 

The United States of America and His Majesty the King of 
Prussia, equally animated with the desire of maintaining the 
relations of good understanding which have hitherto so happily 
subsisted between their respective States, of extending, also, and 
consolidating the commercial intercourse between them, and con- 
vinced that this object cannot better be accomplished than by 
adopting the system of an entire freedom of navigation, and a 
perfect reciprocity, based upon principles of equity equally bene- 
ficial to both countries, and applicable in time of peace as well as 
in time of war, have, in consequence, agreed to enter into negotia- 



PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 325 

tions for the conclusion of a treaty of navigation and commerce; 
for whicli purpose the President of the United States has con- 
ferred full powers on Henry Clay, their Secretary of State; and 
His Majesty the King of Prussia has conferred like powers on the 
Sieur Ludwig Niederstetter, Charge d'Affaires of His said Majesty, 
near the United States; and the said Plenipotentiaries, having 
exchanged their said full powers, found in good and due form, 
have concluded and signed the following articles : 



Article I 

There shall be between the territories of the high contracting 
parties a reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation. The 
inhabitants of their respective States shall mutually have liberty 
to enter the ports, places, and rivers of the territories of each party, 
wherever foreign commerce is permitted. They shall be at liberty, 
to sojourn and reside in all parts whatsoever of said territories, 
in order to attend to their affairs ; and they shall enjoy, to that 
effect, the same security and protection as natives of the country 
wherein they reside, on condition of their submitting to the laws 
and ordinances there prevailing. 



Article H 

Prussian vessels arriving either laden or in ballast in the ports 
of the United States of America, and, reciprocally, vessels of the 
United States arriving either laden or in ballast in the ports of the 
Kingdom of Prussia, shall be treated, on their entrance, during 
their stay, and at their departure, upon the same footing as national 
vessels coming from the same place, with respect to the duties of 
tonnage, light-houses, pilotage, salvage, and port charges, as well 
as to the fees and perquisities of public officers, and all other 
duties and charges, of whatever kind or denomination, levied in 
the name or to the profit of the Government, the local authorities, 
or of any private establishment whatsoever. 



326 APPENDIX 

Article III 

All kinds of merchandise and articles of commerce, either the 
produce of the soil or the industry of the United States of America, 
or of any other country, which may be lawfully imported into the 
ports of the Kingdom of Prussia, in Prussian vessels, may also 
be so imported in vessels of the United States of America, without 
paying other or higher duties or charges, of whatever kind or 
denomination, levied in the name or to the profit of the Govern- 
ment, the local authorities, or of any private establishments 
whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or produce had been 
imported in Prussian vessels. And, reciprocally, all kind of mer- 
chandise and articles of commerce, either the produce of the soil 
or of the industry of the Kingdom of Prussia, or of any other 
country, which may be lawfully imported into the ports of the 
United States in vessels of the said States, may also be so imported 
in Prussian vessels, without paying other or higher duties or charges 
of whatever kind or denomination, levied in the name or to the 
profit of the Government, the local authorities, or of any private 
establishments whatsoever, than if the same merchandise or pro- 
duce had been imported in vessels of the United States of America. 

Article TV 

To prevent the possibility of any misiuiderstanding, it is hereby 
declared that the stipulations contained in the two preceding 
articles are to their full extent applicable to Prussian vessels and 
their cargoes arriving in the ports of the United States of America, 
and, reciprocally, to vessels of the said States and their cargoes 
arriving in the ports of the Kingdom of Prussia, whether the said 
vessels clear directly from the ports of the country to which they 
respectively belong, or from the ports of any other foreign country. 

Article V 

No higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importation 
into the United States of any article the produce or manufacture of 
Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the 



PRUSSIAN- AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 327 

importation into the Kingdom of Prussia of any article the pro- 
duce or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be 
payable on the like article being the produce or manufacture of 
any other foreign country. Xor shall any prohibition be imposed 
on the importation or exportation of any article the produce or 
manufacture of the United States, or of Prussia, to or from the 
ports of the United States, or to or from the ports of Prussia, which 
shall not equally extend to all other nations. 

Artict.e VI 

All kind of merchandise and articles of commerce, either the 
produce of the soil or of the industry of the United States of 
America, or of any other country, which may be lawfully exported 
from the ports of the said United States in national vessels, may 
also be exported therefrom in Prussian vessels without paying other 
or higher duties or charges, of whatever kind or denomination, 
levied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the local 
authorities, or of any private establishments whatsoever, than if 
the same merchandise or produce had been exported in vessels 
of the United States of America. 

An exact reciprocity shall be observed in the ports of the kingdom 
of Prussia, so that all kind of merchandise and articles of co- 
merce either the produce of the soil or the industry of the said 
Kingdom, or of any other country, which may be lawfully exported 
from Prussian ports in national vessels, may also be exported 
therefrom in vessels of the United States of America, without pay- 
ing other or higher duties or charges of whatever kind or denomi- 
nation, levied in the name or to the profit of the Government, the 
local authorities, or of any private estalishments whatsoever, than 
if the same merchandise or produce had been exported in Prussian 
vessels. 

Article VII 

The preceding articles are not applicable to the coastwise 
navigation of the two countries, which is respectively reserved by 
each of the high contracting parties exclusively to itself. 



328 APPENDIX 

Article VIII 

No priority or preference shall be given, directly or indirectly, 
by either of the contracting parties, nor by any company, cor- 
poration, or agent, acting on their behalf or under their authority, 
in the purchase of any article of commerce, lawfully imported, on 
account of or in reference to the character of the vessel, whether it 
be of the one party or of the other, in which such article was 
imported; it being the true intent and meaning of the contracting 
parties that no distinction or difference whatever shall be made in 
this respect. 

Article IX 

If either party shall hereafter grant to any other nation any 
particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall immediately 
become common to the other party, freely, where it is freely granted 
to such other nation, or on yielding the same compensation when 
the grant is conditional. 

Article X 

The two contracting parties have granted to each other the 
liberty of having, each in the ports of the other. Consuls, Yice- 
Consuls, Agents and Commissaries of their own appointment, 
who shall enjoy the same privileges and power^ as those of the most 
favored nations. But if any such Consul shall exercise commerce, 
they shall be submitted to the same laws and usages to which the 
private individuals of their nation are submitted, in the same 
place. 

The Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Commercial Agents shall have 
the right, as such, to sit as judges and arbitrators in such differ- 
ences as may arise between the captains and crews of the vessels 
belonging to the nation whose interests are committed to their 
charge, without the interference of the local authorities, unless 
the conduct of the crews or of the captain should disturb the order 
or tranquillity of the country, or the said Consuls, Vice-Consuls or 
Commercial Agents should require their assistance to cause their 
decisions to be carried into effect or supported. It is, however. 



PRUSSIAN-AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 329 

understood, that this species of judgment or arbitration shall not 
deprive the contending parties of the right they have to resort, 
on their return, to the judicial authority of their country. 

Article XI 

The said Consuls, Vice-Consuls and Commercial Agents are 
authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities, for 
the search, arrest, and imprisonment of the deserters from the 
ships of war and merchant vessels of their country. For this 
purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals, judges and 
officers, and shall in writing demand said deserters, proving, by 
the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls of the crew3, 
or by other official documents, that such individuals formed part 
of the crews; and, on this reclamation being thus substantiated, 
the surrender shall not be refused. Such deserters, when arrested 
shall be placed at the disposal of the said Consuls, Vice-Consuls, 
or Commercial Agents, and may be confined in the public prisons, 
at the request and cost of those w^ho shall claim them, in order to 
be sent to the vessels to which they belonged, or to others of the 
same country. But if not sent back within three months from the 
day of their arrest, they shall be set at liberty, and shall not be 
again arrested for the same cause. However, if the deserter should 
be found to have committed any crime or offence, his surrender 
may be delayed until the tribunal before which his case shall be 
depending shall have pronounced its sentence, and such sentence 
shall have been carried into effect. 

Article XII 

The twelfth article of the treaty of amity and commerce, con- 
cluded between the parties in 1785, and the articles from the 
thirteenth to the twenty-fourth, inclusive, of that which was 
concluded at Berlin in 1799, with the exception of the last para- 
graph in the nineteenth article, relating to treaties with Great 
Britain, are hereby re\ived with the same force and virtue as if 
they made part of the context of the present treaty, it being, how- 



330 APPENDIX 

ever, understood that the stipulations contained in the articles 
thus revived shall be always considered as in no manner affecting 
the treaties or conventions concluded by either party with other 
Powers, during the interval betw^een the expiration of the said 
treaty of 1799, and the commencement of the operation of the 
present treaty. 

The parties being still desirous, in conformity with their inten- 
tion declared in the twelfth article of the said treaty of 1799, to 
estabHsh between themselves, or in concert with other maritime 
Powers, further provisions to ensure just protection and freedom 
to neutral navigation and commerce, and which may, at the same 
time, advance the cause of civilization and humanity, engage 
again to treat on this subject at some future and convenient 
period. 

Article XIII 

Considering the remoteness of the respective countries of the 
two high contracting parties, and the uncertainty resulting there- 
from, with respect to the various events which may take place, it 
is agreed that a merchant vessel belonging to either of them, which 
may be bound to a port supposed at the time of its departure to 
be blockaded, shall not, however, be captured or condemned for 
having attempted a first time to enter said port, unless it can be 
proved that said vessel could and ought to have learnt, during its 
voyage, that the blockade of the place in question still continued. 
But all vessels which, after having been warned oft' once shall, 
during the same voyage, attempt a second time to enter the same 
blockaded port, during the continuance of the said blockade, shall 
then subject themselves to be detained and condemned. 

Article XIV 

The citizens or subjects of each party shall have power to dis- 
pose of their personal goods within the jurisdiction of the other, 
by testament, donation, or otherwise; and their representatives, 
being citizens or subjects of the other party, shall succeed to their 
said personal goods, whether by testament or ab intestato, and 



PRUSSIAN- AMERICAN TREATY OF 1828 331 

may take possession thereof, either by themselves or by others 
acting for them, and dispose of the same at their will, paying such 
dues only as the inhabitants of the country wherein the said goods 
are shall be subject to pay in like cases. And in case of the absence 
of the representative, such care shall be taken of the said goods 
as would be taken of the goods of a native, in like case, until the 
lawful owner may take measures for receiving them. And if 
question should arise among several claimants to which of them 
said goods belong, the same shall be decided finally by the laws 
and judges of the land wherein the said goods are. And where, 
on the death of any person hold,ing real estate w^ithin the territories 
of the one party, such real estate would, by the laws of the land, 
descend on a citizen or subject of the other, were he not dis- 
qualified by alienage, such citizens or subject shall be allowed a 
reasonable time to sell the same, and to withdraw the proceeds 
without molestation and exempt from all duties of detraction, on 
the part of the Government of the respective States. But this 
article shall not derogate in any manner from the force of the laws 
already published, or hereafter to be published by His Majesty 
the King of Prussia, to pre^•ent the emigration of his subjects. 

Article XV 

The present treaty shall continue in force for twelve years, 
counting from the day of the exchange of the ratifications; and if 
tw'elve months before the expiration of that period, neither of the 
high contracting parties shall have announced, by an official 
notification to the other, its intention to arrest the operation of 
said treaty, it shall remain binding for one year beyond that time, 
and so on until the expiration of the tweh'e months, which will 
follow a similar notification, whatever the time at which it may 
take place. 

Article XVI 

This treaty shall be approved and ratified by the President of 
the United States of America, by and with the advice and consent 
by the Senate thereof, and by His Majesty the King of Prussia, 



332 APPENDIX 

and the ratifications shall be exchanged in the city of Washington, 
within nine months from the date of the signature hereof, or sooner 
if possible. 

In faith whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed 
the above articles, both in the French and English languages, and 
they have thereto affixed their seals; declaring, nevertheless, that 
the signing in both languages shall not be brought into precedent, 
nor in any w-ay operate to the prejudice of either party. 

Done in triplicate at the city of Washington on the first day of 
May, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and 
twenty-eight, and the fifty-second of the Independence of the 
United States of America. 

(seal) H. Clay, 

(seal) Ludwig Niederstetter. 



Articles Revived from the Treaty of 1799 between the 
United States -\nd Prussia 

Article XIII 

And in the same case of one of the contracting parties being 
engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties 
and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandise 
of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of 
every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the sub- 
jects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall 
be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condem- 
nation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless, it shall 
be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for 
such length of time as the captors may think necessary to prevent 
the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their pro- 
ceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss 
such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further 
be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any 
part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full 
value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the 



ARTICLES REVIVED FROM 1799 TREATY 333 

place of its destination. But in the case supposed of a vessel 
stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel 
stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband 
nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in 
that case be carried into port, nor further detained, but shall be 
allowed to proceed on her voyage. 

All cannons, mortars, fire-arms, -pistols, bombs, grenades, 
bullets, balls, muskets, flints, matches, powder, saltpeter, sulphur, 
cuirasses, pikes, swords, belts, cartouch boxes, saddles and bridles 
beyond the quantity necessary for the use of the ship, or beyond 
that which every man ser^'ing on board the vessel, or passenger, 
ought to have; and in general whatever is comprised under the 
denomination of arms and military stores, of what description 
soever, shall be deemed objects of contraband. 

Article XIV 

To ensure to the vessels of the two contracting parties the 
advantage of being readily and certainly known in time of war, 
it is agreed that they shall be provided with the sea-letters and 
documents hereafter specified: 

1. A passport, expressing the name, the property, and the burthen 
of the vessel, as also the name and dwelling of the master, which 
passport shall be made out in good and due form, shall be renewed 
as often as the vessel shall return into port, and shall be exhibited 
whensoever required, as well in the open sea as in port. But if 
the vessel be under convoy of one or more vessels of war, belonging 
to the neutral party, the simple declaration of the officer com- 
manding the convoy, that the said vessel belongs to the party of 
which he is, shall be considered as establishing the fact, and shall 
relieve both parties from the trouble of further examination. 

2. A charter-party, that is to say, the contract passed for the 
freight of the whole vessel, or the bills of lading given for the cargo 
in detail. 

3. The list of the ship's company, containing an indicatioa by 
name and in detail of the persons composing the crew of the vessel. 
These documents shall always be authenticated according to the 



334 APPENDIX 

forms established at the place from which the vessel shall have 
sailed. 

As their production ought to be exacted only when one of the 
contracting parties shall be at war, and as their exhibition ought to 
have no other object than to prove the neutrality of the vessel, its 
cargo, and company, they shall not be deemed absolutely neces- 
sary on board such vessels, belonging to the neutral party as shall 
have sailed from its ports before or within three months after the 
Government shall have been informed of the state of war in which 
the belligerent party shall be engaged. In the interval, in default 
of these specific documents, the neutrality of the vessel may be. 
estabhshed by such other e\ddence as the tribunals authorized to 
judge of the case may deem sufficient. 

Article XV 

And to prevent entirely all disorder and violence in such cases, 
it is stipulated that, when the vessels of the neutral party, sailing 
without convoy, shall be met by any vessels of war, public or pri- 
vate, of the other party, such vessel of war shall not send more than 
two or three men in their boat on board the said neutral vessel to 
examine her passports and documents. And all persons belonging 
to any vessel of war, public or private, who shall molest or insult 
in any manner whatever, the people, vessels, or effects of the 
other party, shall be responsible in their persons and property 
for damages and interest, sufficient security for which shall be 
given by all commanders of private armed vessels before they are 
commissioned. 

Article X\l 

In times of war, or in cases of urgent necessity, when either 
of the contracting parties shall be obliged to lay a general embargo, 
either in all its ports, or in certain particular places, the vessels 
of the other party shall be subject to this measure, upon the same 
footing as those of the most favored nations, but without ha\dng 
the right to claim the exemption in their favor stipulated in the 
sixteenth article of the former treatv of 1785. But on the other 



ARTICLES REVIVED FROM 1799 TREATY 335 

hand, the proprietors of the vessels which shall have been detained, 
whether for some military expedition, or for what other use soever 
shall obtain from the Government that shall have employed them 
an equitable indemnity, as well for the freight as for the loss 
occasioned by the delay. And furthermore, in all cases of seizure, 
detention, or arrest, for debts contracted or offences committed 
by any citizen or subject of the one party within the jurisdiction 
of the other, the same shall be made and prosecuted by order and 
authority of law only, and according to the regular course of pro- 
ceedings usual in such cases. 

Article XVII 

If any vessel or effects of the neutral Power be taken by an 
enemy of the other, or by a pirate, and retaken by the Power at 
war, they shall be restored to the first proprietor, upon the con- 
ditions hereafter stipulated in the twenty-first article for cases of 
recapture. 

Article XVIII 

If the citizens or subjects of either party, in danger from tem- 
pests, i)irates, enemies, or other accidents, shall take refuge with 
their vessels or effects, within the harbors or jurisdiction of the 
other, they shall be received, protected, and treated with humanity 
and kindness, and shall be permitted to furnish themselves, at 
reasonable prices, with all refreshments, provisions, and other 
things necessary for their sustenance, health, and accom(m)oda- 
tion, and for the repair of their vessels. 

Article XIX 

The vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall 
carry freely, wheresoever they pilease, the vessels and effects 
taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, 
charges, or fees to officers of admiralty, of the customs, or any 
others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under 
legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other 
party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their 
22 



336 APPENDIX 

captors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the 
commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show. But, 
conformably to the treaties existing between the United States and 
Great Britain, no vessel that shall have made a prize upon British 
subjects shall have a right to shelter in the ports of the United 
States, but if forced therein by tempiests, or any other danger or 
accidents of the sea, they shall be obliged to depart as soon as 
possible. 

Article XX 

No citizen or subject of either of the contracting parties shall 
take from any Power with which the other may be at war any 
commission or letter of marque, for arming any vessel to act as a 
privateer against the other, on pain of being punished as a pirate; 
nor shall either party hire, lend, or give any part of its naval or 
military force to the enemy of the other, to aid them offensively or 
defensively against the other. 

Article XXI 

If the two contracting parties should engage in a war against a 
common enemy, the following points shall be observed between 
them: 

1. If a vessel of one of the parties, taken by the enemy, shall, 
before being carjied into a neutral or enemy's port, be retaken by a 
ship of war or privateer of the other, it shall, with the cargo, be 
restored to the first owners, for a compensation of one-eighth part 
of the value of the said vessel and cargo, if the recapture be made 
by a public ship of war, and one-sixth part, if made by a privateer. 

2. The restitution in such cases shall be after due proof of 
property, and surety given for the part to which the recaptors are 
entitled. 

3. The vessels of war, public and private, of the two parties, 
shall reciprocally be admitted wdth their prizes into the respective 
ports of each, but the said prizes shall not be discharged or sold 
there, until their legality shall have been decided according to the 
laws and regulations of the State to which the captor belongs, but 



ARTICLES REVIVED FROM 1799 TREATY 337 

by the judicatories of the place into which the prize shall have 
been conducted. 

4. It shall be free to each party to make such regulations as 
they shall judge necessary, for the conduct of their respective 
vessels of war, public and private, relative to the vessels, which 
they shall take, and carry into the ports of the two parties. 

Article XXII 

When the contracting parties shall have a common enemy, or 
shall both be neutral, the vessels of war of each shall upon all 
occasions take under their protection the vessels of the other going 
the same course, and shall defend such vessels as long as they hold 
the same course, against all force and violence, in the same manner 
as they ought to protect and defend vessels belonging to the party 
of which they are. 

Article XXIII 

If war should arise between the two contracting parties, the 
merchants of either country then residing in the other shall be 
allowed to remain nine months to collect their debts and settle 
their affairs, and may depart freely, carrying off all their effects 
without molestation or hindrance; and all w^omen and children, 
scholars of every faculty, cultivators of the earth, artisans, manu- 
facturers, and fishermen, unarmed and inhabiting unfortified 
towns, villages, or places, and in general all others whose occu- 
pations are for the common subsistence and benefit of mankind, 
shall be allowed to continue their respective emploAinents, and 
shall not be molested in their persons, nor shall their houses or 
goods be burnt or otherwise destroyed nor their fields wasted by 
the armed force of the enemy, into wdiose power by the events of 
war they may happen to fall; but if anything is necessary to be 
taken from them for the use of such armed force, the same shall 
be paid for at a reasonable price. 

Article XXIV 

And to prevent the destruction of prisoners of war, by sending 
them into distant and inclement countries, or by crowding them 



338 APPENDIX 

into close and noxious places, the two contracting parties solemnly 
pledge themselves to the world and to each other that they will 
not adopt any such practice; that neither will send the prisoners 
whom they may take from the other into the East Indies or any 
other part of Asia or Africa, but that they shall be placed in some 
parts of their dominions in Europe or America, in wholesome 
situations; that they shall not be confined in dungeons, prison- 
ships, nor prisons, nor be put into irons, nor bound, nor otherwise 
restrained in the use of their limbs; that the officers shall be 
enlarged on their paroles within convenient districts, and have 
comfortable quarters, and the common men be disposed in canton- 
ments open and extensive enough for air and exercise, and lodged 
in barracks as roomly and good as are provided by the party in 
in whose power they are for their own troops; that the officers 
shall also be daily furnished by the party in whose power they are 
with as many rations, and of the same articles and quality as are 
allowed by them, either in kind or by commutation, to officers of 
equal rank in their own army; and all others shall be daily fur- 
nished by them with such ration as they shall allow to a common 
soldier in their own service; the value whereof shall l)e paid by the 
other party on a mutual adjustment of accounts for the subsistence 
of prisoners at the close of the war; and the said accounts shall not 
be mingled with or set off against any others, for any other article 
or for any other cause, real or pretended, whatever. That each 
party shall be allowed to keep a commissary of prisoners of their 
own appointment, with every separate contonment of prisoners in 
possession of the other, which commissary shall see th« prisoners 
as often as he pleases, shall be allowed to receive and distribute 
whatever comforts may be sent to them by their friends, and shall 
be free to make his reports in open letters to those who employ him; 
but if any officer shall break his parole, or any other prisoner shall 
escape from the limits of his cantonment after they shall have been 
designated to him, such individual officer or other prisoner shall 
forfeit so much of the benefit of this article as provides for his 
enlargement on parole or cantonment. And it is de^-lared, that 
neither the pretence that war dissolves all treaties, nor any other 
whate^'er, shall be considered as annulling or suspending this and 



ARTICLE REVIVED FROM 1785 TREATY ' 339 

the next preceding article; but, on the contrary, that the state of 
war is precisely that for which they are provided, and during 
which they are to be as sacredly observed as the most acknowledged 
articles in the law of nature and nations. 

Article Revred from the Treaty of 1785 between the 
United States and Prussia 

Article XII 

If one of the coiitracting parties should be engaged in war ^^•ith 
any other Power, the free intercourse and commerce of the sub- 
jects or citizens of the party remaining neuter with the belligerent 
Powers shall not be interrupted. On the contrary, in that case, 
as in full peace, the vessels of the neutral party may navigate 
freely to and from the ports aud ou the coasts of the belligerent 
parties, free vessels making free goods, insomuch that all things 
shall be adjudged free which shall be on board any vessel belonging 
to the neutral party, although such things belong to an enemy of 
the other; and the same freedom shall be extended to persons who 
shall be on board a free vessel, although they should be enemies 
to the other party, unless they be soldiers in actual service of such 
enemy. 

APPENDIX III 

Agreement between Hassenpflug and Weber and the 
Samoan Chiefs, 1877 

(V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anlagen No. 239, p. 67) 
Anlage 9. 

(Ubersetzung) 

Faleasiu, 3. Juh, 1877. 
Wir versprechen hierdurch den deutschen Vertretern: 
1. Wir werden die Neutralitaet des Distriktes von Letogo bis 
]\Iulinuu, einschliesslich dieser beiden Plaetze, annehmen (derselben 
entsprechen, nachkommen). 



540 



APPENDIX 



2. Falls Krieg ausbricht, werden wir unsere in Mulinuu auf- 
gezogene Flagge herunternehmen, mid die Angestellten iinserer 
Regienmg werden INIiiliniiu verlassen. 

3. Wir werden fuer deutsches Eigenthum, Haeuser, Land und 
Pflanzimgen gute Sorge tragen. Sollte irgend einer der zu unserer 
Regienmg gehoert, einem Deutschen oder irgend etwas einem 
Deutschen Gehoeriges Schaden zufuegen, so werden wir dafuer 
zahlen (solches entgelten). 

4. Wir werden in keiner Weise die deutsche Regierung zurneck- 
setzen oder irgend einer anderen jremden Regierung Vorrechte vor 
der Deutschen gewaehren. 

Wir beharren gaenzlich bei Allem, was ivir den deutschen Ver- 
tretern in jener Beziehung geschrieben haben, in Uebereinstimmung 
mit den uns in ihrem (den deutschen Vertretern) Briefe an uns vom 
24. Mai angezeigten Punkten. 

5. Wir werden den deutschen Konsul den Tag anzeigen, wann 
der Krieg ausbricht. 



Wir die Taimua und Faipule. 





(gez.) 


Samoa 


(gez.) Aiono 




IC 


Lavea 


Loto 




« 


Aufai 


" Masua 




11 


Tagaloa 


" Tuisalega 


(gez.) Neli 


« 


Tuia 


" Mataia 


Sekretaer 


" 


Le Tufuga 


Sua 




<< 


Asiata 


" Leaeno 




« 


Tia 


" Laiataua 


(L. S. 


li 


Tuataga 


Alapa 


grosses Samoa-Staats- 


i< 


IVIataafa 


Tupuola 


siegel) 


11 


Leutele 


" Fiame 




" 


Lemana 


" Mamea 




n 


Leiato 


" Mulipola 




i( 


Letuli 


Talao 


Geschehen auf Befehl d( 


3r Taimua und Faipule. 










(gez.) Meisake, 








Zweiter Sekretaer. 



Anlage 10 

(Uebersetzung) 

Vaiusu, 5. Juli 1877. 
Wir sprechen hierdurch den deutschen Vertretern: 
1. Wir werden die NeutraUtaet des Distriktes von Letogo bis 



GERMAN AGREEMENT WITH SAMOAN CHIEF, 1877 341 

Mulinuii, einschliesslich dieser beiden Plaetze, annehmen (derselben 
entsprechen, iiachkommen) . 

2. Wir werden uiisere Flagge nicht auf jeiiem neutralen Grunde 
auf Ziehen, noch werden Angestellte imserer Regierung dort 
residiren. 

3. Wir werden fuer deutsches Eigenthum, Haeiiser, Land und 
Pflanzungen gute Sorge tragen. Sollte irgend einer, der zu unserer 
Regierung gehoert, einem Deutschen oder irgend etwas einem 
Deutschen Gehoeriges Schaden zufuegen, so werden wir dafuer 
zahlen (solches engelten). 

4. Wir iverden in keiner Weise die deutsche Regierung zuniech- 
seizen oder irgend einer andern Regierung Vorrechte nor der Deutschen 
gewaehrefi. — Wir beharren gaenzlich bei Allen, was wir dea 
deutschen Vertretern in jener Beziehung geschrieben haben in 
Uebereinstimmung mit den in ihrem (der deutschen Vertreter) 
Brief e vom 24. Mai derTaimua und Faipule angezeigten Punkten, 
wo von wir eine Abschrift empfangen. 

5. Wir werden dem deutschen Konsul den Tag anzeigen, wenn 
der Krieg ausbricht. — Wir nehmen diese Uebereinkunft gaenzUch 
an und setzen unsere Unterschrift darunter. 

Wir zeichnen unseren Xamen. 

(gez.) Malietoa. 



APPENDIX IV 

"The Story of Samoa" 

IN 

Frederick W. Seward's "Reminiscences of a War-time 
Statesman and Diplomat," p. 437. 

One morning in 1877, while sitting at my desk in the Depart- 
ment of State, I was informed that two gentlemen "from some 
Pacific Islands" desired to see me. On entering, they introduced 
themselves. One was an American merchant, who had been 
engaged in business at Apia Harbor. The other was a tall, fine- 
looking, swarthy-complexioned man, in ordinary American dress. 



342 APPENDIX 

who proved to be the Secretary of State and Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Samoan Islands. 

He spoke Enghsh easily and fluently, but with some quaint 
idicms that seemed to render it more impressive. When I asked 
how he had learned it, he told me that he was taught by the mission- 
aries. Schools and text-bcoks not being available, his chief bcok 
for study of the language had been the Bible. 

His credentials proved to be all in proper form, and as the 
business which brought him to Washington was so important it 
had been deemed wise that he should come on himself, instead 
of entrusting it to any diplomatic or consular representative, I 
duly presented him to the Secretary of State, Mr. Evarts, and to 
President Hayes, and I was authorized to discuss matters with him 
on the part of our Government. 

With the increase of intercourse and trade, the Samoan Islanders 
had percei\-ed that they might become the object of some intrigue, 
or perhaps fall under the sway of some one of the maritime powers 
of Europe, whom they would be powerless to resist. Doubtful 
of their ability to maintain peaceful and stable existence, they 
washed the United States to recognize and protect their independ- 
ence, to establish commercial relations with their people, and to 
assist them in their steps toward regulated and responsible govern- 
ment. 

In short, his mission was nothing less than to ask that they might 
come under the flag of the United States and become a part of our 
extended dominion, either by formal annexation or under a pro- 
tectorate, in such form as the American Government might prefer. 

Having seen Pacific islands, one after another, eagerly seized 
upon by some European power, and having no wish to become 
subjects of any such power, they had decided to oft'er their islands 
to the United States. Of course, they hardly anticipated that there 
would be any hesitation on our part in accepting such an oft'er. 

I explained that, while the American people had in former years 
been willing and desirous of extending their national domain on 
the continent, yet there had now come a decided change in public 
opinion. Extension of the national boundaries was now looked 
upon with disfavor. 



"the story of Samoa" 343 

Especially was there a strong opposition to the acquisition of 
any islands, near or remote, inhabited by any race but our own. 
The proposed treaties for naval harbors in the West Indies, and 
for the acquisition of St. Thomas, Santa Cruz, and Santo Domingo, 
had been shelved or summarily rejected. Even the Panama Canal 
had been allowed to pass into the hands of a European power; 
and the purchase of Alaska was still a subject of reproach and 
ridicule and pronounced a gigantic folly. 

Having had a hand myself in the negotiation of these treaties, 
I could foresee the difficulties in the way of the mission he had 
undertaken. Of course, I believed this dread of national expansion 
was a passing phase and an unreasonable and unnatural one. But, 
while it lasted, it had to be reckoned with. 

The Samoan proposals were laid before Secretary Evarts, and 
by him laid before the President and Cabinet. Both President 
Hayes and Mr. Evarts believed that my father's policy in this 
regard had been wise and judicious. But they saw also that it 
would now encounter the same opposition that it had during the 
administration of President Johnson and subsequently under that 
of President Grant. 

The Navy Department warmly favored the Samoan proposition, 
as it had always desired the establishment of naval outposts in 
the Pacific. In fact, tentative steps had already been taken by 
naval officers for obtaining a port in the islands for coaling and 
repairs. 

The leading members of the Foreign Affairs Committees in 
Congress, and the leading Republicans in both Houses were 
sounded. There were diflFerences of opinion among them, but 
practically all were agreed that the times were inauspicious for the 
consideration of any such project. The Senate would not consent 
to any treaty that involved expense or obligation, and the House, 
in which there was an anti-administration majority, would vote it 
down as a matter of course. It seemed to be considered a mark of 
patriotism to oppose any addition to our own country. 

The Samoan Envoy listened gravely and sadly to the recital of 
these adverse conditions. Finally, he said that I might draw up 
the treaty in any form I thought best, and he believed his people 



344 APPENDIX 

would agree. They would give us their best harbor, that of Pago- 
Pago, which fortunately was as yet unoccupied, and in return 
would ask nothing, except our assurances of peace and friendship. 

I drafted a treaty, and then another and yet another, endeavor- 
ing to meet the various Congressional and popular objections. 
It seemed as if the Senate might be induced to consent to the 
acceptance of a harbor, provided the country was not to pay 
anything for it, or even to agree to protect or defend it. 

So, at last, the treaty was put into that form. Even the phrases 
tendering our good offices in case of disputes with other powers 
were objected to, but were finally allowed to stand. The treaty 
was signed and sealed by the Secretary and jNIr. Mamea, the 
Samoan Elnvoy. It was sent to the Senate and in due time was 
confirmed. 

The press and the public seemed to regard the matter with 
indifference, and the House refused any appropriation for a coal 
yard for Pago-Pago, which remained deserted and unused. 

The Diplomatic Corps, of course, took note of the Samoan affair. 
Some of them were amused and others puzzled by it. For a nation 
of " landgrabbers, " as we were called in Europe, we seemed to be 
very slow and reluctant to take steps for our own aggrandizement. 

When I mentioned to the British Minister, Sir Edward Thornton, 
that the Samoans might perhaps ask Queen Victoria for a pro- 
tectorate in case their negotiations with us should fail, he smiled 
and said, 

"Well, I suppose we should take them, but I do not think we 
should care to enter into any quarrel about it." 

A few months later. Dr. von Schloezer, the German Minister, 
came into my room in very cheerful mood. 

"Aha I" said he. "Also we have a harbor in Samoa. Not the 
best — no, you have the best. You have Pago-Pago. But we 
have the next best." 

"What one have you, mein Herr?" 

"Apia — Apia Harbor. It is a good harbor. It is where the 
people are, and the trade. We shall use our harbor now. You 
do not use vours — no. But you will, some day. Some day, you 
will." 

And in so saying the cheery Envoy proved himself a prophet. 



AMERICAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1878 345 



APPENDIX V 

Commercial Treaty between the United States and Samoan 

Islands, 1878. 

(U. S. Statutes at Large, 45th Congress, 1877-1779, Vol. 20, p. 704) 

Jan. 17, 1878. Treaty between the United States of America 
and the Government of the Samoan Islands. Friendship and Com- 
merce. Concluded January 17, 1878; ratification advised by Senate, 
with amendments, January 30, 1878; ratified by President 
February 8, 1878; ratified by the Samoan Envoy February 11, 
1878; ratifications exchanged at Washington February 11, 1878; 
proclaimed February 13, 1878. 

By the President of the United States of America 
A Proclamation 

PREAMBLE 

Whereas a treaty of friendship and commerce between the 
United States and the Government of the Samoan Islands was 
concluded and signed by their respective Plenipotentiaries at the 
city of Washington on the seventeenth day of January, in the 
year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight; 
which treaty, after having been amended and ratified by the 
contracting parties, is word for word as follows: 

CONTRACTING PARTIES 

The Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Samoan Islands, being desirous of concluding 
a treaty of friendship and commerce, the President of the United 
States has for this purpose conferred full powers upon William jM. 
Evarts, Secretary of State; and the Govermnent of the Samoan 
Islands has conferred like powers upon INIK. Le Mamea, its Envoy 



346 APPENDIX 

Extraordinary to the United States. And the said Plenipoten- 
tiaries having exchanged their fnll powers, which were found to be 
in due form, have agreed upon the following articles: 

Article I — Peace and Friendship 

There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between the 
Government of the United States and the Government of the 
Samoan Islands. 

Article II — N^aval Station and Freedom to Trade 

Naval vessels of the United States shall have the privilege of 
entering and using the port of Pago-Pago, and establishing therein 
and on the shores thereof a station for coal and other naval supplies 
for their naval and commercial marine, and the Samoan Govern- 
ment will hereafter neither exercise nor authorize any jurisdiction 
within said port adverse to such rights of the United States or 
restrictive thereof. The same vessels shall also have the privilege 
of entering other ports of the Samoan Islands. The citizens of the 
United States shall likewise have free liberty to enter the same 
ports with their ships and cargoes of whatsoever kind, and to sell 
the same to any of the inhabitants of those islands, whether natives 
or foreigners, or to barter them for the products of the islands. 
All such traffic in whatever articles of trade or barter shall be 
free, except that the trade in fire-arms and munitions of war in 
the Islands shall be subject to regulations by that government. 

Article III^ — Duties 

No import or export duty shall be charged on the cargoes of the 
vessels of the United States entering or clearing from the ports of 
the Samoan Islands, and no other than a tonnage duty of one- 
half of one per cent, per ton actual measurement shall be charged 
on the entrance of such vessels. 



AMERICAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1878 347 

Article IV — Consular cmd Mixed Court 

All disputes between citizens of the United States in the Samoan 
Islands, whether relating to civil matters or to offences or crimes, 
shall be heard and determined by the Consul of the United States 
at Apia, Samoa, under such regulations and limitations as the 
United States may provide; and all disputes between citizens of 
the United States and the people of those islands shall be heard by 
that Consul in conjunction with such officer of the Samoan Govern- 
ment as may be designated for that purpose. Crimes and offences 
in cases where citizens of the United States may be convicted shall 
be punished according to the laws of that country. 

Article V — Jntercession 

If, unhappily, any differences should have arisen, or shall here- 
after arise, between the Samoan Government and any other govern- 
ment in amity with the United States, the government of the latter 
will employ its good offices for the purpose of adjusting those 
differences upon a satisfactory and solid foundation. 

» Article VI — Privileges 

The Government of Samoa agrees to allow to the Government 
and citizens of the United States free and equal participation in 
any privilege that may have been or may hereafter be granted to 
the government, citizens, or subjects of any other nation. 

Article VII — Duration 

The present treaty shall remain in force for ten years from its 
date. If neither party shall have given to the other six months 
previous notice of its intention then to terminate the same, it shall 
further remain in force until the end of twelve months after either 
part}' shall have given notice to the other of such intention. 

Article VIII — RatificatiGn and Proclamation 

The present treaty shall be ratified and the ratifications ex- 
changed as soon as possible. 



348 APPENDIX 

In faith whereof the Plenipotentiaries have signed and sealed 
this treaty at Washington, the seventeenth day of January, one 
thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight. 

William Maxwell Evarts (seal) 
MK. Le ]\Iamea (seal) 

And whereas the said treaty, as amended, has been duly ratified 
on both parts, and the respective ratifications of the same were 
exchanged in the city of Washington on the eleventh day of 
February, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-eight : 

Now, therefore, be it known, that I, Rutherford B. Hayes, 
President of the United States of America, have caused the said 
treaty to be made public, to the end that the same, and every 
clause and article thereof, may be observed and fulfilled with good 
faith by the United States and the citizens thereof. 

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my name and caused the 
seal of the United States to be affixed. 

Done at the city of Washington this thirteenth day of February, 
in the year of our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and seventy- 
eight, and of the independence of the United States the one 
hundred and second. 

(Seal) R. B. Hayes. 

By the President: 

Wm. ]M. Evarts, Secretary of State. 

APPENDIX VI 

Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between the German 
Empire and Samoa, 1879 

(V. R., 1879, Vol. VI, Anlagen No. 239, p. 1) 

Freundschafts — Vertrag zwischen Seiner INIajestaet Dem Deuts- 

chen Kaiser, Koenig von Preussen, etc., Im Namen Des 

Deutschen Reiches, und Ihren Excellenzen Den Herren 

Der Taimua, Im Namen der Regierung von Samoa. 

Seine Majestaet der Deutsche Kaiser, Koenig von Preussen, 
etc., im Namen des Deutschen Reiches einerseits, und Ihre 



GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 349 

Excellenzen die Herren der Taimiia, im Namen der Regierung von 
Samoa andererseits, von dem Wunsche geleitet, Ihre freunds- 
chaftlichen Beziehungen und Ihre Interessen gegenseitig zu 
foerdern and zii befestigen, haben beschlossen, einen Freund- 
schaftsvertrag abzuschliessen. Zu diesem Ende haben Sie zu 
Ihren Bevolhnaechtigten ernannt, naemhch: 

Seine Majestaet der Deutsche Kaiser, Koexig von 
Preussen, etc.: Allerhoechst Ihren Korvettea-Kapitaen Carl 
Bartholomaeus von Werner, Kommandanten Seiner Majestaet 
Korvette "Ariadne, " Ritter des Koenighchen Kronenordens dritter 
Klasse und des Rothen Adierordens vierter Klasse, und Aller- 
hoechst ihren Kcnsul fuer die Samoa und Tonga Inseln, Theodor 
August Ludwig Weber, und Ihre Excellenzen die Herren der 
Taimua: das ]Mitglied der Taimua, Tuia und das ]Mitglied der 
Taimua, Lemana und den Unterstaatssekretaer Meisake, welche 
nach gegenseitiger Mittheilung ihrer in guter und gehoeriger Form 
befundenen ^'ollmachten ueber nachstehende Artikel uebereinge- 
kommen sind. 

Artikel I 

Es soil Friede und immerwaehrende Freundschaft sein zwischen 
dem Deutschen Reich einerseits und Samoa andererseits, sowie 
zwischen den beiderseitigen Angehoerigen ohne Unterschied der 
Personen und der Orte. 

Artikel II 

Den Angehoerigen der beiden vertragenden Theile soil in beiden 
Laendern der vollstaendigste und immerwaehrende Schutz ihrer 
Person und ihres Eigenthums zu Theil werden, und sollen ferner die 
Deutschen in Samoa und die Samoaner in Deutschland von alien 
Kriegskontributionea, militaerischen Requisitionen oder Kriegs- 
diensten, und zwar besonders die Deutschen in Samoa von einer 
Okkupation ihrer Haeuser, Laendereien und Pflanzungeii durch 
kriegfuehrende Parteien befreit sein. 



350 APPENDIX 

Artikel III 

Die Deiitscheii, welche sich in vSamoa unci die Samoaner, welche 
sich in Deiitschland aufhalten, geniessen vollstaendige Kiiltus- 
und Gewissensfreiheit, und sollen dieselben in keiner Weise wegen 
ihres religioesen Glaiibens oder wegen der Ausuebung ihres 
Gottesdienstes in ihren Haeusern oder Kirchen belaestigt, beun- 
rubigt oder gestoert werden. Auch sollen die Angehoerigen 
beider Laender die Befugniss haben, ihre Landsleute, welche in 
Deiitschland oder aiif den Samoa-Inseln mit dem Tode abgehe'i, 
an Orten, welche sie zu dem Zwecke erworben und eingerichtet 
haben, zu bestatten, und sollen die ihren kirchlichen Gebrauechen 
entsprechenden Begraebnissfeierlichkeiten in keiner Weise gestoert, 
noch die Graeber aus irgend einem Grunde beschaedigt oder 
zerstoert werden. 

In alien diesen Faellen haben die Samoaner in Deutschland sich 
den Gesetzen und Verordnungen des Landes zu unterwerfen und 
sich nach den betreffenden Sitten und Gebraeuchen zu richten 
sowie die kirchliche Schicklichkeit zu beobachten. Die Deutschen 
in Samoa sollen in der Beziehung gehalten sein, sich nach etwaigen, 
spaeter zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen zu vereinbarenden 
Gesetzen luid A'erordnungen zu richten, inzwischen jedoch sollen 
dieselben nichts thun, was gegen die Gesetze und ^^erordnungcn 
ihres eigenen Landes verstossen wuerde. 

Artikel IV 

Es soil fuer die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen voUstaendige 
Handelsfreiheit in alien Gebieten Samoas bestehen. Diesell)en 
koennen ungehindert mit ihren Schiffen und Ladungen aller Art 
in alle Plaetze, Haefen und Gewaesser Samoas einlaufen, die 
Ladungen ihrer Schiffe verkaufen, an Land nehmen und lagern, 
sowie auch alle ihnen gehoerigen Landeserzeugnisse oder andcre 
Gegenstaende irgend einer Art absenden und ihre Schiffe damit 
beladen. Die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen sollen weder fuer 
ihre ankommenden und ausgehenden Schiffe und deren Ladungen, 
noch fuer die Betreilnmg des Ilandels irgendwelchen Steuern, 
Abgaben oder Beschraenkungen unterworfen sein, so lange solche 



GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 351 

nicht besonders zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen verein- 
bart sind, jedoch sollen die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen auch in 
solchem Falle immer die gleichen Rechte und ^'o^theile in Samoa 
geniessen, wie die Samoaner oder die Angehoerigen der meist- 
beguenstigten Nation. 

Artikel V 

Es soil den deutschen Kriegsschiffen freistehen, in den Hafen 
von Sakiafata einzulaufen, daselbst zu ankern, zu verweilen, 
Bedarf einzunehmen und auszubessern, und der deutschen Regier- 
ung soil es ferner freistehen, in jenem Hafen nach eigenera Ermes- 
sen alle fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiffe und deren Besatziuigen 
nuetzlichen Einrichtungen uikI Anordnungen zu treft'en. 

Die Samoaregierung ist ferner damit einverstanden, dass die 
deutsche Regierung an den Ufern jenes Hafens Gebaeude zwecks 
Lagerung von Kohlen und irgend anderen Bedarfsgegenstaenden 
fuer die deutschen Kriegsschiflfe und deren Besatzungen errichtet. 
Es soil der deutschen Regierung auch freistehen auf dem Lande, wo 
die Stationsgebaeude errichtet werden, ihre Flagge aufzuziehen, 
jedoch soil die Oberhoheit der Samoa-Regierung ueber den Hafen 
von Saluafata dadurch in keiner Weise geschmaelert oder beein- 
traechtigt werden, andererseits aber Verspricht diese auch nichts 
zu thun, wodurch die der deutschen Regierung in diesem Artikel 
gewaehrten Rechte irgendwie werthlos gemacht oder beeintraechtigt 
werden koennten. Auch soil diirch die in diesem Artikel der 
deutschen Regierung gewaehrten Rechte der Hafen von Saluafata 
den Kriegs- oder Handelsschiffen derjenigen Nationen, welchen 
die Samoa-Regierung ihre Hafen offen haelt, nicht verschlossen 
werden, jedoch darf die Regierung von Samoa in Bezug auf diesen 
Hafen und seine Ufer keiner anderen Nation gleiche Rechte, wie die 
der deutschen Regierung gewaehrten, bewilligen. 

Es soil den deutschen Kriegsschiffen ferner freistehen, auch in 
alle anderen Plaetze, Haefen und Gewaesser Samoas einzulaufen, 
daselbst zu ankern, zu verweilen, Bedarf einzunehmen und auszu- 
bessern, nach Massgabe etwaiger, zwischen den beiderseitigen 
Regierungen zu vereinbarender Gezetze, und verspricht die Samoa- 
Regierungen hierdurch ferner, dass sie keiner anderen Nation in 



352 APPENDIX 

irgeiid einer Weise irgendwelche Vorrechte vor der deutschen 
Regiening in Bezug auf den Hafen von Apia und dessen Ufer 
bewilligen will, sondern dass die deiitsche Regierung auch in dieser 
Beziehung mit anderen Nationen immer gleichberechtigt sein soil. 

Artikel VI 

Die Angehoerigen eines jeden der beiden vertragenden Theile 
koennen gegenseitig mit voller Freiheit jeden Theil der betref- 
fenden Gebiete betreten, daselbst reisen, ihren ^Yohnsitz nehmen, 
Handel und Gewerbe treiben, Laendereien und Grundstuecke 
kaiifen oder miethen, dieselben bebauen und benutzen, sowie 
Haeuser, Magazine und Laeden darauf errichten. In alien diesen 
Faellen sollen die Samoaner in Deutschland sich den Gesetzen und 
Verordnungen des Landes unterwerfen und alien anderen A>rpflicht- 
ungen nachkommen, sowie dieselben Steuern, Beitraege oder 
Auflagen entrichten wie die eigenen Landesangehoerigen. Ebenso 
sollen die Deutschen in Samoa sich nach den Gesetzen und Ver- 
ordnungen richten und die Steuern und Abgaben an die Samoa- 
Regierung zahlen, welche spaeter zwischen den beiderseitigen Re- 
gierungen vereinbart werden moegen, jedoch sollen die deutschen 
Staatsangehoerigen darin immer dieselben Rechte und Vortheile 
in Samoa geniessen, wie die Samoaner oder die Angehoerigen der 
meistbeguenstigten Nation. 

Insbesondere sichert die Samoa-Regierung hierdurch den 
deutschen Staatsangehoerigen den friedlichen Besitz aller Laender- 
eien in Samoa zu, welche dieselben bisher in ordnungsmaessiger 
und zu seiner Zeit gebraeuchlicher Weise von Samoanern gekauft 
haben, und sind durch diese Bestaetigung des Eigenthumsrechts. 
der deutschen Staatsangehoerigen durch die Samoa-Regierung 
alle ferneren Anfechtungen in Bezug auf solche Laendereien ausges- 
chlossen. Es soil den Deutschen daher freistehen, alle ihre Laender- 
eien in Samoa ungestoert zu benutzen, Pflanzungen darauf anzu- 
legen und die noethigen Arbeitskraefte, sowohl zu diesem Zwecke 
wie im Allgemeinen fuer ihre Werften, Geschaeftsplaetze und 
Haeuser heranzuziehen und zu verwenden. 



GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 353 

Artikel VII 

Die Bestimmiing der Gerichtsbarkeit, welcher die in Samoa sicli 
aiifhaltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen 
bei Rechtsstreitigkeiten iinter sich, sowie in Bezug auf von ihnen 
gegen einander begangene Yergehen und Verbrechen unterworfen 
sind, bleibt der deutschen Regierung und deren Anordnungen 
ueberlassen, dagegen bleibt die Feststellung einer Gerichtsbarkeit 
und des \^erfahrens in Bezug auf Rechtsstreitigkeiten zwischen den 
in Samoa sich aiifhaltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und 
Schutzgenossen einerseits und Samoanern andererseits, sowie in 
Bezug auf Yergehen und Yerbrechen der Angehoerigen des einen 
vertragenden Theils gegen die des anderen, einer besonderen 
Yereinbariuig zwischen den beiderseitigen Regierungen vorbe- 
halten, einschliesslich der noethigen Bestimmungen ueber die 
Ausfuehrung der Bestrafung der als schuldig ueberwiesenen Per- 
sonen, sowie ueber die Anwendung des gegenseitig zustaendigen 
Zeugenzwanges bei Gerichtsverfahren. 

Inzwischen, bis die beiderseitigen Regierungen solche Yerein- 
barung getroffen haben, sollen alle zwischen Deutschen und 
Samoanern in Samoa entstehenden Streitigkeiten in bisher 
gebraeuchlicher Weise von dem deutschen Konsul oder dessen 
Stellvertreter in Gemeinschaft mit einem Beamten der Samoa- 
Regierung entschieden werden. 

Artikel YIII 

Alle Gesetze und Yerordnungen, welche die in Samoa sich auf- 
haltenden deutschen Staatsangehoerigen und Schutzgenossen 
sich zu unterwerfen, sowie alle Steuern und Abgaben, welche 
dieselben demgemaess der Samoa-Regierung zu entrichten haben, 
soUen von dem deutschen Konsul oder anderen zu dem Zwecke 
von der deutschen Regierung ernannten Personen zusammen mit 
Beamten der Samoa-Regierung berathen werden, ebenso alle 
zweckdienlichen Massregeln, um die Beobachtung solcher Gesetze 
und Yerordnungen durch die Deutschen in Samoa herbeizuf uehren ; 
jedoch sollen alle solche gemeinschaftlich von den Beamten der 



354 APPENDIX 

beiderseitigen Regierungen berathenen und vereinbarten Gesetze 
iind ]Massnahmen erst nach erlangter Bestaetigung derselben 
diirch die deiitsche Regierung in Kraft treten. 

Etwaige Vereinbarungen jedoch, welche Beamte der beider- 
seitgen Regierungen mit Bezug auf IMunizipal-Einrichtungen oder 
Polizei- Quarantaine- und Apia-Hafenverordnungen, sowie ueber 
ein Verbot oder die Regelung des Verkaufs oder der Abgabe von 
spirituoesen und berauschenden Getraenken an Samoaner und 
Eingeborene von anderen Inseln des Stillen Ozeans durch Deutsche 
in Samoa getroffen haben, sollen sofort von den deutschen Staats- 
angelioerigen beobachtet werden und zwar so lange, als die 
deutsche Regierung die Bestaetigung nicht versagt hat. 

Die deutschen Staatsangehoerigen sollen indess auch in alien 
diesen Faellen immer die gleichen Rechte und Yortheile wie die 
Samoaner oder die Angehoerigen der meistbeguenstigten Nation 
in Samoa geniessen und keinen Gesetzen oder IVIassnahmen unter- 
worfen sein, wodurch sie den Angehoerigen anderer Nationen in 
Samoa gegenueber zurueckgesetzt oder benachtheiligt werden. 

Artikel IX 

Ausser den in den vorstehenden Artikeln gedachten verschie- 
denen Vereinbarungen bleibt auch die Regelung des Civilstands — 
und anderer noch nicht beruehrter A^erhaeltnisse der Angehoerigen 
und Schutzgenossen des einen Staates waehrend des Aufenthalts 
in dem Gebiete des anderen Theils, wie auch die Feststellung der 
Rechte, Befugnisse und A>rpflichtungen der gegenseitigen Kon- 
sularvertretung und der in Bezug auf den Handel noch unerledig- 
ten Punkte, einer Vereinbarung der beiderseitigen Regierungen 
vorbehalten. 

Artikel X 

Die Regierung von Samoa verspricht, im eigenen Lande keine 
Monopole, Entschaedigungen oder wirklichen A'orrechte zum 
Nachtheile des deutschen Handels oder der Flagge und der 
Staatsangehoerigen des Deutschen Reichs zu bewilligen. 



GERMAN-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 355 

Artikel XI 

Die Regierung von Samoa verspricht, class sie der deutschen 
Regieriing sowohl in Betreff aller in den vorhergehenden Artikein 
dieses Vertrages beruehrten Gegenstaende, wie auch iieberhaiipt 
eben so viele Rechte zugestehen will, als den meistbeguenstigten 
Xationen, und als den letzteren in Zukimft eingeraeiimt \\erden 
moegen. 

Artikel XII 

Der gegenwaertige Vertrag wird vom Tage der I'nterzeichninig 
ab in Kraft treten und Gueltigkeit haben, vorbehaltlich dessen, 
dass derselbe wieder ungueltig wird, falls die Ratifikation desselben 
seitens der deutschen Regierung innerhalb der Frist von vierund- 
zwanzig Monaten, vom Tage der Unterzeichnung ab, nicht erfolgen 
sollte. 

Artikel XIII 

Der gegenwaertige Vertrag, aus dreizehn Artikein bestehend, soli 
ratifizirt und die Ratifikationen sollen sobald als moeglich in Apia 
ausgetauscht werden. 

Die Ratifikation seitens der Samoa-Regierung soil jedoch gleieh 
nach Unterzeichnung dieses Vertrages erfolgen, und die betref- 
fende Urkunde bis zur Ankunft der Ratifikation der deutschen 
Regierung im Kaiserlich deutschen Konsulat zu Apia verwahrt 
werden, mit der Bedingung, dass der Samoa-Regierung ihre 
Ratifikations-Urkunde zurueckerstattet wird, im Falle die deutsche 
Regierung diesen ^'ertrag nicht innerhalb der festgesetzten Frist 
ratifiziren sollte. 

Zu Urkund dessen haben die beiderseitigen Bevollmaechtigten 
den gegenwaertigen Vertrag in doppelter Ausfertigung unterzeich- 
net und besiegelt. 

So geschehen im Kaiserlich deutschen Konsulat zu Apia auf 
Upolu am vier und zwanzigsten Januar Achzehnhinidert neun 
und siebenzig. 

(gez.) Von Werner, (l. s.) Tlha. (l. s.) 

A. Weber, (l. s.) Lemana. (l. s.) 

Meisake. (l. s.) 



356 APPENDIX 



APPENDIX VII 



Treaty of Friendship, etc., Between Great Britain and 

Samoa 

(See Hertslet's Commercial Treaties, Vol. XV, p. 334) 

Samoa 

Treaty of Friendship, etc., between Great Britain and the King 
and Government (Malo) of Samoa. Signed at Apia, August 
28, 1879. 

Her Majesty tlie Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and the King and Government (Malo) of Samoa, 
being desirous to establish relations of friendship between their 
respective dominions and subjects, have resolved to conclude a 
Treaty for that purpose, and have therefore named as their 
Plenipotentiaries : 

Her jMajesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, etc., the Honorable Sir Arthur Hamilton Gordon, 
Knight Grand Cross of the INIost Distinguished Order of St. 
IMichael and St. George, Her INIajesty's High Commissioner and 
Consul-General for the Western Pacific, Governor of Fiji; and 
Alfred Percival Maudslay, Esq., one of Her Majesty s Deput}' 
Commissioners for the Western Pacific; and 

The King and Government (INIalo) of Samoa, the High Chief 
Malietoa Laupepa and the High Chief Saga; 

Who, after ha\'ing communicated to each other their respective 
full powers, have agreed upon and concluded the following Articles : 

Art. I. There shall be perpetual peace and friendship between 
the subjects of Her Britannic JNIajesty and those of the Samoan 
State. 

II. The King and Government (IVIalo) of Samoa engage to 
grant to no other Sovereign or State any rights, pri\'ileges, 
authority, or predominance in Samoa in excess of such as are or 



BRITISH-SAMOAN TREATY, 1879 357 

may be accorded to Her Britannic ]\Iajesty. The subjects of Her 
Britannic ]\Iajesty shall always enjoy in Samoa whatever rights, 
pri\ileges, and immunities shall be granted to those of the most 
favored nation; and no rights, privileges or immunities shall be 
granted to the subjects of any foreign State that shall not be 
equally and unconditionally accorded to the subjects of Her 
Britannic INIajesty. 

HI. Full hberty for the free pursuit of commerce, trade, and 
agriculture is guaranteed to British subjects, as well as the peaceful 
possession of all lands heretofore purchased by them from Samoans 
in a customary and regular manner, and in the event of any 
dispute arising as to the fact of such purchase, it shall be deter- 
mined by a Commission, to consist of one person nominated by 
the Samoan Government (Malo), and one nominated by her 
Britannic ^Majesty's Consul; and in the event of their disagree- 
ment, they shall themselves select an umpire; or, if they fail to do 
so, such umpire shall be appointed by Her ^Majesty's Consul- 
General. All British subjects resident in Samoa shall be exempt 
from war contributions, military requisitions, and occupation of 
their houses and lands by war parties. 

IV. If any subject of Her Britannic Majesty in Samoa is charged 
with a criminal offence cognizable by British law, such charge 
shall be tried by Her Britannic ]Majesty's High Commissioner for 
the Western Pacific Islands, or other British officer duly author- 
ized by Her Britannic Majesty in that behalf. The expression 
"British Law" in this Article includes any rules duly made and 
issued by Her Britannic INIajesty's High Commissioner for the 
Western Pacific Islands, for the government of British subjects 
within his jurisdiction. 

V. Every ci\il suit which may be brought in Samoa against 
any subject of Her Britannic ^Majesty shall be brought before, and 
shall be tried by. Her Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, or 
such other British officer duly authorized as aforesaid. 

VI. Every summons or warrant to appear as a witness before 
Her Britannic ]Majesty's High Commissioner, or such other British 
oflScer duly authorized as aforesaid, and directed to a Samoan 



358 APPENDIX 

subject, shall have the same authority, and may be enforced in 
like manner, as if such summons or warrant had been directed to 
a subject of Her Britannic INIajesty. 

VII. Her Britannic ^Majesty engages to cause Regulations to be 
issued to enforce the observance by British subjects of such of the 
existing municipal laws and police regulations of Samoa as may be 
hereafter agreed upon by agreement between the Government 
of Her Britannic ]Majesty and that of the Samoan State, and for 
the due observance of quarantine by British subjects. 

VIII. Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain may, if she think 
fit, establish on the shores of a Samoan harbor, to be hereafter 
designated by Her Majesty, a naval station and coaling depot; but 
this Article shall not apply to the harbors of Apia or Saluafata, or 
to that part of the harbor of Pago-Pago which may be hereafter 
selected by the Government of the Ignited States as a station under 
the provisions of the Treaty concluded between the I'nited States 
of America and the Samoan Government, on the 17th day of 
January, 1S7S. 

IX. The present Treaty shall come into force from the date 
thereof, but shall again become null and of no effect if not ratified 
within the prescribed period. 

X. The present Treaty, consisting of 10 Articles, shall be 
ratified, and the ratifications exchanged at Apia within one year 
from the date thereof. 

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries ha\e signed 
the same, and have affixed thereto their seals. 

Done at Apia, the 28th day of August, in the year of Our Lord, 
1879. 

(l. s.) Arthur Gordon. 

(l. s.) Alfred P. Maudslay. 

(l. s.) Malietoa Laupepa. 

(l. s.) Saga le Auauxa. 



APIA MUNICIPAL CONVENTION, 1879 359 

APPENDIX VIII 

Municipal Convention Establishing Municipality of Apia, 
Sept. 2, 1879 

(See House Executive Documents, 50th Congress, First Session, 
1887-1888, Vol. 28, No. 238, p. 132.) 

Convention between Great Britain (Germany, the United States), 
and the King and Government of Samoa, for the government 
of the town and district of Apia. Signed at Apia, September 
2, 1879. Ratifications exchanged at ]\Tuhnuu, August 27, 
1880. 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Ireland, and the King and Government of Samoa, being 
desirous to make better provisions for the good government of the 
town and district of Apia, and the preservation of peace and good 
order therein, as well as for the maintenance of its neutrality, 
should internal disturbances unhappily take place in the Samoan 
State, have determined to conclude a convention for that purpose 
and have named as their plenipotentiaries : 

Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Ireland, etc., the Honorable Sir Arthur Hamilton 
Gordon, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order 
of St. Michael and St. George, Her Majesty's High Commissioner 
and Consul-General for the Western Pacific, Governor of Fiji; 
and Alfred Percival Maudslay, Esquire, one of Her ]\Iajesty's 
deputy commissioners for the Western Pacific : 

And the King and Government of Samoa, the High Chief 
IMalietoa Laupepa; and the High Chief Saga; 

Who, having met and conferred with the rej^resentatives at 
Apia of other nations having entered into treaty relations with 
Samoa, that is to say, Corvetten-Capitaen F. Mensing, Imperial 
German Navy, commanding His Imperial German ]Majesty's 
gun- vessel Albatross; Theodor Weber, Esquire, Imperial German 
Consul for Samoa and Tonga; Captain II. Chandler, United States 



360 APPENDIX 

Navy, commanding the United States ship Lackawanna; and 
Thomas M. Dawson, Esquire, Consul of the United States of 
America at Apia, have, in conjunction with them, agreed upon and 
conchided the following articles: 

Article I 

The space comprised within the following limits, that is to 
say, commencing at Vailoa, passing thence along the coast to the 
mouth of the Fulnasa River, thence up the course of the river 
Fulnasa to the point at which the Alafuala road crosses such river, 
thence along the said road to the point where it reaches the river 
Vaisigo, and thence, in a straight line, to the point of commence- 
ment at Vailoa, shall constitute and be known as the town and 
district of Apia. The waters of the harbor of Apia are also com- 
prehended within the district. 

Article II 

Such town and district shall be placed under the government of 
a municipal board, consisting of those foreign consuls resident in 
Apia whose nations have entered into treaty relations with Samoa. 
Representatives of every such nation, having a consul in Samoa, 
shall, at a future period, be added to the said board, and shall be 
chosen in such manner and exercise such functions a . may be 
provided by regulations to be hereafter agreed upon and published 
by the said board. 

Article III 

The municipal board shall have power to make and enforce 
regulations and by-laws with regard to police and good order, 
public works, sanitary regulations, the issue of licenses, the imposi- 
tion of harbor regulations, the p^-eveution of the sale and supply 
of spirituous liquors to Samoans and other islanders of the Pacific 
Ocean, and other similar mattere, within the said district, and such 
regulations shall be binding upon all persons within the said dis- 
trict, and may be enforced by penalties not exceeding $200 fine, 



APIA MUNICIPAL CONVENTION, 1879 361 

or imprisonment with hard labor for a period not exceeding six 
months, or both fine and imprisonment not exceeding the before- 
mentioned penalties. 

Article IV 

The municipal board of Apia may, for the purpose of defraying 
expenses incurred under the above article, levy rates upon the 
occupiers of houses or lands within the district of i\.pia, not exceed- 
ing 5 per cent, annually on the annual assessed value of such 
premises, as calculated on the presumed rental valuation thereof, 
or 1 per cent, annually on the real value of such property. 

Article V 

All offenses against the regulations of the municipal board, by 
whomsoever committed, shall be tried by a magistrate to be 
appointed by the board. 

Article VI 

If a subject or citizen of any of the contracting parties in Apia 
be charged with an offense against the laws of his own country, 
he shall be tried according to the jurisdiction provided therefor by 
the legislation of the nation to which he belongs, or according to 
the stipulations of the treaty concluded between his nation and 
Samoa. 

Article VII 

Every Samoan subject charged with a criminal offense within 
the limits of the district of Apia, other than an offense against the 
municipal regulations, shall be liable to trial by the magistrate 
appointed under the provisions of iVrticle V, in conjunction with 
a Samoan magistrate. 

Article VIII 

The foregoing articles shall in no way prejudice the territorial 
integrity of Samoa, and the Samoan flag shall be hoisted at such 
place of meeting of the municipal board as may be permanently 
adopted. 



362 APPENDIX 

Article IX 

In case of civil war, the town and district of Apia, and the 
adjacent districts comprised between the boundaries of the town 
and district of Apia and Letoga, Tiapepe Point, and Siusega, shall 
be considered as neutral territory, and the municipal board may 
frame and issue such regulations as may be considered necessary 
for the support and maintenance of such neutrality. 

Article X 

The present convention shall be revised at the end of four years 
from its date, and if the internal state of Samoa at that time will 
happily admit thereof, without prejudice to the interests of foreign 
residents in Samoa, the powers conferred by the present conven- 
tion upon the municipal board of Apia shall cease and determine, 
and the district again pass under the control anfl authority of the 
Samoan Government, or such other authority as may be agreed 
upon between the Samoan Government and the high contracting 
parties. 

Article XI 

The representatives of the Imperial German Government, in 
virtue of the powers accorded to them by Article ^TII of the treaty 
concluded between His Imperial Majesty the German Emperor 
and the Government of Samoa on the 24th day of January last 
past, accede and agree to the present convention, on behalf of the 
Imperial German Government, subject to the conditions of the 
said article. 

Article XII 

The representatives of the United States Government provision- 
ally accede and assent to the present con^'ention, on behalf of the 
Government of the United States, subject to the approval of that 
Government. 

Article XIII 

The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications 
exchanged at Apia within one year from the date thereof. 



CONSULAR SAMOAN AGREEMENT, 1880 



363 



In witness whereof we have signed the same and affixed thereto 

our seals. 

Done at Apia, this 2nd day of September, in the year of Our 

Lord 1879. 

(l, s.) Arthur Gordon. 

/^ g ) Alfred P. Maudslay. 

(l. s.) F. Mensing, 

Corvetten-Capitaen. 

(l. s.) T. Weber, 

Imperial German Consul. 
(l. s.) R. Chandler, 

Captain, United States Navy, Commanding United 
States Ship "Lackawanna." 
(l. s.) Thomas M. Daw^son. 

(l. s.) Malietoa Laupepa. 

(l. s.) Saga le Auauna. 



APPENDIX IX 

Agreej^ient between Three Consuls and the King of Samoa 
March 24, 1880 

(House Executive Documents, 50th Congress, First Session, 
1877-1878, Vol. 28, No. 238, p. 207) 

An agreement made between the King and Government of Samoa 
and the foreign consuls in Samoa. 

Whereas the King and Government of Samoa did, on the 31st 
day of August, 187.9, address a letter to the three Governments 
of the United States of America, Germany, and Great Britain, 
requesting them to take some concerted action for the preservation 
of peace and good order in Samoa, and for the protection of the 
King and Government thereof: and 

Whereas on the 15th day of December, 1879, the civil war in 
Samoa was terminated in the treaty of peace between the repre- 
sentatives of the opposing forces; and 



364 APPENDIX 

Whereas on the 23d day of December, 1S79, on board H. I, G. IVI. 
ship "Bismarck," a permanent agreement was entered into by the 
representatives of both parties electing and recognizing Malietoa 
Talavou King for Hfe; and 

Whereas dn the 12th day of January, 1880, the Imperial German 
Goyernment sent instructions to the Imperial German Consul- 
general in Samoa that the Governments of England and America 
had accepted the proposals of the German Government, and 
ordering him to recognize and enter into an agreement with his 
colleagues for the protection of Malietoa and his government by 
the three powers already named in this preamble; and 

Whereas on the 14th day of January, 18^0, the English Govern- 
ment ordered H. B. M. ship "Danae" to Samoa with instructions 
to Captain Purvis, commanding, to recognize Malietoa and protect 
his government in conjunction with the naval forces of Germany 
and America; and 

Whereas the present King and Government of Samoa earnestly 
desire that this arrangement may be consummated as speedily 
as possible, for the greater security of life and property within the 
kingdom, and for the utmost prosperity of the Samoan Islands. 
Therefore the King, Malietoa Talavou, and the Government of 
Samoa, the Taimua and Faipule, and Captain Zembsch, Imperial 
German consul-general, on behalf of the German Government, 
and Thomas M. Dawson, United States Consul, on behalf of the 
Government of the United States of America, and J. Hicks Graves, 
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, on behalf of the United Kingdom 
of Great Britain and Ireland, etc., have agreed upon and con- 
cluded the following four articles, to take effect immediately, and 
to continue in force until ratified, modified, or rejected by the three 
protecting powers: 

Article I 

The present King, Malietoa Talavou, shall be supported as the 
head of the Samoan Government during his life-time, and his 
successor shall be agreed upon by the three protecting powers. 



GERMAN-SAMOAN COUNCIL AGREEMENT, 1884 365 

Article II 

There shall be an executive council for the King and Govern- 
ment of Samoa consisting of a citizen of the United States of 
America, a German and a British subject, and they shall hold the 
oflBces, respectively, of minister of justice, minister of finance, 
and minister of public works. 

Article III 

The members of the executive council shall be nominated from 
among the residents of Samoa by the consuls of their respective 
nations resident at Apia, and they shall hold office from the date 
of their nomination, which must subsequently be confirmed by 
the home Governments. 

Article IV 

The members of the executive council shall hold office until 
their successors are nominated by the consuls, and they shall 
receive such salaries as may be agreed upon between the Govern- 
ment of Samoa and the consular representatives of the three pro- 
tecting powers. 

In witness whereof we have signed the same and affixed thereto 
our seals. 

Done at Apia this twenty-fourth day of March, in the year of 
Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and eighty. 

Zembsch. (l. s.) 

Thomas M. Dawson. (l. s.) 

J. Hicks Graves. (l. s.) 

APPENDIX X 

Agreement between German Consul Stuebel and Malietoa, 
Nov. 10, 1884, Establishing German-Samoan Council 

(See V. R. 1885. Anlagen Vol. VI, Aktenstueck No. 167, p. 726 f.) 

Anlage 2 zu Nr. 47 (Uebersetzung) 
Um den in Samoa lebenden Deutschen die Vortheile einer guten 
Regierung zu sichern und in Ausfuehrung von Artikel ^TI, des 



366 APPENDIX 

deutschsamoanischen Freundschaftsvertrages vom 24. Januar, 
1879 haben sich der Verweser des Kaiserlichen Konsulates fuer die 
Suedsee-Inseln iind der Koenig, der Vizekoenig und die Regierung 
von Samoa ueber die nachstehenden Bestimmungen geeinigt: 

Artikel I 

Es wird ein deutsch-samoanischer Staatsrath gebildet. Zu 
demselben sollen gehoeren der deutsche Konsul oder dessen 
Stellvertreter, zwei Samoaner, von denen der eine von dem Koenige, 
der andere von dem Vizekoenig im Einvernehmen mit den Taimua 
und Faipule ernannt werden, und zwei Deutsche, welche von dem 
deutschen Konsul ernannt werden, 

Artikel II 

Der deutsch-samoanische Staatsrath soil ueber alle Gesetze 
und Einrichtungen berathen, und Beschluss fassen, deren Ein- 
fuehrung dem gemeinsamen Interesse der Samoa-Regierung und 
der in Samoa lebenden Deutschen entspricht. Er wird insbeson- 
dere gesetzliche Vorschriften aufstellen, welche auf die strafbaren 
Handlungen von Samoanern Anwendung leiden, wenn damit ein 
Deutscher oder ein in deutschen Diensten stehender Angehoeriger 
eines anderen Staates oder ein in deutschen Diensten stehender 
farbiger Arbeiter oder das Eigenthum solcher Personen verletzt 
worden ist. Die gleichen ^'orschriften sollen auf die strafbaren 
Handlungen der in deutschen Diensten stehenden farbigen 
Arbeiter Anwendung leiden. 

Artikel III 

Die von dem deutsch-samoanischen Staatsrath aufgestellten 
Vorschriften werden von dem Koenig und dem Mzekoenig unter 
ihrer Unterschrift als Gesetz erlassen. In dem Eingang ist zu 
erwaehnen, dass das Gesetz nach vorgaengiger Feststellung durch 
den deutsch-samoanischen Staatsrath erlassen wird. 



GERMAN-SAMOAN COUNCIL AGREEMENT, 1884 367 

Artikel IV 

Der Koenig wird im Einvernehmen mit dem deutschen Konsul 
einen deutschen Beamten der Samoa-Regierung ernennen. Der- 
selbe wird der Sekretaer und der Rathgeber des Koenigs in alien 
Angelegenheiten sein, welche die in Samoa lebenden Deutschen 
betreffen. Er wird in den Strafsachen, an welchen die in Samoa 
lebenden Deutschen ein Interesse haben, sofern nicht auf mehr 
als zwei Jahre Gef aengniss mit barter Arbeit erkannt werden kann, 
das Amt eines deutschen Richters ausueben; in Gemeinschaft mit 
einen samoanischen Richter ueber Samoaner und farbige Arbeiter, 
welche sich der Verletzung von Samoanern oder von samoan- 
ischen Eigenthum schuldig gemacht haben, allein ueber farbige 
Arbeiter wegen der von denselben unter einander begangenen 
strafbaren Handlungen. Wenn auf mehr als zwei Jahre Gefaeng- 
niss mit barter Arbeit erkannt werden kann, wird der deutsche 
Konsul, neben einen samoanischen Richter, das Richteramt 
selber uebernehmen oder den deutschen Beamten der Samoa- 
Regierung oder eine dritte Person damit beauftragen. 

Artikel V 

Zur L nterbringung der Strafgefangenen aus Strafsachen, an 
welchen die in Samoa lebenden Deutschen ein Interesse haben, 
wird ein Gefaengniss errichtet werden. Die zu Gefaengniss mit 
barter Arbeit Verurtheilten sollen zu angemessener Arbeit ange- 
halten werden, welche zur Deckung der entstehenden Verwal- 
tungskosten verwerthet werden kann. Der deutsche Beamte der 
Samoa-Regierung wird die Aufsicht ueber das Gefaengnisswesen 
fuehren. 

Artikel VI 

Der Koenig wird im Einvernehmen mit dem deutschen Konsul 
Polizisten anstellen, welche den Gefaengnissdienst und den Sicher- 
heitsdienst auf den deutschen Pflanzungen versehen werden. 
Dieselben unterstehen dem Befehle des deutschen »Beamten der 
Samoa-Regierung. 
23 



368 appendix 

Artikel YII 

Die in Folge dieser Vereinbarung sich noethig machenden 
Ausgaben werden aiis den eingehenden Gerichtsgebiiehren, Geld- 
strafen, Einkuenften aus der Gefangenenarbeit und aiis den 
Steiiern gedeckt werden, welche von den deutschen Interessenten 
aufziibringen sind. 

Mit Verwaltung dieser Gelder soil ein Vertreter der deutschen 
Steuerzahler beaiiftragt werden. Die Umlegung der Steiiern, 
sowie die Feststelliing der Hoehe der Ausgaben, erfolgt durch den 
deutsch-samoanischen Staatsrath. 



Artikel VIII 

Dieses Uebereinkommen tritt sofort in Kraft vorbehaltlich der 
Genehmigung durch die Kaiserlich deutsche Regierung. So lange 
diese nicht erfolgt ist, soil von Deutschen die Zahlung von Steiiern 
nicht verlangt werden koennen. Die Kaiserlich deutsche Regie- 
rung soil das Recht haben, dieses Uebereinkommen zu kuendigen, 
welchenfalls dasselbe nach sechs Monaten aiisser Kraft tritt. 

Zu Urkunde dessen haben wir hierunter imsere Unterschriften 
gesetzt. 

Geschehen im Kaiserlichen Konsulate zu Apia am 10. November 
1884. 

(gez.) Dr. Stuebel. (gez.) Malietoa, 

Kaiserlicher Konsulats-Verweser Le Tupu o Samoa 

(gez.) Th. Weber, (gez.) Tupua, 

als Zeuge. Le Sui Tupu 

Es wird hierdurch bescheinigt, dass Vorstehendes eine getreue 
Uebersetzung des im Archiv des Kaiserlichen Konsulats auf- 
bew^ahrten in samoanischer Sprache abgefassten Originals ist. 

Apia, den 11. November 1884. 

Der Kaiserliche Konsulats-Verweser. 
(l. s.) (gez.) Dr. Stuebel. 



BRITISH-GERMAN AGREEMENT, 1886 369 



APPENDIX XI 

Declaration Relating to the Demarcation of the German 

AND British Spheres of Influence in the 

Western Pacific. (18S6) 

(V. R. 1885-86, Anlagen, Vol. VI. Aktenstueck No. 291, p. 1570) 

The Government of His ^Majesty the German Emperor and the 
Government of her ^Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland ha\ing resolved to define the limits of 
the German and British spheres of mfluence in the Western Pacific, 
the Undersigned duly empowered for that purpose, viz.: 

1. Count Herbert Bismarck, 

His Imperial Majesty's Under Secretary of State for Foreign 
Affairs, 

2. Sir Edward Bald"\vin Malet, 

Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary, 

have agreed on behalf of their respective Governments to make the 
following 

DECLARATION 



For the purpose of this Declaration the expression "Western 
Pacific" means that part of the Pacific Ocean lying between the 
15th parallel of North latitude and the 30th parallel of South lati- 
tude, and between the 165th ^Meridian of longitude W^est and 130th 
Meridian of longitude East of Greenwich. 

II 

A conventional line of demarcation in the Western Pacific is 
agreed to, starting from the North East coast of New Guinea at a 
point near Mitre Rock on the eighth parallel of South latitude, 



370 APPENDIX 

being the boundary between the German and British possessions 
on that coast and following that parallel to point A and thence con- 
tinuing to points B, C, D, E, F and G as indicated in the accom- 
panying Charts; which points are situated as follows: 

A: 8° South laf^" 154° long^'' East of Greenwich. 

B: 7° 15' South laf^' 155° 25' East long'^^ 

C: 7° 15' South lat^*^ 155° 35' East long'^^ 

D : 7 ° 25' South lat<^' 156 ° 40' East long'^^ 

E: 8° 50' South laf"' 159° 50' East long•^^ 

F: G° North lat^'^ 173° 30' East long''^ 

G: 15° North lat'*' 173° 30' East long*'. 
The point A is indicated on the British Admiralty Chart 780 
"Pacific Ocean" (South West Sheet); the points B, C, D and 
E are indicated on the British Admiralty Chart 214 (South 
Pacific Solomon Islands) and the points F and G on the British 
Admiralty Chart 781 "Pacific Ocean" (North West Sheet). 

Ill 

Germany engages not to make acquisitions of territory, accept 
Protectorates, or interfere with the extension of British influence 
and to give up any acquisitions of territory or Protectorates already 
established in that part of the Western Pacific lying to the East, 
South-East or South of the said conventional line. 



IV 

Great Britain engages not to make acquisitions of territory, 
accept Protectorates or interfere with the extension of German 
influence and to give up any acquisitions of territory or Protec- 
torates already established in that part of the Western Pacific 
lying to the West, North- West or North of the said conventional 
line. 

V 

Should further surveys show that any Islands now indicated on 
the said Charts as Iving on one side of the said conventional line, 



SCHURZ-BAYARD CORRESPONDENCE ON SAMOA 371 

are in reality on the other side, the said Hne shall be modified so 
that such islands shall appear on the same side of the line as at 
present shown on the said Charts. 

VI 

This Declaration does not apply to the Navigator Islands 
(Samoa) which are affected by Treaties with Germany, Great 
Britain and the United States; nor to the Friendly Islands (Tonga) 
which are affected by Treaties with Germany and Great Britain; 
nor to the Island of Nine (Savage-Island) which groups of Islands 
shall continue to form a neutral region; nor to any Islands or 
places in the Western Pacific which are now under the sovereignty 
or protection of any other civilized Powder than Germany or Great 
Britain. 



Declared and signed in duplicate at Berlin, this sixth day of 
April one thousand eight hundred and eighty-six. 

(l. s.) Graf Bismarck, 
(l. s.) Edward B. Malet. 



APPENDIX XII 

Correspondence on the Samoan Question between Senator 
ScHURZ AND Secretary Bayard 

From "Speeches," etc., of Carl Schurz, Vol. V, p. 1) 
To Thomas F. Bayard 

New York, Jan. 30, 1889. 
As a loyal American citizen I feel in duty bound to make to you 
the following confidential communication. 

Early this morning I received a note from Count Arco informing 
me that he would be in this city during the day and requesting me 
to meet him at such time and place as I might designate — if pos- 
sible during the forenoon. Having been for years pleasantly 
acquainted with Count Arco, I called upon him at the Albermarle 



372 APPENDIX 

Hotel on my way down town. He at once asked me for my opinion 
on the present state of the Samoan business, adding that he 
, intended to write to Count Bismarck today. 

I replied that as to all I should say I wished him to keep in mind 
that I could only speak for myself as a private citizen; that I had 
had no communication concerning this subject with any one 
connected with the Government, and that I had only the official 
publications, the newspapers and my acquaintance with people of 
different classes as sources of information and opinion. From 
my study of the matter it appeared to me that the Germans 
had committed the error common to civilized nations coming, 
in the pursuit of their material interests, into contact with savage 
or semi-civilized populations — namely the error of relying 
mainly upon the application of force in the treatment of those 
populations. The English had frequently committed this error, 
we had sometimes in our intercourse with the Indians, and the 
Germans seemed to repeat it in x\frica as well as in Samoa. This 
policy frequently led to acts of injustice, was always costly as well 
as cruel, but by no means always successful in the way desired. In 
this case it has produced situations irritating to others more or less 
concerned. 

Count Arco observed that, while, according to reliable informa- 
tion received at Berlin, the hostility of the Samoans to the Germans 
was largely, if not entirely, owing to constant instigation on the 
part of Americans, officials as well as private persons, in Samoa, 
the Government of the United States had made little, if any, 
complaint in the diplomatic way of the conduct of German officials 
in Samoa. The whole controversy, if there was any, seemed to be 
carried on by the subordinate officials among themselves and by the 
newspapers, but was, perhaps, for this reason all the more exciting 
(to) the public mind. 

I interrupted, saying that I remembered an elaborate despatch 
or instruction addressed by Mr. Bayard to Mr. Pendleton explicitly 
stating the things complained of by this Government, and that in 
the official correspondence I found plenty of criticism of the conduct 
of the Germans in Samoa by the American officials, but no evidence 
of their having incited a refractory spirit among the natives. How- 



SCHURZ-BAYARD CORRESPONDENCE ON SAMOA 373 

ever, these were questions of fact which, thousands of miles away, 
we might not at present be able to answer. 

The con\ersation then turned upon the more important question 
what was now best to be done to avoid further difficulty. Count 
Arco repeatedly assured me that the German Government w^as 
most peaceably disposed, and I said, that as I knew the character 
of the American people and the traditions of the Government, the 
prevailing disposition here was certainly of the same nature, and 
that I had been very much surprised to see in some important 
German newspapers remarks imputing to the Government of the 
United States, with regard to the Samoan business, a quarrelsome 
and grasping temper. Nothing could be farther from the truth. 
Without ever having exchanged a word on the subject with any 
member of the Administration, I felt confident that the Govern- 
ment, in accord with public opinion, asked for nothing but that 
the autonomy of the Samoan people and the treaty rights of the 
United States be properly respected. 

Count Arco replied that his Government had time and again 
declared that it had no purposes in any way hostile to Samoan 
autonomy or to American treaty rights, and would be ever ready 
to respect that declaration. In fact, a proposition of Prince Bis- 
marck for another conference on Samoan affairs was on its way to 
this country, the conference this time to be held at Berlin. The 
British Government had already assented to it and Mr. Bayard 
seemed to be favorably inclined. 

The Count asked me what else, in my opinion, could be done to 
avoid further excitement about the matter and to restore the old 
good feeling. In answering this question I again called his atten- 
tion to my private station, and said that if the invitation to the 
new conference were accompanied, by the German Goverrmient, 
with a declaration, in the frankest and most cordial language 
possible, that the maintenance of the Samoan autonomy and of 
all treaty rights should be the basis, the recognized fundamental 
condition, of further understandings between the treaty Powers, 
it would undoubtedly have a very good effigct on public opinion in 
this country, and, as appeared from the official correspondence and 
from Senator Sherman's speech reported in today's papers, go far 



374 APPENDIX 

to meet the demands put forward by the present Administration 
as well as by the party to come into power on the 4th of ]\Iarch. 

Count Arco asked whether the situation would not in some 
important respects be changed by the incoming of the Republican 
Administration. I answered that if the German Government 
made a fair proposition accompanied by satisfactory assurances, 
a situation would, as it seemed to me, thereby be created which 
would have to be dealt with upon its own merits by any Adminis- 
tration, whatever its party character. 

Count Arco observed that some persons seemed to apprehend 
that Mr. Blaine, if appointed Secretary of State, might be in favor 
of annexing the Samoan Islands to the United States, or at least 
of establishing an American protectorate over them. I replied 
that I would be slow to give weight to such an apprehension; as 
was well known, the traditional policy of the country was most 
decidedly averse to such distant annexations and to the entangle- 
ments certain to grow out of such protectorates; and that tra- 
ditional policy was too deeply rooted in public opinion to be 
disregarded. The conservative and cautious spirit of the American 
people in this respect was clearly demonstrated by their refusal to 
accept Saint Thomas and Santo Domingo when those countries 
were offered to the United States. 

I further suggested that a pleasant impression might be produced 
by the German Government permitting the publication of the so- 
called protocols, so as to show that there was nothing to be con- 
cealed ; and I alluded to what I had said in an interview, that those 
minutes might at least be communicated in confidence to the 
Senate — which seemed to strike the Count more favorably than 
the publication asked for by the Ford resolution in the House of 
Representatives. 

Count Arco expressed the hope that the "war" in Samoa might 
by this time be practically ended; possibly the military honor of 
Germany, after the killing of the German marines, might consider 
itself satisfied by the bombardment of the Samoan villages; but 
he did not know. I suggested that, if the war was not yet con- 
sidered ended, this might be a good opportunity for calling upon 
the "friendlv offices" of the United States, of which the American 



« SCHURZ-BAYARD CORRESPONDENCE ON SAMOA 375 

treaty with Samoa contained a standing offer. I added that I 
thought the Germans had made a great mistake in trying to impose 
upon the Samoans, Tamasese, a king not chosen by the natives; 
that populations of that kind, if unwilhng to submit to a foreigner, 
will be still more unwilling to submit to a man of their ow^n race 
imposed upon them by foreigners ; that under such circumstances 
conspiracies and revolutions are inevitable; and that, in my 
opinion, the Germans as well as all others concerned would serve 
their own interests much better by permitting the natives to choose 
their own king without foreign influence of any sort. Count Arco 
observed that this might be so, and he thought the German 
Government might finally accept Mataafa himself as Samoan 
king. 

The conversation turning upon what the coming conference 
between the treaty Powers might do, I said, in answer to a question, 
that as to the future government of Samoa perhaps some propo- 
sition intermediate between that advanced by Prince Bismarck 
and that of Mr. Bayard might be found, satisfactorily securing 
Samoan autonomy as well as treaty rights, and Count Arco shared 
that hope. 

He expressed regret at the fact that the Consular representatives 
(of the United States) in Samoa had in most instances been inferior 
to those of the other Powders in point of mental ec^uipment as well 
as social standmg, and he attributed their unsatisfactory relations 
in great part to that circumstance. I said that, not knowing any 
of the gentlemen in question, I could neither assent or dissent; 
but I fear the Count in making that remark was not wholly wrong. 

Count Arco asked me whether, notwithstanding the substantial 
agreement of the purposes of the two Governments with regard to 
Samoa, I saw any point of danger. I replied that the only danger 
under such circumstances might possibly arise, as 1 thought, from 
the forwardness of some naval officer, or from some indiscretion 
in the conduct of the diplomatic correspondence, one party taking, 
or putting the other party into, an offensive position from which 
retreat with honor would be difficult. 

After some final exchange of sentiment as to the desirability of 
a prompt and complete restoration of the traditional cordiality 



376 APPENDIX , 

of feeling between the United States and Germany, the Count 
said that he would today send a cable message as well as a more 
elaborate letter to his Government, and we separated. 

In making this confidential communication to you I trust you 
will understand that I am very far from desiring to meddle with 
the business of the Government. But being asked for my opinion 
on this important affair by the German IVIinister in a manner 
manifesting a sincere desire on his part to see all differences 
between the two countries amicably and honorably adjusted, I 
thought there would not only be no hami in my giving him mj'' 
individual views, but I might possibly aid a little in bringing about 
what all lovers of peace must wish to accomplish. I give you so 
elaborate an account of our conversation, in the hope that, if 
anything I said to Count Arco was erroneous in point of fact or 
conclusion, you will have the goodness to set me right and enable 
me to correct the impressions I may have conveyed to his mind. 

From Thomas F. Bayard 

Department of State, 

Washington, Feb. 1, 1889. 
Confidential and Personal. 

I read with entire appreciation of its friendly motive and high 
intelligence your letter of the 30th, and am glad to inform you that 
today Count Arco came with a note-verbale from Berlin, which he 
read to me — to the eftect that the extreme action of the German 
Consul at Samoa in declaring martial law in that region had been 
disapproved by his Government and that orders countermanding 
such steps had been sent by telegraph. This apparent return of 
Prince Bismarck to the fine of the perfectly well understood agree- 
ment — that native autonomy and independence should be sus- 
tained by the three treaty Powers — leads me to be hopeful of a 
satisfactory adjustment by the conference to which I understood 
the German Government has decided to invite the United States 
and Great Britain, and the terms of which may be expected to be 
presented here in a few days. 

You are perfectly correct in your diagnosis of the case — it is a 
mercenarA- clash of rival traders in the course of which GermauA- has 



SCHURZ-BAYARD CORRESPONDENCE ON SAMOA 377 

allowed official action to be too freely employed in aid of private 
schemes. In the discussions, which are fully reported in the proto- 
cols, this became apparent, and as I told Comit Arco today, ]\Ir. 
von Alvensleben was inspired throughout by the counsel and 
presence here of Mr. Weber, formerly a Consular officer in Samoa, 
and now connected with the German Company there. 

As a result our plans for a sensible and just government in 
Samoa were drifted away from the original basis of concurrent 
agreement, into a scheme which would have connected the group 
into a German dependency. It is, I think, unfortunate that 
Germany and Great Britain should decline to publish these papers, 
the contents of which ha^'e been discussed in the correspondence 
with Berlin, and which serve now only as bases for charges of 
"secrecy" and "suppression," creating mystery where all should 
be clear as day. 

Today Count Arco intimated that he would ask the consent of 
his Government for the communication of these protocols to the 
Senate in confidence. 

If that body called for them to be used in confidence, I scarcely 
see how the President could \\ithhold them, although the point is 
delicate and I should be very sorry to have it raised. 

I am xery sure, however, that the various plans for a native 
government assisted by the treaty Pow^ers, in which no preponder- 
ance of control should be awarded to any one of the three, will 
under candid treatment yield a just and satisfactory solution of 
the present unhappy and distressing and dangerous condition of 
affairs. There can be no doubt that the wholly different policies 
of the United States and Germany in respect of colonies and 
dependencies increase the difficulties of cooperation, but knowing 
the whole ground of the Samoan question, I can say to you luihesi- 
tatingly it can be adjusted without difficulty if mercenary forces 
are not allowed to obtrude themselves into the discussions. 

When you come to read these protocols, which will some day be 
done, I have no doubt that our judgments will be at one. 

As soon as I received the German note today, the President sent 
it in to Congress, and with an understanding that the natives are 
not to be crushed, and the Government with whom the treaties 



378 APPENDIX 

were made is to be respectfully considered, and American treaty 
rights guarded, I believe the mischief-makers will subside and 
settlement will rapidly progress. 

It is difficult to describe the singular bitterness of feeling which 
seems to control the Republican managers, and which has led to 
a systematic obstruction, misrepresentation and aspersion of the 
Administration in every Department, and towards none so fiercely 
as the Department of State, in which I am just closing four years 
of constant duty. 

They have sought, and only with too much success, to embarrass 
me in deahng with foreign Governments; and I was only too glad 
to see in John Sherman's speech signs of an appreciation of the 
responsibility which approaching power naturally brings. 

Your criticism on the tone and character of our Consular repre- 
sentative in Samoa is just. But with the pittance allowed for 
salary, it was difficult, indeed impossible, to obtain men of ade- 
quate ability. Under my urgent applications the pay was raised 
from $1500 to $2000, and at this session I have succeeded in 
getting the salary placed at $3000. 

The Senate Committee have been examining in secret the present 
Consul, to see whether some error or something of discredit to me 
could not be unearthed. But all I want is the whole history to be 
made public. Nevertheless you can appreciate such treatment of 
the head of a Department. 

I shall endeavor to get a sensible, good-tempered man as soon 
as I can, though the time for me is short to do so. 

I cannot avoid anxiety, lest the indiscretion of some naval 
officer, on one side or the other, may lead to a broil, which may 
expand itself. But I have been so single-minded in pursuing 
justice and friendly relations with Germany, as I believe my 
correspondence will thoroughly prove, that I believe we will find 
a clear channel and come to a worthy settlement. 

I thank you for your letter, and shall continue to believe you 
the friend of our countrv and of 



T. F. Bayard. 



I read vour letter to the President. 



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